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Critical & Creative Thinking:

the Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children
Vol 10 No 2 October 2002

CONTENTS

Research

Marie-France Daniel — Pupil thinking: relativistic or inter-subjective?

Philosophical Studies

Hannu Juuso — P4C in the light of Hegel's thought

Clive Lindop — Plato's legacy: how to do philosophy

Interview

Irene de Puig and Manuela Gómez — Interview with Mat Lipman

Book Review

Clive Lindop — *Philosophy goes to the Movies*

Critical & Creative Thinking *10(2) October 2002*

The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children

The Federation of Australian Philosophy for Children Associations (FAPCA)

ISSN - 1325-7730

Aim and scope

To provide a vehicle for the communication of ideas and a forum for discussion and debate of issues concerning the practice of philosophical inquiry with children.

To foster continuing development of the theory and practice of engaging children in philosophical inquiry;

more specifically:-

(1) to promote better teaching and curricular design for the development of critical and creative thinking amongst children through increased understanding and use of philosophical inquiry in the classroom

(2) to enrich the understanding of philosophy and philosophical inquiry as well as its role in the development of good thinking and good judgment.

(3) to increase interaction and collaboration between the academic community of scholars in universities and teachers in schools on matters of logic, epistemology, creativity, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, inquiry, philosophy of science, mind, personhood, community, under-standing, learning, thinking, dialogue, discussion

(4) to promote discussion of the place of philosophy in the national and school curriculum and its infusion into the present curriculum; the place and contribution of philosophy to the intellectual, creative, moral and social development of individuals.

Structure

The journal will carry a range of articles reporting on all aspects of the practice of engaging in philosophical inquiry and developing critical and creative thinking. To this end it will be organised into four main Sections or Departments as follows:-

(1) Theory and Applied Research

a. Contributions concerning the more theoretical aspects of philosophy and inquiry such as:-
the nature and purpose, of philosophy, inquiry, community, conversation, dialogue, critical thinking, creative thinking, reasoning, etc.
the nature of childhood, adolescence, mind; the philosophy of childhood and development, etc.
epistemological, social, political and ethical dimensions of the practice of engaging children in philosophical inquiry, policy and planning, future studies and directions; implications of recent Government Reports

b. Research studies of classroom practice: the impact of philosophy for children on class-room interaction, classroom discourse and dialogue; pupil participation, thinking and learning; teacher thinking and behaviour; classroom climate, etc.

(2) Philosophical studies

discussion and clarification of key philosophical concepts, topics and issues embedded in and raised by class-room readers and other materials;
exegeses of the philosophical literature on such matters.

(3) Reports from the field:

a. Reports from practising teachers on their experience of engaging children in philosophical inquiry; discussion of practical problems and possible solutions; innovative ways of using class-room materials, arranging classrooms, grouping, interacting with pupils. Children's reactions and views new materials or exercises. This section may well stimulate other research projects.

b. Children's work- writings, illustrations,

(4) Resources & Reviews (R&R)

Reports from in-service or workshop experiences and challenges. News and reports from national and international conferences. Discussion of different approaches, new materials, exercises and such. New philosophical stories, teacher manuals and other materials. Reviews of books and other materials.

Welcome to Critical & Creative Thinking

Welcome to the tenth volume of Critical and Creative Thinking - the Journal for the Federation of Australian Philosophy for Children Associations. This Journal is dedicated to improving the teaching and research of critical and creative thinking by providing a forum for discussion and debate on all aspects, theoretical and practical, of the practice of engaging children in activities intended to develop and improve their thinking. We encourage classroom teachers as well as academics to send in their contributions for publication. Critical & Creative Thinking is intended to be a teachers' professional journal featuring a combination of theoretical and research articles with articles from teachers on their classroom experience and practical strategies for engaging children in critical and creative thinking activities. Whatever program you are trying with your class, please write in and let us know about it and its impact on your students as well as its influence on your own teaching practice. There are many others who are interested in what you are doing, together we can help each other become even better teachers and educators.

Clive Lindop
Deakin University-Warrnambool

Notes for contributors

All contributions are welcome. Manuscripts should be typed and doubled spaced on A4 letter or US letter paper and accompanied with a disc copy, preferably 3.5 in Macintosh disc in Word 5.1 format (though IBM MS DOS is acceptable). Alternatively, to save time and avoid damage or loss in the mail, contributors may send their articles by E-mail to:-

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Please use the Author - Date system with endnotes and bibliography for your articles

NB: to maintain academic credibility, contributions to sections (1) Theory and Research and (2) Philosophical Studies, are subject to those processes of peer review normal for scholarly refereed journals including blind refereeing.

Letters to the Editor

If often happens that one reads an article and wants to respond, but not in the form of a lengthy article. Such responses, which might simply add to a point made by the author either in agreement or disagreement, or offer an alternative view, etc. could appear as a 'Letter to the Editor.' The idea here is to encourage dialogue between readers and authors- in effect using the Journal to create a community of inquiry!

Send all postal contributions to

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Clive Lindop, Deakin University-Warrnambool, Vic 3280, Australia.

Critical & Creative Thinking
Vol 10 No 2 October 2002

ABSTRACTS

Marie-France Daniel – Pupils' philosophical discourse

The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between philosophical dialogue and critical thinking in pupils using the P4C approach adapted to mathematics. The research was conducted during an entire school year in two groups of pupils from Melbourne. We analyzed transcripts of the pupils' exchanges in an inductive manner, inspired by the Grounded Theory approach. From our analysis of the transcripts, a distinction between monological and dialogical exchanges emerged, along with nuances between non-critical, semi-critical and critical dialogue. Then the characteristics of each type of exchange were linked to the pupils' epistemological perspectives. Analysis of the transcripts reveals that, unless the pupils have more than one year of experience with P4C, their discourse is dialogical but not critical, or, in other words, it is relativistic but not inter-subjective.

Hannu Juuso – Hegel's influence on P4C

The article reflects on p4c in the light of the Hegelian viewpoints examined in the previous issue of CCT (10,1 March 2002). It is argued that the key notion of p4c, 'community of inquiry', as well as the concept of philosophy it contains, can only be understood in terms of the early pragmatic philosophers' critical engagement with Hegel's thought. Peirce´s 'fallibilism' and 'scientific method' as well as Dewey´s 'experience' and 'reflective thinking' are linked to the framework of Hegel´s philosophy. It is argued that Hegel exerts a theoretical influence on p4c that is indirect and primarily antithetical in nature. In the second section of the article Matthew Lipman´s educational ideas are examined in the light of Hegel´s and Dewey´s pedagogical ideas pointing, in the end, to some Bildung-theoretical challenges for p4c.

Clive Lindop – Plato on 'how to do philosophy'

Philosophy as we know it in the West took its shape from the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues. It is not implausible to regard the Dialogues as heuristic devices designed for engaging in philosophical inquiry. It is instructive then to take a close look at one of the longer dialogues featuring Socrates engaging in such inquiry, not with an untutored interlocutor, but with a professional, the sophist Protagoras, in order to identify the features of the inquiry itself. For this will reveal something of what Plato conceived to be the activity of philosophy to which we are the heirs. The *Protagoras* is examined with a view to highlighting the lesson in doing philosophy that Plato might have wanted his students to observe.

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of
THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL for PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY WITH CHILDREN (ICPIC)

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Dear friends of philosophical inquiry with children:

It is with pleasure and anticipation that I announce the eleventh ICPIC conference, to be held on the Black Sea shore in the city of Varna, Bulgaria. Our conference theme revolves around dialogue between children and adults. We welcome interactive presentations which approach this theme from any number of angles—whether theoretical papers, reports of relevant research, original curriculum, or some other. Thirty to fifty children, mainly from the Rakovsky School in Varna, a grades 1-12 institution which has been practicing P4C for nearly a decade, will attend the conference, and approximately one-third of the sessions will be planned as philosophical dialogues among groups of children, as well as groups with roughly equal numbers of adults and children. Keynotes will be delivered by both adults and children.

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Hoping to see you there,
David Kennedy

Are the philosophical exchanges of pupils aged 10 to 12 relativistic or inter-subjective?

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Introduction

In Australia, Canada, Mexico and elsewhere in the world, education is becoming more and more problematic, in that the 21st Century will likely be shaped by three main tendencies: globalization and world-wide application, the explosion of knowledge and the accelerated development of technologies, and the increasing complexity of life in society (Delors, 1996). In the future, schools must provide younger generations with a form of education that will allow them to successfully meet these new challenges (Pallascio, Lafortune, Allaire, Mongeau, 1997; Splitter & Sharp, 1995).

In this respect, the pupils' development in terms of critical thinking is a starting point that is proposed more and more frequently by the work groups studying these topics (Corbo, 1994; Inchauspé, 1997), among others, the International Commission on Education for the 21st Century, presented at UNESCO (Delors, 1996). According to the Commission, the development of pupils' critical thinking is becoming essential "in order to favour a true comprehension of events among pupils instead of developing and maintaining a simplifying vision of the information connected to these events." (1996, p. 47). Secondly, the UNESCO Report on Education proposes that schools "value cooperation" among youngsters. It thus appears that the UNESCO Report refers to a definition of critical thinking that is cooperative in its essence. Critical thinking is not seen as a technique, but as a global process (Daniel and Schleifer, 1996; Slade, 1996). We shall call this "dialogical critical thinking".

According to the literature, the Philosophy for Children program (P4C) (Lipman et al., 1980; Splitter and Sharp, 1995) and its counterpart, adapted to the learning of mathematics ("P4CM") (Daniel et al., 1996), foster critical thinking in pupils, to the extent that they are used regularly in the classroom (Daniel et al., 2000). The justification for this relationship is found in philosophical dialogue among pupils, which characterizes the programs.

In this paper, we study the relationship between philosophical dialogue and critical thinking in pupils using the P4CM approach. To do so, we will have to refer to epistemological perspectives.

The research objective studied in this paper is part of a larger research project subsidized by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) (1998-2002), which was conducted in three different cultural contexts, Australia, Mexico and Quebec, and which had as a global objective to study pupils' manifestations of critical thinking, as well as its developmental process. To achieve that objective, we will describe the various types of exchanges among pupils when they use a philosophical approach. In doing so, a distinction between monological and dialogical exchanges will emerge, along with nuances between non-critical, semi-critical and critical dialogue. Then we will link the characteristics of each type of

exchange to the epistemological perspectives that emerged from the analysis of the transcripts of exchanges among pupils (Daniel et al., submitted for publication). This will allow us to determine to what extent philosophical dialogue among youths is relativistic (non-critical) or inter-subjective (evaluative). Although our analysis includes transcripts from the Australian, Mexican and Quebec pupils, in this paper, we present only excerpts from transcripts of exchanges that took place among Australian pupils.

1. Philosophical Dialogue and Epistemological Perspectives

In this section, we will present definitions relating to critical thinking, philosophical dialogue and epistemology. The definitions of critical thinking and dialogue are theoretical, whereas those definitions relating to epistemology emerge from exchanges among Australian, Mexican and Quebec pupils participating in the research project.

Critical Thinking

Psychology and philosophy have both contributed in their own way to our comprehension of critical thinking. Psychologists are mostly concerned with the thinking process and how this process can help people bring meaning to their experience. Psychologists emphasize problem solving (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Needham & Begg, 1991; Polya, 1957), rather than ethical thinking (Lewis & Smith, 1993).

Philosophy's contribution finds its roots in the writings of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. From these beginnings, philosophers have been interested in using logical reasoning as a moral force to promote good. Nowadays, critical thinking remains ill-defined. Today, dispositions and skills are frequently integrated into the conceptions of critical thinking. But even so, critical thinking is too often reduced to mere logical reasoning. Whereas some contemporary academics include creative thinking in critical thinking, others do not. Generally, definitions concerning critical thinking ignore its cooperative or dialogical aspect, although the concept of "caring thinking" is becoming more popular.

Harvey Siegel (1988) defines the critical thinker as "a person who acts, assesses, claims, and makes judgments on the basis of reasons and who understands and conforms to principles governing the evaluation of the force of those reasons" (p. 38). Thus, for Siegel, critical thinking is directly related to rational thinking or logical reasoning, in the sense that a critical person justifies her or his actions and judgments by basing them on valid and relevant reasons. The development of rationality leads to the actualization of critical thinking.

According to Robert Ennis (1987, 1991, 1993), critical thinking includes creativity as well as dispositions. Thinking critically means judging the credibility of sources; identifying conclusions, reasons and assumptions; judging the quality of an argument; developing and defending a position on an issue; asking appropriate clarifying questions; seeking reasons, seeking clear statements and being open-minded; drawing conclusions when warranted, but with caution; etc. (1993, p. 180.). For Ennis, "critical thinking is reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe or do" (1993, p.180). In this definition, the attitudes complement the cognitive skills, and creativity is added to logical reasoning.

For Matthew Lipman (1991), "Critical thinking simply helps us avoid thinking uncritically and acting unreflectively." (p. 144). In other words, Lipman contends that critical thinking, "protects us from being coerced or brainwashed into believing what others want us to believe without having the opportunity to inquire for ourselves" (p. 144). It helps people to do better thinking and make better judgments. To Lipman, critical thinking presupposes skills and attitudes, which develop according to four categories: conceptualization, reasoning, generalization and research. The Lipmanian

fundamental criteria of critical thinking are: 1) *Use of particular criteria:* Individuals, whose cognitive conducts can be associated to a form of critical thinking, make use of particular criteria to evaluate the terms of statements. 2) *Self-correction:* Individuals who can engage in an active search for their own mistakes, with self-correction in mind. 3) *Sensitivity to context:* Individuals who develop flexible thinking, allowing them to recognize that different contexts require different applications of rules and principles (Lipman, 1991). To Lipman, critical, creative and caring thinking are three distinct modalities of what he now calls "multidimensional thinking" (Lipman, accepted for publication October, 2002), meaning that although these modes of thinking are distinct, they are interwoven.

Richard Paul (1992) considers that critical thinking is "disciplined, self-directed thinking that exemplifies the perfection of thinking, appropriate to a particular mode or domain of thought. It comes in two forms. If disciplined to serve the interests of a particular individual or group, to the exclusion of other relevant persons and groups, it is sophistic or weak-sense critical thinking. If disciplined to take into account the interests of diverse persons or groups, it is fair-minded or strong-sense critical thinking." (pp. 9-10). Although the ethical dimension emerges from his definition, the emphasis is placed on logic, which is based on creative thinking: "critical thinking can now be understood as a deep interest in the logic of logic, the art of taking charge of the large variety of ways in which we create concepts and make inferences by means of them, the various ways, in other words, in which we use human reason well or poorly in attempting to make sense of things and our created interpretations of them." (1993, p. 31). For Paul, critical thinking thus presupposes logical, creative and ethical skills and attitudes.

As a starting point for this project, we are inferring a very broad definition from these latter: *Critical thinking is the process of (e)valuating an object in an attempt to eliminate irrelevant criteria, properties, etc. It thus implies the use of complex attitudes and thinking skills. As a result, a new understanding of the object is generated, and a modification of the initial idea appears.*

Philosophical Dialogue

From the perspective of the Philosophy for Children (P4C) approach proposed by Lipman and Sharp, philosophical dialogue represents the very essence of the approach. Philosophical dialogue is a complex concept that researchers have not reached a consensus in defining, and which can lead to confusion. Indeed, some may confuse dialogue with talking or with conversation (Splitter & Sharp, 1995), assigning it the same meaning. When does an exchange between youths become dialogical? Is philosophical dialogue necessarily critical? Can philosophical dialogue among youths be relativistic? These are some of the questions that interest us, and that we attempt to understand within the framework of this study. In our attempt to achieve this, we base our theoretical framework on Lipman and Sharp's thesis.

We know from the philosophers of antiquity that *philo-sophia* is either an internal (personal thoughts) or an external (from personal to others' thoughts) dialectic. Thus, it can either be an auto-reflexive or a dialogical practice; but what one constructs in isolation remains latent if left unshared.

Lipman and Sharp maintain that the reflective method that best illustrates the path of inquiry specific to philosophy is *dia-logos*. Dialogue encourages the child to become a person, in that speaking and listening include reciprocity, lessons to be given and taken, tolerance and respect, as well as understanding of the meaning of the words of others (Lipman et al., 1980; Sharp, 1990; 1992).

From this pragmatist viewpoint, dialogue is based on pluralism. It does not require or presuppose a single area of agreement; it makes an effort to understand the thoughts of others, without however translating them: "being rational is resisting [...] the idea that

there would be a (single) set of terms for which all contributions to conversation could be formulated - it is trying to understand the jargon of the interlocutor rather than trying to translate it into our own." (Rorty, 1979/1990, p. 352). In this case, philosophical dialogue is not a verbally opposed criticism or an argumentative justification, but rather a verbalization that differs, or a justification that can be negotiated.

Dialogical exchange is the principle by which meaning is revealed, relations are established and learning is integrated. Furthermore, when the basis for philosophical dialogue corresponds to daily experience, then the people in question learn to understand and clearly communicate their own thoughts; they also learn to open up to the opinions of others and to criticize them in a constructive manner; finally they learn to put into practice, in their daily actions, the behaviour acquired during the group's exchanges.

In short, philosophical dialogue, from the perspective of Lipman and Sharp, is characterized by the following principles: pluralism, reciprocity and tolerance.

Epistemological Perspectives

There are remarkably consistent relationships between people's beliefs relating to their way of knowing (their epistemological frame of reference) and the justifications they bring forth to support their beliefs (which is what is encouraged by philosophical dialogue among youths). Indeed, in both of these mental operations, the organization of the cognitive network and the inherent and internal logic has to be similar. For example, if a child possesses a single category to classify his knowledge (i.e.: when knowledge is based on direct observation), then it will be impossible for that child to justify his or her beliefs by referring to the probability that a point of view relating to a situation is more exact than another (abstraction and reasoning). This child will justify his or her beliefs by referring to what is concrete and real in personal observations (King & Kitchener, 1994).

In another analysis (Daniel et al., submitted for publication) of transcripts of exchanges among pupils, three levels came clearly into evidence: egocentricity, relativism and inter-subjectivity oriented toward meaning. These levels reflect the thinking of 10 to 12 year olds, while another level seemed to hover in the background, one which we were unable to bring out explicitly (inter-subjectivity oriented toward constructed knowledge).

The egocentric perspective appears to be the most spontaneous among the pupils, whereas their beliefs, opinions and interests are anchored in concrete observation, or anchored in those of the adults that surround them (parents, teachers, media, etc.). At this moment in time, the pupils are not aware that they are able to formulate their own judgments and act accordingly. They spontaneously believe that there is only a single way of looking at the world – that which they were taught and which they must master – and that the evidence for this is so plausible that there is no need to justify the belief.

The relativistic perspective is noted when the pupils make reflective judgments regarding the problem to be solved, but hardly doubt what they have acquired, hardly question the validity of their peers' statements, and present their own statements as closed conclusions. Relativism is easily accessible to pupils aged 10 to 12.

Inter-subjectivity oriented toward meaning presupposes that the pupils are, to a certain extend, aware of their tendency to support their judgments with irrational beliefs, and that their peers are essential if the pupils are to surpass their own beliefs and conceptions; to increase coherence, viability, solidity, etc. in their judgments; to construct their comprehension of the world, and to construct themselves as unique persons and as members of a community. The perspective related to inter-subjectivity

oriented toward meaning implies the critical evaluation of criteria, perspectives, and different and alternative points of views.

Critical evaluation should also appear in the epistemological perspective of inter-subjectivity oriented toward constructed knowledge, the existence of which we have inferred, as it was not directly manifested in transcripts of the pupils' exchanges, except that at this latter level, scientific thinking presupposes thinking about the theories rather than thinking along with the theories, and thinking about evidence, rather than being influenced by that evidence. The aim is no longer to "construct meaning" in an attempt to improve the quality of personal experience, but rather to construct knowledge from theories and experience in a conscious attempt to advance knowledge in a particular scientific domain. These perspectives are thus quite distinct.

Research Question:
The theoretical data related to philosophical dialogue is ambiguous with regard to the epistemological perspective to which it leads the pupils. Indeed, theoretically, the objective of philosophical dialogue seems to reside in inter-subjectivity, but its principles seem to concern relativism: concepts such as pluralism *(the situation in which diversity is accepted in the midst of a community)*, reciprocity *(which implies exchange, mutuality and sharing)* and tolerance *(an attitude that consists of giving others freedom to express their opinions although one considers them to be false)* do not necessarily strive toward critical evaluation, which is a characteristic of inter-subjectivity, but possibly toward an acceptance of differences, which is a characteristic of relativism.

In an attempt to answer our research question, "Is relativism or inter-subjectivity the epistemological perspective inherent in philosophical exchange among pupils aged 10 to 12?" we analyzed the transcripts of 24 exchanges from the eight groups of Australian, Mexican and Quebec pupils participating in our study.

2. Context and Methodology

As written previously, as a whole, this research project, subsidized by the SSHRC, was conducted in three different cultural contexts: Australia, Mexico and Quebec. Three groups of pupils were studied in Mexico, three groups in Quebec and two groups in Australia, for a total of eight groups of pupils. Each group included an average of 30 pupils. The pupils were aged 10 to 12 years, and were attending elementary schools (grades 5 and 6). The experiment took place during an entire school year. Differing socio-economic backgrounds were represented (4 privileged and semi-privileged groups; 3 underprivileged; 1 extremely poor). Two groups (from Australia and Mexico) consisted of pupils experienced in the Philosophy for Children (P4C) approach, whereas the others were not.

The research project aims to describe pupils' reality rather than verifying a theory. The findings were constructed in an inductive manner, inspired from the qualitative analysis, such as is defined by Huberman and Miles (1991) and Glaser and Strauss (1967). The methodology consisted of three phases with the following objectives: 1) Analyze the 24 transcripts from Australia, Mexico and Quebec to clarify the different types of exchanges among pupils when using the P4CM program; 2) Analyze the transcripts with regard to the content and form of the exchanges, and develop a grid that describes the developmental process of "dialogical critical thinking" as it manifests itself in the pupils involved in the research project; 3) Refine Lipman's definition of critical thinking and compare its theoretical criteria with the pupils' reality, applying the grid developed in Phase 2 to the transcripts of exchanges revealed to be dialogical and critical (Phase 1). This paper is concerned with the findings from Phase 1. To illustrate our findings, we use examples from the Australian transcripts.

In Australia, the experiment was conducted in two classes in Melbourne for one hour each week. One group comes from a public or state school where, for at least five

years, the *praxis* of P4C has been one of their school projects; pupils from all socio-economic classes attend this school. The other group of pupils comes from a Catholic system school; the socio-economic background that characterizes this group varies from lower to middle class; this group had no experience with P4C. The approach used was that of P4C adapted to mathematics, or P4CM.

Three video recordings of the exchanges among pupils, taken during a P4CM session, were produced for each group: one at the very beginning of the school year, another at mid-year and the last at the very end of the school year. A professional using two cameras filmed the proceedings.

After transcription, the exchanges were first analyzed by the research head. Approximately six weeks later, they were again subjected to a blind analysis by the same researcher. The transcripts were then analyzed by at least one other team researcher. Finally, these analyses were submitted for discussion among the researchers; adjustments were made until a consensus was reached.

3. Results

In this section, we present: 1) the types of exchanges, and 2) the epistemological perspectives that emerged from analysis of the transcripts.

3.1 Types of Exchanges

First, analysis of transcripts revealed that not all philosophical "exchanges" among pupils are philosophical "dialogues". Analysis of the Australian transcripts highlighted at least two types of exchanges among pupils: monological and dialogical. The groups of pupils that had never experimented with the P4C approach generally expressed themselves in a monological manner, whereas the groups that had previously practiced P4C took up the discussions dialogically. In the following section, we highlight the characteristics related to each of these two types of exchanges.

Monological

Elsewhere, certain of the current authors (Daniel and Pallascio, 1997) defined monological, in a general manner, as a type of exchange during which pupils pursued a series of monologues with themselves in relation to a question chosen by the group for discussion. Although this type of exchange is based on the pupils trying to resolve a common problem (or question), each one pursues a personal idea, without being influenced by peers' perspectives. This study enumerates the specific characteristics of this type of exchange.

In a group of Australian pupils, monological exchange is manifested mostly in the first transcripts of the school year, when the pupils have no experience with P4C. Monological exchange is particularly evident among pupils who seem to search for an answer that will meet with the teacher's approval *(-P1: It might be a millimeter longer. -T: It might be a millimeter longer. –P1: Or it might not be.)*, rather than searching for elements of response relevant to the question chosen by the group for discussion. In this situation, the pupils' interventions are brief, to the point that they resemble simple answers much more than well-thought-out statements aimed at group improvement *(-T: Tell us why it's a perfect cube? -P1: I'm not sure. –T: It's certainly a cube isn't it? -P1: It looks like one. –T: Is it a perfect cube? -P1: Yes.)*. Pupils do not bring forth spontaneous justification to support their statements, and when the teacher prompts them in this direction, they merely provide concrete and subjective answers that we cannot consider as justifications *(-P1: My own drawing is best. – T: Why? - P1: Because I drew it.)*. (For the distinction between a statement and a simple answer see Daniel et al, 2000). Finally, the group does not apply the principles of the community of inquiry; this emerges, among other things, when the pupils wait for the teacher's questions before putting any effort into reflection. If, from time to time, a link to the remarks of peers is noted *(- What P1 said that cubes are not exactly the same. Some people, they do all*

different things, like they can do wide long and tiny. So even though they... they're cubes, they're not all that perfect.), the sequences of links are nevertheless not sufficiently present in the totality of the exchange to make it dialogical.

In short, from this group of pupils (as well as from other groups of Mexican and Quebec pupils who exchanged in a monological exchanges), the following characteristics emerged: monological exchange is manifested in the form of brief responses, that is, those with few words or expressed in short sentences; pupils' interventions are independent from one another; statements remain unjustified; solving the problem is not seen as an inquiry process, but as a traditional search for the right answer; generally, from the group's viewpoint, the teacher knows the "right" answer, and represents the source of reference; pupil satisfaction comes from authority's approval; thinking is part rational and part concrete (perceptual experience); the thinking mode most often displayed is logical thought.

A monological exchange among pupils does not require any particular practice, in that such exchanges spontaneously emerge among pupils aged 10 to 12 years. Although it demands reflection, a monological exchange does not require the pupils to surpass themselves on any level (cognitive, meta-cognitive, affective, social, moral). The pupils rapidly develop a feeling of boredom, and have an impression of "getting nowhere" with their ideas.

A monological exchange subtends a generally egocentric and sometimes relativistic epistemological perspective (see the following section). The pupils' statements are simple, in that they are usually comprised of a single thinking mode per intervention. The thinking mode most used is logical thought. Responsible and meta-cognitive thinking is almost absent, and creative thinking is present, but only to a small extent and at a lower level (Daniel et al., Submitted for publication).

Dialogic

In another paper, certain of the current authors (Daniel and Pallascio, 1997) draw a general definition of dialogical exchange: dialogue supposes explicit links between the majority of pupil interventions, in other words, without discontinuity or "jumping from one subject to another" between interventions; pupils formulate their own ideas according to what their peers are discussing. Interdependence is manifest, and the reflections of pupils seems to develop with the intention of contributing to the search for meaning. A harmony emerges in reading the transcripts, a principle of continuity, which seems to have directed the reflections. Within the scope of the current study, we will elaborate characteristics specific to this type of exchange.

In the transcripts we analyzed, the groups of pupils less experienced in P4C passed from monological at the beginning of the year, to dialogical at the end of the school year. *A priori*, however, this dialogue does not seem to be "critical" (understood in the sense of "evaluative of the remarks of peers"); the quality of its progress is at the very least uneven. After analysis, two types of dialogue, preliminary to critical dialogue, emerged: the non-critical and the semi-critical. (Note that for this study it is not necessary that every intervention in the exchange to be dialogical for the exchange to qualify as dialogue; dialogue can be constituted of a few pupil interventions, which we refer to as a brief dialogue drawn from the overall exchange).

Non-Critical Dialogue

Non-critical dialogue is expressed by linking ideas in a linear manner, as in the following excerpt, where all of the interventions are related to each other, and where they converge toward a common objective; in this instance it is the development of a relevant example. The interventions show that P2 and P3 are trying to understand and help P1 formulate her idea:

P1: You could research.

T: Could you give us an example of what you mean by research?
P1: What about some of those...the paintings that we were talking about last week, you know, the war one.
P2: The portraits.
P3: The Picasso.
P1: Yes, the Picasso one where the war...They thought it was...(But) when they heard the story of what it was: Ah this is beautiful, because of what's behind, what the story is.

Thus, the principle of continuity is respected, and interdependence is manifested as the two pupils join the first to help her develop her example and, in doing so, help her express her thoughts. In this manner, egocentricity of perspective is surpassed and is set in relativism (see the following section). Furthermore, the dialogue is simple, without nuance and without modification of the initial idea.

In short, the characteristics of non-critical dialogue that emerged from analysis of the Australian transcript (as well as the Mexican and Quebec transcripts that included this type of exchange) are the following: The group of pupils forms the beginning of a community of inquiry; the pupils do not talk, they dialogue; dialogue is developed with respect for differences; the pupils take peers' points of view into consideration in elaborating their own (meta-cognitive thinking); statements are not spontaneously justified, they are justified when the teacher prompts the pupils in this direction; points of view become more complex as the interventions progress; quantity (vs. quality) of interventions is considered to be an aim; the validity of viewpoints is hardly challenged, or not at all.

Semi-Critical Dialogue
Other transcripts show that the dialogue is sometimes more than non-critical, but not yet fully critical. The critical character of the dialogue remains poor or indirect, even though the exchange is centered on a common problem and the pupils' ideas are interrelated. We will call it semi-critical dialogue. Following is an example from the Australian transcripts:

P1: But how does he prove it? There's always going to be a few people who don't like it.
P2: But what kind, what, how...He can't prove it's beautiful, but he can prove a point.
P3: Can you prove a point?
P2: Well, I don't know, but he can't prove a point because (...) can't prove points.
P4: I agree with P2, because you can't prove it (is beautiful) because if he brings other people to his painting and he says: "If you look right deep into it, you can see a few of the stuff like flowers and..."
P1: But how can you prove it to the rest of the world?
P2: Easy he shows it to his face.

-- Everybody starts talking at the same time. –

This excerpt shows that the pupils search for answers or reference points, question themselves and attempt to find answers. However we have no choice but to recognize that the answers provided by peers, although they enrich the initial meaning, do not contribute to modifying it. Furthermore, the dialogue cannot be pursued and thus become critical because it rapidly transforms into an uncontrolled exchange, as all the pupils try to simultaneously present their points of view.

If dialogue is a way of thinking and influencing the world, beginning and ending with daily experience so as to improve it (Dewey, 1929/1960), then the quality of interventions – with regard to criteria such as relevance, reliability, validity – must be taken into account before determining whether or not a sequence of exchanges is dialogical. On one hand, considering the relevance of pupils' questions and the interdependence of their interventions, this transcript extract would attain a fairly high

dialogical quality rating. On the other hand, considering the answers provided, it would rate rather poorly, since the answers are barely thought-out, and presuppose an epistemological perspective fluctuating between egocentricity and relativism; this is a dominant, logical thinking that leaves little room for creative, meta-cognitive and responsible thinking. We qualify this exchange as semi-critical dialogue.

The following characteristics of semi-critical dialogue emerged from analysis of the Australian (as well as those Mexican and Quebec transcripts that reflect this type of exchange): a common question to resolve, links between the majority of pupils' interventions, interdependence among pupils, critical questions (*Can you prove a point?) (But how can you prove it to the rest of the world?).* But : statements not always spontaneously supported by justifications (*he can't prove a point because (...) can't prove points.);* answers, at times naïve and unconsidered (- P1 *But how can you prove it to the rest of the world?* -P2: *Easy he shows it to his face);* listening and respect for others are not always completely integrated into the attitudes and behaviour of the pupils, which indicates that the "community of inquiry" is not yet totally established. In short, in this excerpt, the pupils seem to dialogue in order to speak (which is a first step) more than to think (our goal).

Critical Dialogue

Dialogue is said to be critical when, as a whole, it seems to consist mostly of a search for significant elements (vs. a single and final truth) as the pupils attempt to place themselves in relation to the world and to understand its relationships. In fact, the dialogue's critical character evolves according to the pupils': a) cognitive skills; b) attitudes toward others; and c) epistemological perspectives, when thinking and dialoguing with peers. In the following paragraphs, we present an analysis of excerpts from a dialogue among Australian pupils who have already worked with P4C for a few years. The analysis will allow us to highlight constituent elements specific to critical dialogue.

The aim of this exchange among pupils is to elaborate a taxonomy between humans and animals. From the beginning, the pupils are aware that the keynote to the discussion is multiplicity of criteria: *Well, I think it comes down like to what it usually comes down in any philosophy discussion. It depends what you're talking about, the overall or whether you're talking about if it's humans in their inventive way or in their instinctive way.* Also, the exchange is marked by uncertainty. Furthermore, there is a concern for taking the other party's point of view into account, in this instance that of the animals: *I think that humans in their inventive way are smarter than other animals. But also, they might not be. To other animals, we wouldn't be because the other animals make what they need, not what they want, so...* This empathic thinking, which necessarily leads to doubting human superiority, is also found in other interventions during the exchange: *We may think they're (dolphins) smart because they've got sonar and all this whiz-bang stuff, but they might think we're smart because we've got this language and we can build these fortresses.*

Continuing the same tendency, one pupil, recognizing the wastefulness of humans, tilts the scale in favour of the animals: *I reckon we make things more that we need. Like if you look in the supermarket, you could go down one aisle and everything you'd need will be in there and there'd be no choices.*

This in turn prompts another pupil to infer two negative criteria related to human behaviour: appearance and desire (vs. need). *I think also humans are just appearance. Everyone just wants to be sort of standing out in a group. Everyone is seen in places, you know shops and they've got all these clothes and make-up and stuff. We don't really need that. We need clothes at certain temperatures, but just make-up and stuff that we don't really need.* Then, moving on to moral behaviour: *They (animals) respect other people and we tend to be*

selfish. Finally, she formulates a conclusion unfavourable to mankind: *...I don't think we deserve to go at the top for what we've done to all those animals and how we've had wars.*

Nevertheless, in the discussion, the superiority of mankind re-establishes itself when a pupil elaborates another criterion to understand the world she lives in, this time of an epistemological order, that of mankind's invention of language and mathematics: *I think that humans are the only ones that can do math, because it's like English: Humans invented English. And math is just like another language that we invented. We use it to understand things, to well everything we've got to make a reason why. Like why the sky is blue and why we can't float or fly. So we invented maths to explain it...But the animals they just think sky and they don't really think about it.*

And, following the teacher's questions, what emerges is a criterion related to the ethical and global comprehension of the person, that of mankind's complex and multiple intelligence: - *Oh, well if it's the order of how smart they are, I think humans would have to be at the top. – What criteria are you using? – How complex they are. And that we've got other intelligences, empathy and sympathy and stuff like that.*

The perspective of mankind's superiority begins to establish itself in the exchange when an intervention brings the discussion back to mankind's limits: – *And they (animals) only kill what they need...but we buy stuff and we throw it away. An average household would throw away quite a bit in a week also.* Then another criterion related to human limits is put forward: *Greediness and power and stuff.* And justified by the following example: *He (Hitler) kept on killing people even when they'd lost the war.*

Uncertainty is always present during the exchange. This uncertainty seems to be fed by the pupils' awareness of human nature's duality: *It really depends. Like in World War II, well you know Hitler, he was killing lots of...Jewish people and had to be stopped. Even though lots of people died, we really needed to stop him. And even though we may be selfish and throw away lots of things that man made to buy something that had lots of plastic in it or whatever and used up trees and everything, I think we're still smarter even though we do that. It's silly but we've just got a higher intelligence.* Uncertainty, here, is not paralyzing, it is open-minded: open-minded toward others, open-minded toward diversity, open-minded toward reflection, open-minded toward criticism, etc. It is open-mindedness that leads to inter-subjectivity, in that it is the diversity of viewpoints that fosters an enrichment of initial or individual perspectives. Without peer contributions, formulating definite conclusions proves difficult. Hence, when the teacher asks whether man or animal predominates, a pupil, in summarizing remarks previously made by peers, refuses to conclude the reflection by formulating a conclusion: *It does depend...they've got their own ways. And people just think they're dumb because they don't know our ways, but they probably think we're dumb, if they do think. So I kind of, I don't know...I kind of think animals are smarter in their own way and we're smarter than them in our own way.* Thus, the exchange becomes "enlarged thinking" or, in other words, an exchange where the desire to understand peer points of view is manifest, with an intention of enriching one's own perspective.

However, this open-mindedness toward another's perspective could eventually anchor the group in non-critical dialogue, where all viewpoints are considered acceptable. And indeed, this tendency to relativism was observed in the group – which brings us to note that the dialogue is not completely critical from beginning to end, but that it goes from non-critical to semi-critical to critical, the main part of the dialogue being critical.

Nonetheless, we note that the exchange is characterized not only by acceptance of peer viewpoints, since some criteria are instantly accepted by the group, whereas others are evaluated: – *With brains, I wouldn't rely on brain-size because any animal could have a huge brain and use a tiny bit or someone could have a tiny brain but use all of it; – Because we*

invented maths you can't blame them (the animals) for...like animals are stupid because they don't know maths. They've got their own ways. And people just think they're dumb because they don't know our ways. In other words, the exchange often takes on the appearance of a negotiation of viewpoints, a transaction among pupils, an open process whose conclusions, when they are spoken, are open and temporary, serving as a hypothesis for future reflection.

From analysis of this transcript (as well as those from Mexico and Quebec that reflect, at least partly, this type of exchange) the following specific characteristics related to critical dialogue emerged: explicit interdependence between peer interventions; striving to construct meaning rather than searching for a single truth; being aware of the complexity of concepts; respect and consideration of peers' points of view; negotiated and pyramidal elaboration of viewpoints; uncertainty; alternation between acceptance and criticism of peer remarks; open-mindedness toward new possibilities and divergence of perspectives; spontaneous elaboration of justifications; moral preoccupations inherent in certain remarks; statements that are closer to hypotheses than to conclusions.

Conditions for the Development of Critical Dialogue

From this analysis, what stands out is that critical dialogue develops not solely because of the cognitive contribution of the pupil, but also stems from the person's global commitment. Indeed, the practice of critical dialogue is demanding at all levels (cognitive, affective, social, moral) and lies in the highest level of dialogue, among other things, because of the difficulty inherent in formulating and receiving direct criticism. In the following excerpt (from the last transcript of the year for the Australian group not experienced in P4C), we see that P1 (an individual) criticizes P7 (representative of his team) with regard to the mathematical problems that were done and submitted in class. On P1's part, formulating criticism supposes the capacity to compare, measure, organize into hierarchies, etc. (complexity on the cognitive level) in order to adequately evaluate the work of peers (social responsibility) and, in so doing, challenge what was previously accepted by the rest of the class (difficulty on the affective level):

T: What about some of the answers to the (mathematics) problems? Were some more accurate than others?

P1: Yes I do. Because with P7's group they just had an estimate where as with our group we worked out the exact number...Because they were just estimating how many books were in the school. They didn't...count them. They took off.

Receiving criticism is not easy either, since each person considers criticism as a personal attack (on the affective level), and not as an instrument that allows them to adapt, refine, clarify and justify their ideas (on the cognitive level). The following excerpt complements the previous one, showing the impact of P1's criticism on the group being criticized:

T: And what about your answer. Is yours exact?

P1: Yes.

T: How do you know that?

P1: I worked it out on the calculator.

Group: ...they cheated.

T: Excuse me, is using your calculator to check your answer, is that cheating? Children this isn't a competition to see who is best. Because P1 pointed out your group in estimating couldn't have been as exact as, well, their answer because they checked it on the calculator and it is exact. It's not a criticism; it's not for you to take personally.

Thus, when the community of inquiry is not yet established in the group, the class group functions like a micro-society in the process of democratization: both the search for personal power and the negotiation game have identical stakes, and are elaborated in the same manner, that is, marked by games of power and difficulties (Daniel et al.,

2000). In this group of pupils, mutual respect and reciprocal trust are not sufficiently present to compensate for the affective and cognitive insecurity triggered by criticism. It is only when the foundations of the community of inquiry are well established that the pupils can begin critical dialogue, because criticism is no longer perceived as rhetorical argumentation aiming at ensuring personal victory; it is a dialogical tool aiming to enrich the meaning of the concept or of the problem studied in the P4CM session, and therefore to achieve the common objective. To dialogue critically presupposes an apprenticeship, just as thinking does.

Establishment of the philosophical community of inquiry is a process that can take many months (Daniel et al., 2000). Indeed, it requires rigorous and regular work (a *praxis*) with regard to the elaboration of personal opinions (autonomy), coherent articulation of these opinions so as to be understood by peers, and construction of critical questions and comments regarding one's own statements and those of peers. The community of inquiry also requires the development of attitudes such as: the courage to share opinions with the group without fear of ridicule or fear of error, active listening to others' statements, tolerance toward diversity, respect and mutual trust. From the beginning of the school year, thanks to previous experience, this group did make use of the aforementioned skills and attitudes.

To the extent that critical dialogue presupposes de-centering of one's own perspective, taking into account peers' viewpoints to elaborate one's opinions, desiring to think interdependently, awareness of the need to justify one's opinions, etc., then it becomes relevant to relate the manifestations of critical dialogue to the epistemological perspectives of the pupils. Furthermore, the epistemological study will enable us to clarify the conditions for the appearance and the development of dialogical critical thinking. This incursion into epistemology is made all the more relevant since researchers in this field are more interested in the perspectives of college students than in those of children. Consequently there are few studies among this age group.

3.2 Epistemological Perspectives

Three epistemological levels emerged from the analysis of Australian, Mexican and Quebec pupils participating in the research project (Daniel et al., Submitted for publication). We will illustrate these with examples from the Australian transcripts. These levels are: egocentricity, relativism and inter-subjectivity oriented toward meaning.

Egocentricity

Egocentricity represents the first level the youngsters can attain during exchanges among peers. It is more pronounced in groups that are not experienced with P4C, and is apparent mostly at the beginning of the school year, when the pupils have no *praxis* with this approach. Here is an excerpt from an exchange among Australian pupils:

T: Is "cube" a word given to just that cube?
Pupils: No.
P6: ...I think every cube is perfect but they're just different sizes.
P7: Well, that looks like a perfect cube to me because it's in the shape of a cube.
T: So you think that might be perfect?
P7: Yes.

In this excerpt, questioning is not characteristic of the exchange. Pupils do not show curiosity or interest regarding the ideas of their peers. Each intervention is stated as though, because it is primarily based on sensory observation, it is at once solid and viable.

In all the transcripts analyzed (Australian, Mexican, Quebec) of exchanges reflecting this perspective, the following characteristics emerged: the teacher or the adult seems to be the only expert that can decide between true and false. The pupils do not offer

any justifications to support their statements, as though this were unnecessary since the pupil's (specific) viewpoint reflects the group's consensus. Viewpoints that lie within the scope of diverging references seem to be left unheard, in that these ideas are not taken up again when elaborating viewpoints. Diverging viewpoints seem to be confusing rather than enriching. The exchanges are of a monological and linear type, supposing simple juxtaposition of viewpoints. They neither feed nor enrich pupil comprehension.

Relativism

Relativism was noted in all the groups, either at the beginning or at the end of the experiment. This perspective seems to be the one that most reflects pupils aged 10 to 12 years. Passage from egocentricity to relativism seems to develop, at first, through a coexistence of both perspectives. Indeed, we have observed that two epistemological perspectives can cohabit in an exchange, just as an exchange can at times be dialogical and at other times monological. This duality of perspectives is found, on one hand, when a group of pupils is not yet anchored into a perspective – it fluctuates from one to another, according to the contents of the remarks being discussed – and, on the other hand, when certain pupils of the group share one perspective while other pupils adhere to another. Following is an example from the Australian transcripts:

P1: There is a way of proving it. You could take it to an art museum and ask a professional to look at it and see what they think of it.

P2: Yes I know but P1 that's only one person who thinks it's beautiful and there are millions of people in the world.

T: What would that do though? P1? Why take it to the professional person? What would the professional person know that the basic ordinary person wouldn't know about art?

P1: Well, if they've been studying paintings all their life then they would know the difference between a good painting and a bad painting.

P2: But P1, if I drew something and I took it to a professional and he said it was ugly, maybe I'd still think it was beautiful.

P3: P1, why would you get a professional, because he doesn't know everyone else's opinion even if he studied paintings?

P1: You could use his opinion, you show it to someone else and then you could use his opinion to help you like...you could use his opinion...so when they say: Oh it's ugly, then you tell them the story and they think: Oh it's O.K." and then you tell them what the professional thought and then what...

P4: Yeah but if you take it to more than one professional, like the first one might say it's disgusting and the second one might say it's beautiful. And see, everybody has a different idea of what beautiful is.

In this excerpt, P1 believes that only the museum expert holds the power and the authority to prove whether or not a canvas is beautiful. P2, however, does not seem to understand how the opinion of a single person can be more important than the opinion of millions of others, and he questions P1 about this. This critical question, enriched by that of the teacher, leads P1 to justify the importance he attaches to the expert by tracing a causal relationship between his specialized studies and the relevance of his evaluation. P2 still does not accept or does not seem to understand, as he marks the dichotomy between egocentricity's "they-absolute truth" and relativism's "I-contextual truth". His critical comment and P3's ensuing question prompt P1 to reflect on and refine his position. He offers an explanation – concrete but plausible – in which the expert's evaluation no longer appears as an end in itself, but as a means available to non-experts to help them judge paintings. This excerpt illustrates the fact that the pupils are their peers' first educators: whereas some convey more open epistemological beliefs, by their questions, they prompt other more absolutist pupils to open up their horizons and make their way toward a more reflexive judgment.

In all transcripts (from Australia, Mexico and Quebec) we analyzed that illustrated relativism, the following specific characteristics emerged: pupils presented viewpoints

or criteria that were left unchallenged by their peers, as if they were all equally reliable, equally viable and equally solid. The exchange showed decentering with regard to the object of discussion and to the self; beliefs were no longer conjugated in the singular, but in the plural form; "truth" was modifiable according to context; each person had a point of view; pupil justifications are not spontaneous, but are usually induced by the teacher and presuppose a capacity to link the senses' concrete observations to abstractions in the form of reasoning; also, justification seemed to be elaborated merely to prove that one's opinion is better than that of one's peers.

In sum, the relativism we speak of is a subjective relativism that should ideally be surpassed for the enrichment of the individual and of the social experience.

Inter-Subjectivity

Inter-subjectivity appears either in groups of pupils who are particularly stimulated intellectually by the teacher's questions, or in groups who are experienced with the practice of philosophical dialogue. Following are a few exchanges that illustrate this perspective among the Australian pupils aged 10 to 12 years:

P1: I think that humans are the only ones that can do math, because it's like English: Humans invented English. And math is just like another language that we invented. We use it to understand things, to well everything we've got to make a reason why. Like why the sky is blue and why we can't float or fly. So we invented maths to explain it...But the animals they just think sky and they don't really think about it, because they've got one main instinct, which is, eat and reproduce...

P2: I agree with P1, well sort of. If I had to rank any the animals in a higher order or whatever, I think I'd put humans on the top as well because well we build things, animals don't, yes they just rely on instinct. Animals don't know what English is, animals don't know what maths is or anything. They just do what they're meant to do, really...We usually do whatever we want because we've got better resources for it and we've created more things. It's just our brain power is larger. I don't know if it is but I think that our brain-power is larger.

P3: I strongly disagree; I disagree with P2, when he said they don't build things. They build nests, they build burrows, they have got to work out how to build them, that's not really easy. And they only kill what they need,...but we buy stuff and we throw it away. An average household would throw away quite a bit in a week also.

T: So does that make them smarter than us or are we smarter than them?

P3: I haven't got to that yet. Because, as P1 said, it does depend, because we invented maths and you can't blame them for...like animals are stupid because they don't know maths. It's our maths, it's not theirs and we don't have a sit-down classroom with animals how we teach them our ways, they've got their own ways. And people just think they're dumb because they don't know our ways, but they probably think we're dumb, if they do think. So I kind of, I don't know...And look at us, we have massive holocausts over land and we kill thousands of people but they'll just have one old fight and then it'll be over. I kind of think animals are smarter in their own way and we're smarter than them in our own way.

P2: I think, I sort of changed my mind, I sort of agree with P3, but I still think that we're in a higher level than animals because...yes, it really depends. Like in World War II, well you know Hitler, he was killing lots of...Jewish people and had to be stopped. Even though lots of people died, we really needed to stop him. And even though we may be selfish and throw away lots of things that man made to buy something that had lots of plastic in it or whatever and used up trees and everything, I think we're still smarter even though we do that. It's silly but we've just got a higher intelligence.

Inter-subjectivity supposes that the object of analysis develops and "latches onto" various perspectives, and not to all (relativism) or only to that of authority (egocentricity). This excerpt shows that inter-subjectivity is generated and springs from critical dialogue. Criticism is an integral part of inter-subjectivity, in that it is, by definition, an evaluation of statements, actions, criteria, etc. Criticism can be shown in

various ways (doubt, oppositions, etc.), but when it lies within a cooperative exchange, it has a single purpose, which is to make the search for meaning more relevant and more significant. In such a process, the cognitive, the affective and the social dimensions are interwoven. Since the person's perception as a social being is integrated, subjectivism becomes less important and relativism fades. The pupil attempts to discriminate the relevant from the irrelevant, the significant from the non-significant, and in so doing, analyzes or justifies her/his point of view so as to enrich the community, not so as to prove that her/his point of view is the correct one.

To the analysis of this extract, we added the analysis of the critical dialogue engaged in by the Mexican and the Quebec pupils who had experience with P4C. We observed the following characteristics illustrating inter-subjectivity oriented toward meaning: Pupils are capable of criticism (toward themselves, the community of inquiry, society and mankind) with improvement in mind; individual knowledge is uncertain, and as such develops from the groups' diversified viewpoints; evaluation of viewpoints is performed according to criteria that the pupils put forward; pupils are aware that their viewpoints are temporary, and that dialogue is an open process that is subject to revaluation; the justifications provided apply to the analysis and approach argument; the purpose of reflection is to conduct a critical evaluation of the remarks, to discern the most relevant and significant ones.

We did not observe in the transcripts we analyzed a complete exchange among pupils, where the majority of interventions were anchored in inter-subjectivity oriented toward meaning. However, from a pragmatist perspective on the practice of dialogue and the development of youngsters' complex thinking, it is advisable to try to attain inter-subjectivity that is, an "objective relativism" (vs. a "subjective relativism") which may lead to a more complex level, which we could call inter-subjectivity oriented toward knowledge.

Inter-Subjectivity Oriented Toward Constructed Knowledge

As we did not observe any transcript including a perspective more complex than that just described, we inferred that the final epistemological level would also be anchored in inter-subjectivity, except that it would be oriented toward knowledge. Knowledge is not seen here as an *en-soi* to be transmitted, but as a social construction, integrated in a particular context, and open to refinement; likewise with theories that are not perceived as truths, but as models approximately reflecting the world. At this level, personal experience and theoretical knowledge (external) are interrelated, and empower the individual to actively contribute to improving the social experience. We consider that a discussion between professional adults, experts in a discipline, could reflect this level in which all ideas would be considered *a priori* deficient and require examination in a critical manner.

4. Discussion and Conclusion

The fact that the pupils talk, using the P4CM material, does not automatically mean that they are engaged in a dialogical exchange; they could be engaging in a monological exchange. At this stage, the pupils are not aware that they can formulate their own judgments and act on them. They spontaneously believe that there is a single way of looking at the world – the one they were taught and must master – and that the evidence for this is so plausible that there is no need to justify it further. Egocentricity then seems to be the epistemological perspective that best characterizes the pupils' thinking at the beginning of the school year.

A dialogical type of exchange does not necessarily presuppose that dialogue is critical, since an exchange can evolve according to principles of interdependence and continuity while remaining linear (non evaluative). Therefore, there are exchanges among pupils that are of a non-critical dialogical type.

Furthermore, critical statements and questions can randomly punctuate a dialogue without it being truly critical. Indeed, it is possible that the criticism is indirect or of poor quality, so that it does not stimulate a more profound reflection on the part of the interlocutor; it could even be that the interlocutor is so anchored in an egocentric or relativistic perspective that criticism does not reach or stimulate his or her reflection. We call this "semi-critical dialogue" because it is comprised of interesting statements and questions that could lead the group to self-correction, to a search for divergent meanings, to the modification of the original idea, etc., although these statements remain without apparent impact.

In both of these cases (non-critical and semi-critical dialogue), the relativistic perspective predominates, as the pupils pass reflective judgments with regard to the problems they are solving. However, they do not, or hardly, doubt what they have acquired; do not, or hardly, question the validity of peers' statements; and they present their statements as final conclusions. Relativism is the perspective that best illustrates the exchanges among the pupils aged 10 to 12 years old who participated in our research.

In spite of this, analysis of the 24 transcripts revealed that three of them (one from each culture, where the pupils had more than one year experience in P4C) were partly or mainly critical. Following are some characteristics specific to critical dialogue: constructive questions and criticisms; hypotheses (vs. conclusions); constant reversals of viewpoint; complexity of viewpoint; higher-order thinking skills are used to express and justify points of view; and in particular, its result is found through modification of the initial idea.

Following are some of the participating pupils' attitudes: instability; awareness of the complexity of reality; awareness of enrichment stemming from the diversity of viewpoints; uncertainty; doubt; openness to others; respect of differences; concern for others; predisposition to give as well as receive criticism; unnecessarily hasty conclusions; intrinsic motivation to get involved in the search for meaning; interdependence and reciprocity; and inclusion.
It is inter-subjectivity of perspective that emerges from this type of dialogue. Nevertheless, according to our analyses, it does not seem that this perspective spontaneously appears in pupils aged 10 to 12 years, or even after one year of philosophical *praxis*. We did not observe any exchange in which inter-subjectivity reflected the whole group's epistemology, or even where it characterized the majority of interventions. Between the ages of 10 and 12 years, pupils still have the reflex to largely accept the perspectives put forward by peers. Doubt and critical evaluation require tenable attention and a real cognitive effort that pupils neglect when they are enjoying participating in a spontaneous dialogue.

To conclude, let us come back to the initial question: does philosophical exchange among pupils aged 10 to 12 years necessarily lead to critical thinking, and thus to inter-subjectivity? To the extent that the pupils are engaged in a dialogue oriented toward a search for definitions, criteria, etc., the exchange can be considered philosophical. However, the transcripts we analyzed reveal that philosophical dialogue between peers is marked more heavily by subjectivity than by a nascent search for inter-subjectivity. In other words, most of the philosophical exchanges among pupils that we analyzed were relativistic. Relativism presupposes that the pupils surpass spontaneous thinking to reach a superior level where thinking makes an effort toward reflection to solve a given problem. However, at this level, the pupils take pleasure in the diversity of definitions, criteria and solutions; they are not oriented toward inquiry, as per Dewey's meaning (1938/1967), nor toward inter-subjectivity.

Nevertheless, given that some individuals aged 10 to 12 years old stated interventions were anchored in inter-subjectivity, the epistemological level is accessible to pupils of

this age group. So how can we encourage pupils to evolve from relativism to inter-subjectivity?

First, in order for inter-subjectivity to take place within philosophical discussions, there must be a well-sustained philosophical *praxis*, both in frequency and in time. By this, we mean at least one hour every week for more than the duration of an entire school year. In other words, the pupils of this age group need a regular class-space that is part of their school curriculum. Random practice, one year out of two or three, is insufficient. Moreover, the integration into the curriculum should not dissociate the philosophical discussions from the other subjects, but rather should integrate them all transversely.

We must also consider the importance of the quality of the teacher's philosophical facilitating as revealed by analysis of transcripts. Indeed, the P4C or P4CM session is not only a place to learn to talk (pleasure), but also a place to learn to think (pleasure + work). The practice sessions must allow the pupils to experiment with the soundness of the following elements: diversity of opinions for collective enrichment; uncertainty and ambiguity, as essential predispositions in reaching a significant solution; systematic evaluation of what is acquired (premises, criteria, definitions, etc.) to objectivize the object of discussion; criticism as a privileged means for the evolution of ideas; challenging, doubting and questioning as signs of open-mindedness, not impertinence; etc.

To help the pupils grasp these elements (cognitively, affectively, socially, in short, globally), the teacher must overtake the natural and spontaneous flow of the exchange to systematically stimulate logical, creative and meta-cognitive thinking in the pupils. At the same time, in order to mitigate the sometimes too-intellectual (unimodal vs. multimodal) character of inter-subjectivity, which is exclusively concerned with pointing out flaws and limits, the teacher must promote cooperation among peers, as well as the soundness of pluralism. The development of responsible thinking aimed at social commitment is a means that can contribute to the development of globally valued thinking among pupils.

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Philosophy for Children in the light of Hegel´s thought.

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Introduction

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) is considered by many to be one of the most vital thinkers of western philosophy. For after him hardly any 'master' of thought has been able to express his/her ideas without taking into account what Hegel had to say on their. As Richard Rorty states, philosophers are deemed to encounter Hegel; he patiently waits at the end of the road no matter which route they choose to take.[1]

The early American pragmatists like *Charles Sanders Peirce* (1839-1914) and especially *John Dewey* (1859-1952) - the pivotal figure in the theoretical background of Philosophy for Children (p4c) - developed their own thinking in response to the ideas of Hegel as well as Kant.[2] In the beginning of his academic career, Dewey was intensely impressed by Hegel's anti-dualistic writings. And later, he - more or less explicitly - continues the discussion of Hegel's ideas in his own basic writings. "The acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking", Dewey acknowledges himself.[3] For this reason, Dewey's thinking is often placed closer to Continental than, say, British analytic philosophy

Given this direct Hegelian connection there is a good reason to assume that p4c would have been seriously examined from this perspective as well. However, in the literature of p4c, the Hegelian connection seems to be quite neglected. The Hegelian ideas of *Bildung* seen in the light of teaching philosophy are rarely referred to and, to my knowledge, never discussed systematically. True, the founder of p4c, *Matthew Lipman*, mentions him, for example, in the context of *J. Royce*'s 'community of interpretation', thus affecting Peirce´s 'community of inquiry' - the core concept of p4c - and occasionally refers to him when reflecting on *V. V. Davydov*'s and *L. S. Vygotsky*'s thought.[4] But there is no further elaboration or more detailed analysis to be found on this topic. It seems that the quite obvious theoretical-historical connection between p4c and Hegel via Peirce and Dewey has been sadly neglected.

This article is directly connected with my paper 'Hegel on Teaching Philosophy' published in the previous issue of this journal.[5] Here I will continue the same theme by reflecting more closely on p4c in the light of the Hegelian viewpoints that I examined earlier. I have divided the article into two sections: in the first, I will argue that the key elements of Lipman's definition of critical thinking expressed in the notion of 'community of inquiry' as well as the concept of philosophy it contains, can only be understood in terms of the early pragmatic philosophers' critique of Hegel's epistemology, especially Peirce and Dewey. This is the reason why Hegel's influence on the philosophical base of p4c is indirect and primarily antithetical in nature. In the second section of the article, I will examine Hegel´s and Dewey´s pedagogical ideas and their contributions to p4c pointing to some basic Bildung-theoretical challenges for p4c.

1. Community of inquiry as an anti-Hegelian epistemic notion

The 'community of inquiry' forms the heart of p4c. It offers the context in which p4c seeks to cultivate 'higher-order thinking', the prerequisite of reasonableness, which is seen as the ultimate goal of education in a democratic society.[6] 'Higher-order-thinking', in turn, consists of a combination of critical, creative and caring thinking. In what follows I will argue that through these basic concepts p4c ties itself to the philosophical notions originating from Peirce's and Dewey's critique of the epistemological thinking of Hegel as well as Descartes and Kant.[7]

Hegel and Peirce

Peirce rejects Descartes' idea of the beginnings of philosophy in universal doubt. It is an impossible starting-point for philosophical inquiry that, in effect, means the acceptance of all our preconceptions. According to Peirce, individual consciousness, detached from experience - something in which Hegel's dialectical process also finally culminates - is a futile tool for uncovering certainty and truth, leading to full subjectivism that bypasses tradition and especially certain collective forms of human experience. Thus, consciousness and reality, the subject and object cannot meet. Peirce points out that, as individuals, we cannot sensibly hope to achieve the ultimate understanding that we are searching for; it can only be striven for by the community of philosophers.[8] According to Peirce, philosophy should only take as its starting-points premises that can be subjected to careful inquiry and rely more on the number and variety of its arguments rather than on the decisiveness of any one of them. "Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected." [9] This idea put forward by Peirce provides the fundamental idea for Lipman's community of inquiry. But what is it ultimately based on and what is its relationship to Hegel's dialectic?

The most essential epistemological idea in the pragmatist philosophy elaborated by Peirce can be seen in understanding knowledge as a dynamic, evolutionary process, rejecting the Cartesio-Hegelian search for certain knowledge via an individual consciousness purified from experience. For Peirce pragmatism meant, above all, a means to find out the meaning of things. However, it is not ultimately enough here to identify a thing on account of its familiarity, or to be able to formulate its definition. According to Peirce, we can best tell the meaning of a thing by inquiring into the effects that the object in question might have:

> Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. [10]

For Peirce, the actual meaning of a concept, from among its countless possible meanings, is manifested in human action.[11] When we try to establish the meaning of an object, we must therefore study the practical effects that the object in question might have, because only they find an expression through action. Connected with this axiom and his inability to give any satisfactory account of the elements represented in Hegel's categories of dialectic, Peirce developed in his science of phaneroscopy (or phenonemology) his own view of the relationships needed to describe reality.[12] According to him, this only requires three categories - firstness, secondness and thirdness – of which thirdness is the most important and provides at the same time the basis for Peirce's well-known semiotics or theory of signs.[13] According to Peirce,

> A sign ... is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representment.[14]

The use of signs thus requires an interpreter to whom the sign referring to an object can only mean something without revealing all of its aspects. This will lead to the idea of so-called **fallibilism**, according to which knowledge is always more or less uncertain due to the possibility of interpreting the object in endlessly different ways. According to Peirce, "... we never can be absolutely sure of anything, nor can we with any probability ascertain the exact value of any measure or general ratio."[15] As the meaning of a proposition lies in its consequences, which can be verified, and as there is an endless number of possible consequences, the best thing that we can do is to verify the proposition on the basis of probability. Probability does not, however, mean the

same as certainty, whereby it is justifiable according to Peirce to maintain that any statement with regard to reality is potentially untrue and therefore fallible.

Peirce's idea of knowing as a continuous process of belief, habit, action, doubt and inquiry is connected with fallibilism.[16] Dewey later repeats the main characteristics of Peirce's thought, though in somewhat different terms, and regards inquiry in particular as an experimental method. Both of them argue that man's beliefs are firmly connected with action. When an action in accordance with a habit based on a belief does not proceed as expected (so that we experience a felt difficulty) but leads to an unexpected result, a genuine and living doubt (or problematic situation) arises. We do our best to get rid of it, by means of inquiry, to reach a new belief, i.e. a peaceful and satisfied condition which we do not avoid and which we would not like to trade away.[17] From the viewpoint of Hegel's speculations on reaching the Absolute, it is therefore important to note that the result of knowing for Peirce and Dewey is always a temporary belief that can be revised to provide "... a stadium of mental action, an effect upon our nature due to thought, which will influence further thinking".[18]

Inquiry rises from the doubt caused by the conflict between beliefs (Peirce); from an indeterminate situation that is disturbed or unsatisfactory in one way or another, a 'felt difficulty' (Dewey). According to Peirce, the formation of views, and either permanent or momentary balancing of our thoughts and beliefs, takes place in various ways that he appears to think of as certain kinds of developmental stages of inquiry. Dewey talks only about the empirical and scientific experimental method, putting the focus on reflective thinking. Their critique of Hegel's thought gives rise to Peirce's criticism of the so-called a priori method and Dewey's experimental method.[19]

Peirce thinks that the various metaphysical systems provide a good example of the a priori method of inquiry. Here Peirce refers explicitly to Hegel's dialectic. It is based on our innate inclination to adopt views that 'make sense' but which thinks little of experience and observable facts.[20] Although Peirce clearly admires Hegel's intellect and perhaps adopts from him ideas related to the constant change and continuity of the world, he criticizes the a priori method because of its subjectivity and its mixing of inquiry with the development of taste.[21] Later, Peirce's criticism is targeted especially at the one-sidedness of Hegel's thinking. Mere thinking, alone and individually, is not sufficient for understanding reality as it cannot become concrete without action, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act. It is in this very issue that both Peirce, and later Dewey, disclaim the primacy of speculation contained in Hegel's dialectics:

> The truth is that pragmaticism is closely allied to the Hegelian absolute idealism, from which, however, it is sundered by its vigorous denial that the third category (which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking) suffices to make the world, or is even so much as self-sufficient. Had Hegel, instead of regarding the first two stages with his smile of content, held on to them as independent or distinct elements of the triune Reality, pragmaticists might have looked up on him as the great vindicator of their truth.[22]

The 'method of science' has arisen from the insufficiency of the above. Peirce thinks that only it can offer an external and stable basis for our beliefs, thus enabling a correct distinction between right and wrong views. "To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect."[23] External permanence means to Peirce a factor that influences everybody, or potentially everybody such that it is not restricted to single individuals. If such scientific inquiry were continued long enough, it would lead all inquirers to the same result that is not dependent on short-term consequences or personal feelings or purposes, but on the method itself. The fundamental hypothesis of the scientific method thus described by him is that

> There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are and truly are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience he reason enough about it, will be led to the True conclusion. [24]

Combined with what Peirce says in his theory of signs, it seems, however, that Peirce's 'Reals' cannot be based on any absolute starting-point situated outside our minds, in contrast to Hegel's concept of *Geist*. Here Peirce's 'realism' also frees itself from the viewpoint, according to which, reality has an effect on our thinking without being created by it. [25] A reality which is independent of individual human beings' ideas and inquiry means to Peirce an approach to reality as a result of inquiry, and not a starting point that has been set in advance. This fundamental idea of Peirce's epistemology is later reiterated by Dewey, according to whom previous epistemologies have drifted into either empiricism or rationalism (or a combination of them) by making the mistake of assuming that knowledge shall get a grasp of a reality that exists **before** the operations of inquiry, regardless of them or their consequences. Thereby, the logical characteristics of the operations of inquiry are either transferred into the reality given in advance, the conscious world being reduced to atomistic elements, or into a Kantian manifold, or some kind of 'idealistic' or 'realistic' machinery is constructed to bring the two together.[26] For Peirce, the 'Real things' must therefore be assumed only as postulates of inquiry, as "Reals cannot be doubted by anyone ...for, if he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction." As a necessary condition for doubt everyone thus in fact accepts the above-mentioned basic hypothesis. And even though the existence of 'Real things' cannot be proved through inquiry, Peirce maintains that it does not lead to an opposite conclusion either. In addition, everyone uses the scientific method to explore highly varied questions and the experience that we have gathered with it has not led us to doubt its suitability for the formation of views.[27]

Hegel and Dewey

Dewey's criticism of Hegel is directly connected with the above-mentioned inadequacy of the rational thinking of the a priori method that was already put forward by Peirce. Although Hegel questions in his *Phenomenology* the subject-object arrangement contained in Kant's epistemology, proposing their adaptation through the dialectical process, this does not satisfy Dewey at all. In *The Quest for Certainty* (1929) Dewey thinks that despite everything, Hegel's main ambition remains to continue the Cartesian search for certainty in the individual consciousness itself. Dewey considers this to be simply a new formulation of the persistent attempt, reaching all the way to antiquity, to make a distinction between the practical and less valuable changing world and our knowledge about it on the one hand, and the rational reality that is not dependent on man's practical life, seen as a final, unchanging and self-sufficient form of voluntary and self-directed 'pure action', on the other hand. As being or reality is ultimately eternal, divine, perfect and unchanging, it is imagined that it can be reached through rational intuition and described with rational evidence. At its most extreme and best, the changing world thus includes the possibility of achieving the unchanging and the final. According to classical thinking, these two different worlds also mean two different knowledges. One of them, science, is knowledge in the true meaning of the word - rational, necessary and unchanging. It is certain. The other knowledge, connected with the changing world, corresponds to beliefs and views, it is based on experience, is particular and random and is connected with probability, not certainty. This division of being and knowledge, says Dewey, corresponds to the division of action into the pure and rational, on the one hand, and into the practical, based on the needs of a lower realm of physical change, on the other.[28]

Dewey argues that the goal of post-Kant idealistic systems was to overcome the above-mentioned problem of cognitive and practical dualism inherited from antiquity by

combining them, while Kant had, in his own 'critical philosophy,' kept them in force by dividing them. Fichte's approach was to derive the structure and characteristics of the actual world from the necessities set by moral ideals. Hegel did not consider it to be man's moral function to create the world such that it would be in accordance with the ideal, but to take into his possession intellectually and personally the meanings and values already materialized in the real world. In this way Hegel excludes the possibility for man of exerting an active influence on the formation of the world. Hegel tries to prove the 'absolute' nature of the meanings and values in question as manifestations of the Absolute spirit in accordance with the necessary logical development. In this way, Dewey thinks, both Hegel and Fichte preserve, however, the integrity of the old tradition. The ideal authority of truth, goodness and beauty is preserved in the 'ultimate being', in the individual consciousness independent of human experience and practical action in which the 'mind' constructs the object of knowledge "... by some occult internal operation".[29]

From Dewey's point of view, the pursuit of the absolute a priori is ultimately reduced to theology and superstition in the cloak of rationality. Experience with the conventions in question leads to the fact that we do not even think of questioning the premises connected with them. According to Dewey, we assume that only something fully fixed and unchanging can be real, which is why we further do not notice how this kind of a pattern of thought controls our ideas about the mind, consciousness and reflective inquiry.[30] "They all flow - such is my basic thesis - from the separation (set up in the interest of the quest for absolute certainty) between theory and practice, knowledge and action." [31] The attempts to overcome dualism - Dewey is most likely referring here to Hegel's criticism of Kant - have led to a transcendent empire, in which case the pattern of thought in question is, however, preserved, ending "... in a division between things of this world as mere appearances and an inaccessible essence of reality."[32]

Peirce's theory of the scientific method and inquiry also inspired Dewey. In fact, it is in the experimental method of inquiry and in his concept of experience connected with it that Dewey tries to solve the problem of dualism by referring repeated, as does Peirce, to the unsatisfactory nature of Hegel's own dialectic approach. The solution emerging from this criticism of Hegel has an important bearing on p4c. Peirce's identification of several different types of inquiry corresponds in Dewey, however, to the division between the 'empirical' and 'scientific' thinking only. Thinking is not a characteristic of something separate from nature named intelligence or reason, but a way to control external action. It is an intentional effort "... to discover specific conditions between something which we do and the consequences which result, so that the two become continuous."[33] The process of thinking consists of different aspects of thinking (reflection, reasoning, remembering, being suspicious, feeling, understanding, observing, imagining and considering), ranging in its widest sense from everything that takes place in our minds to the more complex ideas of reflective thinking which follow and precede each other (the 'train of thoughts').[34]

'Empirical thinking' is restricted by things that we fail to observe, which is why Dewey thinks that it is finally inadequate. Recalling Hegel's 'abstract understanding', it leads easily to false beliefs, preventing us from coping in new situations, resulting in laziness, prejudice and finally dogmatism.[35] 'Reflective thinking' as an "... active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends..." is inquiry in accordance with the scientific method, by means of which the indeterminate can be changed to be a satisfactory, linked whole again.[36] As the goal of inquiry in fact is to change situations from worse to better, he is clearly including moral and aesthetic implications in his concept of inquiry.[37]

For Dewey, knowing is linked to his idea of how knowledge can be achieved in the dynamics of self and the community, being connected at the same time with the

existence of the whole person. Its main characteristic is, instead of dualistic distinctions, an effort to maintain the continuity of knowing together with action that shapes the environment in a purposeful manner. According to Dewey, knowledge of something consists of all the ways in which our action is expressed intellectually, implying the idea of a merger of theory and practical action. Knowledge is not contemplative or 'from another world' in contrast to the less important realm of practice. Meanings, beliefs and knowledge are connected with consciousness of human activity and its consequences, abandoning the Hegelian cognitive pursuit of absolute certainty by purely mental means. The mind is not any passive observer external to the world, but inside the world as part of it, constructing purposefully and creatively its events and future.[38] Action aims at a goal directed by a theory. Thus theory requires certain actions for it to be seen if the expected results do appear. The test of the truth is based on the consequences and cannot be understood in terms of something passively aimed at or deliberation of the absolute, but as something actively achieved with the help of a guiding theory. True knowledge, claims Dewey, only consists of what has organized our disposition to adapt nature to our needs and to adapt our goals and desires to our life situations. Knowing as an action is about introducing certain dispositions to our consciousness to remove our confusion by forming a connection between ourselves and the world in which we are living.[39]

The world was not, according to Dewey, given as something readily meaningful, and it can become such only through intelligent experimental inquiry. This kind of inquiry cannot lead to a rigid and fixed whole, as the experience of reality always contains unforeseen, new and spontaneous dimensions. Self-correcting inquiry is a continuous process, proceeding through problematic situations and their solutions and through the new solutions thereby arising, and through the new problematic situations arising from them, requiring new solutions. According to Dewey, the scientific attitude could almost be defined as an ability to enjoy a state of doubt that is productively translated into operations of inquiry. The inquirer is a person who 'loves thinking' and is interested in problems for their own sake.[40] A vital feature of Dewey's reflective thinking is concretized in the inquirer: "... to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and protracted inquiry..." [41] A true Copernican revolution means to Dewey that we do not need to reach knowledge to get a grasp of reality. The world such as we experience it **is** the real world.[42]

According to both Peirce and Dewey, knowing is always based on questions posed and on the kind of information that is being sought as well as on the seeker's viewpoint and context.[43] Due to this limitation of human thinking it aims at constant self-correcting and at finding the restrictions on one's own thoughts and theories. Although knowledge is always theoretically conveyed, based on the opinions rising from the conventions of a fallible community of inquiry in a given historical situation, it does not mean that science cannot make progress. According to Peirce, understanding one's own limitations opens up an opportunity for openness and critical thinking together, manifested in a desire to inquire into the new points of view presented on reality. Knowing thus means a social process within the framework of the rules, norms and standards created by man himself in contrast to the Cartesian doctrine of individual experience or Hegelian dialectic incarnation of the spirit. For Peirce "... the very origin of the concepts of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge".[44]

The relationship between p4c and Hegel's philosophy can be perceived on the basis of the analysis of the community of inquiry described above. Its epistemological ideas, i.e. fallibilism, self-correcting and 'knowing in the world', derive largely from the dissatisfaction of Peirce and Dewey with the ontological basis of Hegel's idealistic thinking which preserved dualism and its consequences. Hegel's philosophy as individual knowing, reaching the inevitable process of reality purified from particular

experience in the dialectic process, is restored to the face of the earth in community of inquiry, into man's experience and his search for meaning with the potential to create new things. Hegel's philosophy starts its flight as the Owl of Minerva in the dusk of the night, trying to grasp the reality that is **already** in place. Dewey hands over philosophy to the people to **remake** themselves and the world. Thus the 'critical thinking' typical of p4c, demanding the criteria, sensitivity to the context and self-correcting, as well as the aspects of creative thinking and caring, can be more deeply appreciated from this historical perspective.

2. From the recapitulation of the development of spirit to the educative process

Although Peirce can be considered to be the father of the concept of the community of inquiry, he did not elaborate it in connection with education. Meanwhile Hegel, and especially Dewey, derive pedagogical implications from their basic philosophical approaches. In this second section, I will start by briefly discussing the Bildung-theoretical ideas of Hegel and Dewey, and then reflecting this theme in p4c.

On the Bildung-theoretical perspective of Dewey

As argued in my first article, Hegel derives his ideas on the special question of teaching philosophy directly from the basic thoughts of his philosophy of the spirit. The truth, the absolute, can only be reached as the end result of a long and laborious dialectical process supported by the school institution as a particularly important form of the development of the spirit. Hegel's main thought, also defining philosophy teaching, is therefore that the condition for the achievement of the genuinely philosophical, i.e. real from the individual's point of view, is to go through repeatedly the conflicting developmental stages of the spirit while realising the unity of knowing and its object - learning to swim by going into the water. In other words, the actual content of Hegel's teaching of philosophy lies in his own system of the development of the spirit. Within its framework, abstract understanding, its breakage in the dialectical movement, and the speculation revealing the original abstractions as non-absolute moments, shall be reproducible in pedagogical mediation. In the process of Bildung the educative influence (*erziehung*) is inevitable. As we recall, it was difficult for Hegel to put these fundamental ideas into effect in his practical teaching. Particularly erroneous in Hegel's opinion was starting with the 'practical exercises' and going straight into the speculative as demanded by Niethammer. He ended up instead starting with the abstract that was immediately present in the pupil's life-world, such as freedom and law, which in the gymnasium still only form the prephilosophical basis for later speculative thinking or proper studies in philosophy at a university.

In his letters Hegel considers only once the possibility of teaching philosophy (simple, easy to understand logic) to children younger than gymnasium students, i.e. children younger than fourteen. The reasons that he gives for this are their obedience and confidence in authority and the fact that people of this age are less interested in the external characteristics of things or emotions connected with them than older gymnasium students are.[45] On the other hand, Hegel lived in a time in which the ideas of romanticism (e.g. Rousseau) also influenced the conception of childhood. At the turn of the 19th century, childhood was discovered as an important, qualitatively unique experience with a value per se, and not just as preparation for adulthood. In 'playful pedagogy' this was seen in the requirement for so-called natural growth, as a consequence of which an effort was made to link school education to the child's changing needs and capabilities. The spontaneous, pure, innocent and happy childhood was to be protected and continued as long as possible. As we have noted above, Hegel took a highly reserved attitude to this, considering that it meant pedagogically inadequate one-sidedness that lost its content. This does not, however, mean that Hegel did not understand the psychological dimension of education. This can be seen, among other things, in the themes with which he thought that the teaching of philosophy should be started. Thus the ideas of romanticism also had an

effect on Hegel and could be seen in his theory of the family in particular.[46] Although romanticism did find a totally new, polymorphous level of life in childhood, it still took up a prejudicial attitude towards the child's capacity to think. It was considered primitive compared to the adults, yet it was thought to be capable of gradual growth. As philosophy had been by definition for centuries a complicated and enormously difficult branch of science, it is obvious that it could not touch upon the child of the 19th century.[47] Hegel did not make an exception in this respect; teaching philosophy to children younger than gymnasium pupils was not a topical issue for him.

Like Hegel, Dewey also tries to contribute to the philosophical theme in education. In fact, Dewey maintains that his philosophy is no less than the general theory of education.[48] In the important work on educational philosophy from his later stages entitled *Experience and Education* (1938) Dewey, however, tries not only to construct education on the very basis of his above-mentioned philosophy of experience, but also from the autonomous nature of pedagogy that is not just derived from the notions of philosophy or psychology.[49] The book ends with Dewey's important statement:

> The basic question concerns the nature of education with no qualifying adjectives prefixed. What we want and need is education pure and simple, and we shall make surer and faster progress when we devote ourselves to finding out just what education is and what conditions have to be satisfied in order that education may be a reality and not a name or a slogan. It is for this reason alone that I have emphasized the need for a sound philosophy of experience.[50]

For Dewey, the basic problems involving pedagogic action connected with the process of Bildung are resolved in the nature of the educational experience as the intertwining of the continuity of experience with the subjective-objective interaction in the educational process. Here knowing is understood as action, as experimental method, as reflective thinking to solve an experienced difficulty. So it is possible, in teaching, to control the objective circumstances through which a more mature educator judges and conducts the continuity of experience of a less mature student. For Dewey the experience, which is always the actual life-experience of some individual, does not occur in a vacuum but **interacts** with objective conditions i.e. the total set-up of situations in which a person is engaged including what is done by the educator and the way in which it is done (e.g. words and the tone of voice, equipment, books, apparatus, toys, games played etc.). In this idea of education adapting the subjective and objective Dewey actually rejects the one-sided Either/Or extremes that have been connected with it. According to Dewey, experience does not go on simply inside a person, nor is any subject of instruction as such, educative or conducive to growth. There is no such thing as educational value in the abstract, states Dewey.[51] Education as growth or maturity or as a desire to go on learning is for Dewey an ever-present social process that does, however, require the adaptation of the subjective and objective as the educator's active influence. This Bildung-theoretical way to read Dewey brings to the surface new ingredients in his pedagogical thinking left out of typical interpretations in theories of learning.[52] This thematic, which Dewey unfortunately does not develop any further, opens up a new perspective for conceptualising the educational process in the community of inquiry as well.

As the actual reality, the Absolute, is ultimately to be found behind everything in Hegel's teleological system, the institution of education is manifested only as a support for this inevitable process of realizing a decided end result, with pedagogical action also deriving its meaning from this end. Dewey's criticism of Hegel's epistemology leads him to an open field of pedagogical action based on the unity of the adaptation of the continuity and interaction of experience, yet preserving the way to perceive pedagogical action that is typical of Hegel and modern educational thought in general. Education emerges through it not only as the generator of individual growth but also as an essentially important ally for social and political reform, in which 'inquiry' is not

interest-free or value-free. It not only aims at the achievement of knowledge and understanding but is also explicitly a means of changing the world for the better.

Lipman's educative philosophical experience

Dewey thinks that the scientific method, i.e. reflective thinking, is not the sole right of an elite of scientists but belongs to all intellectually active people in their everyday lives. He thinks that it is of particular importance in teaching in which it shall be linked to action on the one hand and to ourselves and the world in which we are living on the other hand.[53] For Dewey, "...Thinking is the method of intelligent learning, of learning that employs and rewards mind ... the method of intelligent experience in the course which it takes."[54] Dewey is, however, strongly opposed to teaching thinking as a separate skill, and also to teaching special skills without thinking. This Hegelian idea has subsequently been conveyed into one of the basic theses of p4c, providing the theoretical content for Lipman's 'teaching **for** thinking' as well as the concepts 'higher-order-thinking', 'complex thinking' and 'thinking in the disciplines'.[55]

It would appear at first glance that Dewey - and thereby also Lipman - only repeat Hegel's requirements for the importance of the abstract and also for the unity of content and form. It must be noted, however, that for Hegel these ideas are linked to the reproduction of the developmental process of the spirit which is necessary for freedom, in which they constitute the condition for the feasibility of achieving the actual Absolute that has already been assumed to exist. Quite as we have observed above, Dewey aimed at refuting this epistemology proposed by Hegel, which is why the focus on the pupil's life-world as well as the requirement for the unity of content and form are relevant to him on different grounds. Whereas individual experience is only an abstract and necessary intermediate stage of the dialectical process for Hegel, it is the dynamic basis of all knowledge for Dewey. Dewey thinks that thinking that is not meaningful to the pupil in separate skills leaves him at the mercy of his own routine habits and other people's authoritative control, finally resulting in the largest obstacle of all for educative experience and thereby for growth, which for Dewey is not only physically but intellectually and morally one exemplification of the principle of continuity.[56] Awareness of the causes and consequences of thinking means signification of things, resulting in increased intellectual freedom and thereby more plentiful options and alternatives. On the other hand, the results of any inquiry cannot be understood if they are detached from the process of inquiry that produced them.

For Lipman these Deweyan ideas mean education enriched by the **philosophical experience.** This involves engaging children in 'reflective reading', 'reflective questioning' and 'reflective discussion' i.e. by inquiry or self-corrective practice as the quest for meaning through the problem-solving heuristic.[57] On this basis, Lipman criticizes the traditional school education that has drifted aimlessly along under the dominance of Piagetian principles as well as the programs of the so-called critical thinking movement due to their lack of conceptual significance.[58] Dewey's philosophy, arising from the criticism of Hegel as a practice that genuinely touches on all people's lives and problems as well as the changed ideas of childhood, also acquires its pedagogical value for Lipman from the viewpoint of democratic citizenship. In his reconstruction of philosophy, Lipman aims at a situation where children philosophize under the guidance of their teacher on issues that they experience as meaningful to themselves in particular. With Lipman emphasizing that this is explicitly about **starting** to study philosophy, his thought would appear to coincide with Hegel. If we take a closer look, this is not really the case. Although it is necessary for Hegel to start from the abstract understanding - i.e. that which is natural and spontaneous to the pupil - it is only an intermediate stage, disengagement from which postulates true philosophy as pure thinking freed from individual experience. Via Dewey, Lipman maintains the ontological status of individual experience which in education, however, is not determined and developed in whatever random or merely indirect way, but

expanded, under the guidance of the teacher, by the help of philosophical fiction actually based on the very history of philosophy. In his novels Lipman dramatizes it for the reach of children (Philosophy *for* Children). It would be a bonus later, says Lipman, if pupils became interested in philosophy also as an academic field of study. On the basis of the above Lipman does not, however, mean that this should take place at the expense of what is significant to the pupil.

Is there any room for dialectic in Lipman's thought? In his book entitled *Vygotskian Dialogues* (1996), he discusses in passing the dialectic of moving from the abstract to the concrete.[59] Referring to Davydov and obviously also agreeing with him, Lipman insists on encouraging the conveyance of the child's immediate and concrete experience to the abstract if we are to encourage them to understand the general forms of action. This leads Lipman to further consider the conflicting relations between knowledge and experience in terms of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Through analyses of Davydov, Lipman also ponders on whether moving dialectically from the abstract to the concrete is typical of all higher-order thought. "To teach children to move intellectually in this fashion is simply to have them to learn the way scientists learn, using abstractions, generalizations and theoretical concepts."[60] Lipman thinks, however, that moving from the abstract to the concrete cannot be a universally valid pedagogical formula, as he supposes that the architecture of thinking in the case of both children and adults consists of constant oscillation between the general and particular.[61] It can be considered that this idea is derived directly from Dewey's concept of experience, which is not, however, elaborated by Lipman from the viewpoint of the theory of Bildung. Lipman does not pose the theoretical questions of the possibility of an individual process of Bildung and of what happens when the educatee becomes a subject.

For Lipman, dialecticality is connected above all with philosophical materials designed for children. The characters in the stories manifest different ways of knowing and experiencing that conflict with each other (the optic versus the haptic; men's versus women's; the logical versus the developmental; the experimental versus the intuitive; the analytical versus the empirical and so on). "They fall into oppositions that have to be transcended."[62] So, this is not about reproduction of the dialectical process typical of Hegel in education, but rather about enriching experience through an inquiry of different styles of experiencing. Lipman's reluctance to write a traditional textbook of philosophy is connected with this. The idea is to transfer the pupil's attention through conflicting and vague philosophical fiction from the teacher to the text to questioning. Yet the teacher is also for Lipman the bearer of the content of philosophy through Socratic questioning, though he doubts that teacher as a model of good thinking alone is sufficient to bring improvement in the way students think.[63] I think that this approach is largely based on problems similar to those experienced by Hegel in his own philosophy teaching and presentation of his *Propedeutics*.

Although Lipman thinks that children are philosophically sensitive, it does not follow that they can find on its basis only and alone, the meanings for which they search.[64] Children's social impulsiveness must, however, be assumed as the starting-point for influencing the educatee. Translated into Dewey's manner of speaking, it is a question of the process of adapting the subjective and objective in which educative experiences are produced for the children. In Lipman's case this can be formulated as an attempt to show, with the help of philosophy, issues that attract and satisfy their curiosity in a constructive manner. For Lipman "... all educational situations involve adult mediation between the culture and the child," and so the teacher is the absolute pedagogical authority in the educational community of inquiry.[65] This means, however, "...an opportunity for the teacher to demonstrate not so much the authority of rule-enforcer as the sagacity of the expert in pedagogy".[66] With the help of philosophy, the teacher can add to the children's endless capacity to wonder, to have a consciousness of the fundamental enigmas of existence that most children without

guidance only have a faint idea of, maintains Lipman. Children shall be helped to think better, so that they can, for instance, estimate their own reasoning and its grounds and avoid fragmentation of their thinking. Although philosophy cannot provide the ultimate meanings, it can convey to the children the idea of the possibility and profitability of searching for meanings connected with their own lives. According to Lipman, children shall be guided to think in ways that add to the experience of meaning in their lives. Thus, for Lipman philosophy in education aims to actively generate the educative process.

So, it seems that Lipman´s 'education' is not just a theory of learning. But even though he clearly avoids the problems of principle connected for example with constructivism (i.e. the idea of the subject constructing the world independently) in his educational thought, his ultimate way to understand pedagogical action still remains slightly unclear. The epistemology of the community of inquiry as well as the influence of Mead´s and Vygotsky´s ideas would seem to turn Lipman's education into interactionism, i.e. the idea of producing a subjective identity intersubjectively in 'socializing interaction'.[67] The problem then is how this intersubjectivity can exist before and without education and how the above-mentioned authoritative position of the educator adapts to it. Based on Mead, Lipman seems to maintain that the starting-point for education is the child that is **already** social.[68] But does he confuse here the child's social impulsiveness and plasticity with the goal of education? If we assume that the child is already social or capable of intersubjectivity before his education, education is basically not needed any more. In the p4c movement this interactionist educational thought can also be found in a more straightforward form than that advocated by Lipman. The attempt to rehabilitate childhood as a form of knowing and being with a value per se, together with a dialogic perception of the relation between the adult and child in education as well as a banishment of the power relation between them, avoids the basic problems involving education and the process of Bildung in modern pedagogy, of being thereby threatened by the loss of education in a theoretical sense.

Endnotes

[1] Rorty, R. 1991, 96.

[2]When I speak about the theoretical background of p4c, I am referring in this paper mostly to the analyses presented by Matthew Lipman in his various books. In addition to Peirce and Dewey, from the early pragmatists it is important also to mention here G.H. Mead. See e.g. Lipman 1996, xii-xv; 7-8.

[3] "Supplied a demand for unification that was doubtless an intense emotional craving, and yet was a hunger that only an intellectualized subject-matter could satisfy.. ..The sense of divisions and separations, that were I suppose, borne in upon me as a consequence of a heritage of New England culture, divisions by way of isolation of self from the world, of soul from body, of nature from God, brought a painful oppression - or rather, they were an inward laceration ... Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human culture, of institutions and the arts, involved the same dissolution of hard-and-fast dividing walls, and had a special attraction for me.... I should never think of ignoring, much less denying, what an astute critic cationally refers to as a novel discovery - that acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking. " (Dewey 1930 in Russell 1961, 192). See also Dewey 1973.

[4] See Lipman 1991, 105: Lipman 1996, 21, 47-51.

[5] Juuso 2002.

[6] For example, Lipman 1991, 64-65.

[7] Important writings by Pierce from the viewpoint of my topic include at least the following: *The Fixation of Belief, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism, The Principles of Phenomenology, Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs, Some Consequences of Four Incapacities* and *The Essentials of Pragmatism.* Hereafter I will refer to these writings of Peirce collected and edited by Justus Buchler in Philosophical Writings of Peirce (1955) as PWP. Dewey's works *How We Think* (1910) - called hereafter HWT, *The Quest for Certainty* (1929) – called hereafter QC and *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938) – called hereafter LTI, are essential in this respect.

[8] PWP, 229. See also West 1989, 44.

[9] ibid., 229.

[10] ibid., 31. Peirce adopted the term "pragmatism" from Kant who used it in his "Metaphysics of Morality" in distinction from the "practical". Kant used the latter term in connection with a priori moral laws, while the former term was connected with rules based on artistic and technical experience and open to experience. As an empiricist and logician, Peirce was interested in the art and technique of thinking, especially in the clear presentation of concepts, whereupon he started to use the term pragmatism (Dewey 1925).

[11] The prevalent conception about pragmatism is that it considers the truth to be "that which works" without really asking what "working" originally meant in this connection in Peirce's philosophy. Dewey thinks that the general erroneous interpretations of pragmatism are connected with this very fact. It has been claimed so far as pragmatism is concerned that "...it makes action the end of life" and that it "... subordinates thought and rational activity to particular ends of interest and profits" (Dewey 1925). Although Peirce's theory includes as an essential part a certain relationship to action, human behaviour, it means according to Dewey, however, understanding action as something that conveys, not the "praise" of action as an end in itself. Because concepts can be manifested in many different ways, they can also have several different meanings. A concept cannot thus be restricted to a certain special case, as it is possible for us to understand its more general meaning. According to Dewey, Peirce's theory thus means opposition to thinking in which the meaning of a concept is linked to the achievement of an individual result and even more linking it to a personal goal.

[12] See *The Principles of Phenomenology* in PWP, 74-97. The essay in question actually consists of scattered notes written by Peirce that Buchler collected and headlined as mentioned. See footnote on page 74 in the book in question.

[13] The categories in question derive from the monadic, dyadic and triadic relation. By a monadic relation Peirce refers to a relation that is immediately perceptible to us (e.g. "the apple is sweet"), while a dyadic relations refers to a relation between two different things (e.g. "Peter is Lisa's brother") and a triadic relation means a relation between three or more things (e.g. "Peter gives Lisa a present"). For more on this topic, see Peirce's essay *Logic as semiotic: The theory of Signs* in PWP, 98-119. .

[14] PWP, 99.

[15] ibid., 58.

[16] The meanings of the concepts in question and the relations between them are examined by Pierce in his essays entitled *The fixation of belief* (1877) in PWP, 5-22; *How to make our ideas clear* (1878) in PWP, 23-41 and *The essentials of pragmatism* (1905) in PWP, 251-268.

[17] PWP, 10-11.

[18] ibid., 10-11; 28-29. Later Peirce – criticizing different interpretations of pragmatism – specifies more closely the concept of belief, connecting it with the understanding of truth. Peirce finds that a belief is as *ipso facto* true meaning simply a single unconscious habit lasting a certain length of time that, similarly to other habits – until it encounters a surprise – is "fully satisfied with itself" (PWP, 256-258). In reducing the truth to a belief that we cannot doubt, Peirce would seem to anticipate the analysis of the

categories of knowing and certainty put forward by Wittgenstein in his late philosophy.

[19] For Peirce's lower stages of the development of inquiry (i.e. the "method of tenacity" and the "method of authority") see PWP, 12-14.

[20] William James's (1948, 159-176) criticism of the traditional, so-called intellectual way of thinking can be seen in his comparisons of the thinking of intellectualists and pragmatists in terms of the theory of truth. According to him, both the pragmatists and the intellectualists agree that truth is about a relation between "agreement" and "reality". A disagreement arises, however, as soon as one starts discussing what those concepts exactly mean "... when reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with." James thinks that the intellectualists assume the truth to mean an essentially inert static relation that leads to understanding the truth as a final state. Whereby "... you're in possession; you **know**; you have fulfilled your thinking destiny. You are where you ought to be mentally; you have obeyed your categorical imperative; and nothing more need follow on that climax of your rational destiny. Epistemologically you are in stable equilibrium" (ibid., 169. Note James' polemic reference to Kant in this quotation). The term 'intellectualists' used by James is most likely due to a one-sided focus on rational thinking as a tool of acquiring knowledge. The intellectualists among whom James undoubtedly also counts Hegel clearly represent to him a Cartesian way of thinking known as the correspondence theory of truth.

[21] I am referring here to Peirce's ideas influenced by Hegel of "tychism", "synechism", "agapism" and "evolutionary love" (see PWP, 354-374).

[22] PWP, 267.

[23] ibid., 18.

[24] ibid., 18.

[25] Peirce adopted the realistic way of thinking from Duns Scotus (1270- 1308). See e.g. West 1989, 50-53; Yrjönsuuri 1996.

[26] QC, 160, 229-250.

[27] PWP, 18-19.

[28] QC, 17-20, 136-155, 229-250. See also Dewey 1917.

[29] ibid., 19, 49-52.

[30] ibid., 21-22.

[31] ibid., 24.

[32] ibid., 25.

[33] Dewey 1916, 152.(Hereafter DE).

[34]HWT, 3.

[35] ibid., 145-149.

[36] ibid., 6; see also LTI, 104-105.

[37] Lipman (1993), for instance, finds that Dewey's "inquiry" is not interest-free or value-free and that it does not only aim at achieving knowledge and understanding but that it is specifically a way to make the world better. Rorty's view about the most important perspective of Dewey's thought is also connected with this issue. Rorty (1991, 17) thinks that it is Dewey's idea of man's ability change and to change himself - "...change from a sense of their dependence upon something antecedently present to a sense of utopian possibilities of the future, the growth of their ability to mitigate their finitude by a talent for self-creation."

[38] QC, 232; see also Dewey 1917, 27.

[39] DE, 344. See also Rosenthal 1993. Cf. Gadamer's theory of "hermeneutical experience" in *Truth and Method* pp. 235-341.

[40] QC, 182. An obvious model for Dewey's view on the scientific attitude has been Peirce's thinking introduced in 1896 in the essay entitled *The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism*, PWP s. 42-59.

[41] HWT, 13.

[42] QC, 235.

[43] Peirce thinks that there is actually nothing new in this thought, as many of the greatest thinkers of all times have considered it to be true. The same has been discussed later also by James (see James 1948, 142-144) and Dewey (see Dewey 1925).
[44] PWP, 247.
[45] Hegel 1984, 395
[46] See Väyrynen 2000. According to Väyrynen, emphases obviously differing from Kant and connected with romanticism can be seen specifically in Hegel's theory of the family and the idea of love connected with it.
[47] See also Lipman et al. 1994, 3-4.
[48] DE, 338.
[49] The idea that the pedagogical problems can be understood only by the concepts of it´s own (*einheimische Begriffe*) derives from Herbart (see Siljander 2000). In the beginning of his *Talks to Teachers* (1899/1913) William James - referring to Herbart - maintains the same thing.
[50] Dewey 1938/1968, 90-91 (called hereafter EE).
[51] EE, 46.
[52] See e.g. Pikkarainen 2000.
[53] "It is, however, as true in the school as in the university, that the spirit of inquiry can be got only through and with the attitude of inquiry. The pupil must learn what has meaning, what enlarges his horizon, instead of mere trivialities. He must become acquainted with truths instead of things that were regarded as such fifty years ago or that are taken as interesting by the misunderstanding of a partially educated teacher. It is difficult to see how these ends can be reached except as the most advanced part of the educational system is in complete interaction with the most rudimentary." (Dewey 1990, 78-79.)
[54] DE, 153
[55] See Lipman 1991, 17-18, 23-25, 185, 263-264.
[56] EE, 36.
[57] See e.g. Lipman 1991, 105-108; Lipman 2001.
[58] See e.g. Lipman 1994. Lipman speaks about the lack of the abstract suffered by children. It must be noted here that Hegel used the concept of the abstract in a different sense.
[59] Lipman 1996, 45-50, 56-57, 63. The book in question consists of fact and fiction written in the form of a dialogue, which is why its interpretation involves more problems than usual. The dialectic of the abstract and concrete is, of course, conveyed to the so-called Soviet psychologists (e.g. Vygotsky, Leontyev, Luria, Davydov etc.) from Hegel via Marx.
[60] ibid., 49.
[61] ibid., 56.
[62] ibid., 50-51.
[63] Lipman 1991, 185.
[64] ibid., 105.
[65] ibid., 177; Juuso 1994.
[66] Lipman 2001.
[67] About the theories of loosing education, see more in Siljander 2000.
[68] Lipman 1991, 230. See also Mead 1993.

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Plato's legacy: how to do philosophy

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Introduction

Although it has its origins earlier, philosophy as we know it in the West took its shape from the Socrates of Plato's Dialogues. It is not implausible to regard the Dialogues as heuristic devices designed for engaging in philosophical inquiry. As such, they would model the process of philosophical inquiry as well as illustrate the common pitfalls or errors to avoid when engaging in such inquiry. So it will not be surprising to see Socrates, the character of the Dialogues, modeling questionable, even poor, inquiry techniques as well as good; admonishing other characters for poor technique and reminding them of lessons they should have learned earlier in their tuition. Plato presumably would expect students reading and role-playing a Dialogue to recognise when and where such instances occur. It is instructive then to take a close look at one of the longer dialogues featuring Socrates engaging in such inquiry, not with an untutored interlocutor, but with a professional, the sophist Protagoras, in order to identify the features of the inquiry itself. For this will reveal something of what Plato conceived to be the activity of philosophy to which we are the heirs. The *Protagoras* can be read as an illustration (not a definition) of how to do philosophy. And to aid this reading, I propose to focus on the logical form of the inquiry, the moves made by the characters and the techniques displayed, rather than the adequacy of the substantive arguments they mount.

Argument v. debate

The dialogue, *Protagoras,* is complicated by the fact that Plato has Socrates playing two different roles: that of mentor to the youthful Hippocrates, and that of enquirer into the questions of the nature of virtue or human excellence, and whether or not it can be taught. In the former role we see Socrates jesting with friends, chiding Hippocrates and reminding him (and the readers) of general principles acquired in earlier studies by directing discussion along avenues they have been down before. The latter role he enters when engaged in argument (rather than debate) with Protagoras about whether the excellence the sophist professes to teach can really be taught at all. In this Dialogue, Plato explicitly distinguishes between argument and debate. At one point the discussion becomes rather acrimonious with Socrates threatening to retire from the engagement, but we see others intervene to soothe their tempers and appeal to both to argue the topic and not to debate it:

> for whereas argument is conducted amicably among friends, debate takes place between antagonists and adversaries. The former will be the most proper atmosphere for our discourse. For you, by speaking in this spirit, will win our respect, not praise (respect being the sincerely felt disposition of us, your audience, as opposed to praise, which is a frequently insincere verbal expression of regard); while we, by listening, shall experience delight, not pleasure (delight being an intellectual feeling experienced by one engaged in the activity of thought and learning, as opposed to pleasure, which is an agreeable sensation, accompanying such purely physical activities as eating). 337b

Clearly Plato takes the satisfaction of philosophy to be intellectual appreciation of the activity, the moves made in the argument process - the elegance and style of the process, rather than physical experience of pleasure at seeing a rival beaten in debate. So it is the moves that Socrates and Protagoras make in their discourse that reveal to us just what Plato regarded as good (and poor) philosophy.

Conceptual Analysis

The dialogue opens with a play on the word "beauty" when Socrates is teased by a friend for chasing after the youthful Alcibiades, a reputedly handsome young man

(309). Socrates replies that although Alcibiades was there, he scarcely noticed him. To which his friend asks with mock amazement whether this was because Socrates had encountered a greater beauty. "Yes, very much so," Socrates replies. "You found him so beautiful that he actually seemed fairer than Alcibiadies?" he is asked. "Is not the greatest wisdom likely to be the greater beauty?" responds Socrates, in a play on words, shifting the sense of 'beauty' from appraisal of physical to mental attributes.

So right from the start of the Dialogue Socrates, as mentor, reminds us of ways in which words can be used with different meanings. As other dialogues feature similar word plays, it seems that Plato regards philosophical inquiry as one aimed at clarity by being explicit about the way in which one is using words, which can be used in different contexts where they take on different meanings. We might call this skill conceptual analysis, the ability to clarify a concept by exploring the meanings the concept word can acquire when used in different contexts. What one is acquiring in doing philosophy is a *sensitivity to* the relationship between words and the *context* in which they are deployed. This is made explicit in the Protagoras when Socrates calls on the sophist Prodicus, referring to him as the one who likes to make distinctions between things, to clarify whether a certain poet meant 'bad' or 'terrible' when he used the word 'hard' in a poem they are explicating. Furthermore, as Hubbard and Karnofsky (1982, 67) point out in their commentary on the *Protagoras*, the Greek word 'kalos' is used at various times to mean 'beautiful', 'good', 'noble', 'admirable', 'esteemed', sometimes in fun to make a pun, and at other times seriously to clear up ambiguity in the usage. Plato seems to regard facility in conceptual analysis as one of the important techniques of philosophy. This emphasis on conceptual analysis is probably best illustrated nowadays in what has become known as analytical philosophy. But in any branch of philosophy, care for meaning, for connecting concepts that should be connected, distinguishing what should be distinguished and realising the role of context in appraising meaning are all preconditions for serious consideration of substantive philosophical questions.

In his Dialogues, Plato exercises us in this facility by exploring the ways in which a word acquires different meanings in different contexts. This is most often done by the use of examples, counter examples, similes and analogies. He also shows that such knowledge can be used for good or ill: to clarify, in a genuine exploration of a concept, the logical implications of a particular usage; or to obfuscate, and by shifting between meanings (equivocation), confuse opponents in debate in order to defeat them (a sophist trick). Mention was made earlier of Plato's distinction between argument and debate in the *Protagoras* which neatly illustrates this point.

Logic

If conceptual analysis is one skill, logical reasoning is another important skill to be mastered for effective philosophical inquiry. Throughout the dialogue, both Socrates and Protagoras are seen to use several logical rules for ascertaining the validity of arguments they are advancing in order to determine when their inquiry is reaching a dead-end, thus triggering a move to explore another avenue in their discussion. Although logic was not formalised until later (by Aristotle, one of Plato's more famous pupils) the dialogues illustrate Socrates' and Plato's explorations of different argument forms in order to discount certain particular argumentative moves. **But more than this, Plato, through Socrates, is urging us to recognise that philosophical inquiry is a disciplined activity in two senses: firstly of establishing a clear goal for the activity and sticking to it, that is, staying on track; and secondly of avoiding logical errors so that the whole argumentative inquiry moves validly to its conclusion.** I will try to indicate where these moves of conceptual clarification and logical reasoning occur as we peruse the *Protagoras* to better illustrate philosophy in action.

Socratic questioning

After the opening play on "beauty" the dialogue moves to the incident which sparks the inquiry - the young Hippocrates calls on Socrates to help convince Protagoras to accept him as a pupil. Socrates is happy to encourage seekers after wisdom but asks Hippocrates just what his aim is in attaching himself to Protagoras in this way. (It transpires that Hippocrates has no clear idea). This is the emphasis on clearing up the end or goal of an activity or inquiry, so that it doesn't become a literally aimless exercise. But it is the *way* in which Socrates goes about reminding us of this that is instructive - by judicious questioning. Here we see the technique of pursuing an inquiry by means of directed questioning (known as Socratic questioning). Socrates' questions are deliberately chosen to control the inquiry, not in the sense of pre-empting the answers but in pointing out the avenue along which the inquiry is to proceed. (Even today trainee teachers are reminded that every good question contains within it, the kernel of the answer). Socrates does this with a series of examples and analogies to illustrate the sort of answer he has in mind so that the inquiry builds deliberately in a certain direction; it is not a free ranging affair. (While Socrates is perhaps more substantively, as opposed to procedurally, active in the inquiry than a Philosophy for Children teacher might be suggested to be, there are still things to be learned about the role of the more senior inquirer of a pair in dialogue.)

Hippocrates has complained that Protagoras is not making him wise (by just listening in on conversations) so he wishes to pay for instruction. "So, Socrates inquires (311), "You propose to pay him a fee in his capacity as a .... what? With the expectation of becoming a .... what? For instance, you would pay Hippocrates of Cos in his capacity as a .... what? (doctor) With a view to becoming a .... what? (a doctor). So it transpires (after several such hints from Socrates) that Hippocrates is apparently aiming to become, heavens forbid (they exclaim), a sophist! No way! (312a)

Socrates agrees to go with him to ask Protagoras just what Hippocrates will gain by associating with him. To which Protagoras replies that Hippocrates will become a better man (318). But better *at what*? And again Socrates takes charge of the conversation with his directed questions using the analogy of an apprentice to a sculptor, to a painter, to a musician. Protagoras obliges with: *at* good planning and conduct of his own and the city's affairs - what Socrates interprets as good citizenship and citycraft (public policy and administration).

Rehearsal of familiar arguments

At this point Socrates breaks out of his role as mentor to Hippocrates and declares that he didn't think *this* sort of excellence or practical wisdom could be taught (319b). To support his claim he uses the example of the practice of the Athenians in the public assembly of allowing only experts to advise on technical matters (construction of ships and public buildings), for such knowledge can be taught (by experts) and learnt by apprentices. When the issue at hand is one of public policy and general conduct of the city's affairs (choice among competing goals, setting priorities among approved goals for the city), anyone at all is allowed to speak, all views are considered, for no one is regarded as an *expert* on what is *best* for the city. Likewise, he points to the example of famous good citizens who are unable to pass on their excellence (good judgment, wise conduct) to their own children.

Since it is taken for granted that the Athenians are the wisest of people and hence the best judges, their practice is held to be the criterion of truth by both Socrates and Protagoras. And their practice, Socrates points out, indicates that such excellence, both personal and public, cannot be taught. Yet he declares himself willing to learn otherwise from Protagoras.

Now Socrates has not simply given an anecdote with his examples, he has mounted a logical argument (technically known as the method of denial) to assert the truth of his claim. The argument has the following form:-

Premise 1: On matters the Athenians think can be taught, only experts are allowed to advise the Assembly

Premise 2: (But) the Athenians allow non-experts, anyone at all, to speak and advise the Assembly on matters of public policy,

Conclusion: (So) matters of public policy are matters that Athenians think cannot be taught.

Premise 2 is a denial of the consequent of Premise 1 (only experts are allowed to advise)

The argument can be given in symbolic form as follows:

Premise 1: If p then q (where p = matters Athenians think can be taught; and q = only experts can advise)

Premise 2: not q (not only experts, but anyone, can advise)

Conclusion: not p (public policy is a matter Athenians think cannot be taught)

or, more succinctly, If p then q; not q, then not p.

(And the argument could go on with a further premise that whatever Athenians think to be the case is the case to the conclusion that matters of public policy are matters that cannot be taught).

The dialogues feature two major argument forms that were to be later formalised by Aristotle into the method or way of affirmation (modus ponens) and the method or way of denial (modus tollens) for establishing the validity of the conclusion drawn from earlier postulates or premises in the argument. Socrates, we saw above, used the method of denial to affirm the truth of his conclusion. Now Plato has Protagoras illustrate the other method of affirmation to assert the truth of his position. Later we see Plato introduce a tactic (conversion) to show how these methods can be abused.

Not to be outdone, Protagoras offers to demonstrate the truth of his position (that such excellence can be taught) while accounting for Socrates' observations about excellence in two ways, firstly with a mythical story and secondly with an argument. His story about how mankind, being devoid of natural means of offence and defence (having no fur, wings, claws, predatory teeth, or speedy legs to outrun prey or escape from predators) must agree to unite (civilise) into communities for mutual survival by moderating their selfish behaviour, is also used by later philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, to account for the origins of social justice. In Protagoras' version, while Epimetheus hands out various powers disproportionately to all creatures then has none left for mankind, Zeus, to ensure their survival, gives all men an equal sense of justice and shame enabling them to unite, cooperate and live peaceably together in cities. The point of the story is somewhat obscure in that it seems to agree with Premise 2 of Socrates' argument in that anyone has as much entitlement as anyone else to advise on matters of public good (as each is equally capable by way of divine endowment) for there is not a restriction to a subset (those who are expert). But perhaps it is that Protagoras is not inclined to accept Socrates' view that this is because such 'excellence' is not a matter of expertise and is rather of the view that some expertise is innate in all. And, of course, it being innate does not mean that it cannot be improved upon further by teaching. Such a construal allows Protagoras to maintain consistency as he does not have to deny the authority of Athenian views as truth, an authority both he and Socrates accept as shared ground. Whatever Protagoras had in mind however, one trouble with the story, as with all myths, is that there is no way of ascertaining its truth (a point we will return to).

For his argument (324) Protagoras quotes the Athenian practices of child rearing, instruction and schooling through a system of reward and punishment (teaching) to inculcate personal and civil excellence, moderation and good conduct, as instances of the popular belief that these can be taught even though it doesn't always succeed (because poorly taught). Though Zeus endowed all with the appropriate sense of justice and shame, men must be taught to activate and utilize them effectively. So those who are better at achieving this (eg Protagoras) ought to be welcome in any city-state.

Here Protagoras shows himself equal to Socrates at logical argument by employing the tactic of affirming the antecedent of the hypothetical claim to prove the consequent. Such an argument (the method of affirmation) has the form: If p then q; p is true; therefore q is true. Again, the practice of the Athenians, being the wisest of peoples, is to be accepted as the criterion of truth, so the argument is:
Premise 1: If the Athenians think something can be taught, then it can be taught
Premise 2: The Athenians think personal and civil excellence, moderation and good conduct can be taught.
Conclusion: Personal and civil excellence, moderation and good conduct, can be taught.

It is not my intention to go into the fine detail of all the arguments in the text (for that see Taylor, 1991), only to point out the form that their arguments take. Suffice it to say that a reading of the relevant passages would suggest that both Socrates and Protagoras rely on equivocation to argue their respective positions, sliding between different meanings of the words "technique," "excellence," "virtue." Experts may be the best people to determine which means of accomplishing a particular goal is the most cost-effective, for instance, but questions of the best way to govern the city-state revolve around just and unjust ways of treating citizens, and of which goals are the most desirable for the city and the welfare of its citizens. These matters are technical in a different sense than the former, yet these differences are glossed over in the arguments. Plato may well have expected his more astute students to have recognised these equivocations, pointing out that the excellence promoted by reward and punishment is conformity to the social norm, while the excellence Protagoras promised to teach Hippocrates was good judgment and wise conduct. Again there is equivocation on 'good' - as pragmatic good or moral good. And there may be reason for these equivocations in the dialogue. In their commentary, Hubbard & Karnofsky mention that these arguments given by Socrates and Protagoras were well known to all at the time (87), so Plato is merely rehearsing these for the edification of his students. As a teaching aid, the dialogue would not only model forms which argument ought to take but also include deliberate examples of common errors in reasoning for his students to detect, but given the purpose of this paper, there is no need to expose all of these.

In rehearsing the arguments, Plato has illustrated a couple of points, the logical form which valid arguments take (affirming the antecedent, denying the consequent), and an agreed means of establishing the truth of the premises used in the argument forms. In this case the agreed criterion of truth is given as the practice of the Athenians (since they are the wisest of peoples). This suggests that philosophical arguments, in order to be effective need agreement on background matters that are common to all participants. Not only must the rules of validity in terms of which to appraise various moves of argument be agreed upon, but also, in order for an argument to persuade, the hearer must accept its premises. So, it is futile to offer arguments with disputed and unchéckable premises. Arguments with premises derived from myth are a case in point. Finally, when arguing against someone's view, one's argument has to be 'on target'. If he said X and you respond arguing that not-Y, then the criticism fails (though all concerned can be tricked if Y looks as if it means the same as X). What happens when these points are ignored is also illustrated in the dialogue: equivocation

sets in, participants become frustrated, antagonistic and adversarial; the argument degenerates into debate (329-334)

Dialogue

Another point, Plato wrote his philosophical inquiries as dialogues in which the characters ask and answer questions of each other. As it is easy to identify with a character raising a particular question and wanting an answer, this draws us more readily into the action and holds our attention. It's as if Plato is suggesting, that for novices at least, such texts are more appropriate for engaging students than detailed monological treatises. There is no necessary connection of course, it would be possible to write dialogues that are difficult, dry and unattractive to proficient practitioners let alone novices and, for that matter, it is also possible to write engaging monologues.

But further to this, in the questioning dialogue form we see philosophy exercised as the joint operation of more than one person critically exploring a topic. Again, this might be Plato suggesting that progress is more likely this way than one person trying to both advance a position and act as the source of objection (as self critic). Socrates, in encouraging Protagoras, quotes Homer to this effect: "When two go in company, one sees before the other." However, even if this is so, philosophers, if they are to avoid dogma, have to be capable of balanced soliloquy as well - a criticism that can well be made of Descartes' Meditations. The dialogical form of mutual critical exploration may well make progress easier for novices (and, of course, Lipman's Philosophy for Children program was deliberately designed this way). However, a final goal is for philosophers to examine critically their own views.

Socrates as inquirer

These introductory sections of becoming clear about what Hippocrates wants and what Protagoras is offering, in which Socrates plays the part of mentor in leading us to realise the importance of specifying clear goals and in rehearsing some examples of how to reason, are preparation for the main argument in which Socrates plays a different role - that of a genuine inquirer. Plato uses this to demonstrate a few more philosophical moves to advance inquiry. As we have seen so far, the first step is to get a clear and explicit statement of the problem/issue to be examined. But it is the *way* in which Socrates approaches this, with analogies to make his questions clear and to give direction to the inquiry that is exemplary.

Socrates professes to be impressed with Protagoras' demonstration and will be convinced, he declares, if Protagoras can clarify a point for him - whether or not the terms justice, knowledge, moderation, good conduct, wisdom, courage that Protagoras used in his argument are different names for the one thing, excellence, or whether they are names of identifiable parts of the one whole, excellence (329c). Protagoras opts for the latter position, at which point the inquiry begins in earnest, with Socrates again directing the questions as he seeks clarification of the logical nature of the concept under investigation.

He begins by examining the nature of the part-whole relationship in question, using similarities to clarify his query - is it like the parts of the face to the face, or like the parts of a lump of gold indistinguishable from each other and the lump, except in size? Like the face, Protagoras confirms. Does this mean then that each part is unique in function and structure (as the eye is different to the ear)? Yes. So justice is a just kind of thing? Yes. And holiness is a holy kind of thing and not unholy? Yes. So how do we respond to someone who concludes that since justice alone is just, and holiness is a different kind of thing, then holiness is not just and justice is not holy? Especially when we believe that the just is holy and the holy just. In other words, Protagoras' position seems unsatisfactory because it leads to a conclusion that is counter-intuitive, contradicting the common view. Here, Plato appeals to the touchstone of common sense practice, reminding us that whatever position/conclusion we adopt must

somehow accommodate (not necessarily agree with) our intuitive view of things or risk being rejected as mere personal preference or unsound in some way.

Protagoras however, is not entirely satisfied, still wanting to say that justice and holiness are somehow different. So Socrates tries another approach to clarify the error in their argument by working through a series of opposites (332a). Plato uses this to employ another test for invalid argument: self-contradiction. He first has Protagoras agree that the opposite of folly is wisdom, then proceeds through a series: the opposite of good is bad, the opposite of high is low, the opposite of noble is base, the opposite of acting foolishly is acting in a self controlled manner, to establish that each thing has *one single opposite* and no more. Then reviews: the opposite of folly is self-control, but we previously agreed that the opposite of folly is wisdom. Now since we also agree that a thing can have only one opposite and no more, we are in contradiction with ourselves by holding that folly has two different opposites! So we must give up one of our claims these being that a thing can have one opposite only, or that wisdom and self-control are each distinct things (dissimilar in capacity and function as with the parts of the face, and each a part of excellence). These claims, as Socrates puts it, are not in unison, they don't chime in well-tuned harmony together (333a). Protagoras agrees. To resolve the inconsistency, Socrates chooses the option that wisdom and self-control are one and the same thing, just as earlier he had concluded that justice and holiness are one and the same thing.

The point here is not so much the quality of Socrates' argument (which again relies on equivocation, slipping between different meanings for 'opposite' such as 'lacking an inherent characteristic' and 'lacking the defining characteristic'), as it is the *form* of the argument - driving a line of thinking into self-contradiction. For what Socrates regards as the 'clincher' for his position is the demonstration that the contrary position is self-contradictory, and hence false. Although logic had not been formalised in Plato's time, the rule of self-contradiction is one Plato recognises as a final arbiter between a sound and an unsound claim, between good and poor thinking. Self-contradiction is evidently a powerful weapon to aid inquiry by rejecting claims that are demonstrably false, or, as in this case, a set of mutually inconsistent claims, (at least) one of which must therefore be rejected.

And Plato shows that Protagoras also identifies self-contradiction as a flaw when he points to a clash in a poem they decide to explicate. In the discussion Socrates, following Prodicus in making distinctions, suggests that the poem is misunderstood by Protagoras because the placing of the words allows for equivocation between 'being' and 'becoming' which can only be detected by aligning it with a further equivocation in the placing of the word 'willingly' later in the poem (343d -). The point is, however, that Plato uses this incident to illustrate philosophy in action, for as Protagoras is given to say, "... the greatest mark of education in a man is his skill at discussing verses; that is to say, his ability to discriminate what is sound from what is unsound in a poet's writings, and to give a reasoned account in reply to questions" (339a). It must be remembered that for the ancient Greeks, the poets were revered as inspired by the gods and their writings more akin to revelations than self-indulgent musings. Hence correct interpretation was regarded as a fine art not to be undertaken lightly. Giving a reasoned account of a claim to knowledge is evidently the business of philosophical inquiry. Such accounts in the *Protagoras* rely on making distinctions, avoiding self-contradiction and much cross-questioning. This, in a nutshell, is a fine illustration of the activity of philosophy at which Socrates excels. And it is further elaborated upon by the next stage of the dialogue where the discussion turns back to examining the question of whether wisdom, moderation (self-control/good sense), courage, justice and holiness are five names that name the same thing (excellence/virtue), or whether they are names of separate, distinct parts of the one thing, each part being unique in structure and function (as the eye is different from the ear and nose but all are parts of the same face). Socrates had earlier argued that wisdom and moderation are the same

thing, as are justice and holiness. As a result Protagoras modifies his original position that all five are different, conceding that four of them are much the same but that courage is altogether different to the others. This difference is demonstrated by those who are thoroughly unjust, ungodly, unruly and ignorant but nevertheless courageous.

Socrates, who holds that all five qualities are the same, thinks this bears investigation as he sees a close similarity between wisdom and courage. Plato uses the ensuing argument to introduce another tactic to aid inquiry, the use of what is now known as **conversion** (familiar to Philosophy for Children readers of *Harry Sottlemeier's Discovery* as the technique of reversing sentences to check the equivalence of subject and predicate). Socrates proceeds to try to demonstrate his point to Protagoras, as follows:

1. *All the courageous are daring* (to which Protagoras agrees).
2. Daring comes from knowledge. Those who know are more daring than those who don't have the requisite knowledge. For instance, horsemen are more daring on horseback than those who lack knowledge of horses; light infantrymen are more daring than those who don't know how to handle spear, sword and shield. It is reasonable to conclude that those who are most knowledgeable, *the wise, would be the most daring*. (Protagoras agrees.)
3. As *the wise* are the most daring, they *are the most courageous*. Hence wisdom and courage turn out to be more-or-less the same thing (contrary to Protagoras' view).

Socrates argument takes the following form:
Premise 1. *All the courageous are daring*.
Premise 2. *All the wise are daring* (since daring comes from knowledge).
Conclusion 3. Therefore, *all the wise are courageous*.

Note that this argument has the same form as:
Premise 1. All cats are animals.
Premise 2. All dogs are animals.
Conclusion 3. Therefore, all dogs are cats.

This conclusion 3, would only follow if the *converse* of premise 1 (all animals are cats) followed from the original (all cats are animals) and were included in the argument as, say, premise 1a thus:

Premise 1. All cats are animals,
Premise 1a. (So) all animals are cats.
Premise 2. (Now) all dogs are animals.
Conclusion 3. Therefore, all dogs are cats.

The conclusion 3 follows from premises 1a and 2. But of course, it is not true that if all cats are animals (premise 1) then all animals are cats (premise 1a). As the conversion of 1 into 1a fails, the conclusion 3 does not follow from premises 1 and 2. To think that 3 does follow from 1 and 2 is to commit the fallacy of illicit conversion (to think that 1 is the same as 1a).

Likewise, Protagoras points to the illicit conversion in Socrates' argument which would be valid only if the first premise 'all the courageous are daring' was equivalent to, and thus entailed, its converse 'all the courageous are daring'. That this is not so is shown when Socrates accepts Protagoras' observation that some men can do daring things when driven by rage, vengeance, madness, even though they lack the requisite knowledge of horses, or of handling spear, sword and shield. Such men, though daring, are not courageous but crazy or foolhardy. In other words, as not all the daring are courageous the claim that they are is false and not equivalent to the claim that all the courageous are daring (which they accept as true). The conversion is

invalid. Which means that Socrates' argument rests on the fallacy of illicit (invalid) conversion and so fails to show that Protagoras' claim that courage is different is false.

This tactic of conversion is used again when making distinctions between the good, the pleasant, the desirable and the best. Both Protagoras and Socrates use it in their discussion testifying that Plato regarded it as an important tool of philosophical inquiry. In fact much of the discussion can be visualised as an investigation into the validity of various arrangements of Euler circles representing the concepts under investigation. For instance, 'No courageous person is daring' would be represented by two separate circles, one representing the class or set of all courageous people and the other representing the set of all the daring people. 'Some courageous people are daring' would be represented by the area formed when the two circles (sets) overlap. 'All courageous people are daring' would be represented by the placing the courageous circle inside the daring circle. It is an early exploration of logical relationships that Aristotle was later to formulise into syllogistic logic. For Plato, philosophy involved much exploration of the logical boundaries of concepts by first giving a clear, unambiguous statement of a *supposed* relationship (all As are Bs, no As are Bs, some As are Bs, some As are not Bs) then using the tactics of identity, conversion and self-contradiction with examples and counter-examples of possible combinations of As and Bs to expose the best representation of their actual relationship. The process may be extended to see how A and B are further related to another concept C, as for instance in the above where the role of knowledge is raised in connection with the virtues of being daring and being courageous.

The *Protagoras* continues on trying to tease out the role played by knowledge (and hence teaching) in acting virtuously. Pursuing the role of knowledge in virtue, they agree that living pleasantly is good, but disagree over whether what is pleasant is always good for some pleasant things may be bad. It is a question of knowing the extent to which the set of what is good overlaps the set of what is pleasant. But they agree that even those who profess to *know* what is good don't always *do* what is good because they are overcome, for instance, by desire. It looks as though knowledge, which both Protagoras and Socrates declare to be the most powerful quality one can possess (352d) can be overcome by less powerful qualities such as pleasure, pain, fear, anger, love. Just what is this phenomenon of being overcome by desire? To investigate this question, Plato introduces another philosophical move, substitution of words and the tactic of reducing a claim to absurdity to show that it can't be true.

As with their discussion of excellence where they found themselves using other terms such as wisdom, courage, justice and so on, in their discussion of good they find themselves using other terms such as living well, pleasant, enjoyable, admirable, respected, desirable, love (as contrasted with bad, misery, pain, fear, shame). It would simplify the discussion if they could settle on fewer terms and give up using several words at the same time (355b). So after some discussion they agree that good is whatever brings pleasure and avoidance of pain or misery, not necessarily immediately, but in the end. Now, going back to the puzzle of being overcome by desire and making the substitution of terms, the claim becomes: a man, knowing bad for what it is, still does it. Why? Because overcome. By what? And we can no longer say, "By pleasure," for another word has been substituted for "pleasure" namely, "good". So he does bad because overcome by the good? Absurd.

How to escape this absurdity? Consider how it is that men go wrong about choosing between pleasure and pain, choosing between actions that are likely to result in more pleasure than pain. Since this involves consideration of more and less, greater and smaller, nearer and more remote, the inquiry is about measurement since it is concerned with excess, deficiency and equality. Then since measurement is a kind of skill and knowledge, what happens to us is not that we are overcome by pleasure, but by ignorance.

The remedy for this then would be knowledge - which is teachable. So now Socrates has reached a position contrary to what he started out with, that excellence is not teachable. At which point Socrates declares, "When I survey this terrible confusion and chaos, Protagoras, I have a burning desire to make sense of it. And I would like us to give a thorough account of this subject until we can emerge with an understanding of what excellence is, and only then return to attack the question of whether it can or cannot be taught" (361c). Is Plato suggesting that philosophical inquiry goes around in circles and gets nowhere? I don't think so. Even in this dialogue, as in others, Plato does not give a definitive answer to the main question, but in the process much progress is made, even if it is of a negative kind, for many errors are uncovered, faulty thinking is shown to be just that and why, and many beliefs are exposed as being false. On the positive side, we are shown *how* to uncover such errors, how to advance an inquiry. Since Plato wanted to teach students to do this for themselves he showed them how to do it rather than provide an answer for them to parrot. For as Socrates reassures Protagoras, you mustn't think I'm arguing with you for any other purpose than the investigation of questions by which I myself am constantly puzzled" (348c). And in doing so Socrates avers, "I am taking forethought for my entire life when I concern myself with all these questions." And so might we.

Plato has left us a legacy: how to conduct inquiry into such matters. And we have seen that such inquiry relies on clearly stating the problem or puzzle to be examined, avoiding equivocation and pursuing the inquiry where it leads using logical techniques to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments. But to do so we must first keep alight the spark of curiosity and wonder that ignites the fire of such philosophical inquiry. The dialogue had purpose; it grew from puzzlement. Both the intrigue of philosophical puzzlement and the availability of tools of good thinking with which to resolve that puzzlement are legacies of Plato's work, legacies that we would do well to hand on to our students.

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Interview with Matthew Lipman

Irene de Puig and Manuela Gómez: GrupIREF (Catalonia, Spain)
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Grup IREF (Innovation and Research for the Teaching of Philosophy), the Centre of Philosophy for Children in Catalonia, Spain.

GrupIREF is han association born in Catalonia (Spain) in 1987, with the aim of promoting the research for the teaching of philosophy. From the very beginning, one of its main tasks has been the development of the educative proposal *Filosofia 3/18*, which takes as a reference the international programme *Philosophy for Children.* A parallel task, to foster the philosophical reflection in the classroom, has been focussed on the training of teachers in relation to *Filosofia 3/18.*

GrupIREF has translated and adapted materials from the original curriculum of *Philosophy for Children* into Catalan as well as created new programs, especially for pre-school and first grade levels.

GrupIREF has also researched the language of arts as a way of knowledge. In this sense, several materials and projects, developed by GrupIREF s teachers, have arts at their core. To mention but a few: *Ecodialogo*: Environmental Education and Philosophical Dialogue; *Eduarts:* Cities and the Educative Capacity of Arts; *Playing Thinking*: The first steps towards a Philosophical Community of Inquiry through painting, fairy-tales and games. (This is a program for teachers and children at pre-school level).

About the interview:

In the summer of 2001, I was the IAPC (Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children) at Montclair University, NJ, USA. During my stay, I did joint work with Matthew Lipman in the Second Edition of his book *Thinking in Education.* I had also the chance of interviewing him about several topics of interest for GrupIREF teachers and others at this moment. We asked him questions about materials for the future; about the autobiography that he has been working on; about the P4C currículum.

M.Lipman, as always, gave us his time and his kindness.

We have already translated it into Catalan and Published it in our bulletin. However, we realise that it may also be of interest to teachers and teacher-educators of P4C in other countries, With the proposal of sharing them, we offer here transcription of the interview which Matt has kindly given permission to reproduce for others.

Sincerely yours,
Manuela Gómez

THE INTERVIEW

About the autobiography

Question- We know that you have been working on your autobiography. Many times teachers see the author behind the books and they ask: what were the interests of the author when he wrote this or that, what were his thoughts? Who is he? We thank you very much for this work which is going to be a great orientation for teachers in the present and in the future.

In your autobiography, you say "my academic life began in kindergarten". It seems that, for you, very young children can enjoy and also learn in an academic sense. If so:
-What do you think that kindergarten children could enjoy and learn from philosophy?
-What about pre-kindergarten children?

Answer- I'd like to consider this question in two parts. About the first one, when I was asked for writing an intellectual autobiography, I started to think of my schooling. I went back and back in my memories, until I saw myself in Kindergarten. However, my memories of that time are only about pinching each other and occasionally screaming at the tops of our lungs.

About the second part, philosophy can introduce them to concepts that don't refer to things, like table, chair, etc., but to abstractions, such as beauty, fairness, respect, time, truth and so on. Philosophy can also help them in reasoning. For example, imagine a teacher asking her group of kindergarten children "Who came today by bus?" From twenty, eighteen raise their hand. Then, she can asks them "Who didn't come today by bus?" and most of them raise their hand again. Now, she can ask them "How is it possible?" This is a funny situation. They know that it is not possible for them to go to the school by bus and not to go to the school by bus the same morning. But perhaps what their raised hands mean is that they want to be asked, they want to say something, they want to catch the attention of the teacher. What it is useful here is to help them realise that there are things that are possible and other things that are not possible.

About pre-kindergarten children, I think it is never too soon to help them to gain comprehension about fundamental questions, so long as we take into account their limitations. At the beginning, we need to help them think in a systematic way, to use terms appropriately, to make comparisons, to imagine, to be consistent, to detect contradictions, to distinguish properly formulated questions from improperly formulated questions, etc.

Philosophy can also help them to pay attention to aspects of language which grammar doesn't deal with. For example, we can ask if it is the same to say, "The sky is falling down" as "I think the sky is falling down" or "The sky can fall down". To recognize the differences between these verbs is fundamental. And this is one of the things philosophy does.
We could also ask them about other things that can fall down from the sky. Such questions help them imagine other possibilities, as well as to discover relationships between what they know and what they can imagine.

Question- Can philosophy help them observe, in order to engage them in aesthetic thinking?

Answer- Yes, sure. Imagine you show them a yellow envelope, and on the back of which you draw a red point. You ask them: "What do you see?" They may say: "A red point". You can ask again: "Just a red point?" "A red point on a paper", they may answer. You can ask again: "Which kind of paper is this?" "An envelope", they may say. "Do you just see an envelope with a red point? Where is this envelope?"... In this way we could go on widening the field of observation and the relationships that things have among them. They might also increase their vocabulary.

Question- Should these children retain something from kindergarten that would be applicable to the rest of their academic life? How could teachers help in this sense?

Answer- Their capacity of surprise is fundamental. We should stimulate it. In this sense, ambiguity can be very useful because it generates curiosity. (Mat makes a performance with gestures: he fills up a glass of water, then, slowly, brings it close to his mouth and when he is about to drink it, he passes his mouth and empties out the water on his eye. "This is an ambiguous situation that has resolved itself into a surprising one," he says).

Question- Getting back to your autobiography, can you think of some landmark or 'turning point' in your growth as a professor, as a philosopher, or as a person? Like, as you say in the autobiography, the discovery of "real books" in fifth grade, for example?

Answer- I remember one winter day in 1963. While walking on the sidewalk with my son, Will, I slipped on a patch of ice and broke my ankle. In the hospital, during the training in using crutches, I lost my balance and sprained my back. I spent five days in the hospital, and that made possible a hiatus in my stressful circumstances. Until that point, I had been working furiously, teaching philosophy or contemporary civilization at the Mannes College of Music, the Columbia University Colleges of Engineering and Pharmacy, Columbia College, Sarah Lawrence College, and so on. The stress of driving each day from Montclair to New York City, finding parking spots on the street, and returning to Montclair after my evening courses at City College, all of this rushing around was slowly wearing me down. Now, unexpectedly, I had almost a week in which I could relax in a hospital bed and do some much-needed reflection.

When I was asked if I wanted something to read, I thought of a book I had recently obtained: Stendhal's *The Red and Black*. As I read it, I became more and more agitated. Julian Sorel is the existentialist hero par excellence, in a breathtaking moment he chooses his life.

My own agitation, I realised, was related to the thought that occupied my mind: I must change my life. Not a little bit, but totally. I enjoyed my family and my work. Nevertheless, I thought: "This cannot go on. I must change my life". Was it something I'd read in Rilke or Gide or Camus? It doesn't matter.

As I continued reading the book by Stendhal, a curious notion began to shape itself among my more conventional thoughts: "I must organise an art exhibition!" Not something little, but something fairly big. So I called an old friend, Howard Fussiner, an artist for whose work I had high esteem, and I asked hem if he would like to put on an art show. "Good idea," he responded. "... We called it *The Natural Image*."

About the theoretical books

Question- You have just finished the Second Edition of *Thinking in Education*. Among your theoretical books, are there any that you are particularly satisfied with?

Answer- It depends on the purpose we have in mind. *Philosophy in the classroom* was written for elementary school teachers. I think it can be very useful to understand the importance of what teachers can do with philosophy at this level. *Thinking in Education* is a good theoretical book in some respects. It contains ideas from psychology, education, art and philosophy. It is not just a book about P4C. *Philosophy goes to school* is perhaps more academic because it connects traditional philosophy with P4C.

Therefore, all of them are important for different reasons. What is very useful is the bibliography of each novel. The ones of *Pixie* and *Harry* are already done. *Lisa*'s, *Kio and Gus'*, *Mark*'s and *Suki*'s should be done.

About the P4C curriculum

Question- Do you consider the P4C curriculum to be complete?

Answer- No, it is not complete. Every program is just the tip of an iceberg. There are several fields that haven't been treated: materials for the youngest, for example, that we haven't developed.
Connections have been made between *Harry* and the teaching of other subjects, such as music and language.
Every book only shows a surface that announces possibilities. It also could be a good idea to create materials on ethics for different ages. *Lisa* proposes one approach on ethics, but it is not the only possible one.
The materials (manuals and novels) have to be refreshed with new and up-to-date questions. The manuals should be revised. For example, there is nothing about "definition" until *Suki*. I think it should be included earlier. But to revise so many things is a huge task.

Question- Is there any program you consider the most well-rounded or satisfying for you? Either the novel or the manual?

Answer- Personally, I have a special relationship with *Suki* because it is partially about poetry. It says many things to me.
Harry because it was the first one. I think it is a good introduction to philosophy. The manual is good as a resource to introduce teachers to philosophy. I like also *Ethical Inquiry, Lisa*'s manual. *Kio and Gus* has many nice moments, especially from the middle of the novel. *Pixie* is full of delights. *Elfie* is too long and too complex, but it has some good things. *Nous* is not too philosophical, but it is about our relationship with animals, an important topic.

Question- In which direction would you like the P4C curriculum to be developed, and in which directions would you prefer it not be developed?

Answer- Wherever there is a specific educational need, there is a specific philosophical need. I don't think the curriculum has to be extended towards higher levels, but I do think that it can be extended to cover specific needs, and be open to specific philosophical areas. For example, a program on ethics for primary school. I remember an experience with children who had emotional disorder problems. It was not the case that they were very violent. Philosophy was very useful to help them verbalise some of their emotions and beliefs.

Question- In your manuals, you propose exercises to clarify concepts by considering families of terms. I would propose to you one of them in relation to P4C:
P4C is similar/different/identical to:

a method	a curriculum	
a pedagogy	an educational approach	an educational project

Answer- I don't have anything against considering it as a method if it is not reduced to just a method. Here, I understand by method a way of doing in dealing with different situations using the same procedures. More accurately, I would say that P4C is an educational approach. It is also, but not only, a curriculum. It is an educational approach that includes a method and a curriculum, as well as a conception of philosophy in education. An educational project seems to refer to a work which has some pre-established objectives to be achieved in order to finish it.

About being a pedagogy, once I heard some one who said that P4C is just a pedagogy, because doing philosophy consists merely in teaching students how to answer the question *why are things like they are*? If this is what someone thinks philosophy is about, therefore we can expect him or her to say just about anything.

Question- Could P4C be put into practice without its novels and manuals?

Answer- There is nothing forbidden in doing so. It depends on the level and the circumstances under which we work. I think that in higher levels, like in college, a material which dramatises philosophy is not so necessary because philosophy can be read directly.
On the other hand, the role of the teacher is fundamental because it is she or he who can guide and enhance the philosophical dimension in a dialogue. In this sense, it is the teacher who needs to know philosophy. The manuals in P4C are a rich source of philosophical ideas, activities and explanations so that teachers have support with which to foster and improve the philosophical level of the discussions. The key words are "philosophical inquiry". The teacher has to learn to think like a philosopher, in that she has to be able to connect the questions that the class raises with the big philosophical questions of the tradition.

In elementary school, if the curriculum is not used, the possibilities of doing philosophy are very reduced. Until now, I have not seen any material as rich in philosophical resources as the manuals and the novels of P4C. Although, I insist, much depends on the situation and on the needs. For example, in Russia, P4C is employed with gifted children without using a curriculum. We need to take into account all the situations in a pluralistic sense. There are other materials that can be used, and they can be linked up with the P4C manuals because these are very broad.

Question- Have you thought about what criteria or conditions any new materials of P4C should satisfy? (Would you write some orientations about this?)

Answer- It is difficult to say what other people have to do. It is not for me to say what other authors should do.

Question- You don't have to say what others should do, but since you are the main author of P4C, could you offer some orientations about how to create new materials for doing philosophy with and for children?

Answer- I am thinking that the philosophical associations or the editors of philosophical journals could propose an open contest to reward Philosophy for Children materials. In this way, the criteria to be applied would be developed by a committee and not just by one single person.

Question- If other kind of materials could be used to stimulate philosophical dialogue among children, such as works of art, existing children's literature or others, would you give some recommendations for teachers?

Answer- In China, for example, they write their own stories inspired in their narrative tradition. There are people in China who use proverbs to encourage philosophical reflection in the classroom. This is better than nothing or anything at all. Fables are not so readily recommended because they are more didactical. They drive to a conclusion, and children know what conclusion they have to learn. The conclusion is also more open in parables.

It is difficult to say in advance which should be the materials to be used. This question refers us to the relationship between theory and practice. Experience and expertise are required to use different materials. Their need has to emerge from the classroom, as well as its suitability. The materials used must be useful to the children. There are no materials that are good or bad by themselves. The teacher should ask herself the question: Are they useful for my students? Have they been helpful? How could I improve them?

About evaluation

Question- What does it mean 'to progress' in philosophy, and in relation to P4C?

Answer- It is difficult to say. *To progress* has a different meaning in sciences and in humanities. In science, it is possible to see progress constantly. Theories are refuted, conceptions are overcome... In humanities nothing is lost, everything is a treasure, there is a place for everything. Humanities is the realm of pluralistic approaches. In this sense, philosophy is a great example. If we take the definition of *man*, for the humanities this definition refers to the history of human beings. For science, the definition of *man* will be something different.

There is an idea according to which *to progress* is gain without loss. This is an idea of Collinwood. I do not agree totally. There are things that we can lose because we don't need them. Going back to the criteria to know what could we mean when we talk about progress in philosophy, let's imagine that we want to explain what it means to progress in philosophy to non-philosophers and to people without knowledge regarding education. We could tell them that philosophy is an accumulative knowledge, where ideas are built on other ideas in an increasing movement. Philosophy reflects not on facts, but on the meaning of facts. It is also a knowledge that is transferred to other areas without losing anything, and with gaining in comprehension.

Philosophy is also a playful activity and it allows access to values.
In the classroom, a way to progress in philosophy is by fostering generalisation and exemplification. Generalising is a very powerful capacity to develop knowledge. Philosophers generalise, but have more difficulties thinking up instances. Children, however, know how to exemplify. Both movements, generalisation and instantiation, have to be part of thinking in order to progress in philosophy.

Montclair, August 2001.

Book Review

Philosophy Goes to the Movies: an introduction to philosophy
by Christopher Falzon. Routledge: London and New York, 2002

Verdict: Clear, succinct and engaging. Highly recommended.

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This is an engaging introduction to philosophy written by one who has a fine grasp of the philosophical tradition and the intricacies of its argumentation. Not only that, Christopher Falzon also has a passion for film that radiates throughout the book as he explicates difficult philosophical concepts with the aid of scenarios and characters from a host of films. The book is organised into chapters dealing with broad areas of philosophical interest: knowledge, personal identity, morality, our socio-political life and the impact of modernity, especially science and technology. Each chapter deals with the kinds of questions and challenges that have arisen in each area in a roughly historical progression from ancient Greek, through mediaeval and modern to contemporary thought. In this respect it is a typical introductory philosophical textbook; what is different, and what gives life to the book, is the grounding of abstract philosophical ideas in cinematic material. From Plato's 'picture show' in the Cave to modern day blockbusters, he shows just how apposite film and film-making is for illuminating philosophical ideas and arguments.

As the author says, "... this book is an introduction to philosophy that turns to films in order to illustrate and discuss philosophical ideas and themes," and it does this admirably. Professional philosophers often tend to think and talk in abstractions, sometimes finding it hard to give practical and concrete instances of their ideas for students. Falzon argues that films can help as they tend to make their points in the realm of action and appearance. In this way they can act as a corrective to a philosophy that has lost itself in abstraction and universalisation. Philosophy begins in wonder and philosophers produce speculative visions, frameworks for understanding and thinking about the world, ourselves, our physical, social and political existence. The trouble is that their speculations can be very abstract, abstruse and unappealing for the lay audience. Good science fiction writers speculate too, taking a particular idea or vision of the world, drawing out the logical conclusions in a concrete way for the characters and the visionary world they occupy, with the attention to detail that philosophers often overlook, but which the lay audience devour. Not surprisingly, Falzon refers to many science fiction films to illustrate his points, though many other film genres are included. This makes the book attractive for those unfamiliar with philosophy who would like to become better acquainted. Introductory textbooks to philosophy, in trying to cover so much material, tend to summarize the conclusions of various philosophers so becoming rather didactic. Falzon's appeal to the popular medium of film for his illustrations ameliorates this tendency, contrasting different film scenarios, characters and solutions to keep readers wondering and speculating on yet other possibilities. This is useful for beginning students of philosophy, providing fresh avenues for thinking about philosophical issues. With philosophy now available for the Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE) in the final years of secondary school, the book is a useful resource for teachers of philosophy providing many cinematic illustrations of the ideas being dealt with in class.

After the initial chapter 'Plato's Picture Show,' dealing with theory of knowledge, the chapter headings take their cue from film titles – *All of me* (personal identity); *Crimes and Misdemeanors* (morality); *Antz* (social and political philosophy); *Modern Times* (science and technology); and Monty Python's *Holy Grail* (critical thinking). A brief overview of each follows:-

Plato's Picture Show

The epistemological conundrums of Descartes' doubt about reality, about whether our experience could all be a dream, or an illusion created by an evil demon, are neatly discussed and illustrated in reference to several recent films. Cartesian rationalists are in danger of being locked into a personally imposed vision of reality (solipsism) that other rationalists disagree with, preferring their own 'reasoned' visions. So whose vision is the more accurate? Empiricism, the historical rejoinder to Descartes' rationalism, argues that unless one's view is grounded in sense experience the result is bound to be unverifiable and dogmatic. For empiricists, ordinary experience is to be the touchstone of reality when it comes to knowledge of the external world. But just what is experience and just how impartial and reliable is it? Is it true that 'what you see is what you get (reality)?' Which, of course, is what film makers deal with all the time in constructing their films. as they all come to their topic within a frame of reference. Whose point of view is the 'real' one? Falzon explicates the challenges and problems inherent in film-making as well as discussion of the traditional philosophical problems raised by the empiricist view of the world. And this makes his book all the more interesting for lay audiences.

Immanuel Kant offered a neat synthesis of rationalism and empiricism with his necessary framework of categories through which we view the world, but Falzon's slide from this to the relativism of social and cultural world views as determining our reality is a little too glibly made, confusing a logical point with a psychological claim, for even those views themselves use Kant's categories of substance, causality, time and space. To gloss over this difference is unbecoming of discerning philosophy. The problems inherent in Kant's synthesis could have been handled better than this. It is the only blot on an otherwise good book that I noticed in reading through it.

All of me

The chapter on personal identity illustrates the problems inherent in the dualism of Plato and Descartes using the plethora of mind-body swapping films available to good effect. John Locke's more phenomenological approach of continuity of consciousness in an attempt to improve on the 'ghost-in the-machine' of dualism, has metaphysical and moral problems that are clearly illustrated in the discussion of several films.

Crimes and misdemeanors

This chapter takes its title from Woody Allen's film by way of introducing the issues in moral philosophy with the question 'Why be moral?' and the traditional responses to this from Plato through Christianity, Kant's categorical imperative, Utilitarianism and Existentialism. This is a well organised chapter clearly delineating the issues and what the variety of responses to the opening question involve, with their strengths and weaknesses well illustrated with characters and scenarios from many films.

Antz

From questions of morality, of how it is best to behave and live, the discussion widens to take into account that we live in society with others and therefore what we do impacts on others and they on us. Are there better and worse ways of living with others, of organising ourselves in society so that we can all feel accepted, respected and fulfilled? So from *Antz*, the recent cartoon version of life in a Republic modelled somewhat on Plato's, through modern liberal ideas of how society ought to be organised including capitalism and communism's reaction to this, the issues of power, authority and manipulation of individuals are well laid out and illustrated including Foucault's recent account of the unsavoury and apparently unavoidable disciplinary impositions of modern technological societies that impact on individuals and their interpersonal lives which raise the fundamental questions about human nature itself that were initially raised in the earlier chapter on self identity. For just what is it to be a human being? We have seen that human beings have great capacity for evil and well as good, for brilliant technological solutions to some of our practical problems as well as crass

stupidity in dealing with others. Can modern science help out? Can it lead to Utopia, to moral progress and the betterment of the human condition?

Modern Times

This was certainly the hope and belief of the eighteenth century Enlightenment scholars impressed with the great advances achieved by the rapid growth of science. Now, just over two centuries later, would they recognise the contemporary world as the Utopia of which they dreamt? Falzon starts his chapter on society, science and technology with the opening scenes from Charlie Chaplin's film showing the debilitating impact of industrialisation on the life of the working men and women of the world as anticipated by Marx and Engels in their *Communist Manifesto*. This casts doubt on the Enlightenment faith that scientific and technological progress will be accompanied by social and moral progress. Illustrated with many films this chapter examines both the dangers of alienation, superstition, social control, environmental degradation, scientific hubris, and promise of advances in medicine, agriculture, industry and commerce, environmental management, and the human spirit. The examination is a philosophical one, from the Enlightenment period to contemporary philosophers, yet the illustrations are cinematic thus grounding the theory in a more amenable medium, and it works well: the discussion flows smoothly with vivid illustrations, the mood hopeful, recognising that we cannot return to the blind Enlightenment faith that science and technology will inevitably lead to social and moral improvement in the human condition. However, we can be critical and wary of the path taken: we can still choose. But what we need more than ever, is the ability and the willingness to engage in critical and reflective thinking about the content and direction of scientific, social and political progress.

The Holy Grail

So the book culminates with Monty Python's *Holy Grail* of critical thinking, distinguishing between reasoning and arguing, faulty thinking and closed thinking that get in the way of good arguments with illustrations from several films. What all this suggests is that it is philosophy which holds the key to Utopia, not to a *Brave New World*, but to a world free from dogma, from closed systems of belief; a world always remaining open to other possibilities. For philosophy, as critical reflection is liberating: it is the kind of thinking, as Falzon says, that helps set one's thinking free. And this, truly, is the aim of Philosophy for Children.

The book is highly recommended for practitioners of Philosophy for Children.
Clive Lindop

Given the recent correspondence on the p4c-list concerning films for illustrating philosophical issues, I thought it would be of interest to many to list the films mentioned in the book:-

A Nous la Liberté
The Addiction
Agnes of God
Aguirre, Wrath of God
Alien Resurrection
All of me
Alphaville
Amadeus
Amateur
Angel Heart
Antz
Apocalypse Now
Augustine of Hippo
Basic Instinct
Beavis and Butthead do America
Bedazzled
Being John Malkovich
Being There
Big
The Big Sleep
Blade Runner
Blaise Pascal
Blue Collar
Blue Velvet
Bob Roberts
Brazil
Breaker Morant
Breathless
Cabaret
Casablanca
Casper
Chances Are
Chinatown
Cinema Paradiso
Citizen Kane
A Clockwork Orange
Colossus: The Forbin Papers

The Conformist
The Cook, The Thief, His Wife and Her Lover
Crimes and Misdemeanors
Crimes of Passion
The Crucible
The Crying Game
Dangerous Liasons
Dark City
Dark Star
Dead Again
The Devil's Playground
Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde
Dr Strangelove
Dracula
Easy Rider
Educating Rita
Elephant Man
Enemy of the State
The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser
eXistenZ
Face Off
Farenheit 451
Fatal Attraction
Five Easy Pieces
The Fly
Fortress
Frankenstein
The Frighteners
Full Metal Jacket
The Game
Gattaca
Ghost
Ghost . . . of the Civil Dead
The Goalkeeper's Fear of the Penalty
Grip of the Strangler
Groundhog Day
The Handmaid's Tale
Hannah and Her Sisters
Harrison Bergeron
He said, She said
High Hopes
High Noon
Hilary and Jackie
If
Inherit the Wind
Interiors
Interview with a Vampire
Invasion of the Body Snatchers
Island of Lost Souls
It's a Wonderful Life
Judgement at Nuremburg
Jurassic Park
Koyaanusqaatsi
Ladybird, Ladybird
The Last Supper
Lord of the Flies
Love and Death
Mad Max
The Maltese Falcon
The Manchurian Candidate
Matewan
The Matrix
Mephisto
Metropolis
The Mission
Modern Times
Mon Oncle
Monty Python and the Holy Grail
Mony Python's Life of Brian
Mony Python's The Meaning of Life
My Fair Lady
The Name of the Rose
The Next Best Thing
Nineteen Eighty-Four
Norma Rae
North by Northwest
The Nutty Professor
O Lucky Man!
October
Olivier, Olivier
On the Beach
On the Waterfront
One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest
The People vs Larry Flynt
The Player
Playtime
The Princess Bride
A Pure Formality
Question of Silence
Quiz Show
Rain
Rain Man
The Rapture
Rashomon
Rear Window
Rebel Without a Cause
The Return of Martin Guerre
Robocop
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead
Salt of the Earth
Saving Private Ryan
Schindler's List
Sea of Love
Se7en
The Seventh Seal
Sherlock Holmes in Washington
Shocker
The Silence of the Lambs
Simon of the Desert
Sleeper
Socrates
Sophie's Choice
Stage Fright
Star Trek (TV)
Star Trek: First Contact
Star Trek:The next Generation
Star Trek: The Wrath of Khan
Star Wars
The Stranger
Suture
Switch
Terminator
Terminator 2
The Testament of Dr Cordelier
Things to come
Three Colours: Blue
The Three Faces of Eve
Total Recall
The Truman Show
Twelve Angry Men
2001: A Space Odyssey
The Usual Suspects
Vice Versa
The Virgin Spring
Wag the Dog
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The Wild One
Wings of Desire
Wittgenstein
You Only Live Once

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Critical & Creative Thinking

CONTENTS

Volume 1

Number 1 March 1993

Mat Lipman:	The Educational value of Philosophy for Children
Ann Sharp	The Ethics of Translation
Ron Reed	Reconstructing Linguistic Experience
Felicity Haynes	Teaching Children to Think for Themselves
Christina Slade	Pixie's Anti-realistic view of Analogy
Robert Laird	Philosophy for Children in Aboriginal Classrooms
Tim Sprod	Philosophy for children and Literacy
Anthony Imbrosciano	Logic in Schools
Laurance Splitter	**Simon** Chapter 1 a story about being the same and being different

Number 2 October 1993

Phil Guin:	Reflections on Karl Popper & Philosophy for Children
Mat Lipman:	Unreasonable People and inappropriate Judgments
Ron Reed:	Critical Theory, Post-modernism & Communicative Rationality
Helmut Schreier:	The Role of Stories in Philosophising with Children
Klaus Doderer:	Children as Little Philosophers in Children's Books
Jen Glaser:	Is Pixie Reasonable? Social and Ethical Themes in 'Pixie'
Martyn Maher:	Reflections on Philosophic Practice in the Classroom
Lyn English:	Using Philosophical Inquiry to enhance Mathematical Communication
David Inverarity:	Paint me some Thinking
Laurance Splitter:	**Simon** Chapter 1: Classroom Discussion Plans and Exercises

Volume 2

Number 1 March 1994

Ann Sharp	The religious dimension of Philosophy for Children I
Ross Phillips	A sincere word for the Devil's Advocate
Sandy Yule	Philosopher culture and teacher culture
Anthony Brooker	Punishment
Lawrence Parker	Strategies for infusing critical thinking into a culture
Cairns & Wilks	A PMI on philosophy
Anthony Imbrosciano	Teaching logic well
Malcolm Miller	Philosophy in New Brunswick schools
Tim Sprod	An attempt at evaluating Philosophy for Children

Number 2 October 1994

Ann Sharp	The religious dimension of Philosophy for Children II
Phil Cam	A philosophical approach to moral education
Roger Creswell & Peter Hosbson	Contested values and Philosophy for Children in a pluralistic, democratic state
Irene de Puig	Beyond knowledge: moral and political education
Sue Wilks	Encouraging pupil participation: practical ways of establishing a community of inquiry
Christine Durham	A philosophical fortune hunt
Greg Smith	An experience of introducing *Lisa* to secondary school teachers
Tock Keng Lim	Evaluation of the Philosophy for Children project in Singapore

Critical & Creative Thinking

Volume 3

Number 1 March 1995

Chris de Haan	Deweyan aesthetics in the philosophy classroom
Terri Field	Philosophy for Children and the feminist critique of reason
Nina Iulina	Philosophy abroad - a Russian perspective
Sandy Yule	On trusting teachers with philosophy
Peter Davson-Galle	Advocatus Diabli or Advocatus Dei? a reply to Cam, Cresswell & Hobson
Phil Cam	Against indoctrination - response to Davson-Galle
Cresswell & Hobson	The moral dimension - response to Davson-Galle
Peter Davson-Galle	Rejoiners to Cam, Resswell & Hobson
Ann Sharp	Habit in the thought of CS Peirce
Yim Pyoungkap	A graceful error corrects the cave
Manuel Meglas Rosa	Is Philosophy for Children useful for the ESL teacher?
Clive Lindop	Philosophy for Children and ESL
Lindop,Delany et al,	Philosophy comes to School
Ann Sharp	Who owns the flowers?
Peter Davson-Galle	More doggeral verse

Number 2 October 1995 ICPIC CONFERENCE ISSUE I

Peter Singer	Coping with global change
Ann Sharp	Educating for global ethical consciousness
Susan Gardner	Inquiry is no mere conversation
Christina Slade	Reflective reasoning and the self
Mike Pritchard	On becoming reasonable
Richard Moorhouse	Research in Philosophy for Children
Vicki Mackrill	Philosophy for Children in Kinder and Prep
Kathleen Davson-Galle	Bare Brains
James Battye	A puzzle for Jessica
Laurance Splitter	Philosophy for Children Strategic Plan

Volume 4

Number 1 March 1996 ICPIC CONFERENCE ISSUE II

Robert Fisher	Socratic education: a new paradigm for philosophical inquiry
Gil Burgh	Translating democracy into practice: a case for demarchy
Shari Popen	Rethinking teaching and teachers within communities of inquiry
Phil Guin	Education for global citizenship
Mike Ross	A child's belief system and security
Grreg Smith	Fostering community in the community of inquiry
Lim & Kaliannan	Reflections of teachers on the community of inquiry in their classroom
Margarete Wenzel	Storytelling as embodied philosophy
Jin Whan Park	Democratic citizenship ed. in a global community: the case of Korea
Fr Stan Anih	Schooling without thinking: the ed. curricular crisis in our time
Tim Sprod	Bouncing Balls
Cresswell et al	Book Review of 'Thinking Stories' I & II

Number 2 October 1996

Carol Steiner	Learning opportunities, communication and mass education
Christina Slade	Conversing across communities
David Kennedy	Young children's moves
Ross Phillips	Self esteem and ownership of ideas
Dina Mendoca	The religious dimension of Philosophy for Children
Steve Williams	Learning sequences and inquiry in small groups
Roger Creswell	Demons, devils, dragons and flames: harnessing sporting interests in the philosophy classroom
Peter Davson-Galle	Matters of degree and kind

Critical & Creative Thinking

Volume 5

Number 1 March 1997

Mat Lipman	Philosophical discussion plans and exercises
Winifred Wing-Lamb	'A good dinner and a game of backgammon'
Clive Lindop	Truth, hunches and our form of life
Dina Mendoca	Reading Vygotsky
Anthony Imbrosciano	Philosophy and student academic performance
Tim Sprod	An historical community of inquiry
Kathleen & Peter Davson-Galle	Eyes lies

Number 2 October 1997

Freddy Mortier	Competence in children: psychological, legal, moral
Christine Gehrett	The power of narrative in a philosophical community of inquiry
Marie-France Daniel	An interactionist-constructivist mode for the practical education of preservice teachers in physical education
Tim Sprod	Book review: *Reasonable Children* by Michael Pritchard
Clive Lindop	Book review: *Thinking Stories III* by Phillip Cam

Volume 6

Number 1 March 1998

Susan Gardner	Philosophy for Children realluy works! A report on a two year study
Richard Morehouse	The use of student argument skill: a report on a two year study
Tock Keng Lim	How to evaluate Philosophy for children
Terry Allen	Being an individual in the community of inquiry
Mary Barrett	Humour
Peter Davson-Galle	Schools and Fools
Winifred WH Lamb	Review: The philosophy of Childhood
Lilly Hawkins	Review: Thinking and Talking Through Literature

Number 2 October 1998

Clive Lindop	Self identity: explorations in philosophic method
Wendy Turgeon	Reluctant philosophers: casues and cures
Tim Sprod	Thinking for oneself
Leanne Parfitt	Education and Thinking
John Colbeck	Courage to think, to be, and to become different
FAPCA Report	

Volume 7

Number 1 March 1999

Jim Burdett	The community of inquiry as a means of reducing youth suicide
Peter Davson-Galle	Democracy, philosophy and schools
David Kennedy	The politics of objectivity, the philosophy of childhood and dialogical education
Lola Hill	Preservice teachers' experience of the community of inquiry
Leanne Parfitt	Dynamics of a classroom dialogue
Michel Sasseville	ICPIC Report to UNESCO:- International co-operation in Philosophy for Children

Number 2 October 1999

Gareth Mattehws	Philosophy as child's play
Tim Sprod	Philosophy and Childhood
Stephan Millett	The Wesley experience
Winifred W H Lamb	TOK at Narrabundah
Greg Smith	Using non-Lipman materials with Yr 9
Ross Phillips	Review: *Places for Thinking*

Critical & Creative Thinking

Volume 8

Number 1 March 2000

Winifred W H Lamb	Philosophy for Children and the 'Whole child'
Sue Knight & Carol Collins	Curriculum transformed: philosophy embedded in the curriculum areas
Felicity Haynes & Bruce Haynes	The development of a conceptual frame work for critical thinking and problem solving K-12
Joanna Haynes &Karin Murris	Listening, juggling and travelling in philosophical space
Mary Barrett	American philosophical naturalism in *Lisa*
Laurance Splitter	Teacher perspectives on Philosophy for Children - Part I

Number 2 October 2000

Marie-France Daniel	From talking to dialogue
Greg Smith	Growing into community
Mia O'brien	Developing thinking and knowing
Brenda Cherednichenko	Teaching thinking: reform for educational equity
Jin-Whan Park	Teaching moral wisdom
Laurance Splitter	Teacher perspectives on Philosophy for Childrem - Part II

Volume 9

Number 1 March 2001

Tim Sprod	Aristotle, children and morality I
Lipman & Pizzurro	The Vygotsky touch
Matthew Del Nevo	Philosophy is not a technology
McDermott & Fox	The encouragement of "reasonableness" through the practice of philosophy with children at risk.
Barry, King, Maloney and Burke	Philosophy for Children and the promotion of high level cognitive talk
Clinton Golding	Concept games: a method of philosophical exploration
Clive Lindop	Book Review: *Engaging with Ethics*

Number 2 October 2001

Tim Sprod	Aristotle, children and morality II
Matthew Lipman	Dramatising philosophy
Jim Burdett	Education and aesthetics
Sandra Lynch	Encouraging students voices in school welfare policy
Seon-hee Jo & Jin-whan Park	Applying P4C in Korean preschool
Chris Falzon	Philosophy goes to the movies
Crystal Baulch	The Seven Dwarfs and the Game of Knowledge and Belief
Clive Lindop	Book Review: *Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education*

Volume 10

Number 1 March 2002

Hannu Juuso	Hegel on teaching philosophy
Phil Cam	Fact, value and philosophy education
Megan Laverty-Smith	Teaching and pedagogy in Australian schools
Gil Burgh & Mia O'Brien	Philosophy and education: integrating curriculum, teaching and learning

Number 2 October 2002

Marie-France Daniel	Pupil Thinking: relativistic or inter-subjective?
Hannu Juuso	Hegel's influence on P4C
Clive Lindop	Plato's legacy: how to do philosophy
GrupIREF	Interview with Mat Lipman
Clive Lindop	Book Review: *Philosophy Goes to the Movies* by Chris Falzon

THE ELEVENTH BIANNUAL CONFERENCE
of
THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL for PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY WITH CHILDREN (ICPIC)

FIRST CALL FOR PAPERS

CHILDREN AND ADULTS: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENCOUNTER

JUNE 26-30, 2003
VARNA, BULGARIA

Dear friends of philosophical inquiry with children:

It is with pleasure and anticipation that I announce the eleventh ICPIC conference, to be held on the Black Sea shore in the city of Varna, Bulgaria. Our conference theme revolves around dialogue between children and adults. We welcome interactive presentations which approach this theme from any number of angles—whether theoretical papers, reports of relevant research, original curriculum, or some other. Thirty to fifty children, mainly from the Rakovsky School in Varna, a grades 1-12 institution which has been practicing P4C for nearly a decade, will attend the conference, and approximately one-third of the sessions will be planned as philosophical dialogues among groups of children, as well as groups with roughly equal numbers of adults and children. Keynotes will be delivered by both adults and children.

Since this is an inter-generational conference, we encourage you to consider bringing any or all your own children, if this is appropriate—or, if you live within the region—schoolchildren with whom you practice philosophy.

If you wish to propose a paper, or to conduct a session with a specific theme, please submit a proposal of 300-500 words to any or all of the ICPIC officers, who are:

David Kennedy, President (USA)
Kennedyd@mail.montclair.edu

Beate Borresen, Vice-President (Norway)
Beate.Borresen@lu.hio.no

Cecilia Hornell, Secretary (Sweden)
Cecilia.hornell@riksteatern.com

Brynhildur Sigurdardotti, Tresurer (Iceland)
brynhildurs@hotmail.com

Hoping to see you there,
David Kennedy