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Critical & Creative Thinking:

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GILBURGH

Aim and scope

To provide a vehicle for the communication of ideas and a forum for discussion and debate of issues concerning the practice of philosophical inquiry with children.

To foster continuing development of the theory and practice of engaging children in philosophical inquiry;

more specifically:-

(1) to promote better teaching and curricular design for the development of critical and creative thinking amongst children through increased understanding and use of philosophical inquiry in the classroom

(2) to enrich the understanding of philosophy and philosophical inquiry as well as its role in the development of good thinking and good judgment.

(3) to increase interaction and collaboration between the academic community of scholars in universities and teachers in schools on matters of logic, epistemology, creativity, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, inquiry, philosophy of science, mind, personhood, community, under-standing, learning, thinking, dialogue, discussion

(4) to promote discussion of the place of philosophy in the national and school curriculum and its infusion into the present curriculum; the place and contribution of philosophy to the intellectual, creative, moral and social development of individuals.

Structure

The journal will carry a range of articles reporting on all aspects of the practice of engaging in philosophical inquiry and developing critical and creative thinking. To this end it will be organised into four main Sections or Departments as follows:-

(1) Theory and Applied Research

a. Contributions concerning the more theoretical aspects of philosophy and inquiry such as:-
the nature and purpose, of philosophy, inquiry, community, conversation, dialogue, critical thinking, creative thinking, reasoning, etc.
the nature of childhood, adolescence, mind; the philosophy of childhood and development, etc.
epistemological, social, political and ethical dimensions of the practice of engaging children in philosophical inquiry, policy and planning, future studies and directions; implications of recent Government Reports

b. Research studies of classroom practice: the impact of philosophy for children on class-room interaction, classroom discourse and dialogue; pupil participation, thinking and learning; teacher thinking and behaviour; classroom climate, etc.

(2) Philosophical studies

discussion and clarification of key philosophical concepts, topics and issues embedded in and raised by class-room readers and other materials;
exegeses of the philosophical literature on such matters.

(3) Reports from the field:

a. Reports from practising teachers on their experience of engaging children in philosophical inquiry; discussion of practical problems and possible solutions; innovative ways of using class-room materials, arranging classrooms, grouping, interacting with pupils. Children's reactions and views new materials or exercises. This section may well stimulate other research projects.

b. Children's work- writings, illustrations,

(4) Resources & Reviews (R&R)

Reports from in-service or workshop experiences and challenges. News and reports from national and international conferences. Discussion of different approaches, new materials, exercises and such. New philosophical stories, teacher manuals and other materials. Reviews of books and other materials.

Welcome to Critical & Creative Thinking

Welcome to the tenth volume of Critical and Creative Thinking - the Journal for the Federation of Australian Philosophy for Children Associations. This Journal is dedicated to improving the teaching and research of critical and creative thinking by providing a forum for discussion and debate on all aspects, theoretical and practical, of the practice of engaging children in activities intended to develop and improve their thinking. We encourage classroom teachers as well as academics to send in their contributions for publication. Critical & Creative Thinking is intended to be a teachers' professional journal featuring a combination of theoretical and research articles with articles from teachers on their classroom experience and practical strategies for engaging children in critical and creative thinking activities. Whatever program you are trying with your class, please write in and let us know about it and its impact on your students as well as its influence on your own teaching practice. There are many others who are interested in what you are doing, together we can help each other become even better teachers and educators.

Clive Lindop
Deakin University-Warrnambool

Notes for contributors

All contributions are welcome. Manuscripts should be typed and doubled spaced on A4 letter or US letter paper and accompanied with a disc copy, preferably 3.5 in Macintosh disc in Word 5.1 format (though IBM MS DOS is acceptable). Alternatively, to save time and avoid damage or loss in the mail, contributors may send their articles by E-mail to:-

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Please use the Author - Date system with endnotes and bibliography for your articles

NB: to maintain academic credibility, contributions to sections (1) Theory and Research and (2) Philosophical Studies, are subject to those processes of peer review normal for scholarly refereed journals including blind refereeing.

Letters to the Editor

If often happens that one reads an article and wants to respond, but not in the form of a lengthy article. Such responses, which might simply add to a point made by the author either in agreement or disagreement, or offer an alternative view, etc. could appear as a 'Letter to the Editor.' The idea here is to encourage dialogue between readers and authors- in effect using the Journal to create a community of inquiry!

Send all postal contributions to

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The Federation of Australasian Philosophy for Children Associations

Preliminary Notice

of the

12th Annual FAPCA Conference

'A Community of Inquiry on Education'

Brisbane, Queensland

Sat 28 Septemner – Mon 30 September

This year's conference will be a "participants' conference" emphasizing community and dialogue. FAPCA will bring together practitioners from all fields of education and related areas, including academics, teachers, administrators, students, parents and interested community members, to engage in the following themes:

Children in Democratic Classrooms
Learning Communities
New Pedagogies
Curriculum design for Lifelong Learning

There will be an informal get-together on the night before the opening of the conference. The conference will be open on Saturday with a hypothetical and inquiry. Papers and workshop sessions will be thematically related, with each theme (or strand) preceded by a plenary session and discussion followed by a community of inquiry. The conference closes on Monday with a forum and discussion.

The AGM will be held on Monday afternoon.

A notice for "call of papers: and further details will be posted soon.

All general inquiries to:

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Critical and Creative Thinking
Vol 10 No 1 March 2002

Editorial Overview

Hannu Juuso offers us an explication of Hegel's views on teaching philosophy in schools and the difficulties involved. He shows the connection with Kant and the development of the idea of dialectic to avoid the philosophy teaching becoming a non-speculative narration of random opinions which can only lead to a contempt for philosophy. The implications of Hegel's approach for the practice of philosophy with children will be explored in a companion piece to aoppear in the next issue of the journal

Phil Cam takes up Hume's classical distinction between fact and value judgements arguing that as there are two kinds of 'ought' judgments the supposed 'gap' between our affective and cognitive powers has little practical effect. In deliberating about what to do and how to act we are engaged in the formation of moral character for our practical reasoning is an integration of our empirical beliefs and our values. In an educational setting it is really only philosophy that can take on this integrating role and in so doing, philosophical inquiry becomes moral education.

Megan Laverty-Smith examines the implications of the introduction of philosophy to the senior secondary school in Victoria, Australia and its implications for the role that Philosophy for Children might play in the school curriculum. She argues that Philsoophy for Children cannot be regarded a simply a precursor to VCE philosophy (the Education Certificate taken by senior secondary school students) for it radically different in many ways. She builds on Kant's idea of the publica nd private use of reason to argue (similarly to Cam) that Philosophy for Children properly insituted through a community of inquiry using the public use of reason is an exercise in one's own humanity in which one works at becoming oneself. Accordingly philsophy for Childrenis no precursor but integral to curriculm.

Gil Burgh and Mia O'Brien report on their ongoing project of developing a framework for curriculum interpretation and design that reflects the approach of philosophy in education as an embodiment of life long learning and transformative thinking. They seek to provide readers with practical tools and processes for designing and interpreting curriculum across all key learning areas (KLAs) to integrate philosophical inquiry into all aspects of school experience for children.

Hegel on teaching philosophy

Hannu Juuso: Teacher Training School, University of Oulu, Finland
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Introduction

G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) is one of the most important thinkers of modern philosophy. Reactions to the basic thesis of his absolute idealism can be seen both in the various forms of philosophy in continental Europe, for example in Marxism, existentialism and phenomenology as well as in thoughts of the early American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce, Josiah Royce and John Dewey. Although the basis of Hegel's philosophy began to spread soon after his death, mainly due to the influence of Ludvig Feuerbach and Karl Marx, his method of examination had an influence on many later elaborations and it still offers topical and fruitful sources for inspiration. For Hegel, all phenomena are only the contradictory and fragmentary moments of a dialectically developing Spirit (*Geist*), which in its final state forms the Idea, "the Being-in-and-for-itself".[1] In pedagogy, this dialectical thinking means the aspiration to study pedagogic action within the requirements of that complex, dynamic, and historical totality.

In addition to his academic career, it is well-known that Hegel also served for a long time, 1808-1816, at Nuremberg as a Rector and Professor of Philosophy at the Gymnasium, a classical school for boys between fourteen to twenty years of age. Prior to that time period, he had spent several years as a home and schoolteacher instructing children and young adults. Although pedagogy did not occupy an independent position in his system of the philosophy of Spirit, it so happened that during his years at Nuremberg, he contemplated issues of teaching philosophy in particular. It would appear *prima facie*, though, that Hegel was quite a conflicting personality as a teacher of philosophy. With supreme confidence in his own philosophical system along with the connected didactic views tinged with Pythagorean discipline, and demanding the "breaking" of the pupil's subjective will, he looks like a conservative, strict soldierly authority. He also condemns sharply the so-called playful pedagogy, emphasising the pupils' own natural growth and spontaneity as a dangerous fad of his times (Hegel 1984: 279,293,340). On the other hand, Hegel was an all-round genius adored by his pupils, and he tried to support them also on a personal level.[2] Hegel did not accept under any circumstances traditional rote learning based on endless repetition, humiliation, pressure, and "spoon feeding" of information, as he thought that it did not take into account the fact that learning is always based on independence. Hegel thinks that teachers shall not subdue or enslave children, nor shall they demand they obey just for the sake of obedience. On the contrary, the teachers shall endeavour persistently to earn the love and respect of the children. Hegel demands that the pupils shall be guided at an early age to trust in themselves and in their own reason, quite as the teaching of philosophy shall aim at *true philosophising* (Hegel 1984: 199; Tubbs 1997).

What is this pedagogical thinking of Hegel's that seems so confusingly divided into two parts all about? How can his views on philosophy and education be seen in his thoughts about teaching philosophy? What does Hegel actually mean by true philosophising, and what is its contribution to his educational thought as a whole? Finally, can Hegel's thought on these issues have any contribution to Philosophy for Children?

This article is the first one of two to explore Hegel's insight about teaching philosophy. It analyses the intellectual underpinnings of Hegel's perplexed ideas concerning the notions of "philosophising" and "thinking for oneself" in the light of his philosophical as well as dialectical pedagogical thinking. In this, however, I want to point out that my article does not pretend to grasp Hegel's philosophical system in all its tremendous complexity. The second article to be published later in this journal concentrates on discussing Philosophy for Children from the Hegelian perspective thus opened.

Hegel's deliberations concerning the teaching of philosophy were recorded in his talks, and especially in his correspondence with the high state officials during the years 1808-1822. The main sources in the study of this first paper are the letters addressed to Niethammer, Sinclair, Raumer, and Altenstein. [3] The keynotes of that correspondence are interpreted in relation to Hegel's *Philosophische Propaedeutic*, -the basis of his instruction- and to Kant´s and Hegel's theory of *Bildung*.[4] It is also argued that in striving to follow Hegel's main thoughts on this specific topic, it is essential to show their connections to Kant's epistemology. In the article, Hegel's demand for the unity of the form and content as well as his dialectical modes of teaching philosophy are brought back to his criticism towards Kant's "Copernican synthesis". On this basis, the article ends up discussing the challenges and ambiguous problems that Hegel had in his curriculum and teaching of philosophy in practice.

Philosophising, thinking for oneself and the process of *Bildung*

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) can be thought of as one of the best-known advocates of "philosophising". In the preface of his lectures in the winter of 1765-66, he discusses the theme entitled *Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winterhalbjahr von 1765-1766.* Kant classifies all sciences, with the exception of philosophy, as either historical or mathematical, with both of them containing texts, for example, "as sources of absolute truths".[5] Both of them can be learned at schools, as Kant thinks that ". . . it is possible to impress either on the memory or on the understanding that which can be presented to us as an already completed discipline"(ibid). For the same to be possible in the case of teaching philosophy, the same idea would be required from philosophy itself. As no one has, however, shown Kant such a book of wisdom and knowledge so far, he ends up recommending philosophy as a special method of teaching of its own.

> The method of instruction, peculiar to philosophy, is *zetetic*, as some of the philosophers of antiquity expressed it. In other words, the method of philosophy is the method of *inquiry* (ibid).

Kant sees the above-mentioned difference between the essence of philosophy itself and the mathematical and historical sciences as a problem for the philosophy teacher. The latter two are based on a general standard, while in the former every human being has a standard of his own. Kant thinks that it would amount to a betrayal of public trust to teach philosophy as a scientific illusion specifically as a collection of readily available things digested for the public by others, when the purpose should be to expand their comprehension and to equip them with the future possibility of adding to their views *on their own.*

It would appear at first that Hegel is questioning the validity of Kant's view. In his letters to Niethammer, Raumer and Altenstein, Hegel criticises repeatedly the intuitionist thoughts of the contemporary pedagogues

(e.g. Graeves, but also Rousseau and Pestalozzi) about learning being based on the subjective experiences rising from immediate life situations (see *Let.*, 259; Väyrynen 2000). Hegel maintains that thinking like this involves the assumption that "a young mind can practise itself in relation to any topic within reach"(*Let.*, 279). Hegel thinks, however, that any more or less coincidental content arising from the life situation of the educatee does not provide any grounds for using it as the basis, as it is quite as one-sided as rote learning based only on reception and remembering.

Hegel addresses quite the same criticism to the teachers of philosophy who start philosophising *by detaching the content from it*. Hegel thinks that this unfortunate effort to teach thinking for oneself and self-productivity without any contents "casts a shadow on the truth". It involves the idea of endless travel without ever learning to know the towns, rivers, countries, et cetera that you meet.[6] Hegel thinks, however, that someone who learns to know a town, comes from there to a river, then to another town, and so forth, learn in this process also how to travel. In fact, he does not even learn it, as he actually travels with the purpose of getting to know those places.

> Thus, in learning the content of philosophy, one not only learns to philosophise, but indeed really philosophises. Moreover, the aim of learning to travel is only to get to know those cities etc., i.e., to know the content (*Let.*, 279).

According to Hegel, philosophy is ". . . the science of the absolute ground of things, that is, their ground not in their Individuality or Particularity, but in their Universality" (*Prop.*, 65). Philosophy thus cannot be defined *only* as something that the philosophers do, specifically a method or activity independent of a given content. Therefore, Hegel demands that philosophising taking place in teaching shall also be directed at its actual content because that is exactly where philosophy equals "highest rational thinking". Hegel maintains that formal and unsystematic philosophy is incidental and fragmentary, with a cold attitude towards the real content as a direct consequence. In the teaching of philosophy, the content cannot therefore be distinguished in any way from the form, as thinking is learnt in the form. The true philosophising as thinking for oneself entails the development of strong conceptual understanding, and thus, Hegel insists philosophy shall be taught and learnt similarly to any other science. He thinks, however, that a prejudice has gained a foothold in philosophy and especially pedagogy, according to which independent thinking shall be developed and practised as if the content did not have any significance, and, on the other hand, as if learning were the opposite of independent thinking. As a matter of fact, thinking can only practise itself in a content that is not based on imagination or senso-intellectual intuition, but is thinking by itself. Hegel thinks that it is quite a common mistake to consider a thought to have been thought independently if it differs somehow from other people's thoughts. By dispelling substance and thoughts the pure formalism leads, says Hegel, only to perennial empty searching and wandering, to unsystematic speculation capable of nothing. On the other hand, it is due to the special nature of its contents that philosophy shall be both taught and learnt from the very start quite in the same way as other sciences (*Let.*, 279, 338).

Meanwhile, in his zetetic method, Kant assumes that philosophy is about open questions and endless study. From the viewpoint of education, its most important function is the pupil's ability to achieve an *independent* capacity to reflect and reason, as Kant thinks it is the only thing useful for

the pupil. As a by-product of philosophising, the pupil can perhaps adopt some individual pieces of knowledge at the same time. Similarly to the Roman poet Horace, Kant advises for courage to be wise. Independent thinking means to Kant (Kant 1995b) "... the search for the ultimate touchstones of truth in one's own self (i.e. in each person's own reason)." Whenever an idea should be accepted, Kant thinks that we should ask ourselves if it is acceptable. Independent thinking means especially the use of cognitive ability, not "cognitive wealth". According to Kant, this foundation of the Enlightenment is laid in the individual subjects by means of education. He insists that "young minds" need to be accustomed early to this reflection (Kant 1995a). However, Kant meets with and sets the fundamental problem of modern pedagogy and education in this requirement for the maturity and self-determination:

> One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the child's capability of exercising his free will - for restraint is necessary. How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint? I am to accustom my pupil to endure a restraint of his freedom, and at the same time I am to guide him to use his freedom aright (Kant 1991,27).

Kant also refers to the very same paradox indirectly at the beginning of his statement on teaching philosophy. The subject-biased Enlightenment ideal of a person's own reason meets inevitably the teacher as an influential educative person. He cannot stay and wait for the natural maturation of his students, but is "despite all the problems involved" also forced to teach such "necessities of life" that can only be understood later. In this requirement Kant would thus appear to reject one-sided activity only based on the student's own interests in the teaching of philosophy as well. Although teaching should, according to Kant, follow the process of the human being's natural cognitive development, starting from understanding and continuing through reasoning to learning, this harmony can thus never be fully achieved (Kant 1996, see also Martens 1995)

The shared pedagogical thought of Kant and Hegel inherent in their idea of teaching philosophy was the principle of *Bildung.* [7] According to Siljander (2000), from the times of Enlightenment that concept became the cornerstone of both individual and social development consisting of the ideas of reason (*Vernunft*), higher humanity (*Höherbildung der Menscheit*), maturity (*Mudigkeit*) and self-determination (*Selbstbestimmung*). In the theoretical tradition of continental modern pedagogy *the process of Bildung* is understood as man maturing from the creature of nature to the creature of culture *but by the indispensable impact of education* (*Erziehung*) (ibid). It is just this process of producing *homo humanus* from *homo barbarus* and surpassing the prevailing form of living where the above-mentioned pedagogical paradox has its origins. In *Propaedeutic* Hegel states that *Bildung*

> ...entails that man, in the gratification of his natural wants and impulses, shall exhibit that prudence and temperance which lie in the limits of his necessity, namely, self-preservations. He must (a) stand away from and be free from the natural (b) on the other hand, be absorbed in his avocation, in what is essential and therefore, (c) be able to confine his gratification of the natural wants not only within the limits of necessity but also to sacrifice the same for higher duties (*Prop.*,43).

As discussed later in this paper, for Hegel, the process of Bildung is closely connected to his philosophical thought as a whole, explicitly for the development of Spirit in the individual, in cultures and in history. The school with its curriculum and methods of instruction is the form of the

realisation of this movement in the level of individual aspiring to the liberation of man, to the freedom, by detaching the child from his immediate desires and moving them towards the intellectual. So for Hegel, the goal of education is

> . . . the elevation of man to an independent state of existence: i.e. to that existence wherein he is a Free Will. On this view many restraints are imposed upon the desires and likings of children. They must learn to obey and consequently to annul their mere individual or particular wills and, moreover, (to annul also) to this end their sensuous inclinations and appetites that, by this means, their Will may become free (*Prop.*, 18; cf *Prop.*, 164).

Both Kant and Hegel put an emphasis on the human being's measureless value, which means in education that the human being is seen as a goal as such that is free from external and instrumental interests. In this connection they are united by the requirement for human self-determination and independent thinking. This does not, however, mean unqualified egoism for either one of them, as it involves the idea of adapting personal interests with the general ones. In Hegel's theory of modern state, education means the development of the human being into a member of society and culture taking place in the process of *Bildung*. This, in turn, presupposes the "mediation of the personal interest in the general one", its determination as "a *link* in the chain of *unity*" (Hegel 1994; see also Väyrynen 2001). In a way, independent thinking encompasses the non-self (or "others") as an ethical moment. Kant would also appear to be pointing at the same collective ethicalness of life when he says that the goals of individual human being can only be realised when they do not prevent the realisation of others' goals.[8] However, these ideals cannot be realised in education solely as natural, subjective acts of the educatee. According to Kant, pupils shall be *led* – not carried - from the very beginning to think so that they are able to "walk by their own efforts without stumbling" in the future (Kant 1996). This "leading" means to Kant, not only the accustomation of the pupil at an early age to tolerate compulsion and restrictions on his/her freedom, but also the demand of developing the conceptual understanding of the pupil learning to think by the help of pedagogical action - not only by some intrinsic and haphazard intuition - from the very beginning, as this is the only path to true self-determination. This is also one main idea in Hegel's pedagogical thought directly connected to his *Propaedeutic* and Hegel's practice of teaching pupils to take their first steps in learning philosophy. In this central issue of *Bildung* Hegel meets with the above mentioned pedagogical paradox formulated by Kant.

Kant's emphasis on the primary significance of formal philosophising is often seen as something contrary to Hegel (eg Cosentino 1996). As argued above this statement is, however, quite questionable. Also Väyrynen thinks that this is only apparent, as it is obvious that Hegel was not familiar with the preface of Kant's lectures and the main emphases in it, which may be why he does not notice the fundamental similarity of his thoughts (Väyrynen 1986, 110-111). On the other hand, Hegel's open criticism of Kant in this very issue cannot totally be neglected. Despite the similar main thoughts on the theory of *Bildung*, my understanding is that the requirement for the unity of form and content related to Hegel's teaching of philosophy implies Hegel's criticism of Kant's epistemology of critical philosophy and the principle of dialectic that is based on it.

Teaching philosophy and the dialectical movement of Spirit
So what does Hegel mean by the actual content of philosophy, preventing one-sided philosophising, and *entwined in its form*? We must first observe that Hegel is not referring here to isolated and individual facts in the history of philosophy, which is what sometimes seems to be the erroneous assumption.[9] In fact, Hegel wanted at some stage to remove fully this kind of study of the history of philosophy from the gymnasium. According to him, as *non-speculative* narration of random opinions and thoughts it only leads to contempt of philosophy (*Let.*, 392). For Hegel, the content of philosophy means the logical structure conveyed through his entire literary production revealed in a dialectical process, in which knowledge is understood not only in terms of the results of this process but also in terms of the research that led to them.[10] For Hegel, such historicalness and historical awareness combining content and form mean the understanding of philosophical questions in their generic and functional contexts, forming a necessary condition for human emancipation at the same time.

As I said above, this emphasis on the unity of the form and content of philosophy in teaching derives ultimately from Hegel's criticism of Kant's epistemological synthesis. As is well-known, in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781 and 1787) Kant's ambition to join the thoughts of rationalists (e.g. Spinoza and Leibniz) and empiricists (e.g. Locke and Hume) had resulted in the non-consciousness of *noumena* or "things-in-themselves" (*die Dinge an Sich*). Thus, there is something outside and independent of our knowledge that only can, according to Kant, appear to us through our own reason giving a *form* to this external thing. In fact, the condition for the thoughts to exist to us is the aprioric form given to them by our reason. The responsibility for this constitution does not, however, rest with us as individual empirical subjects, as its true agent is the anonymous subjectivity, or in Kant´s terms, "transcendental I" (*das tranzendentale Bewusstsein*) by which he refers just to those fundamental aprioric prerequisites of thinking - the categories of pure reason which form the consciousness as such not in reach to any individual experience, which just *is* and can only be felt through its outcomes, the structures created by it.[11] This is why Kant has to abandon the illusion of grasping the transcendent, the Absolute (see Oittinen 1997). This main thought in Kant's epistemology focusing on the form of thought seems also to be reflected in his views on teaching philosophy, leading directly to the cross-path where Hegel on the first few pages of *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807) goes his own way leading to dialectics.

Hegel does not accept Kant's idea of knowability as a kind of instrument or apparatus placed between us and "things-in-themselves". This assumption leads to the placement of the attention in the apparatus itself, on the concern for its dependability and for the fear of error. Meanwhile, this leads to the requirement that the apparatus shall be known before it is actually used so that its possible effects on the object itself can be eliminated. According to Hegel, this analogy with an apparatus cannot be applied to knowing, because knowing can only be studied know-ably. It would mean that know-ability is known before knowing, "learning to swim without going into water". This is why the formal aspects of the object of knowing and know-ability itself shall develop together, never independently or separately from each other.[12]

The criticism of Kant's epistemology offers Hegel, in principle, an optimistic opportunity to achieve the truth -the Absolute- that exists as such as the result of a long dialectical process. According to Manninen, "this

kind of process was eventually based in Hegel on the fact that the subject and object, knowing and its object, the concept and reality were ontologically the same, even so that the "Concept" (or "Notion"-HJ) (*Begriff*) in the sense meant by Hegel was manifested as the innermost core and constructional principle of reality."[13] So far as I can see, this epistemological insight also gives rise to the idea of the unity of form and content that Hegel associated with the teaching of philosophy.

In Hegel's thought everything wraps around the dialectical development of Spirit (*Geist*).[14] The Spirit actualizes itself both in the developmental phases of individual consciousness and will ("Subjective Spirit"), in human society and culture ("Objective Spirit") and in world history. The climax of this complex movement is Reason as "Absolute Spirit", the ultimate unity of the world as fully conscious of its freedom where all forms of human life are completely understood in light of their historical development and mutual relations. Actually, this is the goal towards which Spirit develops through its lower modes as restricted pictures of the Reason itself. This gradual dialectical process is realized by the different forms of life (e.g. political, religious, artistic, social) in their development where the earlier form transfer as to a part of the richer and deeper one. For Hegel, it is just philosophy, especially logic, which is capable of revealing this dynamic progress.

So the word *dialectic* had quite a different meaning for Hegel than for example for the Greeks. For Plato *dialegesthai* refers to the art of philosophical discussion searching for the Truth, as a concept of making a distinction to sophists´ *elenchus*, the intellectual battle. For Hegel, dialectic is the core of his philosophical system referring to the *logic of the development* of Spirit attained by contradictions (thesis and antithesis) towards its perfection, the Absolute (synthesis). The religious orientation of Hegel´s thought is apparent when he states that "God is the Absolute Spirit, that is to say, he is the pure Being that makes himself his own object and in this contemplates only himself, or who is, in his other-being, absolutely returned into himself and self-identical".[15]

This metaphysical Aristotelian (i.e. teleological) movement of Spirit from immediate sensuality towards the Absolute is ultimately about a process similar to growth in education.

> The task of leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge had to be seen in its universal sense, just as it was the universal individual, self-conscious Spirit, whose formative education had to be studied. As regards the relation between them, every moment, as it gains concrete form and a shape of its own, displays itself in the universal individual. The single individual is incomplete Spirit, a concrete shape in whose whole existence *one* determinateness predominates, the others being present only in blurred outline... The individual whose substance is the more advanced Spirit runs through this past just as one who takes up a higher science goes through the preparatory studies he has long since absorbed, in order to bring their content to mind: he recalls them to the inward eye, but has no lasting interest in them (Hegel 1977, 16)

Similarly, the individual must also go through the developmental stages of the universal Spirit. In this way, what the "mature men" were interested in previously is restored to "facts", "exercises" and "children's play". In fact, it is just in the child's development at school that Hegel

thinks we can identify as a silhouette the history of the cultural development of the world.

> In this respect formative education, regarded from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what thus lies at hand, devouring his inorganic nature, and taking possession of it for himself. But, regarded from the side of universal Spirit as substance, this is nothing but its own acquisition of self-consciousness, the bringing-about of its own becoming and reflection into itself (ibid, 16-17)

The school institution is, as an especially important developmental form of Spirit, that "concrete reason" in which Spirit presents itself, but which supports at the same time the dialectical development of Subjective Spirit to freedom through conflicts. The purpose of education is to get an individual to be ´at home in the world´, to catch the world conceptually and realize his identity with Spirit. In this systematic whole of Hegel's philosophical thought, pedagogical action also inevitably leads through various opposite forces and their reversals to alienation from the educatee's natural existence to self-determination. His true nature can only be achieved in this contradictory process of *Bildung* (as discussed earlier) where the content of education of the school is to be derived from the formative stages of Spirit for an individual to pass through. The systematicity of Hegel's philosophy lies in the all-pervasive Reason. Thus, the actual content of teaching philosophy itself is to Hegel his own system of the development of Spirit, which also determines how it needs to be taught.[16]

Hegel analyses the special conceptual nature of his philosophy in terms of a variety of endlessly repeated methodological forms.

> Philosophical content has in its method and soul three forms:
> it is (1) abstract, (2) dialectical, and (3) speculative. It is abstract insofar as it takes place generally in the element of thought. Yet as merely abstract it becomes - in contrast to the dialectical and speculative forms - the so-called understanding which holds determinations fast and comes to know them in their fixed distinction. The dialectical is the movement and confusion of such fixed determinateness; it is negative reason. The speculative is positive reason, the spiritual, and it alone is really philosophical.[17]

For Hegel, the content of philosophy is abstract as well as thinking is abstraction "...in so far as intelligence, starting from concrete intuitions, neglects one of the manifold determinations, selects another, and gives to it the simple form of Thought" (*Prop.*, 75; cf *Prop.*, 4). Hegel's own example of abstract thinking is the fictional situation of execution where the murderer is seen *only* as a murderer, where this simple determination is allowed to smother all other sides of his humanity (Hegel 1981). Abstract understanding (*verständige*) as the fixed determinateness is one stage of the development of individual, Subjective Spirit. This non-dialectical empirical certainty is broken by the dialectic or by the "Negative Reason". In this way, the reversed abstract lead in the positive dialectics of speculative thought to concrete in which the original abstractions are revealed as non-absolute moments. "The Understanding stops short at concepts in their fixed determinateness and difference from one another; dialectic exhibits them in their transition and dissolution; speculation or Reason grasps their unity in their opposition or the positive in their dissolution and transition" (*Prop.*, 126). According to Hegel (1981), only the last form is genuinely philosophical. Going back to that dramatic example of Hegel him-

self, the murderer is seen not only as the criminal but in the light of his entire life, inside the sphere of God's mercy.

These formative stages of Spirit shall not be bypassed in pedagogical mediation, as they are exactly where philosophy is finally constituted. According to Hegel, this content of philosophy can also be learnt, as "...what is true of the teaching of other sciences must also be true of philosophy" (*Let.*, 338). Differently from Kant's thought (i.e. everyone has his own standard for philosophy), Hegel compares philosophy to a "universally true" treasury of ingenious thoughts, achieved through hard laborious work and struggle which can only be achieved by working, precisely by learning.

> The philosophical sciences contain universal true thoughts of their objects. They constitute the end product of the labour of genial thought in all ages. These true thoughts surpass what an uneducated young man comes up with thinking by himself to the same degree that such a mass of inspired labour exceeds his effort. The original, peculiar views of the young on essential objects are in part still totally deficient and empty, but in part - in infinitely greater part - they are opinion, illusion, half-truth, distortion, and indeterminateness. Through learning, truth takes the place of such imagining (*Let.*, 280).

This criticism of the abstract shows the basic principle of transcendental idealism regarding the invalidity of sensualism (the natural) as the basis for scientific consciousness. For Kant, sensualism still is a necessary condition for consciousness of the understanding that synthesises the world, while for Hegel, the world is constructed in thought *per se*, as something detached from the empirical. Hegel thinks that thinking can rise in dialectical work above the sensual i.e. to the transcendental, which only as thought itself can finally reach absolute knowledge.[18] Hegel's repeated criticism of contemporary intuitionistic aspirations and efforts to bypass different areas of philosophy must be seen as a consequence of this basic thesis. According to Hegel, thinking can thus only practice itself in a content that is not based on imagination or the sensual but is thought in itself. This is the reason why logic became the core of Hegel's philosophy. Philosophy as about the absolute ground of things in their universality, says Hegel, comes true just in Thinking and "Logic is the Science of such Thinking" (*Prop.*, 65). It "...has for its object the Thinking Activity and the entire compass of its determinations" (ibid 74). Besides logic is for Hegel "the Knowing of Thinking in its truth" through it "...we also learn to think more correctly; for, since we think the thinking of Thinking, the mind thereby creates for itself its power."[19]

Hegel's view of the special questions related to teaching philosophy cannot be examined in separation from the above whole characterised by his criticism of Kant. The fact that Hegel had published his *Phänomenology* in 1807 just before his years as a headmaster and that he soon thereafter gradually wrote and published another work with a solid basis in his phenomenology, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, had a direct influence on what Hegel thought about education and teaching philosophy – and possibly also vice versa.[20] *Philosophische Propaedeutic* is also related to the same process, although one can have reservations about his efforts to formulate philosophy as a concrete and chronological content for teaching at gymnasiums. Namely the fact that Hegel himself never published this "textbook of philosophy" seems descriptive of the problems in principle connected with teaching philosophy that he often refers to in his letters.

The problem of the beginning

Hegel's Gymnasium had three class levels: the lower class (*Unterklasse*) with an age range of 14-15 years, the middle class (*Mittelklasse*) with an age range of 15-18 years and the higher class (*Oberklasse*) with an age range of 17-20 years. Philosophy was taught four hours per week in each. Usually Hegel started his lesson by reading aloud some short paragraphs of his patchy writings (i.e. later as *Propaedeutic* by Rosenkranz) and then explained them at length. According to George and Vincent, the structure of each of Hegel's lessons was standard and required pupils to recapitulate the previous weeks lesson (George & Vincent 1986, xiv). Hegel also encouraged questions and discussion of the topic spending sometimes the whole hour covering difficulties. Hegel also dictated notes expecting them to be supplemented later by the written homework. However, the approaches of principle described above led Hegel to major curricular problems bothering him constantly. Where and how to start the instruction?

The approaches followed by him in relation to the abstract and speculative contents are described in a letter to Niethammer on December 20, 1812 as "the thorn in my side". Hegel observed the interest that his students had in "Ciceronian philosophising" and would also appear to be attracted by the way in which Plato like Socrates philosophised with young people, as they "...would no doubt be ideal for the gymnasium level", but which would, however, be "...against my nature." [21] Quite evidently Hegel here refers to the necessity of *Erziuhung* in the process of *Bildung* discussed above. For Hegel, the precondition of coming to be ´at home in the world´ or to make Spirit known to itself by passing through its stages in education, entails self-activity of comprehension which, however, needs something to work with. This is why in Hegel's instruction learning by rote had a definite place before the discussion. This is also why Hegel abandons philosophy as an *edification*, to be exact, as fully explained by the teacher without any pupil's own work, even when it is taught to the young. Mind cannot think in a void, says Hegel, but on the other hand mere receiving would be like writing sentences on water (ibid 339, 341. See also George &Vincent 1986, xiv-xv).

For this reason, Hegel ends up with the teaching of philosophy for the young needing to be "essentially preparatory" (*Let.*, 282). It should be restricted to the practical yet systematic teaching of mechanically and grammatically learnable content. This kind of teaching does not reach the above-mentioned negative and positive dialectics, an area that can only be approached occasionally at the gymnasium. According to Hegel, philosophy as a propaedeutic science shall dedicate itself particularly to the formal cultivation and exercise of thought. This is only possible, if it breaks fully away from the imaginary world and the sensual, adhering to the certainty of its concepts and consistent methodological procedure. Meanwhile it is the function of philosophy to entitle, to insight the substantially valuable, to express it with undisputed thoughts, guarding it against obscure bypaths. Confusion in this matter is, according to Hegel, due to the fact that the content of philosophy manifests various separate sciences. This diversity has led to confusion, as a consequence of which efforts are made to deny undisputable concepts and established analyses.

The way in which Hegel ended up limiting the contents of philosophy teaching in the gymnasium and especially the starting of the teaching, is also connected with the dialectical nature of Hegel's philosophical thought on one hand, and on his frustrating teaching experiences on the

other hand. Although logic - as seen above - provided the absolute starting-point for Hegel's philosophy, he felt that starting from it was particularly problematic, and he returned to the theme in many of his letters (see *Let.*, 264, 283-284). Niethammer's directive in 1810 prescribed that he should already lead the pupils directly to speculative thinking through "practical exercises" in the first of the three grades of the gymnasium. Hegel considered, however, that it was extremely difficult to think of logic in this way.

> Transposing a concrete object or actual circumstance into the speculative (key), drawing it forth and preparing it to be grasped speculatively - all this comes last just as much does judging a composition by the bass line in music instruction (*Let.*, 263)

By logical "practical exercises" in speculative thought Hegel could only understand the discussion of true pure concepts in their speculative form, which in turn is the deepest content of logic itself.[22] For Hegel, abstract thinking, in the determinateness of the understandable abstract concept, must precede speculative thought, and teaching at the gymnasium should be limited to this only. In fact, Hegel thought that there is probably too much teaching of (speculative) philosophy at the gymnasium, and that it could be given up completely in the lowest grade.[23] So he considered it better in the following years to start with the *law*, the simplest and most abstract consequence of freedom, moving on to *morality*, and then *religion*. [24] According to Hegel, this approach corresponds to the nature of the content itself, although its discussion on a broader basis is not yet appropriate. Hegel justifies the suitability of content like this for an introduction to philosophy as follows:

> The concepts of these doctrines are simple, and yet they at once possess a determinateness, which makes them entirely accessible to the age group of this class. Their content finds support in the natural feelings of the pupils, and has actuality in their inner life, for it constitutes the side of inner actuality itself. I thus by far prefer for this class the present subject matter to logic, for the latter has a content, which is more abstract, is particularly removed from this immediate actuality of inner life, and is purely theoretical.[25]

Hegel considers freedom, law, property, etc. to be "practical qualifiers" with which we are involved daily and which have a sanctioned existence and validity because of this immediate existence unlike the universal "logical qualifiers". Hegel thinks that the concepts of freedom are directly present in the pupil's life-world and thus also thought without any preceding analysis. Starting with the themes in question actually realises quite what was aimed at. Abstract understanding (*verständige*) is in a key position from the very start, and philosophising shall not be taught separately from the content of philosophy. Hegel defends in this connection as well, the meaning of substance, the true content instead of hollow formalism. The abstract form of philosophical content is to Hegel about philosophy of understanding, which is important at the gymnasium to lead to the dialectical form, which is more difficult and less interesting to the pupils and further to the actual philosophical, speculative truth. According to Hegel, the dialectical and speculative methodological forms of the content of philosophy are not yet suitable for the gymnasium with a few exceptions. Hegel maintains that a few people can only understand speculative thinking, if anyone can know anything about understanding it in the first place (*Let.*, 280-282). Leaving from the abstract does not, however, exclude the practical i.e. the content of more relevance to pupils, quite the opposite. In elementary teaching the first methodological form of phi-

losophical content, abstract understanding as the fixed determinateness, contains the practical as a pedagogically valuable moment (cf Väyrynen 1986 & 1995). Hegel says that he has become increasingly assured of the justification of this approach after the poor experiences that were caused when he tried, as advised in the above-mentioned directive, to start directly from the basic concepts of logic. "I have not repeated that experience," Hegel says meaningfully. So Hegel did not lecture on psychology and logic until the two-year Middle Class, continuing to encyclopaedia based on logic in the Higher Class. It appears that he had to make a concession to what the pupils experienced most relevant and to the intuitionist principles that he had been criticising before.[26]

Later, when he was already working in Berlin, Hegel came back to philosophy teaching at the gymnasium once more. In his letter to Altenstein on April 16, 1822, Hegel divides the pre-philosophical teaching at the gymnasium, preparing for speculative philosophy and philosophical studies at a university, into the more "material" and "formal" teaching (*Let.*, 390-395). Hegel means by the former the very initial contents of the above-mentioned law, morality and religion, considering them to form the true foundation of speculative thinking. Differently from previously, Hegel suggests the ancients as one of the contents of "material" teaching. The great historical and artistic observations of individuals and people, their duties, fates and virtues would act as an introduction to morality and religion. Hegel thinks that such materials as such include the truth and are at the same time directly in connection with the formal content of speculative thought. In the Middle Class of the gymnasium, a move needs to be made to forms of thought that are closer to speculative thought, both purely argumentative ones and common to philosophical thought. Hegel thinks that the introduction to such formal thinking shall be seen as a direct preparation for university studies in philosophy (ibid 391-392).

Hegel also suggests empirical psychology as an introduction to logic, the basic principles of which form the main content of teaching in the Middle Class. Hegel thinks that the students come from the gymnasium to the university without the necessary basic skills in logic needed in philosophical studies. He mentions the students' deficiencies in different reasoning methods, definition, classification, argumentation and the scientific method in particular. It is these very skills that should, according to Hegel, be already studied before the university studies, although young people often do not understand its significance and usefulness. If studying these issues is left for them to decide on their own, logic is not attractive enough. Hegel maintains that this is the reason why the study of logic has been on shaky ground and almost disappeared at gymnasiums (ibid 393).

Hegel thinks, however, that logic as thinking about thinking itself is a highly significant experience for the young. On the other hand, Hegel considers – on the basis of his own experiences in Nuremberg – that logic is not beyond the gymnast's comprehension. He claims that he himself learnt the Wolfian definitions of the "pure ideas" at the age of twelve, and knew all the principles of syllogistics at the age of fourteen. Referring to the contemporary efforts (such as Rousseau and Pestalozzi) to develop independent thinking, Hegel ironically maintains that having learnt one logic, the pupils have more freedom and cause to think about it themselves (ibid 394).

Then *how* should logic be studied according to Hegel? By bearing it in mind, Hegel says briefly that pupils should know the rules of logic as certainly, accurately, and without hesitation as they must know the rules of grammar and mathematical theorems if they wish to understand philology or mathematics. If a sufficient amount of time were reserved for this purpose, it would be worthwhile, according to Hegel, to start the teaching of logic with the simple and easy to understand things. He thinks that logic could also be taught to younger pupils following the same principle (ibid 395).

On the basis of the views on teaching logic in the above-mentioned letter, Ekkehard Martens (1993) criticises Hegel's thinking related to the negligence of the subjective viewpoint to philosophical studies in particular. Martens fails to observe, however, the problem linked to the starting of philosophy that was described above and the practical approaches taken on its basis. Martens also notes Hegel's idea of teaching simple, easy-to-understand logic even to younger pupils.

> Such instruction would then fall in an earlier age, in which youth is still relatively obedient and educable relative to authority, and is less infected by the pretension that, in order for its attention to be won, a matter must be adapted to its representation and the interest of its feeling (*Let.*, 395).

Concluding from what Hegel says about the educability of this age group and its relation to the teacher's authority, we may truly think like Martens did that Hegel is talking about non-gymnasts, children less than 14 years of age.[27] The tone of Marten's interpretation concerning Hegel's ambition to "compel" children into logic does not, however, do justice to Hegel's educational thought as a whole. Situationally, specific forced denial of the subjective will within reasonable proportions is a condition of the *Bildung-process* in it. In his *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* (1821), Hegel defines compulsion as just when it is used as a so-called second compulsion to reverse the first compulsion (93 §). Hegel means by the latter in the case of education, the natural will that is as such violence in relation to freedom. Freedom shall thus be defended with a second compulsion that resists the compulsion of the uneducated will (1994, 117-118; also *Prop.*, 18). As showed previously in this paper that principle of justified compulsion is also connected essentially with Hegel's ideas about teaching philosophy. As Hegel says in the section on teaching logic to children younger than the gymnasts, children are inclined towards any authority also in relation to a content such as logic unlike the gymnasts who imagine the basis for the importance of content to be its external attractiveness. He actually also echoes his idea about the educatee's *will* to be compelled being ultimately the condition for the compulsion to exist.

Thinking for oneself as a consequence of educational contradiction

Philosophising at school means to Hegel education for thinking for oneself. Its true realisation is only possible in content, specifically in the whole of dialectical thought to which the pupils cannot, however, be led directly and immediately. For Hegel, philosophising as something natural and spontaneous is un-dialectical and one-sided, leading to "arbitrary rule by the subject". The subjective adapts to the objective only in positive dialectic, where the spontaneous has been rejected.[28] In the Hegelian sense, philosophising as the development of the Subjective Spirit thus starts with the alienation of the indirect, abstract understanding, i.e. negation. Not only the teaching is important for the alienation, but also what is taught and the fact that the content of the teaching becomes the pupil's

own experience, something done by the pupil himself. As shown by Nigel Tubbs (1997), this leads to a problematic situation from the teacher's point of view. It is, after all, conflicting as such to *teach* the contradiction of dialectical thought as the pupil's own experience. Independent thinking is watered down when derived from abstract knowledge, solving the conflict before the conflict even presents itself. This is the paradoxical core derived from Kant in Hegel's teaching of philosophy, which is why it cannot be flattened in any way into a mere description of the philosophical content and into its mechanical transmission.[29]

Hegel wants to teach to understand on the basis of one's own philosophical activity, but in such a way that the pupil does not end up being dependent on his own subjective views. Thus, the emergent problem is how the pupils' philosophising can be regarded as independent activity if its outcome has been determined beforehand. How can the pupils experience a dialectical conflict genuinely, if teaching right at the start solves it? As Hegel's system is based on independent thinking, it is inevitably conflicting with the teacher telling what to think in the end. As a solution to this problem, Tubbs' interpretation is that Hegel as the teacher of his own philosophy is forced to set himself as the starting-point to be reversed, which in turn means conscious and one-sided exercise of power justified by this pedagogical objective.[30] Hegel, thus, cannot start by teaching his system as a whole, but as abstract parts of it, by giving his pupils, through himself, an opportunity to experience genuinely the incomplete, deficiency, and desperation of their natural ideas, thoughts, and opinions. From the viewpoint of the educational thought described above, there is nothing new in this. As we have noted above, educationality and the goal of self-determination simply cannot be based on the obliteration of the power relation between the teacher and pupil. The contradictory tension between compulsion and freedom formulated by Kant remains, providing the driving force for Hegel's pedagogical thought

According to Tubbs' interpretation, this conflict and the rejection of the teacher's abstract authority taking place in its negation is to Hegel the necessary condition for philosophising and growth based on independent thinking.[31] Tubbs does not, however, present the fundamental question of the condition for historical determination and surpassing the free self-determination of the educatee. What can the creative negation in the pupil to teacher relationship that was described above be based on without turning into socialisation, which is another important function of education? According to Väyrynen, the Hegelian solution to overcome this problem of principle in pedagogical transmission is reached by seeing society and tradition as a heterogeneous, contradictory, and historically changing whole. The heterogeneous historical social tradition involves the possibility of true selection, which is why the individual's socialisation and historical determination are not in an exclusive relation to freedom. On the other hand, the abstract subjectivity and subsequent "philosophising" connected with arbitrary construction can also be overcome and free through knowledge of tradition in Hegelian teaching of philosophy as well (Väyrynen 2000; 1986)

Summary

The contradictory impressions in Hegel's pedagogy derive from the larger whole of his thought on cultural theory and dialectic. Hegel rejected sharply the contemporary "child-centred" organic educational ideas based on spontaneous growth as well as the resulting emphases on teaching philosophy. This did not, however, mean that Hegel did not consider

childhood to be an important and valuable stage of life. The concept of child shaped by romanticism can be seen in Hegel's theory of the family in particular. According to Hegel, the education into a fully competent member of society and culture cannot, however, be based on one-sided requirements such as natural growth in "playful pedagogy", as active educational influence is needed in which the growing person shall learn also to tolerate the restrictions on his freedom at an early age. For Hegel, the education of a child means the educator's responsibility to provide education on the one hand, and the child's opportunity and will to grow and his right to be educated on the other.

Hegel's ideas about teaching philosophy derive from this larger pedagogic thematic. Because of the above-mentioned principle of *Bildung*, Hegel could not accept "natural philosophising" based only on the pupils' interests. In this question, Hegel would appear to have constant problems in his practical work as a teacher. It seems that Hegel had to re-evaluate his curriculum for philosophy at the gymnasium by modifying it with the "pedagogically valuable practical", the content with which the pupils are involved in their daily life. However, Hegel as a teacher of his own philosophy could not neglect the possibility of experiencing true contradiction set by its dialectical nature and its pedagogical value as the starting-point for independent thinking. Here Hegel's thought derives from the fundamental problem of modern pedagogy expressed by Kant, as "How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?"

Another cause of rejecting "natural philosophising" derives from Hegel's critical attitude towards Kant's epistemology. This is implied especially by the requirement for the unity of form and content connected with Hegel's teaching of philosophy and in the dialectic rising from it, intertwined tightly with the process of *Bildung*. Hegel cannot accept Kant's doctrine of knowability as a kind of instrument or apparatus between us and "things-in-themselves". This assumption would lead to fatal consequences from the viewpoint of Hegel's absolute philosophy, with the "things-in-themselves" left outside our knowledge. Hegel thinks that the object of knowing cannot be separated from knowing itself, and they shall be allowed to develop together as an ontological unity. Thus, the true content of philosophy means to Hegel the historical logical structure revealed in a dialectical process and conveyed by his entire literary production, in which knowledge is understood not only as the end product of this process, but also as the research that led to it. For Hegel, this historicalness and historical awareness combining content and form means the understanding of philosophical questions in their genetic and functional contexts, providing at the same time, a necessary condition for human emancipation.

Endnotes

[1] See e.g. Hegel 1986, 76-77. The German word *Geist*, as the most central term in Hegel´s thought can be translated as Mind or Spirit. The so-called Right Hegelians employ Spirit in order to emphasize its supposed compatibility with Christianity. The Left Hegelians, on the other hand, are inclined to see *Geist* in terms of Mind and thus as quintessentially anthropomorphic and pantheistic in its implications. (Georg & Vincent 1986; see also the endnote #38 in this article).

[2] The description of Hegel's style of lecturing written by Heinrich Gustav Hotho (in Manninen et. al. 1994), the close pupil of Hegel, convincingly tells about this deep respect and admiration. Also Tubbs (1996), referring to Mackenzie´s study

(1909), notes that Hegel could teach most subjects with ease and was much liked by his pupils with his genuine enthusiasm for knowledge´. Hegel also took, according to Tubbs, a personal interest in the student´s reading material and interviewed them all before they left the gymnasium.

[3] Letters essentially dealing with the teaching of philosophy were addressed to Niethammer, Sinclair, Raumer ja Altenstein. Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer appointed Hegel to be a headmaster at Nuremberg while he was managing the Bavarian Protestant Department of Education. They became long-time friends, and their correspondence reflects many of Hegel's educational ideas. Letters to Niethammer that bear significance to my topic were registered at Nuremberg on October 10, 1811, February 5, 1812, March 24, 1812, October 23, 1812 and December 20, 1812. The lawyer Isaak von Sinclair was an old "Fichtean" friend of Hegel from the Frankfurt years in 1797-1800. Hegel moved from Nuremberg to a professorship in Heidelberg in 1816 and from there, to succeed Fichte as the professor of philosophy in Berlin in 1818. From this period the letters of relevance to my topic are the ones sent to Raumer from Heidelberg on August 2, 1816 and to Altenstein from Berlin on April 16, 1822. Friedrich Ludwig von Raumer, the historian, was a colleague of the Prussian reform minister Karl August von Hardenberg, while Karl Sigmund von Altenstein was the minister in charge of religious, educational and medical affairs. The source that I have been using is "Hegel: The Letters" (1984) edited by Butler and Seiler (hereafter *Let.*).

[4] *Philosophische Propaedeutic* (hereafter *Prop.*) includes Hegel's papers concerning the content of his own philosophy teaching in Nuremberg Gymnasium. Hegel´s patchy text filled with emendations and rewritings was written between 1808 and 1811. It was, however, found much later by Karl Rosenkranz. He ordered and published it posthumously not until in 1840. For more on the birth history of the work, see the Introduction chapter by George and Vincent in Miller's translation (1986, xi-xxx).

[5] Kant 1996. Kant's classification still shows the lack of differentiation in the 18th century between the disciplines of science compared to the situation of today. No strict distinction was made in those times between e.g. literature, philosophy and science. This can be seen in the names of works fundamental to modern science that were published in those times, such as *"Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica"* (Newton, 1687); *"Philosophia botanica"* (Linne, 1751); *"Philosophie zoologique"* (Lamarck, 1809). In Kant's classification, the so-called historical sciences in those times included "natural history", for instance, which did not refer to developmental history but the description and classification of nature, i.e. plants and animals, among other things. (see Koivisto et al. 1995, viii-xi). It is also notable that both Kant and Hegel could teach several academic disciplines.

[6] Hegel's metaphor derives from Descartes' work *Discourse on Method.*

[7] It should be noted here that the German word *die Bildung* has the meanings, which cannot fully be rendered by some equivalent English term. According to George and Vincent (1986) "the idea of Bildung originated with the poet C.M Wieland and gained considerable popularity with the *Bildungsroman* tradition in eighteenth-century German literature, reaching its zenith in Goethe´s *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* and Schiller´s *Willhelm Tell.* "

[8] Kant 1991, 29. It is not possible here to analyse in more detail the differences that Kant and Hegel may have had in their conceptualisation of the realisation of the value of personality.

[9] See e.g. Cosentino 1996. I think Cosentino is confusing the concepts of *historic fact* and *historicalness* in his interpretation of Hegel. He is also not considering the fact that Hegel's thought on educational theory is associated with Kant.

[10] *Let.,* 288. On the other hand, Hegel also took quite practical point of view to this issue. "I am a schoolmaster who has to teach philosophy, and perhaps this is why I also hold that philosophy must assume a regular structure as teachable as geometry. But knowledge of mathematics and of philosophy is one thing, while

inventive and creative talent in mathematics as in philosophy is quite another." (*Let.*, 288)

[11] See Kant 1990, 397-480; see also Kant 1997, 146-150. It seems to me that Kant´s idea of ´transcendental I´ is a kind of predecessor of some key notions developed in continental twentieth century phenomenology (e.g. Husserl, Heidegger and Merleay-Ponty), Gadamerian hermeneutics and Wittgenstein´s ´language game´ with the distinction, however, that all these later elaborations should be seen as efforts to get loose of the separation between subject and object, between me and not-me or between the mind and the world still preserved in Kant´s critical philosophy. Actually Kant is in his basic thesis conforming the so-called subjectphilosophical paradigm deriving from Descartes. This is, according to Oittinen (1997), the decisive difference between modern philosophy and the philosophy of the Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Reason was not any more thought as an objective principle (*logos* or *nous*) but as a characteristic of the subject, as the opposite of the object.

[12] Hegel 1977, 46-57. See also Bird 1992, Hartnack 1992, Walsh 1992 and Manninen 1987, 213-224.

[13] Manninen 1987, 219. See also *Prop.*, 6, 76, 105-117, 134.

[14] Here we connect up with Hegel´s extremely complex conceptualisation having got a myriad of interpretations. This article aims not to grasp this huge "intellectual fresco" in its details, but I still, because of my topic, have to outline some of its main features. I do this fully aware of the problems included in these kind of short overviews.

[15] *Prop.*, 53. See also *Prop.*, p. 88 where Hegel calls God as "... the Absolute Idea of Reason, not a posited or imagined Being, not something merely possible, He is necessary Idea not posited by an alien thinking." It seems that Hegel´s philosophy has a strong religious and theological tuning. This is supported by the fact that Hegel, after the study in the gymnasium of Stuttgart, went to school for priests in Tubingen in 1788. Here, together with his roommates, Hölderlin and Schelling, he declared the deep concern of the dispersion of modern culture, the segregation of man from nature, society and God. The early writings of Hegel were essentially theological (see more in Plant 2000).

[16] Cf. Tubbs 1997; see also George & Vincent 1986, xv.

[17] *Let.*, 280; Actually these three forms of philosophical content are Hegel´s aspects of logic, see *Prop.*, 126.

[18] See Manninen 1987, where Manninen also examines criticism of Kant in the works *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaft* and *Vorlesungen uber die Geschihte der Philosophie.* As discussed before in endnote # 33, Kant maintains the modern subject-object paradigm, while Hegel tries to overcome it in speculative. It seems, however, that in his criticism of the sensual Hegel accepts the *cogito* basis derived from Descartes and its immediate dualistic consequence, i.e. the distinction between the life-world and thinking, the distinction between life and philosophy. (see e.g. Laine 1993, 42-48).

[19] ibid., 74. Although Hegel did not accept the examination of knowability before knowing, Manninen (1987) thinks that he did not reject the examination of the forms of thinking when the activity and criticism of these forms is *combined*

[20] In his letter to Sinclair in August 1810, Hegel says that he is holding a position (ie. philosophy teacher at a gymnasium) that is personally important to him due to its links to his research (*Let.*, 288). In October 1811 Hegel tells Niethammer in a letter that he is just working passionately to put his own logic into a form that can be understood more easily by the gymnasiasts (*Let.*, 261). Hegel felt that his teaching at the gymnasium in particular – as opposed to the university – had also been useful for his philosophy (see *Let.*, 331-332). The first part of *Wissenschaft der Logik* was published in 1811 and 1812, while the second part was not published until 1816.

[21] *Let.*, 285. Hegel does not exactly explain what he means by "Ciceronian philosophising". Cicero (106-43 B.C.) was a roman statesman, orator, essayist, and letter writer well known of his attempt to unify philosophy and rhetoric. Obvi-

ously Hegel was impressed of Cicero's as well as Socrates' way of philosophising with young but in the context of his own educational thought that unavoidably remained one-sided.

[22] When defining "practical exercises" as the discussion of true pure concepts in their speculatice form Hegel might refer to the Logic in "The Philosophical Encyclopaedia" he taught for the Higher Class. It contained "Ontological Logic" (the analysis of "being", "essence" and "actuality"), "Subjective Logic" (the analysis of "concept", "judgment", "syllogism" and "end") and "Doctrine of the Idea" (the analysis of "life", "cognition" and "knowing"). See *Prop.*, 126-142.

[23] Hegel deliberated repeatedly about whether formal teaching of philosophy based on logic should be removed totally from the gymnasium. Perhaps the ancient philosophers would provide the most suitable and truest introduction to philosophy for the gymnasiasts also from the viewpoint of content. In this thought Hegel felt, however, a conflict in relation to his own duty and the livelihood that it gave to him. On the other hand, he thought that it was also his responsibility as the headmaster. In addition to financial issues, this problem was likely to contribute to the fact that he was considering moving away from Nuremberg. (see *Let.*, 283-284).

[24] *Prop.*, 1-54. *Let.*, 275-276. The partly polemic nature of his letter on October 23, suggests that Hegel had a clearly agitated attitude towards Niethammer's directive to start the teaching of speculative philosophy with "practical exercises". He also explains this to Niethammer in a personal accompanying letter. This led, however, to some kind of a misunderstanding (Niethammer's letter to Hegel on December 3, 1812) that Hegel Hegel had to explain further in his letter dated December 20, 1812. This blunt style of the October letter also shows Hegel's reserve against the formalist ideas of contemporary pedagogues.

[25] *Let.*, 276. In Rosenkranz edition, however, there is also a short portion of logic even for the Lower Class (see *Prop.*, 65-73).

[26] Also see Butler's interpretation in *Let.*, 262-263.

[27] The Nuremburg gymnasium headed by Hegel also had a lower grade for children aged 10-12, and a grade for those aged 12-14 preparing them for the gymnasium.

[28] See the endnotes #11 and #18.

[29] This problem is connected with the issue that puzzled Hegel repeatedly of whether he should compose some kind of introductory versions for the gymnasium and university of *Logic*, for instance. In his letter to Niethammer on March 24, 1812, he mentions the difficulty of understanding what it could mean (*Let.*, 264). According to Tubbs (1997), the erroneous interpretation of Hegel's dialectical thought in the preface (George & Vincent) to *Propaedeutic* is connected with the same problem.

[30] Tubbs 1997. As shown clearly by Tubbs, this viewpoint also questions the so-called. critical pedagogy, in which one of the main aspirations is emancipation, i.e. to overcome domination in the relation between the teacher and pupil. One could think, though, in the Hegelian manner that in principle- or theoretically - this kind of thought would mean the end of education.

[31] Views can differ on the final realisation of this ideal in Hegel's practical teaching. At first glance, it seems here that Hegel is echoing the classic problem of *anamnesis* and its Socratic solution. For Socrates, independent thought comes into being by itself, however requiring the help of a midwife in the process. The pupils have in their own souls the capacity for thought that cannot be put there by the teacher through his teaching. Education means the skill to turn it in the right direction. In practice, this midwifery means to Socrates the leading of the pupil into confusion and conflict. Something new can only arise from a genuine experience of this state of *aporia*. However, it is not possible here to analyse in more detail if Hegel really is repeating this very principle in his own teaching of philosophy.

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Fact, Value and Philosophy Education[1]

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> *Man has beliefs which scientific inquiry vouchsafes, beliefs about the actual structure and processes of things; and he also has beliefs about the values which should regulate his conduct. The question of how these two ways of believing may most effectively and fruitfully interact with one another is the most general and significant of the problems which life presents to us. Some reasoned discipline, one obviously other than any science, should deal with this issue. Thus there is supplied one way of conceiving of the function of philosophy.* (John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty)*

The Fact–Value Distinction

There is a doctrine classically associated with David Hume concerning the distinction between facts and values. Hume entered upon it in his discussion of morals, when he argued that morality "consists not in any *matter of fact*, which can be discover'd by the understanding"(Hume, *Treatise*, 468). According to Hume, there are no facts to be found even in such a vicious act as wilful murder that entitle us to call it vice. Rather than depending upon the facts of the case, our judgments of vice and virtue are expressions of our feelings. "So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious," says Hume, "you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it" (*Treatise*, 469). Hume goes on to remark that authors writing upon morality are in the habit of reasoning from what is and is not the case to what ought or ought not to be so, but that this inference from 'is' to 'ought' is entirely illegitimate. Recognition of this fact alone, says Hume, "wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason" (*Treatise*, 470).

The educational implications of these claims are immense. On a Humean view, there is a realm of objective facts that can be discovered by the understanding or perceived by reason, and another quite distinct realm of subjective values that depend upon the nature of our feelings. Since all matters of fact may be presumed to differ from matters of value in this way, Hume's division between facts and values provides the theoretical underpinnings of a thoroughgoing curricular dualism. Simply put, there are those teaching and learning areas that deal with matters of fact and that appeal to reason, and there are those that are concerned with values and that appeal to the sentiments. From here it is not such a large step to that lingering division in teaching and learning between the cognitive, objective and value-free, on the one hand, and the affective, subjective and value-laden, on the other: between the physical sciences, as it might be, and literature and art.[2]

Hume's stance gives classical expression to the "gap" that Dewey seeks to close when he calls for a rapprochement between our empirical knowledge and the values by which we regulate our conduct. One of life's great problems, says Dewey, is to bring our empirical modes of belief and our approach to values into fruitful engagement with one another. Of special note is Dewey's contention that philosophy itself might take on this task of helping to integrate them. While this is not the only way to look at philosophy, it is a conception that has much to recommend it when we come to consider what we may accomplish by engaging students in

philosophical inquiry. This is even more so if we take Dewey's task to involve attending not just to appropriate subject matter, but also to the cultivation of philosophy as an educational method. So far as subject matter is concerned, philosophy could help to integrate the curriculum, bringing what students are learning about the objective relations between things in the world into connection with what they are learning to value. Yet it is not only through its breadth of subject matter that philosophy can help to lay down connective tissue. When conducted in the right way, philosophical inquiry is a process through which reason is adjusted to feelings and feelings to reason, and is thereby a means of learning to approach moral and other matters of value with intelligence and of reasoning with sensitivity in all things. Otherwise put, philosophy becomes a discipline that can teach us to think and feel as whole human beings.

I will try to show how philosophical inquiry may secure these ends. In attempting to do so, I will be working with a vision of philosophy that is approximately Socratic. That is to say, I will be viewing philosophy as reasoned dialogue between people who are inquiring into how they should conduct their lives, including, of course, what they should value and believe. To connect this idea of philosophy with the function that Dewey confers upon it is to see philosophy as a deliberation concerning life's possibilities that appeals to all of our sensibilities and the whole of our intelligence, which brings into consideration all that we know, believe, feel, hope for, fear, imagine or desire. This makes philosophy a studied extension of everyday practical deliberation much as scientific inquiry is in many ways an extension of everyday empirical inquiry.

Given this conception of philosophy, it will be useful to begin with the more general context of everyday practical deliberation. My object will be to show that when we begin to reflect upon ourselves in a reasoned way, to consider our attitudes and values, or more simply our desires, then we are on a path that leads to philosophy and to a narrowing of the gap between 'is' and 'ought'. For simplicity's sake, I will explore this idea just in terms of reflection upon our desires, and draw attention to the bigger picture only at the end. I will deal with this in the next two sections.

Two Kinds of 'Ought' in Practical Reasoning

Elementary practical reasoning involves deciding what we should do, given our desires and what we know or believe about the relevant circumstances. I want to fly to Melbourne for a conference and to pay the cheapest fare. I hear that the cheapest fares are to be found on the Internet. So I decide to look for a fare on the Net. While many episodes of practical reasoning are tacit and perfunctory like this, others are more consciously deliberative and complex. They may combine more complicated motivational conditions, like hopes, fears and aspirations, as well as more elaborate intellectual processes, such as attending to complex information, ordering priorities and projecting alternative plans.

If I were to explain why I came to a certain decision or acted as I did, I would be likely to cite my relevant desires, beliefs or other attitudes as my *reasons*. (I am looking on the Net because I *want* to find a cheap airfare to Melbourne, and I *believe* that's where I can find one.) By rational reconstruction, my *reasoning* may be summarized in similar terms. (Since I want a cheap fare and I believe that the Internet is the place to find one, I tacitly reason that I ought to look on the Net.)

Notice that the conclusion I draw is of the form 'I *ought* to do so-and-so', whereas the premises are statements about what I believe and desire. So I reason from the relevant facts about what I want and what I believe about how to get what I want, to what I ought to do. This looks like reasoning from 'is' to 'ought', but let me immediately point out that even the most exhaustive and careful deliberation *at this level* can only ever settle what I ought to do in the satisfaction of my desires.[3] The 'ought' is one of practical implication. It remains silent on whether those desires are ones that I should act upon, morally speaking. If my desires themselves were called into question, it would be no defence to say that, given what I desired to do and the circumstances I faced, I did what I ought to have done. This would be like saying that given my overwhelming desire to abuse those who take a view that differs from my own, and my belief that Smith is such a person, I ought to abuse Smith. While this is what I ought to do if I am to satisfy my desire, my reasoning tells me nothing about what I ought to do from a moral point of view.[4]

It is obvious that the psychological states of belief and desire that figure in our deliberations cannot guarantee that morally we ought to do what practical reason dictates. Yet even if the inference from what we desire to what we ought to do implies nothing about whether the action in question is morally desirable, I believe that we can make a kind of progress in closing this gap through the activity of practical reasoning. I will argue that this begins when our reasoning becomes reflective about desire. While this may not provide us with a logical inference from 'is' to 'ought', it does signal a movement from being merely as we find ourselves to be toward being as we would want to be upon reflection. And this kind of movement is the most that is humanly possible in attempting to approach the Form of the Good.

Becoming Reflective about Desire

John Stuart Mill courageously claimed that the only mark of the desirable is that people actually do desire it (Smith & Sosa, 1969, 61). Yet the reduction of the desirable to the desired seems so implausible, so open to counterexample, that one would have to be firmly in the grip of a theory such as Mill's even to think of affirming it. There are ways of improving upon this view, all the same. It is a commonplace that people have desires (and motives, attitudes, feelings and propensities) that they do not find desirable. An angry man who feels the desire to strike his child may grievously regret his desire and struggle to contain it. A woman may have fought for years against feelings of bitterness that she realizes are destroying her chances of happiness. People may desire to eat and drink much more than they know is good for them, and this may lead them to earnestly desire to curb their cravings. In such cases, we have a conflict between desires that do not operate on the same level. These cases are unlike that of the child who is torn between strawberry and chocolate ice cream. The person with the eating disorder wants not only to stop eating so much, but also to overcome an almost uncontrollable desire to eat. Here the desire for food is, we may say, a *primary* desire; and the desire to bring that desire under control, being directed upon a primary desire, we may call a *secondary* desire. Similarly, the man who is painfully aware of his urge to hit his child and who desperately wishes to contain his desire has a secondary desire in addition to the primary one. And again, the woman whose life is being eaten away by bitterness has a secondary desire directed toward a change in her feelings.[5]

These secondary desires take us a step beyond that which is merely desired. From the viewpoint of our reflective judgment, we recognize that some of our desires are not desirable, or not unreservedly so; and having condemned them, or at least brought them into question, we may take all kinds of steps to deal with them. These are normally steps toward what we regard as moral improvement. They are possible for us only because of our capacity for reflective judgement, without which we would not be moral agents at all. This is not to say that our reflective judgements about such matters are unquestionable, or that they reveal to us some indubitable truth about what is desirable and what is not. Rather, our capacity for reflective judgement is something that we can develop, strengthen, make more coherent, more prescient and reliable. Greater coherence and reliability rather than indubitable truth are all that we should expect of reflective practical reason.

The formation of our secondary desires involves thinking about the character, consequences, relative import and propriety of our primary desires, and ordering, redirecting and reconfiguring them. It has as its natural accompaniment the projection and initiation of plans for altered courses of action. To take an extreme example, let us imagine that in reflecting upon the sorry state of my life, I come to desire a radical change in my person, and realise that if I am to accomplish this I will need to do something to curb my worldly desires. This will require me to develop some plan of action. To keep to the extreme, perhaps after further thought and reflection I finally resolve to become a monk or a recluse. Here my reflective reason is that through which my secondary desire takes shape and is transformed into a plan—that through which it takes shape in my life. Reason is the "clarifier and liberator" of desire, not its servant.[6] It helps to give desire its concrete form and unite it more adequately to circumstance. To the extent that I succeed in my plan, reason is also the agent of a wholesale change in my desires. It is through formulating and carrying out my plan that, if all goes well, I will manage to arrange things in such a way as to curb and redirect my desires. So reason can be as much the master as the slave of desire. This talk of slave and master is, in any case, to see reason and desire as confined to an eternal battle for the will. And why should we view such inner conflict as inevitable, rather than as something to be overcome? It is in the *mutual adjustment* of reason and desire to one another that we find the golden mean.

While the capacity for secondary desires is a natural endowment of persons, secondary desires themselves are not for the most part plausibly viewed as purely natural appetites. They are acquired and take shape through thought and reflection. Perhaps the angry man's anguish over his temper could be seen as a natural response to the hurt that he has seen his violent behaviour cause in the past. But my longing to rid myself of my worldly desires must surely have some personal story of behind it. Even if it is natural to tire of excess and to become disgusted by one's own dissipation, we have every reason to suppose that a response like mine takes the form that it does only through reflection.

It is clear that the tools of reflective thought have a hand in giving both form and substance to our secondary desires. Had I not been capable of thinking about where my life was leading me, or not able to envisage a different kind of life, or not capable of evaluating it, then I would not have been motivated to make the changes that I do. In other words, canonical phases of thinking such as exploring consequences, looking for

alternatives, applying criteria and making comparative judgements are involved in the articulation of our secondary desires.

These considerations argue against the separation of our cognitive and affective powers. Given its creative and regulative functions, it is seriously misleading to think of reason simply as a power of judging relations between matters of fact. In the midst of life, a person's intellectual comprehension and emotional sensibility are continually evolving together. Elementary drives that once dominated thought can dwindle and be replaced by desires that are as much nurtured by our intellectual pursuits as the reverse. Projects grounded in an intellectually and emotionally mature life may eventually overtake those pursued with the carelessness of youth. The manner of these changes to the quality of our thoughts and feelings, indeed the whole complexion of a fully developed intellectual and emotional life, cannot be understood on the doctrine of the separation of powers.

Here we are verging upon the connection between moral deliberation and self-formation, thought of as deliberation that is guided by the consequences of our decisions and evaluations for the kinds of persons that we will become in making them. We may turn again to Dewey:

> Moral deliberation differs from others not as a process of forming a judgment and arriving at knowledge but in the kind of value which is thought about. The value is technical, professional, economic, etc., as long as one thinks of it as something which one can aim at and attain by way of having, *possessing*; as something to be got or to be missed. Precisely the same object will have a moral value when it is thought of as making a difference to the self, of determining what one will *be*, instead of merely what one will *have*. . . .The choice at stake in a moral deliberation or evaluation is the worth of this and that kind of character and disposition (Gouinlock, 1994, 142).

To say that moral deliberations are those in which we are concerned with what kinds of persons we will become in taking one or another course of action, is to view the deliberations associated with secondary desires as moral ones. For such deliberative concern with our primary desires and their consequences just is a concern with what sort of persons we are to become.

Fact, Value and Philosophical Inquiry

Although I have been dealing with the formation of secondary desires, I hope it is clear how this topic connects with the general idea of an education that teaches us to think as whole human beings. The development of those secondary desires that mark our characters and through which we develop morally as persons ought to be of fundamental concern so far as *moral education* is concerned. When we broaden our focus, however, an emphasis on learning to think as whole human beings implies that education generally should be concerned to help us to find ways of closing the gap between 'is' and 'ought'. And this means that all areas of teaching and learning should be as much concerned with what 'ought to be' as with what 'is'.

This means that the study of society, history, literature, art, science and technology, should have a normative cast. It should never be just a matter of acquiring information, or even of developing understanding, without attention to what these things might mean to our lives. Students should be learning not only about contemporary life and society, but at the same

time inquiring into how we should live. They should not only be discovering the natural world but also developing an intelligent care and concern for the natural environment and for the procedures of science. Developing their cares and concerns should be as much a part of their scientific education as is an understanding of the theories and evidence they survey. Experience of literature and art should invigorate the study of history and society with aesthetic and human values, while at the same time those values should become richly informed by social and historical knowledge. Any scheme that sees the education of the empirical understanding as independent of the development of values will not help students to think and feel in ways that are humanly whole. It is not enough to attend to the growth of values and human sensibilities *in addition to* the development of students' empirical knowledge and scientific modes of understanding. We need a means of integrating these things.

I began with Dewey's claim that philosophy may take on the role of integrating our empirical beliefs and our values. In an educational setting, it is really only philosophy that can take on this role. Only philosophy combines the breadth of subject matter with the development of a holistic understanding in which both facts and values have their place. And only philosophy has the tools that are appropriate for such a reflective inquiry. This means that if programs of formal education are to help us learn to think as whole human beings then they will need to reserve a central place for philosophy. It probably matters less that philosophy should have a place of its own in the curriculum than that it should be honoured throughout the curriculum. By preference, of course, we should have both.

Not just any approach to philosophy would be appropriate to such educational ends, for philosophy itself is all too often taught as a rather esoteric and technical discipline. If education is to take on the task that Dewey assigned to philosophy, then it needs to be deliberately conducted in such a way as to draw upon student's knowledge of matters of fact and their attitudes and values, and to bring these ingredients together in reflective dialogue. In this regard, philosophical inquiry should be an extension of the process of reflective practical reasoning about desire. It should, for example, help us to reflect upon the motives that have moved whole peoples and societies, and to consider whether we would want to be moved in that way. It should focus upon the attitudes and values that our society sanctions, and upon whether on reflection they are the ones we would want. It should bring us to consider the ways that people have thought to come by knowledge and whether upon reflection we should be guided by them. Such inquiries do not draw upon facts as opposed to values, or reason as opposed to feelings, but adjust each to the others in a way that is humanly whole. Nothing short of this can really begin to address the hiatus between our empirical knowledge and the regulation of our conduct, which Dewey identified as "the most general and significant of the problems which life presents to us".

I have said nothing here about the kinds of methods that are current in philosophy education, and the extent to which they may be suitable vehicles for the educational objectives with which I have been concerned. Those whose interests lie in school education and who are familiar with the concept and practice of the philosophical Community of Inquiry will no doubt be aware of the rich possibilities that it presents for carrying this project forward. This is not the place to expand upon this connection,

which I have already done in a companion piece to this paper,[7] and which in any case people in the philosophy in schools movement are quite capable of doing for themselves. My only purpose here has been to put forward this Deweyan conception of the role of philosophy education and to provide some theoretical background that may help us to understand how the process of reflection can help us to think as whole human beings and by this means to bridge the gap that all too often exists between our knowledge of the world and our values.

Endnotes

[1]An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2000 FAPCA conference held in Melbourne. My apologies go to those who have pressed me for copies of it. The paper was subsequently divided in two, and it has taken me far longer than might be expected to present this part of the original in what I hope is an acceptable form.

[2]While Hume denied that there are logical relations between statements of fact and statements of value, he did not deny the existence of causal relations between our feelings and the operations of our reason. In fact, Hume famously sought to invert the traditional relation between reason and the passions by taking reason to be not the master but "the slave of the passions" that "can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." (*Treatise*, p. 415.) Therefore, from a psychological point of view, consideration of matters of fact, intellectual inquiry and cognitive performances of all kinds should not, according to Hume, be thought of as operating independently of our feelings and of what we value. On the contrary, since "reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will" and "can never oppose passion in the direction of the will," our most deliberative and reasoned acts are entrained by our feelings, which provide their impetus and motive. (*Treatise*, p. 413.) This means that, for Hume, the refinement of our feelings is an educational task of the first order. Otherwise reason, however well developed, is destined to remain the servant of an uneducated master.

[3]Even then there are various humdrum ways in which such inferences can go astray. I may have neglected to factor certain competing desires into my deliberations, for example, or failed to consider relevant information.

[4]Nor will it do to plug in the needed 'moral' premises. Suppose that my strongest desire is to abide by the Golden Rule that I should do unto others as I would have them do unto me. Assuming that I do not wish to be abused by Smith, and given my desire to abide by the Golden Rule, I ought not to abuse Smith. This is still not a moral 'ought', even though it involves the application of a moral rule. It simply tells me what I am to do in order to satisfy my desire.

[5]Harry Frankfurt long ago made the distinction between primary and secondary desires in terms of what he calls first-order desires and second-order desires. See his 'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person,' *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (1971), pp. 5-20. Frankfurt thinks that in addition to second-order desires one must also have second-order volitions in order to be fully a person. That is, one must want some desires and not others to constitute one's will. I take the process through which second-order volitions are formed to be largely constitutive of our moral being.

[6]This response to Hume is adapted from Dewey: "For thought is not the slave of impulse to do its bidding. Impulse does not know what it is after; it cannot give orders even if it wants to. . . . What intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is not to act as its obedient servant, but as its clarifier and liberator." *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Modern Library, 1930), p. 254 -55.

[7]See my 'Learning to think as whole human beings,' which is a response to a target article by Matthew Lipman, both of which are forthcoming in *Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften*.

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Philosophy and pedagogy in Australian schools: the relationship between Philosophy for Children and VCE philosophy.[1]

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Introduction

Traditionally, Australia, unlike several European and Latin American countries, has not taught philosophy in the secondary schools, but now for the first time, Victorian students in their final years of secondary school will be able to study philosophy as part of the Victorian Certificate of Education, or VCE.[2] This is an exciting and portentous moment, both for the discipline of philosophy in Australia and for Philosophy for Children. In particular, with the introduction of VCE philosophy, Philosophy for Children takes on an enhanced status within the school curriculum, expanding from the lower year levels – having hitherto been much less successful in the senior secondary school – with greater legitimacy and direction. Its purported role in the lower levels will now be to prepare students for VCE philosophy study in much the same way that mathematics in primary school prepares students for the study of mathematics in secondary school. But does it? And is this the way to conceive of the role of Philosophy for Children within the broader school curriculum? Assuming that further empirical research and curricular analysis are required to answer the first of these questions, I shall attempt to answer the second.[3]

I begin by distinguishing between Philosophy for Children and the new VCE philosophy subject in terms of curriculum, materials, pedagogical and assessment procedures, so as to highlight potential differences in their underlying conceptions of philosophy and its role in human life. I suggest, in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, that the reflective or examined life is a worthwhile life, and that philosophical thought is, if not synonymous with, then at least integral to, what it is to be reflective. But what I mean by philosophical thought here, is not philosophy as a theoretical discipline of the academy, but rather something more like philosophy as Socrates practiced it.[4] Drawing on the work of Raimond Gaita, Alexander Nehamas and Richard Shusterman for an articulation of this distinction, I argue that students should be given the opportunity to practice philosophy both as an academic discipline (VCE philosophy) and as Socrates practiced it (Philosophy for Children).[5] I focus on philosophy as Socrates practiced it, not because I conceive of it as being uniquely or paradigmatically philosophical but rather because I am taking it for granted that the discipline of philosophy is perspicuous, and no more, or less, worthwhile than any of the other academic disciplines.[6] The reasons for including VCE philosophy in the senior secondary curriculum therefore are the same as the reasons for including European history, psychology and literature for example. On the other hand, the potential of Philosophy for Children to resemble philosophy as Socrates practiced it, demonstrates, I argue, that Philosophy for Children should be incorporated into the *overall* school curriculum not because it culminates in the study of VCE philosophy but because it encourages students to take responsibility for their own thinking and lives enabling them to speak and live more meaningfully.

There is already a great deal of scholarship relating the Socratic or dialectic method to Philosophy for Children, but it tends to highlight the role of questioning, essentially contested concepts, scholarly ignorance and individual self-correction common to both, whereas what I will be

stressing is their ethical and existential dimensions.[7] I shall argue that Philosophy for Children is premised on the Socratic belief that one's philosophical reflections inform, and are informed by, who one is and how one lives one's life. It is a practice of philosophy conditioned by the understanding that individuals represent and construct their personalities through the exploration and establishment of philosophical views. To do philosophy is to articulate a mode of life. It is a way of becoming oneself or, as Nehamas so nicely puts it, the art of living. Philosophy as Socrates practiced it – and by implication Philosophy for Children – involves the examination of our beliefs on matters of importance to us, the logical relations between these beliefs, and the extent to which these beliefs inform how we live. It is to be called to a certain kind of seriousness in our philosophical reflections, and although we necessarily conduct our philosophical reflections in community with others, the aim ultimately is to improve ourselves as individuals (admittedly what is meant by individual improvement cannot be understood independently of our relations with others).

It does not follow from this characterization of Socrates' practice of philosophy, that the academic discipline of philosophy bears no relation to life for there is too much evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, both approaches to the practice of philosophy are legitimate developments of philosophy as it began in ancient Greece. Socrates lived a good life and called others to do the same but couldn't provide the rules for their doing so: he prompted his interlocutors to reflect on their own lives and attempted to persuade them of how important it was for them to do so, but he certainly did not presume to know how *they* should live. Plato on the other hand, identified the views - epistemological, ethical, aesthetic, metaphysical, political and so on - that he thought Socrates *must* have held in order to lead the life that he did, making them the necessary conditions for the living of any good human life. With Plato, philosophy changes from being personal and procedural to becoming more impersonal and substantive. It is from Plato that the academic discipline of philosophy takes its lead, concerning itself with the establishment of true or necessary epistemological, ethical, aesthetic and metaphysical views and the logical relations among them.

Given the concerns and derivations of the academic discipline of philosophy, it is not surprising that it spills over into students' lives, but the point remains that as a practice, it is not conditioned by a sense of itself as relating to the individual living of a life. In the academic discipline of philosophy, arguments are 'rehearsed' and not held. Gaita refers to them as "blackboard arguments" or "arguments only in inverted commas" to emphasize this fact, as well as the fact that they often result in "'conclusions' which no one is seriously prepared to conclude."[8] The suggestion is that the student's engagement with the discipline is predominantly, if not exclusively, intellectual and therefore hypothetical. Socratic concerns - whether a student is actually committed to the conclusion of her argument, the logical relation of this commitment to her other personal commitments, and the extent to which the commitment is consistent with her life – are considered (if they are considered at all) to be of merely psychological and sociological interest. They explain pathologies of thinking, but have little or no bearing on the enterprise of philosophy and what it is for an individual to reason philosophically.

In the following paragraphs, I offer a brief historical sketch of the new VCE philosophy subject, and its current structure so as to reveal its

affiliation with, and likeness to, university philosophy. I then characterize a likely response to the new VCE philosophy subject. Philosophy for Children and VCE philosophy share a common goal, employing alternative, and age-appropriate methods by which to achieve it. I question whether the discrepancies between Philosophy for Children and VCE philosophy are just pedagogical and suggest, rather, a difference in overall emphasis. I explain this difference by way of the distinction between philosophy as Socrates practiced it and philosophy as an academic discipline, concluding that whereas VCE philosophy is valuable for the reasons that all academic disciplines are valuable, Philosophy for Children is valuable because it teaches for more meaningful lives.

The new VCE philosophy subject and its relationship to Philosophy for Children

In recent years, philosophy academics have been looking with greater interest and sense of urgency at alternative possibilities both for philosophy and philosophy graduates. A VCE philosophy subject is one such alternative – designed in 1999, trialed in 2000, it is now being offered in Victorian schools, subject to teacher and student interest.[9] It comprises four units to be taken over the course of two years. There are no prerequisites and each of the units involves at least fifty hours of scheduled classroom hours.[10] Units 1 and 2 are assessed internally and may involve any combination of the following assessment tasks: written reflection or analysis, oral reflection or analysis and essays. Units 3 and 4 are assessed externally by examination. The curriculum, as contained in the four units, is representative of philosophy as it is characteristically taught in the university. Students are introduced to the divisions within philosophy as well as to ancient and modern philosophers and examine some applied philosophical issues.[11]

Philosophy for Children practitioners have witnessed the development of the new VCE philosophy subject with some enthusiasm, largely seeing it as a coup for school-based philosophy.[12] Generally, it is felt that the new VCE philosophy subject essentially vindicates and is continuous with the efforts of Philosophy for Children and that with the growth of VCE philosophy there will be an increasing and proportionate demand for philosophy in the lower grades to give students the grounding they need for VCE philosophy, particularly as there is no plan for any devolution of VCE philosophy to the lower year levels and also that, Philosophy for Children is currently the only available model for teaching philosophy to younger children. But this way of thinking fails to take into account two considerations. Firstly, even though the success of Philosophy for Children in Australia has been limited, by and large, to primary schools, it has a comprehensive curriculum that spans from pre-school until year twelve.[13] Secondly, the new VCE philosophy subject incorporates neither the Philosophy for Children curriculum nor its pedagogy: the transition from Philosophy for Children to VCE philosophy will therefore involve supplanting narrative by philosophical text, a student-driven and student-centered inquiry with the questions of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics etc. and the 'community of inquiry' by individual learning and assessment (I am using the term 'community of inquiry' technically to distinguish it from the communal inquiry which will undoubtedly occur in VCE philosophy).[14]

It might be argued that the transition is not as great as it first appears, for in the case of Philosophy for Children, philosophers have written nearly all of the narratives and supporting teacher resources and intentionally

use these to model arguments and ideas as found in contemporary and historical philosophy. So although Philosophy for Children promotes student-driven and student-centered questioning, students will inevitably ask and propose answers to the central questions of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Admittedly Philosophy for Children has, in recent years, been incorporating and creating curriculum materials that are less derivative of the philosophical tradition, on the assumption that the status of Philosophy for Children *as philosophy* is secured by the philosophical nature of its questions, and the logical procedures that govern the exploration of those questions.[15] For to engage in a 'community of inquiry' is to assume that concepts are contestable. It is to ask for, and to evaluate reasons for a particular point of view; to identify the logical implications of those views, test them for consistency with other views; examine examples and counter-examples; bring to the foreground underlying assumptions and so on. This leads to the second point, that if one justifies the community of inquiry on instrumental grounds – that by virtue of their involvement in the community of inquiry students are able to internalize a model of philosophical reasoning – then it would seem natural to supplant the community of inquiry with more independent study after students have had an adequate number of years to internalize its model of philosophical reasoning. It makes sense to think of Philosophy for Children – with or without traditional philosophy - and the new VCE philosophy subject as being on a continuum.

However there is, I would argue, a real question about whether Philosophy for Children - even with its philosophy-authored curriculum and its connection to the tradition – is continuous with, or a developmental precursor to, VCE philosophy and by implication, to university philosophy. Again we lack the empirical evidence, but there are enough important discrepancies between the two to at least raise some doubts. Let me outline just a few of these. Firstly, in the new VCE philosophy subject, students will be exposed to canonical philosophical texts that span the tradition as well as some of the best pieces of contemporary philosophy; they will be exposed to arguments of the most rigorous and refined kind, and in the case of the canonical philosophical texts, arguments that have been profoundly influential. Students are introduced to philosophical terminology and the subtle but significant variations in use. They are also required to identify and attempt to understand the broader philosophical context for the argument as well as its influence on future philosophical thinking. In learning philosophy's terminology and history, students are increasingly able to map the contours of the philosophical tradition.

Generally speaking in the case of Philosophy for Children there is little or no terminology, with the exception perhaps of the procedures that govern the 'community of inquiry' in that students represent themselves as identifying as well as giving and requesting 'examples', 'counter-examples', 'assumptions', 'implications' and so on. There is however no history lesson and no induction into the philosophical tradition. It is not important that the student know that there is such a thing as 'the dreaming argument' and that Descartes was responsible for it. Some of philosophy's traditional arguments – or parts of them at least - are embedded in the narrative but the arguments are translated into a language and context relevant to the student. Furthermore, the purpose of the narrative is not to explicate or defend a series of arguments, but rather to rehearse different arguments as they intersect and are brought to bear on experience – hence the role of these arguments in the characters'

lives. In reading the narratives, students do not identify arguments but consider what they find puzzling or illuminating in the story. Admittedly, the students of Philosophy for Children are exposed to variety of argumentative moves – 'What is your reason for thinking that is true?' and 'What do you mean by that?' for example – both in the dialogues of the characters and through the facilitation of their own community of inquiry – but rarely examine arguments of a sustained and sophisticated nature. The narrative, as does the community of inquiry, emphasizes the development of reasoned and reasonable positions with respect to experience as it includes others.

Secondly, Philosophy for Children presumes that if children are to be taught to reason philosophically then they need to be both interested in what they are thinking about and have an investment in the outcome of their reflections. In short, their reflections must be seen to impact upon their own lives. Although the philosophical tradition presides in the background of the Philosophy for Children curriculum, students end up discussing questions related to such practical everyday issues as: the relationship between dolls and human beings; the criteria for nerdiness; the best way to distinguish between the floor and a bed; the justified and unjustified exercise of parental and teacher authority – issues about which the philosophical tradition has had little to say, at least directly. Such discussions in Philosophy for Children inevitably raise questions of epistemology, metaphysics and ethics, but the formulation of these questions is sensitive to the context of children's lives and experience. And in discussion of these questions, more than just rational considerations are taken into account: respectful attention is given to how a student might feel about a particular issue, how a student experiences that issue, and how they have been told to think about that issue.

Thirdly, students of VCE philosophy are required to produce more or less substantial pieces of written work; emulating the philosophers that they read by producing sustained and detailed treatments of philosophical issues. This is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, to write a philosophical argument is, in a sense, to own it, and ideally, to produce something of beauty. The repetition of the writing requirement ensures that students simultaneously demonstrate and witness their own philosophical development and growth; the overall experience is one of being inducted into a craft that one then learns how to perfect. Although a student might be better at making distinctions than he is at identifying assumptions, or he might find Plato more accessible than Sartre, the written assessment ensures that the student at least attempts to become competent in all areas. Generally speaking, in the Philosophy for Children program there is little to no structured writing. This is in large part due to the fact that we encourage students in Philosophy for Children to conceive of themselves as comprising 'a community of inquiry' and then interpret what it means to be a 'community of inquiry' literally: homework is rarely set and rarely assessed if set; questions are given immediately after reading; examples and counter-examples are given in response to what others say and so on; an individual's development as an inquirer is generally measured behaviorally. I am suggesting that the absence of any writing requirement means that students in Philosophy for Children all too often fall back on their strengths and fail to develop their weaknesses. The discussion plans and exercises are designed to ameliorate this but are often not used, and if they are used then they are not used in this way. There is no clear sense

of the student developing, or at least attempting to develop, a predetermined set of philosophical skills

Perhaps the differences that I identify between Philosophy for Children and the new VCE philosophy are merely contingent and that what they point to is, that academic philosophy would be enriched by the inclusion of 'community of inquiry' practice as Philosophy for Children would be enriched by including analysis of academic philosophical texts and more writing exercises.[16] Whilst I agree with this to a certain extent, and recognize the efforts on the part of both academic philosophers and Philosophy for Children practitioners in this regard, I nonetheless maintain that the predominance and seeming inevitability of these differences reveal differences in the conceptions of what it is to do philosophy and the role of philosophy in human life on the part of academic philosophy and Philosophy for Children. In other words, even if academic philosophy were to include 'community of inquiry' practices and Philosophy for Children were to include the analysis of academic philosophical texts as well as written work, the emphasis in each case would be different.

Practicing philosophy as an academic discipline: the 'private' use of reason

The new VCE philosophy subject – as with university philosophy from which it derives – practices philosophy as an academic discipline and this essentially involves developing "acknowledged mastery" or expertise (Gaita, 1991, 16). There is a degree of circularity here, of course, because the community of experts to a large extent determines what is to counts as expertise, but it is not completely circular because expertise also implies competency, which, in turn, implies a method or identifiable way of proceeding at which one can become competent. Individuals expert in the discipline of philosophy are, typically, academic or professional philosophers, and their competency includes the terminology and history of philosophy, being able to produce rationally defensible arguments and identifying weaknesses in arguments.

Academic philosophical thinking on this view is equivalent to what Immanuel Kant means by the private use of reason, which he distinguishes from the public use of reason in his essay, "An answer to the question: 'What is Enlightenment?" To use reason privately, according to Kant, is to reason "in a particular civil post or office with which he is entrusted." (Kant, 1991). It is to reason and make judgments in one's capacity as a cleric, magistrate, citizen, or as I am suggesting, academic philosopher. We understand ourselves to be reasoning privately when we qualify what we are saying with the statement, 'I am speaking now as a teacher' or as 'a parent', 'unionist', 'taxpayer', 'your doctor' and so on. The qualification here demarcating that our reasoning in this instance is circumscribed by the role we are fulfilling, or alternatively, the particular relation we have to the problem or issue in virtue of that role. In other words the reasoning is internally conditioned by the function or office, which the individual represents and is therefore answerable to. I am suggesting that academic philosophy, even with its emphasis on questioning, is analogous to the private use of reason because it contains correct procedures which shape our expectations of what it is for someone to do academic philosophy: the student uses philosophical terminology; the student demonstrates familiarity with the tradition and is capable of outlining and commenting on its canonical arguments; the student is capable of producing an argument irrespective of whether she believes it; the student predicts and answers objections to

her argument even thought she might be wracked with uncertainty and so on. A student is not exclusively exercising her reason in her study of philosophy but is reasoning, as the discipline of philosophy requires her to. She is taking on the persona of the philosopher. Let me follow with an example of Gaita's by way of illustration.

An individual studying university or VCE philosophy will inevitably come across the subject of applied ethics in which she will be assessed. To demonstrate competency in the subject a student will need to deal with the issues deemed important by the subject: (abortion, euthanasia, infanticide, surrogacy, human cloning etc.); she will need to be able to apply philosophical theories to these issues; she will need to be familiar with the seminal arguments associated with each issue; she will need to consider the seminal counter-arguments; she will need to frame her reflections in the context of the debate. A student's thought that it might *matter to philosophy* that for example, individual human beings make these decisions in the contexts of their lives, or that we generally don't eat our dead, or that we find it difficult to disassociate pregnancy and sex from intimacy, is determined as being philosophically naïve. Similarly if a student makes the judgment that it is corrupt or evil to consider whether infanticide is justified – she would be speaking morally or religiously but not philosophically. The assumption informing this view is that responding to a thesis on the basis of feeling, experience or political commitments reveals a deficit in one's philosophical ability (unless of course one sublimates one or other of these into an argument of apparent rational derivation). It is to speak personally about an issue, which is, in a sense, to fail to speak philosophically because within the theoretical discipline of philosophy, rational considerations, namely truth and validity, are sovereign; it is purely a matter of argument. The ideal student of philosophy follows reason where it leads and in the moment of reasoning, at least, detaches herself from what she might think or feel about where reason is leading her; she learns to separate her thinking from her humanity. That she is able to do this is largely because there isn't the expectation that she necessarily believes what she is arguing for. The normative ideal is that we are "fearless thinkers" but we can be fearless in our thinking precisely because it is thinking done hypothetically, in one's persona as philosopher. The point is that outside philosophy, there are ideas that we wouldn't want to entertain, for the reason that our doing so would reflect a sickness or corruption of the mind.[17]

For some, what I have described will represent only the first or earliest stage in learning how to do academic philosophy. It is a necessary first stage because it clarifies what academic philosophy is, enabling students in their later studies to accommodate their intuitions and felt insights in a way that is appropriate to, and defensible within, the academic discipline of philosophy. Such a position however, assumes that students' intuitions and felt insights are not altered (or some would say corrupted) by the practice of doing academic philosophy, which is in turn symptomatic of the more general view, that it is possible to engage in academic philosophy without it transforming the self.[18] It also assumes that academic philosophy at best lends itself to, and at worst is not incompatible with, the articulation and evaluation of these intuitions and felt insights, but there has been in recent years within academic philosophy increasing speculation as to whether this is in fact true, possible or even desirable.[19] My response is to say that I am not convinced that I have only described the initiation of students into academic

philosophy, although perhaps (and I am not convinced of this) the conception of philosophy that I identify as informing academic philosophy is most visible here. Secondly, I think it is at least questionable whether it is possible to do academic philosophy without it transforming the self. Thirdly, I think that if academic philosophy is going to properly incorporate these intuitions and felt insights, then its form and practice will need to be more responsive to the lived life, narrative, emotions, poetic discourse etc.

Philosophy as Socrates practiced it: the 'public' use of reason

Ironically, Philosophy for Children conceives of itself in much the same way as the academic discipline of philosophy: the community follows reason wherever it leads; views are subjected to the rational criticism of others; students become more open-minded and willing to entertain alternative possibilities and so on. And there is nothing to say that it can't be conducted in this manner: students can, and often are, encouraged to, 'play' at reasoning philosophically with their peers – asking questions, asking for reasons, giving counter-examples – without having to speak personally or become personally involved. There is the persona of the inquirer in Philosophy for Children as there is the persona of the professional philosopher in the academic discipline of philosophy. However, Philosophy for Children has the potential, I would suggest, to present and practice philosophy as an art of living, as Socrates practiced it, so that it really does matter what one thinks. The first reason for this potential is the lack of clarity in Philosophy for Children with respect to what expertise or mastery in philosophy consists in. In an obvious sense it includes acknowledging one's ignorance, asking the right kinds of questions, identifying logical connections, but there is no reference to either a community of experts or a recognizable body of knowledge. Whilst asking the right kinds of questions seems to be a necessary condition of expertise, it is not sufficient because one has to take into account, the language one uses, the tone with which one speaks, the manner in which one proceeds, who one's interlocutors are and their worldviews and so on. But what is it to have expertise in this?

Secondly, it often seems in the academic discipline of philosophy that any idea is permitted so long as one is able to give a reason for it. Nothing is ruled out of consideration: it has been possible within the discipline of philosophy to doubt the existence of other minds, to doubt the existence of one's body, to be skeptical about the authority of morality and so on. This has been, and undoubtedly continues to be, one of philosophy's strengths. Whilst much is similarly permitted in Philosophy for Children, I want to suggest that certain ideas are importantly ruled out of consideration and that these ideas are ethically and epistemically substantive even though they start out as pedagogical or procedural. In saying that certain ideas are 'ruled out' of consideration, I am not suggesting that the members of a community of inquiry can be forbidden from formulating or positing these ideas, by appeal to some authority, either internal or external to the community of inquiry or that individuals don't ask them. It is possible for individuals to entertain these 'ruled out' ideas in the persona of the inquirer, but what they ideally learn from their experience of the community of inquiry is that it is precisely the practical or 'lived' endorsement of the contradictories of these so called 'ruled out' ideas that provides the conditions for the possibility of inquiry itself. The conditions of the inquiry are such that to inquire is to appreciate that to endorse what I am calling 'ruled out' ideas is to undermine or deny the conditions for the very possibility of inquiry itself, which is to risk

involving oneself in a self-contradiction of the kind that Socrates was trying to draw attention to in his interlocutors.[20]

To put it in more Kantian terms, a person only engages with such 'ruled out' ideas at the risk of profound irrationality, for it is only rational to will the conditions for the possibility of the exercise of one's rationality. Analogously, to inquire is to will the conditions for the possibility of that inquiry, for to question the conditions of the possibility of inquiry (rationality) is to in a sense either, disqualify the *inquiry as an inquiry* (which may indeed be their intention) or to disqualify oneself as an inquirer (disqualify oneself as rational). Given that Philosophy for Children conceives of inquiry as occurring in the context of a lived life (its use of narrative and dialogue), occurring in community, and as directed towards meaningfulness and understanding as opposed to truth, the ideas or questions that I am suggesting are ruled out of consideration are essentially epistemic and ethical (others might want to refer to them as political). Such ideas that are ruled out of consideration include: 'An individual is capable of a meaningful understanding of life without the engagement of others'; 'Some individuals do not deserve respect'; 'I can respect a person without listening to what they think' and so on. I say these ideas are ruled out of consideration because their contradictories provide the necessary conditions for the possibility of community of inquiry. To engage in the community of inquiry is itself to assume that individuals need to communicate with each other in order to come to a meaningful understanding of life, that all individuals deserve respect, and that we show that respect by listening to others.

One way of formulating my point is to say that within the community of inquiry, reflection necessarily becomes answerable to an ethical vocabulary. There is the acknowledgment, within the thinking and reflection itself, of the need for compassion, patience, love and humility, as well as humor and irony, in considering matters of life.[21] This necessarily occurs within Philosophy for Children and not philosophy conceived of as an academic discipline because Philosophy for Children assumes, in the form of the community of inquiry, firstly, that to engage in philosophical reflection is to articulate and revise a mode of life (become who one is) and secondly, that other individuals and the quality of my relations with those individuals are integral to both philosophical reflection and our modes of life.[22] These assumptions are born out in a number of ways. Firstly, Philosophy for Children starts from what is of relevance and interest to student (the issues in their lives) and declining to enlist arguments from authority, encourages students to rely on their own intellectual and experiential resources, to think and speak for themselves and ultimately come to a sense of, and be able to articulate, what they seriously believe. Secondly, students take each other seriously in the context of the community of inquiry: they are listened to; what they think is discussed by others; they are encouraged to see other points of view; look at reasons against what they think and so on.

Thirdly, what counts as a rational or potentially legitimate move within the community of inquiry, exceeds any predetermined single authoritative method or set of rules for proceeding; certain responses and critical concepts become legitimated in the community of inquiry and so are able to be explored and therefore developed. There is for example, constant feedback in a community of inquiry as to how attractive or unattractive someone's views are and how attractive or unattractive they make that individual – a student might come to be *ashamed* of a particular

point of view, or see it as *cynical* or *naïve*. The critical vocabulary of Philosophy for Children extends to include such phrases as, 'Are you being serious?', 'I can't imagine what that would be like' and 'It must be terrible to think that.'[23] In a community of inquiry, judgment and scrutiny can legitimately extend to include behavior as well as assertions - 'Does this individual talk over others?' 'Does the individual frequently interrupt?' 'Is the individual considerate to less assertive members of the community of inquiry?' – highlighting the relationship, or lack thereof, that a person's thinking has to their way of living; drawing attention to the relative superficiality or depth of a person's reflection and self-knowledge as well the role that a person's behavior/thinking has in how someone responds to her thinking/behavior. Within a community of inquiry, as much attention is given to the language with which a person conveys an idea or explains a concept as to the idea or concept itself. It is acceptable within the community of inquiry to be party, if not largely, persuaded by the poetry of a view and to aspire to greater poetry in one's own views - of course, such poetry is open to correction but such correction is always given in the language of which poetry is a part.

I referred earlier to Kant's distinction between the private and public use of reason as presented in his article, "An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?" using his idea of the private use of reason to explain what might be meant by doing philosophy as an academic discipline: reasoning *as* an academic philosopher, or alternatively, as the academic discipline requires. I would like by way of conclusion to return to Kant's distinction and suggest, that if doing academic philosophy is equivalent to the private use reason, then Philosophy for Children is equivalent to the public use of reason which Kant not surprisingly represented as the key to "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity." (1991, 54) To use one's reason publicly, according to Kant, is to speak in one's own person and not in one's capacity as a teacher or student of a theoretical discipline for example (ibid, 57). If the private use of reason is to reason according to the specified roles that one fulfills in relation to others, then the public use of reason is an exercise of one's reason in *one's humanity*. There are two things to be said about this. Firstly, it does not follow from this that the public use of reason is necessarily impersonal and therefore properly universal, for the point about the public use of reason is that it is personal, and because it is personal but unconstrained by *any one role* that we might fulfill, it makes reference to the broader community. Secondly, to reason in one's humanity is for that reasoning to be conditioned by features of our humanity and what it is to live a human life, like the fact that we are embodied, of woman born and will die; that we can only live our own lives and not someone else's; that so much of what happens in our life is a function of contingency; that we experience certain individuals in our lives as irreplaceable and so on.

It is through the exercise of public reason that we are working on becoming ourselves but for such an exercise of reason there can be no absolutist rules or precedents, no requisite way of proceeding; one has, to a certain extent, find one's way as one goes along. In the words of Nehamas (1998, 10) "there is no best work – no best life – by which all others can be judged." All we can do is continue in the public use of reason i.e. make judgments for ourselves, submit those judgments to others for review, and refine those judgments in light of how others respond and their public use of reason, which is what we essentially already do in a community of inquiry. Philosophy for Children provides a forum for the use and education of public reason, and if Kant is right

about the public use of reason being the key to humanity's maturation, then Philosophy for Children should be an integral part of the school curriculum. Further, if to use reason publicly is to reason in our humanity, and if we keep in mind the emphasis in Philosophy for Children on inquiry as occurring in the context of a lived life (its use of narrative and dialogue), in community, and as ultimately directed towards meaningfulness, then it would seem that Philosophy for Children provides a lived experience – an experience of ourselves and each other in our humanity – that serves as a corrective context for any public use of reason. For example, it is impossible, without profound self-contradiction, to genuinely believe myself to be disembodied whilst immersed in a community of gesture; it is impossible, without profound self-contradiction, to conceive of the ethical impulse as imposed from without, whilst witnessing its natural and constant operation in the community of inquiry (Kennedy, 1997, 67). Another way to make the point is to say, drawing on the language of Gaita, that for the public use of reason to be properly answerable to our humanity then "the 'part of us' which is obedient to the claims of reason must be the same part of us which can be the proper respondent of another's call to seriousness" (1991, 329).

Conclusion: the value of Philosophy for Children

In summary then, Philosophy for Children is integral to overall curriculum because firstly, it gives students the opportunity to engage in the public use of reason and the public use of reason is essential to our ability to live meaningful lives and grow as individuals. Secondly, the lived context for that public use of reason that Philosophy for Children provides in the form of the community of inquiry makes it more likely that our public use of reason will have greater authenticity or fidelity to how we experience ourselves and others (our humanity). Philosophy for Children importantly invites students to *take seriously* Socrates' challenge to his interlocutors - rather than what we usually do as philosophy students or readers, which is to assume that we are of his kind and continue to live our lives unchanged.

Endnotes

[1] A version of this paper was presented to the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division 2000 Annual Meeting as part of a symposium, called "Sophie's Travels: Children Doing Philosophy Around the World", arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-college Instruction in Philosophy. I would like to thank both Jennifer Glaser and Mark Weinstein for their comments on that presentation as well as Pablo Cevallos Estarellas, Clinton Golding, Maughn Gregory, Philip Guin and Laurance Splitter, who read earlier versions of the paper.

[2] Philosophy has entered the school curriculum in other guises. Students of religion are introduced to normative ethical theories as a reference point for their reflections on issues of ethical importance. English continues to include as one of its learning objectives, the analysis and development of arguments. Students of the International Baccelariat are required to take "Theory of Knowledge", a basic introduction to epistemology. In the Australian State of Victoria, philosophy is part of an extended or gifted and talented program run by Monash University targeted at high-achieving senior secondary school students and taught through distance education. There are also those schools like Melbourne High that allow philosophy as an extra-curricular activity substituting

for choir, tennis or athletics for example. Whilst these incursions of philosophy have done much to raise the profile of philosophy within schools, they are not the focus of this article.

[3] Although Philosophy for Children has had a presence in Australian schools for seventeen years, there is still very little empirical research establishing the impact of Philosophy for Children on children's reasoning skills. Teachers of Philosophy for Children claim significant and lasting changes in the ways children express themselves, think and reason, but such claims are largely anecdotal.

[4] I am referring here to Plato's character Socrates and so leave mute the question of whether or not Plato's 'fictional' Socrates is an accurate representation of the man, Socrates. I am assuming in my formulation of the distinction that Socrates exemplifies non-academic philosophy although there are arguments to the contrary. I would like to put aside this debate for the purposes of this article and so recommend that if Socrates is not exemplary for you in this sense that, to appreciate the argument of the article, you substitute a philosopher that is. Possible alternatives or complements explored by Nehemas and Shusterman are Nietzsche, Dewey, Wittgenstein and Foucault.

[5] I draw on Raimond Gaita's book, (1991) *Good and Evil: an absolute conception*, in particular Ch 17, 'Fearless Thinkers and Evil Thoughts' and his most recent book (1999). I draw on Alexander Nehamas (1998) and Richard Shusterman (1997).

[6] Of course not everyone agrees that the discipline of philosophy is perspicuous. Others would see the difference between VCE and Philosophy for Children in terms of different approaches to the discipline of philosophy itself, say for example between the analytic versus pragmatist tradition in philosophy, or a debate between the Enlightenment and post-modernism. Without embarking on a discussion of these approaches, I merely wish to highlight the force of the distinction between philosophy as an academic discipline and philosophy as Socrates practiced it, as it relates to the differences between VCE philosophy and Philosophy for Children.

[7] See works by Clinton Golding (2000), Robert Fisher (1995), Gustav Heckmann (1988), James Jordon Jr (1983) and Leonard Nelson (1980)

[8] Gaita, Raimond, 1991, 320–321.

[9] Individuals prepared to teach this subject are not required to have any philosophy background, although several university philosophy departments are offering philosophy seminars or workshops for those teachers who are interested.

[10] Unit three is a prerequisite for unit four.

[11] Information for the new VCE Philosophy subject can be found in the Study Design but what follows is a brief summary:

Unit One: Introduction to philosophical inquiry introduces epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Students are expected to be able to, define key concepts associated with these three areas of philosophical inquiry, understand the relationships between them, as well as provide examples of philosophical thought associated with each of them.

Unit 2: Philosophical issues in practice covers a range of issues in applied philosophy. It is intended that the student should be able to identify and discuss a range of applied philosophical issues as well as argue for a position in an applied issue.

Unit 3: The good life focuses on ancient and modern philosophers. Students examine the relationship between happiness and virtue as conceived by, Plato, Aristotle, the Cynics, Epicureans and Stoics. In the case of the Moderns, students look at theories of Nietzsche and Sartre

with a view to understanding how they both deny the existence of God but argue for a universal ethic.

Unit 4: Mind and knowledge looks specifically at two areas of rich contemporary philosophical debate. Firstly it looks at 'What is mind, and what is its relationship to the body? It then looks at "Does science provide us with knowledge or just true belief".

[12] This sense of optimism is reflected in the renaming of the 'Victorian Philosophy for Children Association' to the 'Victorian Association for Philosophy in Schools' and the renaming of the 'Center for Philosophy for Children' to the 'Centre for Philosophy with Children *and Adolescents'*.

[13] There are principally three reasons why Philosophy for Children has been more successful in the primary school. Firstly, until recent years the primary school curriculum was not overburdened and was taught in a much more fluid and flexible manner, so allowing for the introduction of new programs such as Philosophy for Children. Secondly, and also until recently, there was less emphasis in primary schools on assessment, again allowing for a program like Philosophy for Children that is still in the process of formalizing its assessment procedures. Thirdly – and I find this reason less compelling – it is argued that Philosophy for Children is more successful with younger children because they have had less time in the school system and so are less conditioned by it, making them more open to wondering and puzzling about matters of importance to them. Of course, this way of putting it is intended as a criticism of the current educational system and sets Philosophy for Children up, unnecessarily I think, as an alternative paradigm

[14] The Director of the Centre for Philosophy with Children and Adolescents did serve on the Committee responsible for conceiving and designing the subject but the Study Design reflects that he was most likely a lone voice. One difficulty was that the Board of Studies, which is the body responsible for overseeing VCE subject, had to work with traditional assessment model which, notoriously, make the idea of philosophy as communal inquiry difficult to assess.

[15] This development has been in response to a number of factors:

- An interest in developing a Philosophy for Children curriculum for the young child, eg: DeHaan, MacColl and McCutheon (1995); Partridge, Dubuc, Splitter, and Sprod (1999); Sharp and Splitter (2000).
- A desire to use shorter, more interesting and culturally relevant narratives not necessarily authored by philosophers, eg: Sprod (1993); and Cam (1993-4, 1997)
- A recognition that even though students ask such recognizably philosophical questions as, 'How do I know I am not dreaming?' and 'Is lying ever morally permissible?' it is questions like 'What is the criterion for being a nerd?' and 'Is my pet part of my family?' that often spark sustained and rigorous discussion
- A better understanding of the community of inquiry and its contribution to reasonableness, education of the emotions, imagination and the body.

[16] Philosophers are designing and offering courses that facilitate greater self-reflection and self- knowledge on the part of their students. As examples see Conway (1999) and Shumaker (2000). Teachers of Philosophy for Children are increasingly using email (and therefore writing) in the development and expansion of their communities of

inquiry. One of the things that Clinton Golding does is ask his students to write down one of the questions raised by the students of the class and to write their answer to that question with reasons. These papers re then exchanged among the students with each student writing a response to what they have received – whether they agree, disagree, have different reasons for agreeing and so on. The papers are exchanged again. At the end of the time the student who asked the question is able to read what other people have written in response to their original question.

[17] Such ideas are for example, 'that we should allow a proportion of the human population to die so that there might be greater resources for others', 'that we should be able to experiment on unwanted human babies.' See Gaita (1991, Ch 17).

[18] Stanley Fish makes a related comment in relation to deliberative democracy in the classroom. He argues that the practice advocates that it is advantageous, or at least not disadvantageous, for individual students to entertain ideas that they are undecided about or profoundly disagree with, which is to assume that the student is untouched in the process of entertaining these ideas. He writes in defense of those people who do not adhere to this assumed liberal psychology, that "in another psychology, one undergirded by a conviction of original sin, the mind is not (at least not since Eden) so strongly independent. Rather than standing apart from the range of views that contend for its approval, it is, in its congenital weakness and disposition to be overwhelmed, at the mercy of those views....This is where the indoctrination comes in – not at the level of urging this or that belief but at the more subliminal level at which what is urged is that encountering as many ideas as possible and giving each of them a run for its money is an absolutely good thing." (1999, 93).

[19] Philosophers have increasingly focused on the differences between philosophy and literature in their appreciation of the role of narrative in its relation to the character of practical reasoning. In the spirit of self-awareness, philosophers have identified the adversarial, scientific and authoritative discourses that inform and condition the practice of academic philosophy.

[20] See my article, "Philosophy of education: overcoming the theory - practice divide" in the forthcoming spring edition of *Paideusis.*

[21] For a good discussion of this refer to Lipman (1995).

[22] For a fuller elaboration of the multi-dimensionality of community of inquiry refer to Kennedy 1997.

[23] Callicles says this to Socrates in the *Gorgias* 481. The point he is trying to make with this question is that whilst you might be able to assert what Socrates has asserted, it is another thing to seriously believe it. He is in this comment marking the two kinds of human discourse and wanting to draw attention to his disbelief that Socrates believes the things he is claiming to believe.

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The Federation of Australasian Philosophy for Children Associations

First Notice

of the

12th Annual FAPCA Conference

'A community of Inquiry on Education'

Brisbane, Queensland

Sat 28 September – Mon 30 September

This year's conference will be a "participants' conference" emphasizing community and dialogue. FAPCA will bring together practitioners from all fields of education and related areas, including academics, teachers, administrators, students, parents and interested community members, to engage in the following themes:

Children in Democratic Classrooms
Learning Communities
New Padagogies
Curriculum Design for Lifelong Learning

There will be an informal get-together on the night before the opening of the conference. The conference will be open on Saturday with a hypothetical and inquiry. Papers and workshop sessions will be thematically related, with each theme (or strand) preceded by a plenary session and discussion followed by a community of inquiry. The conference closes on Monday with a forum and discussion.

The AGM will be held on Monday afternoon.

A notice for "call of papers" and further details will be posted soon.

Direct all general inquiries to:

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Philosophy and Education: Integrating Curriculum, Teaching, and Learning

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Philosophy has much to offer us in curriculum design and interpretation. Underlying the aims and objectives of contemporary curricula are concepts, themes, and ways of thinking that are fundamentally philosophical in nature. Understanding the philosophical terrain and inquiry-oriented approach that underpins these frameworks can bring clarity to the curriculum itself, and the intentions within their educational objectives.

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a framework for curriculum interpretation and design that reflects the approach of philosophy in education as an embodiment of lifelong learning and transformative thinking. Particularly as a point of reference in identifying the central concepts to be understood within curriculum, and as a process by which deeper learning and intellectual engagement may be managed and facilitated. This paper, therefore, seeks to provide readers with practical tools and processes for designing and interpreting curriculum by focussing upon the philosophical themes that are inherent within curriculum, and the ways of thinking that are explicit to philosophical inquiry yet often implicit within course objectives and assessment requirements.

In consideration of the renewed emphasis in education on understanding "for the real world" and "lifelong learning," we feel this framework offers an integrated and conceptual interpretation of curricula, a means by which to identify the ideas of significance within syllabus documents, and the strategies by which to make them relevant to contemporary learning and modern life.

The practice of philosophy in the classroom
Much of the literature on the practice of philosophy in the classroom, which has its origins in Lipman's Philosophy for Children curriculum, places emphasis on process or building a community of inquiry, and includes: techniques for getting started, setting the agenda, and conducting discussion. Those of you who have had some experience in practicing philosophy in the classroom will be aware that the community of inquiry is participant centred and that the teacher's role is one of being a facilitator rather than an all-knowing expert.

Procedural questions
As a starting point for building a community of inquiry the literature has attended mostly to the process of inquiry, e.g., bearing in mind that classroom discussion must pay attention to seeking clarity, consistency, the exploration of considering alternative points of view, the sharing of discussion, engaging in self-correction and so forth (e.g., see Cam 1995; Splitter and Sharp 1995; Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyan 1980). Many of you may by now be familiar with what is commonly referred to as *procedural questions*. These questions are important insofar as conducting a community of inquiry is concerned. They assist the community to make reasonable judgments through the exploration of underlying assumptions and the structure of our thinking. Richard Paul's taxonomy of Socratic Question-

ing is an attempt to provide a framework for such questions. A usual sample can be seen below[1]:

Questions of clarification
What do you mean by ...?
Are you saying that ...?
How are you using the word ...?
Could you give me an example of ...?
Does anyone have any questions for (student's name)?

Questions that probe assumptions
What is she assuming?
Do you think that assumption is warranted?
Why would someone make that assumption?
Are there any hidden assumptions in that question?

Questions that probe reasons and evidence
Can you give an example/counter-example to illustrate your point?
What are your reasons for saying that?
Do you agree with her reasons?
But is that evidence good enough?
By what criteria do you make that judgment?
Do you think that source is an appropriate authority?

Questions about view points or perspectives
What would be another way of putting that?
Are any other beliefs on the subject possible?
Are there circumstances in which your view might be incorrect?
How are (student's name) and (student's name) ideas alike/different?
Supposing someone were to disagree with you, what do you think they would say?
What is someone were to suggest that ...?
Can you try to see the issue from their point of view?

Questions that probe implications and consequences
What would follow from what you say?
If we say this is unethical, how about that?
What would be the likely consequences of behaving like that?
Are you prepared to accept those consequences?
Do you think you might be jumping to conclusions in this case?

Questions about the question
Do you think that is an appropriate question?
How is that question relevant?
What does that question assume?
Can you think of another question that would highlight a different dimension of the issue?
How is that question going to help us?
Have we come any closer to solving the problem or answering the question?

These so-called "Socratic questions" or procedural questions are open-ended questions, which are intended to elicit students' views and stimulate further inquiry. These types of questions are frames which can be applied across disciplines and subject matter as the context can be filled out. Socrates, however, also asked open substantive questions.

Substantive questions
In traditional classrooms, children rarely get the opportunity to reflect upon open substantive questions. In classrooms where philosophy is practiced, the opportunity to explore such questions is inherent within the mechanisms of the community of inquiry itself, where students are encouraged to formulate and ask substantive questions. However, a common view of teacher as facilitator concerned *solely* with process rather than the content and the nature of the concepts within the dialogue itself seems to prevail. This misperception may lead to an over-use of procedural questioning, and a reluctance on the part of the teacher to be more involved in the substantive aspects of the inquiry. [2] Facilitating a community of inquiry will be most powerful when teachers engage with participants both procedurally *and* substantively. Facilitation strategies should include questions that scaffold the integration of student's thinking across both process and substance.

Unlike procedural questions, the substantive questions are embedded within specific contexts. As Splitter and Sharp (1995, 57) point out, "They grow out of one's understanding of a discipline or subject, including an understanding of how experts in the field have responded one to the other in the history of the discipline." These questions are, nonetheless, open-ended questions. They provide support for both teacher and students attempting to formulate such questions, and as follow up questions where more than procedural questions are appropriate.

The conversation below highlights the difference between open procedural questions and open substantive questions. Note that substantive questions are used to elicit deeper responses initially elicited by procedural questions.

QUESTION: Can we have a just society?

John: It depends on what is meant by justice?
Facilitator (PQ): *What is justice?*
John: Justice is that which is right.
Sandra: But what is right?
John: What is right or wrong depends on how you were brought up or where you come from.
Facilitator (PQ): *What do you mean by that?*
John: Well, something is right depending on what value or meaning individuals, groups or communities put on it.
Facilitator (SQ): Are you saying that judgments of right or wrong are relative?
John: Yes. Everyone has an opinion on what is right or wrong.
Sandra: I agree with John that everyone has an opinion on what is right, but right is the interest of the stronger.
Facilitator (PQ): *Can you give me an example?*
Sandra: The government will ensure that citizens will behave in a certain way that suits the interests of the rich and powerful.
Facilitator (PQ): *How else might we look at this?*
Fred: Just because it might be the case that everyone has an opinion on what is just, or it might be the case that the powerful exact certain behaviour out of its citizens, but that does not mean that it ought to be that way.
Facilitator (PQ): *Who agrees with Fred?*
Joanne: I do.
Facilitator (PQ): *Have you a reason for agreeing with Fred?*

Joanne: Yes. Because everyone has a right to freedom from coercion, including from government. Justice can only come from having the freedom to do what is in your own interest without interference from others.

Mary: I agree, but in order to have freedom we need to be able to be free to be able to do those things.

Facilitator (PQ): *Is that different from what Joanne is saying?*

Mary: Yes, because freedom is more than the absence of coercion. It is having the opportunity to participate in politics.

Harry: I agree with Mary, but it is more than having the opportunity to participate in politics. It certainly is more than having the right to vote at regular intervals. To really have freedom means having access to goods like education, health and welfare so that we can develop the capacity to make choices.

Facilitator (SQ): *Is a just society one in which we have access to these things you talk about?*

Harry: Yes.

Facilitator (PQ): *Do we require anything else for justice?*

Harry: A just society is an egalitarian one.

Facilitator (PQ): *What do you think Harry means by the term egalitarian?*

Sandra: A society that seeks both liberty and equality.

Natalie: The only just society is a democratic one. However, I don't think that we live in democratic society. What I mean is, for a society to be democratic it must abide by the principles of non-tyranny and equality, but it must also be deliberative.

Unlike procedural questions, to ask substantive questions requires the actual formulation of such questions, and as Splitter and Sharp observe, it is also a matter of timing, and of knowing when it is appropriate to intervene in a discussion with such questions (p.59). More importantly, substantive questions require a deeper understanding of the subject matter or discipline, as well as the context of the conversation. In other words, the use of substantive questions requires some knowledge of how, when and where to ask such questions, and an understanding of the concepts and themes inherent within the questions themselves. Table 1 illustrates the difference in emphasis between procedural and substantive questions.

Table 1: Open questions

PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS	SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS
Engages participants in thinking and inquiry	Adds new ideas, content
"Socratic" questions aimed at encouraging inquiry	Follow-up questions
Questions which probe underlying structure of thinking, and assist in making reasonable judgments	Grows out of understanding of a discipline, subject or domain – including understanding of method/responses in history of discipline
Stimulates further inquiry	Directs discussion in a subtle direction
Schema or frame – filled by reference to particular subject matter	Embedded within specific context
Teacher models procedures of inquiry	Teacher is involved as co-inquirer, but displays "scholarly ignorance," i.e., no claim to the answer in advance but engaged in genuine dialogue

This raises a crucial question: How much knowledge of the discipline of philosophy does the facilitator need? It would appear that one may benefit greatly from an understanding of the key ideas within philosophy, so as to make such questioning possible, i.e., one needs to be educated in the discipline. However, Socrates himself was not schooled in the discipline. It was the asking of both procedural and substantive questions that has contributed to the development of philosophy. Philosophy now has a history. It would be a mistake, therefore, to insist that one becomes educated in the history of philosophy, but on the other hand, such knowledge should not be taken for granted.

Splitter and Sharp state that through example and practice, both teachers and students can gain an understanding of how and when to ask substantive questions (p.59). Like many things that we attempt in life, practice makes perfect, or at the very least we gain some insight into that which we practice. This advice is a little limited at the practical level. We discussed earlier the way in which procedural questioning can be accommodated into pedagogical practice, as illustrated by Paul's taxonomy (1990). With practice, teachers come to understand their appropriate use, guided by the taxonomy's categories. Of course, it is possible to either over-use such questions, or to apply them mechanically like a check list of things to ask, which may result in the stifling of dialogue. However, this is avoided when facilitators remain sensitive to context, and open to philosophical possibilities. On the other hand, our concern with the inclusion of substantive questioning and facilitation remains. Can a framework be developed to support the integration of substantive inquiry into pedagogical practices and the community's inquiry in general? We think so, and offer the beginnings of such a framework within this paper, albeit its use will require more than the implementation of 'a series of questions that with practice can be appropriately applied to a context'.

Strands or sub-disciplines of philosophy

In the table below is a summary of the Strands or sub-disciplines which structure philosophical inquiry. The first two strands ask what philosophers call fundamental questions (see Table 2). The two strands are (1) *metaphysics*, or put another way, the nature of things, the distinction between the way things appear to be (e.g., a road surface may look wet from a distance on a hot day) and the way they really are (the road is actually dry); and (2) *epistemology*, or knowing about things. We cannot emphasise enough that memorising the philosophical jargon is not the aim of this exercise, although one should not fear using the language of the philosopher. After all, as teachers we have become accustomed to using the language of education and freely use terms such as "pedagogy," and "curriculum," terms that might not be so familiar to others outside of the discipline of education. Every discipline has its own terminology that is particular to that discipline. Nevertheless, for our purposes the phrase to the right of the colon is what we will concentrate on.

Take some time to understand each strand. How do they differ? In what ways are they different? Do they overlap in anyway? If so, how? Can you give further examples of questions for each strand? Write them down.

Table 2: Fundamental Questions

STRAND	DESCRIPTION	QUESTIONS
Metaphysics The nature of things	The way we think about the world. Metaphysics attempts to get behind appearances and find out the truth about the nature of things.	What is ultimately real? Why does whatever is real exist? What is the place of human beings in the real?
Epistemology Knowing about things	Asks questions about the nature and grounds of knowledge and the conditions by which we assert things to be true or false.	What is knowledge? What is it to know something? What are human beings capable of knowing? How can we justify our claims to knowledge? Are there limits to human knowledge? If there are limits, what are they, and what fixes them?

The other strands drawn upon, *ethics, social and political philosophy*, and *aesthetics*, we have called **Asking questions about ...** (see Table 3). This is because while they are sub-disciplines, these strands are underpinned by metaphysical and epistemological considerations. For example, to understand what ethics is, we may need to understand the nature of our beliefs and values and where they come from, which is a metaphysical question about ethics. We can also ask whether or not there are moral truths. Because such a question asks if we can have knowledge about the nature of ethics, it is an epistemological question.[3] Indeed, some philosophers argue that we must tackle the metaphysical and epistemological problems first, before we can ask any further questions. However, philosophy being philosophy, you may not be surprised to find other philosophers in disagreement with this point. Our concern is less about such disagreements, and primarily with how important it is procedurally, and how effective it is substantively, to apply good judgment and reasoning. What follows are descriptions of ethics, social and political philosophy and aesthetics.

Table 3: Asking questions about ...

STRAND	DESCRIPTION	QUESTIONS
Ethics Valuing things	A form of values inquiry that grapples with questions that arise from interpersonal relationships and relationships between persons and the non-human world. Concerned about questions of right and wrong, the good and the bad, and the nature of our beliefs about such matters.	How ought we to live? What do moral concepts like good and right mean? Are our moral judgments objectively true or false, or do they express subjective preferences? Can specific moral rules be justified? What motives do we have for living morally? How should I balance the pursuit of my own goals with making a contribution to my community?
Social & political philosophy Individuals and communities	Examines the relationship between individuals and communities, as well as those questions that underlie our thinking about social, cultural and political institutions.	How do we connect with others? How should we organise society? What is the relation of power to law? Who should rule? What is the nature and purpose of law?
Aesthetics Philosophy and the arts	A form of values inquiry that makes possible judgments of appreciation.	What is beauty? Are aesthetic judgements objectively true or false, or do they express subjective preferences?

Note that there is an overlap between these sub-disciplines, especially across ethics and social and political philosophy. Arguably, all social and political questions are underpinned by questions of an ethical nature. For example, "Do we have an obligation to obey the state and hence its laws?"

When we engage in the practice of philosophical inquiry, and we propound a particular view, in order to defend this position we present arguments intended to support this view. The enterprise of reasoning about philosophical issues is known as *logic* (see Table 4). Logic is the branch or sub-discipline of philosophy that involves the **construction and evaluation of arguments**. Logic can be said to be procedural, as it deals with the rules and procedures that underlie inquiry. We can, however, ask philosophical questions about logic itself, e.g., What is truth?, Is knowledge related to truth or falsehood? Moreover, logic, as taught in universities, involves mainly formal reasoning. However, the practice of philosophy in the classroom deals more with logical consequences and drawing attention to reasoning tools as a means to promote quality thinking and deep learning. It is the latter, or procedural considerations, that we will be concerned with here.

Table 4: Construction and evaluation of arguments

STRAND	DESCRIPTION	QUESTIONS
Logic Judgment and reasoning	Logic deals with rules and procedures that under lie inquiry; the study of valid inference. Embraces both critical and creative thinking	How can we distinguish better reasoning from worse?

For convenience, Table 5 below illustrates the overlap within the sub-disciplines of philosophy. Note that the questions in each cell are not exhaustive, but rather examples of potential questions within each strand. Those questions that are fundamental to each strand have been highlighted in bold type. Other questions are those that might be asked when at least two of the strands intersect. Some cells have been left open for you to consider and construct your own questions. Read through them and find time to discuss them with colleagues. Do others agree with you? If yes, why? If not, why not? Remember that the purpose of this exercise is not so much to fill out the cells "correctly," but to reflect upon, and become familiar with, the philosophical terrain through practice and dialogue with others.

Table 5: Mapping the sub-disciplines of philosophy

	Metaphysics	Epistemology	Ethics	Social & Political	Aesthetics	*Logic*
Metaphysics	**What is ...? What things exist?**	What is knowledge?			What is beauty?	What is truth?
Epistemology		**Is knowledge possible?**	Are our moral judgments objectively true or false?		Is beauty in the eye of the beholder?	Is knowledge related to truth and falsehood?
Ethics	Are there moral truths?	Can we show that one moral view is better than another?	**How ought we to live?**			Should my behaviour be consistent with my beliefs?
Social & Political	What does it mean to be a member of a political community?		Do we have an obligation to obey the state?	**How do we connect with others?**	Should art be politically correct?	Is liberty compatible with equality?
Aesthetics	Is there such a thing as beauty?	How do we judge beauty?			**What things are beautiful?**	
Logic	What do we mean when we say a statement is true?	How do we decide whether or not a statement is true?				**How can we distinguish better reasoning from worse?**

Philosophy and Studies of Society and Environment (SOSE)

Philosophy relates in some way, to all eight key learning areas. Generally speaking, every discipline presupposes answers to philosophical questions that cannot be answered by the disciplines themselves.

Here are some examples:

Mathematics: Do numbers exist? Is mathematics discovered or invented?
Science: What is scientific knowledge? How is scientific knowledge different from knowledge in other disciplines?
Religion: Does God exist? What is the relation between faith and reason?
Languages: What is meaning? How does language relate to the world?

For this paper, our analysis concentrates on the key learning area of Studies of Society and Environment (SOSE). SOSE attempts to bring together various disciplines including history, geography, economics, politics, sociology, anthropology, law, psychology, and ethics, as well as studies such as civics and citizenship, cultural studies, and future studies, in order to develop an understanding of society and our lives within it. In doing so, there is currently an emphasis (particularly within Australia, the UK, and Canada) on core societal values as key elements of social education curriculum. For Queensland, this emphasis has been translated as *Key Values* articulated as essential underlying concepts that integrate throughout the curriculum's conceptual strands. The four key values within the Queensland syllabus (QSCC, 2000) are democratic processes; social justice; ecological and economic sustainability; and peace. The four

conceptual strands are time, continuity and change; place and space; culture and identity; and systems, resources and power.

The task of planning a unit of work or series of lessons usually begins with teachers establishing and identifying key learning objectives that integrate with and/or facilitate the 'learning outcomes' endorsed within the syllabus. This process of curriculum interpretation and design has been the subject of a recent study, in which we identified the limitations of a 'content/outcomes' only approach to planning (O'Brien & Burgh, 2001). With substantial research into planning practices and case studies, the project team developed materials that supported a more conceptual and inquiry-oriented approach to curriculum planning. While this work is ongoing, we alert the reader at this point that both the study and this paper assume an inquiry-oriented approach to curriculum, teaching and learning.

Thus, we might begin by asking the question: What is there to know? For example, we may want students to turn their attention to the structure of society and the cultural practices of Ancient Egypt. Next we consider the central concepts and themes that are inherent within this topic, or conceptual understanding. In doing so, we must ask the question: What is there to understand and why is it significant? In this case, students need to understand how cultural and social values, and the structure of a society are interrelated aspects of Ancient Egypt, and the way in which it is governed. They might also consider the impact of these aspects on the quality of life for members of that society, and build further on that understanding by making comparisons to contemporary life in Australia.

By undertaking a brief analysis aimed at identifying key concepts, themes, and understandings, we are now in a position to consider the sorts of philosophical questions we may need to ask. An effective community of inquiry (and indeed, classroom generally) stimulates students to analyse concepts and issues, and to explore underlying assumptions and taken for granted perspectives. If we look at Table 3 (see also Table 5), some of these questions are readily adapted to the specific content of SOSE. For example, when grounded in the *Key Value* of democratic processes and integrated from across the *Strands* of Time, Continuity and Change, Place and Space, Culture and Identity, the question which is at the heart of social and political philosophy: *How do we connect with others?* becomes: *How do different societies reflect different models of citizenship and democracy through time?*

In Table 6 we have placed the *Key Values* and *Strands of the Key Learning Area* as found in the SOSE syllabus, and mapped them generally onto the relevant sub-disciplines of philosophy. We have provided examples of some questions that directly relate to the SOSE syllabus. These questions can be articulated more specifically when applied to particular subject matter (as with the earlier example on the structure of society and the cultural practices of Ancient Egypt).

Note that we have left blank the *Key Values* of Social Justice, and Ecological and Economic Sustainability in relation to the sub-discipline of Ethics for you to fill out. Use the questions in Table 3 (see also Table 5) as a guide and adapt them to each of the corresponding cells in Table 6. Give reasons for answers and why you placed them in each particular cell. Discuss with others your reasons for doing so.

Table 6: Relation of the sub-disciplines of philosophy directly related to the strands and key values in SOSE

		The nature of things			Social & political philosophy: individuals & communities
		Time, continuity & change	*Place & space*	*Culture & Identity*	*Systems, resources & power*
Social & political philosophy: individuals & communities	*Democratic processes*	What is democracy? Can what happened in the past tell us anything about the nature of democracy? How do different societies reflect different models of citizenship and democracy through time? What are the implications, if any, for the theory and practice of democracy?			How are different models of governance implemented and sustained within different societies? Do we have an obligation to obey the state?
	Social justice	What is justice? How has the concept of justice changed over time? What influence has this had on concepts of liberty and equality?	What has been the impact of these changing concepts on people and societies over time? In what ways do cultural and social perceptions of rights, equality and liberty shape and define the practice of social justice in societies?		What role should the processes of citizenship, government, business and economy play in the articulation of justice in a society?
Ethics: valuing things					
	Ecological & economic sustainability				
Social & political philosophy: individuals & communities		What is environment? What has been the impact of ongoing social, cultural, economic and political development on the environment over time?	Can we make sense of the environment by respecting its intrinsic nature rather than acting on its behalf? (eg Indigenous world views vs Western thinking)	How do the underlying perspectives and beliefs held by different cultures and societies influence people's relationship with the environment?	Should democracy be extended beyond the human community?
	Peace	What is peace? Is it merely the resolution of conflict? Do we need to reconsider questions of social justice in order to attain peace?	Should we foster both human and environmental flourishing? How can we achieve this?	What are the influences of difference and diversity on human flourishing? How should we manage different values and beliefs? How should we resolve conflict that arises from difference and diversity?	

Concluding Discussion

It would be a mistake to assume that the *Key Values* identified in the SOSE syllabus should go uncontested. Indeed, the curriculum documents and related literature may be interpreted as presenting such 'shared values' as unproblematic and inherently inclusive. As Tim Sprod (1997, 43) indicates, there is an assumption that these values *ought* to be shared. Hence, while Table 6 gives examples of substantive questions that can act as springboards for exploring the *Key Values*, children need to explore these values further. We need to ask fundamental questions that seek to unpack and examine the underlying assumptions of these 'values' in a critical and socio-culturally informed manner. Questions that get to the heart of the issues. In other words, we need to ask questions about the nature of things, of the values and beliefs that we hold, and on what counts as evidence. We begin by developing, and adapting or building on the general or broader questions found in Table 2 (see also Table 5), fundamental questions such as: What do we mean by ...?, or How do you know ...? These questions are important as they provide the means by which we may question and critically examine the underlying assumptions of the stated *values* and conceptual strands, and the tools with which children may reflect upon and thoughtfully negotiate their own values and beliefs, as well as those of others.

Tables 7 and 8 provide further examples of some fundamental questions. These examples are not intended to be used as a list of questions for teachers to use in the classroom. Their development lies within an intention to support and stimulate our thinking and understanding of why and how we come to ask these questions.

Our main concern has been the need of the facilitator to intermingle both substantive and procedural questions. Guiding a community of inquiry to explore such questions and issues, requires teachers as facilitators who are actively engaged in both the process of inquiry, and the conceptual substance of the dialogue. Such a model of pedagogy requires teachers to be sensitive to context, and to ask questions which assist students in making reasonable judgments. This task involves strategies that encourage students to explore philosophical issues and express points of view, as well as to construct and evaluate arguments. When we are focused upon the development of student's capacities to make judgements based upon scholarly thinking, and the engagement of their intellectual and reasoning skills, high quality dialogue and deep understanding are more likely to occur.

In sum, integrating philosophy into a subject area or KLA requires an understanding of the procedural and substantive nature of philosophy. This may be a more complex task than simply supplementing pedagogy with procedural questions. Indeed, it is one that must engage the teacher's expertise as a thinker and curriculum designer, in order to identify and draw upon those most valuable concepts and themes within curriculum areas. Extending our classroom beyond the 'outcomes' may not be easy, however this paper has presented some ideas and a framework from which to begin this process. With practice in the classroom, and further collegial discussion in the staff room, the philosophical terrain will become more familiar. With time and perseverance, the partnership between philosophy and education, particularly when applied throughout curriculum, teaching and learning, will be an enriching and valuable one for our students.[4]

Table 7: Conceptual strands

Time, continuity and change
What is continuity, and what counts as continuity? What is change, and what counts as change?
What counts as evidence in order to understand changes and continuities over time from ancient to modern times?
How can an understanding of causes and effects inform changes and continuities, in both past and future perspectives? What counts as a cause? What counts as an effect?
How do we establish what contributions by people have affected the present?
What contributions should count towards future perspectives?
Should we place more importance on the dominant perspective?
Should we consider the role of marginalised groups?
What impact have ideas on social environments had on heritages?

Place and space
What do we mean by place and space? Are there natural processes that shape both place and space?
What are natural processes? Are all human-environmental interactions natural processes?
To what extent do human-environmental interactions impact on place?
How do spatial patterns affect human development and environments?
What is the significance of place on human values?
What is the impact of built environments on natural environments?

Culture and identity
Who am I? What does it mean to be me?
Is our identity constructed by culture to which we belong or vice verse? What is culture?
What does it mean to belong to a culture? What do we mean by a sense of belonging?
Is it necessary to be a member of a group to have a sense of belonging?
Is it possible to belong to one group or culture and yet not share all the same values?
Does difference and diversity affect our perceptions of self and what it means to belong to a culture?

Systems, resources and power
What is the relationship between ecological and other systems?
Should economy and business have an influence over the future of the environment?
Is it important that citizens participate in social and political decisions?
What is the relationship between citizenship and government?
Should citizens have access to power? If yes, in what way?
What is power?
What is the relationship between power and access to systems and resources?
Who should control natural resources and the means of production?

Questions overlapping one or more conceptual strands
What are historical facts?
Do facts change over time?
What is the connection between space, time and change?
How does change affect culture?
Can we have culture without continuity?
What is the significant of time and spatial patterns on human identity and culture?
How much of human nature is shaped by natural or innate forces, and how much is conditioned by the social environment or culture?
How does identity and culture affect social and political structures?
Does identity and culture affect how we view history and our place in the world?
How can historical facts be established?

Table 8: Key Values

Democratic processes
What is democracy? Does democracy imply respecting the integrity and the rights of *all* people?
If so, is democracy possible in a pluralist society?
What is the relation between democracy and civil and political rights?
Should all people be involved in democratic decision-making in all aspects of life?
If yes, can we respect the rights of all people *and* promote equal participation and access for individuals and groups? If not, what does it mean to be a citizen in a democratic society?

Social justice
What is social justice? What are some ways in which we might challenge injustices?
Is it possible to share a common humanity *and* value diversity?
Should all people have a right to equitable treatment?
What role do human rights play, if any, in achieving social justice?
What do we mean by the tem "rights"?
Does social justice entail a fair allocation of community resources?
What do we mean by fairness? Is justice fairness?

Ecological and economic sustainability
What is the nature of the interrelationship between ecological systems and economies?
What do we mean by the integrity of natural environments?
Can natural environments have intrinsic value or inherent worth, or do they have value or worth because they are important as the basic sources of life support?

Peace
Is the promotion of positive relations with others and with the environment integral to peace? If so, is it possible to act out of self-interest and yet achieve cooperative and peaceful relations with others?
Is the promotion of spirituality and optimism necessary to peace?
Can we have peace without a sense of belonging in local, national and global communities? If so, is a sense of shared destiny and stewardship of the Earth necessary for peace?

Questions overlapping one or more key values
Is democracy possible without social justice?
Can we have social justice without democracy?
What is the relationship between citizenship and democratic processes?
Can we have citizenship without rights or responsibilities?
How should we decide on what might be a wise, equitable and sustainable use of resources?
Is ecological and economic sustainability necessary for peace?
Is peace possible without social justice?
Is democracy necessary for peace?

Endnotes

[1] Taken from Splitter and Sharp, 1995, p.56-7. Adapted from Paul 1990, Ch.19; Paul et al. 1989a,b; 1990a,b.

[2] The question of teacher intervention and substantive involvement continues to be discuss-ed. It raises the general problem of impartiality, and of whether or not substantive contributions by teachers subvert the course of inquiry. Moreover, if agreement could be reached on these issues, it still leaves open questions of when it is appropriate for teachers to make substantive contributions. For further discussion on the issue of teacher intervention, see Splitter and Sharp 1995, pp.135-9.; and see esp. p.148, Figure 3: Teacher involvement in classroom dialogue; and p.149, Figure 4: Aspects of growth in the classroom community of inquiry.

[3] The enterprise of asking these sorts of questions is sometimes called meta-ethics.

[4] For an introduction to discussion plans and exercises see, Lipman 1997. For discussion plans designed to stimulate discussion on the philosophical underpinnings of both history and moral values, which can be used as stimulus material for lesson plans in SOSE, see Sprod 1997.

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Children in Democratic Classrooms
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New Padagogies
Curriculum Design for Lifelong Learning

There will be an informal get-together on the night before the opening of the conference. The conference will be open on Saturday with a hypothetical and inquiry. Papers and workshop sessions will be thematically related, with each theme (or strand) preceded by a plenary session and discussion followed by a community of inquiry. The conference closes on Monday with a forum and discussion.

The AGM will be held on Monday afternoon.

A notice for "call of papers" and further details will be posted soon.

Direct all general inquiries to:

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