

ritical eative Thinking

The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education

Vol 12 No 2 Nov 2004

Research Articles

Susan T Gardner, "Interactive Reasoning: the Road to Freedom"

Pauline Enright, "Self, Philosophy, and the Community of Inquiry"

Jennifer Bleazby, "Practicality in Philosophy for Children"

Leif Larsen, "Not in My Classroom: A Response to the Values Education Study"

Reports & Reviews

Greg Smith "Bytes of Wisdom for Postmodern Kids"

Sarah Davey on *Connecting Concepts* by Clinton Golding

ISSN 1325-7730

Critical & Creative Thinking

*The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in
Education*

Vol 12 No 2, Nov 2004

ISSN 1325-7730

Welcome to Critical & Creative Thinking

Welcome to Volume 12, No.2 of *Critical & Creative Thinking*: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education.

This edition contains articles by Susan Gardner, Pauline Enright, Jennifer Bleazby and Leif Larsen. Also included is a book review of Clinton Golding's *Connecting Concepts* by Sarah Davey, and a report by Greg Smith on exploring proverbs in the classroom.

Editors

Gilbert Burgh, Contemporary Studies, University of Queensland, Australia

Philip Cam, School of Philosophy, University of NSW, Australia

Stephan Millett, Wesley College and Curtin University, Perth, Australia

Editorial Committee

James Battye, Philosophy, Massey University, New Zealand

Gilbert Burgh, Contemporary Studies, University of Queensland, Australia

Philip Cam, Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Australia

Peter Davson-Galle, Education, University of Tasmania, Australia

Phil Guin, Montclair State University, NJ, USA

Felicity Haynes, Education, University of Western Australia, Australia

Stephan Millett, Wesley College and Curtin University, Perth, Australia

Ross Phillips, Philosophy, La Trobe University, Australia

Laurance Splitter, Hunter College, City University of New York, USA

Tim Sprod, The Friends School, Australia

Sue Wilks, University of Melbourne, Australia

About the Journal

Critical & Creative Thinking is an international journal published under the auspices of The Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA). The focus of the journal is philosophical inquiry with school-age students. What was once called Philosophy for Children has now grown into a sub-discipline of philosophy with its own history, traditions, and pedagogy, and incorporates what could be called philosophical inquiry in the classroom, reflective education and, generally speaking, philosophy in schools as well as related methodologies such as Socratic Dialogue. The journal performs two roles. The first is to publish scholarly research concerning the theory and practice of philosophical inquiry at school level. These articles will appear in the Research Articles section. The second is to publish reports of practice, comments on resources, suggestions and ideas about philosophising with school students and so forth, with a view to encouraging professional interchange among those interested in philosophical inquiry with school-age students.

Aim and Scope

To provide a vehicle for the communication of ideas and a forum for discussion and debate of issues concerning the practice of philosophical inquiry with school-age students.

To promote better teaching and curricular design for the development of critical and creative thinking amongst school-age students through increased understanding and use of philosophical inquiry in the classroom.

To enrich the understanding of philosophy and philosophical inquiry as well as its role in the development of good thinking and good judgment.

To increase interaction and collaboration between the academic community of scholars in universities and teachers in schools on matters of logic, epistemology, creativity, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, inquiry, philosophy of science, mind, personhood, community, understanding, learning, thinking, dialogue, discussion, and related matters concerning philosophy, inquiry and classroom pedagogy.

To promote discussion of the place of philosophy in the national and school curriculum and its infusion into the present curriculum, as well as the place of philosophy in the intellectual, creative, moral and social development of individuals.

Notes for Contributors

All contributions will be considered for publication. Articles will be subject to the normal processes of peer-review for scholarly refereed journals, including blind reviewing by at least two referees drawn from the Editorial Committee (or from other international scholars with special expertise as necessary).

Manuscripts should be prepared with a title page. Include all relevant information about the author; institutional affiliation (if applicable), email address and contact details. The title page will be removed prior to review.

Articles should be 1.5 or double spaced in 12 point. Please keep formatting to a minimum. Use footnote citation with a list of references at the end. Tables and text in side-by-side columns should be placed in a table with 1 point border. Detailed information on manuscript preparation and referencing style will be available on the FAPSA website. An announcement will be posted on the P4C-list.

Please send articles attached as a Word document to: P.Cam@unsw.edu.au

Letters to the Editor

It may happen that you read an article and would like to respond, but not in the form of a lengthy article. Such responses, which might simply add to a point made by the author either in agreement or disagreement, or offer an alternative view, could appear as a "Letter to the Editor." The idea is to encourage dialogue between readers and authors, in effect using the journal to create a community of inquiry.

Send all contributions to: P.Cam@unsw.edu.au

Subscriptions

Critical & Creative Thinking is now available in May and November. Subscription renewals are due in February and will cover the May and November issues. New subscriptions are welcome anytime of the year. Please note that anyone subscribing to the journal after May will receive the May issue with their subscription, and the next issue posted in November. Renewals will then be due the following February. New subscriptions received after November will cover issues for the following year. Currently there are no facilities for MasterCard, Visa or other credit cards. We hope that you will continue your subscription, and if you have any suggestions please send them to us.

Subscription forms are at the back of the journal.

Back Issues

Back issues are available at a cost of AU\$5.00 per issue, or if you order ALL of the available back issues the cost is AU\$40.00 per set. See back of journal for order forms and contents of previous issues.

Critical & Creative Thinking

*The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in
Education*

Vol 12 No 2, Nov 2004

CONTENTS

Research Articles

Susan T. Gardner

Interactive Reasoning: the Road to Freedom 1

Pauline Enright

Self, Philosophy, and the Community of Inquiry 13

Jennifer Bleazby

Practicality in Philosophy for Children 33

Leif Larsen

Not in My Classroom: A Response to the Values
Education Study 43

Letter 53

Reports & Reviews

Greg Smith

Bytes of Wisdom for Postmodern Kids 54

Sarah Davey

on *Connecting Concepts* by Clinton Golding 60

Journal contents: Volumes 1-12 67

Interactive Reasoning: The Road to Freedom

Susan T. Gardner (Capilano College, Vancouver, Canada)

What is the point of reasoning?

“Use your head,” a father says to his son. “Be reasonable,” a woman says to her mate. “Learn how to think,” an advisor says to a prospective student. What is extraordinary about these admonitions is that we do not find them extraordinary. After all, we live in a world that has been, for better or for worse, substantially technologically conquered because of our ever more thorough understanding of the physical-chemical laws that govern it. In academia, virtually all the disciplines—philosophy included—take for granted the bottom line assumption that events follow one another in some kind of causally determined chain. But if this is true, if we in fact base many, most, or all of our decisions about how we ought to act on the assumption that we live in a determined world, then there is a very real question about what we could possibly mean when we say that it is important that people learn how to think. If thinking makes a difference, what other difference could it possibly make except as a source of self-direction or freedom? Surely, therefore, we ought to find it at least odd that few people are even puzzled by the potential incompatibility of the assumption that thinking can make a difference in a world of unquestioned universal determination.

This is the challenge that will be taken up here. It will be argued that, against the background assumption of universal determinism, thinking one’s way to freedom, or autonomy, is nonetheless possible, but that it is only possible through a certain kind of thinking, namely one that will be referred to here as interactive reasoning.

Symbolic reasoning enhances negative freedom¹

We will begin with the assumption that all animate responses are elicited by the stimuli in the environment in which an animal moves. The word 'stimulus' is nothing more than scientific jargon for what lay people mean by 'value'. So we will begin with the assumption that (a) it is perceived value that determines all animate behaviour and that therefore (b) a change in animate behaviour can only occur as a result of a change in perceived value.

This value/behaviour dialectic can be illuminated through an analogy with colour. Let us suppose that all animals are pre-programmed so that red is appetitive (i.e., red elicits an approach response) and blue is aversive (i.e., blue elicits an avoidance response). With association, red and blue rub off on various objects and situations so that, with extensive experience, an animal's environment becomes a riot of colour with many shades and variations of red, blue, and purple. Were we to have the appropriate metaphysical glasses, we would be able to predict an animal's behaviour merely by seeing the colours of its world. We would know, for instance, that a vibrant red would be extremely appetitive, a pale blue mildly aversive, while we would predict that a deep purple would elicit a highly ambivalent response.

What is important to note with regard to the learning process just described is that value moves from object to object, or situation to situation, as a result of association. What is also important to note is that this association can transpire either naturally, or as a result of contrived pairing. The modification of the behaviour of wild animals takes place entirely as a result of natural association, with the result being a "fit" between the animal and the environment that it inhabits. A domestic pet, on the other hand, is also subject to purposeful pairing. A domestic pet, therefore, learns to fit into its social setting, as well as its natural environment. The basic dynamic of behavioural control in both these situations, however, remains the same. The behaviour of both wild and domestic animals is totally determined by values that adhere to external percepts.

With the emergence of self-consciousness and language, the dynamics of value begin to change. Initially,

¹ Many of the ideas incorporated under this heading can be found in S. Gardner's 'Autonomy: A Philosophical Capture,' published in *Practical Philosophy*, Vol. 4, No. 2, July, 2001, pp. 19-22.

the very young pre-linguistic human, like a domestic pet, is subject to behaviour modification both by natural association and purposeful pairing. However, as the child matures cognitively, and develops language, a qualitative change in the dynamic of value occurs. What happens now is that, instead of a caregiver merely trying to “repaint” the values of a child’s environment directly, the caregiver, through symbolic interaction—specifically argumentation—tries to infuse values into the child (rather than directly into the child’s world) in the hope that the child herself will project those values into relevant situations, and in so doing be moved by them.

Let us follow this change in the dynamic of value through an example. Let us suppose that a mother, Mrs. Smith, initially trains her child, Mary, through a typical association program; smiles and hugs for all the desired behaviours, and negative “no’s” for actions that she hopes to eliminate. With cognitive maturity and the development of language, however, Mrs. Smith begins to explain to Mary, that, for instance, generosity is a virtue that is highly regarded by others, and that therefore Mary ought always to share her possessions with her playmates. In subsequent play situations, even if Mrs. Smith is absent, we can presume that though a new toy will serve as a strong behaviour-eliciting stimulus for Mary, a projected image of a greatly admired child generously sharing her toys with her playmates will also exert an appetitive pull. What is happening here is that a projected image of the self serves as a behaviour-eliciting stimulus that competes with the “external”² behaviour-eliciting stimuli in the child’s environment. If the self-projected stimulus over-rides the external stimuli, Mary can be described as having gained “self-control”.

From a metaphysical point of view, the emergence of linguistically reasoned “self-control” can be described as dramatic; from an everyday point of view, however, this drama is usually utterly invisible. This is so because, on the surface, there is no obvious difference between, for example, Mary refraining from being selfish with her toys because it conflicts with her mother’s worldview, and a dog ceasing to

²“External” has been put in quotes so as to signal that the force of any external stimulus is not strictly external. It is also a function of the internal state of the conscious being.

chew on shoes because the behaviour was paired with a wallop. However the difference is dramatic, and that drama resides in the potentiality of the former that is absent from the latter. Clearly the latter, i.e., learning that results merely from physical association, is relatively crude and limited. On the one hand, one can only carry out just so many pairings, and, on the other, in order for an animal to be “trained”, it must first produce the behaviour that one wants to positively or aversively reinforce. As well, the whole procedure must be done with great precision so that one actually reinforces the desired behaviour rather than a closely associated one. If Rover hesitates before coming, the subsequent treat may reinforce the hesitation rather than obedience.

By comparison, values that emerge as a result of linguistic reasoning are more malleable, complex and precise; to say nothing of the virtually miraculous fact that human learning can transpire in the imagination rather than in actuality. Because self-conscious entities can imagine themselves in the future, they can imagine themselves doing both desired and undesired actions and, through symbolic argumentation, others can pair those *imagined* behaviours with *imagined* positive or aversive reinforcement. Thus, in the above situation, if Mary had been a dog rather than a human child, the only way Mrs. Smith could have produced the desired “sharing response” would have been to somehow elicit a “sharing” response and then positively reinforce it (though, as we dog-lovers know, eliciting a genuine sharing response from a dog is well nigh impossible). However, since Mary is self-conscious and is capable of symbolic reasoning, her mother’s words can not only conjure up an image of Mary sharing her toys, her mother’s words can also conjure up an image of mother being mightily impressed by the fact that Mary is sharing her toys. Learning can thus take place in imagination. No *actual* behaviour or *actual* reinforcement need take place.³

From a collective viewpoint, the evolutionary payoff of the emergence of linguistically mediated imaginative reasoning is enormous. Such entities, precisely because they

³ Mary can reason that: “Generosity is highly valued by Mummy. Sharing my toys is a form of generosity. Therefore, sharing my toys is highly valued by Mummy.” This learning is the imaginative equivalent of Mummy literally hugging Mary had Mummy first been able to elicit the sharing response from Mary.

are able to free their behaviours from the determining influence of the immediate external environment, are able to coordinate their actions with each other in a way that is far more complex and layered than entities that only learn through physical association. However, from an “individuating” point of view, these entities seem to be going in the wrong direction. Rather than moving individuals toward autonomy, the emergence of the capacity for linguistic reasoning appears to bring with it a kind of “over-determination”. Though symbolic imaginative learning opens up the way for self-conscious entities to enhance “self-control”,⁴ we need to keep firmly in mind that this so-called “self-control” is really “social control”. It involves behaviour that results from projected values that have been introjected from others. Self-control, in other words, does not result in the creation of a unique work of art; it is, rather, number painting with the design and colour scheme being pre-determined. Self-controlled individuals are not painting their own worlds; they are not in charge of their own practical judgments.

Only impartial reasoning enhances positive freedom

It is value that moves behaviour. Thus if one wants to control one’s own behaviour, one must get control over one’s values. How does one do that? The first step that is necessary in order to take control over one’s behaviour is to understand clearly how others, heretofore, have done so. Others have controlled one’s behaviour either by literal purposeful pairing or through symbolic pairing, i.e., dialogue. Trying to take control over one’s own behaviour by literal purposeful pairing is rare. For one thing, it is crude; for another, it implies that one must resort to treating oneself as a pre-linguistic animal. However, in some instances, such literal purposeful pairing is appropriate. Some alcoholics, for instance, resort to pairing highly aversive stimuli, e.g., drugs that produce severe nausea, with alcohol intake in an effort to conquer their addiction.

⁴ We need to keep in mind that many non-human animals are also capable of some measure of “self control” in the name of social cooperation. Thus, with regard to “self/social control,” the difference between non-linguistic animals and symbolically interacting humans is a matter of degree. For symbolically interacting humans, the learning opportunities are exponentially enhanced by the fact that learning can take place in a linguistically mediated imagination.

The most effective way to take control over one's behaviour, however, is to take control over one's own reasoning processes. Others have plugged into one's reasoning processes by pairing, through symbolic interaction,⁵ an imagined action with an imagined reinforcement, either positive or aversive. That reinforcement, or value, is what we call a reason. "You ought not to do 'x' *because* others will think ill of you." "You ought to do 'y' *because* it will help you flourish." And so on. The word 'because' signals a reason. In theoretical reasoning, the word 'because' signals a reference to a matter of fact, e.g., the bridge collapsed because the cable snapped. However, in practical reasoning, i.e., reasoning about how one ought or ought not to act, the word 'because' ultimately signals a reference to a value. The reference may not be direct, but it will eventually get there. Thus, though the 'because' in the claim 'You ought to contact your grandmother because she is dying' directly refers to a matter of fact, i.e., that your grandmother is dying, it indirectly refers to the value that one ought always to try and make contact with people (or relatives) who are dying. Practical reasoning must eventually end with a reference to a value because the only thing that moves behaviour is value.

Autonomy thus requires that one learn how to reason with oneself about practical issues, i.e., issues of value. However to say that, i.e., that "autonomy requires that one learn how to reason with oneself about practical issues," is not to say that one must simply learn how to supply oneself with reasons. If autonomy is the goal, then there is a certain kind of reasoning that must be mastered, and that is the kind of reasoning that neutralizes outside influence or bias. After all, to be autonomous means that one can make decisions by oneself, that one's decisions are not influenced by outside pressures. Reasoning that is not influenced by outside pressure is impartial reasoning. Autonomy requires that one learn to reason impartially. Autonomy requires that one follow reasons (as opposed to wishful thinking or preconceived ideas) where they lead. Autonomy requires that one become a reasonable individual.

⁵ Specifically through deductive augmentation.

Impartial reasoning requires interactive thinking

Kant argued that the route to impartiality, and thus autonomy, was through rationality. Obviously, if one were able to be perfectly rational (e.g., *Star Trek's* Data), one could be sure that one's judgments were "impartial" or "objective," and, from Kant's perspective, therefore moral. Kant offered the Categorical Imperative (So act that the maxim of your action can become a universal law.) as a negative test of rationality. Since universality is a mark of rationality (e.g., two plus two equals four in all possible worlds), if one's maxims for action were not universalizable, one would know that they were not contenders for objectivity and morality.

Kant's emphasis on the importance of rationality has lent powerful support to the glorification of the solipsistic thinker. Kant's model suggests that good thinking, in and of itself, is the road to human excellence. After all, if autonomy resides in one's capacity to be rational, then it appears that all one need do to become autonomous, i.e., the best to which we humans can aspire, is, through sufficient will power and with the use of various skills, to rise up from one's lower, biased, particular point of view to the more ethereal, objective, universal point of view. All one need do to become autonomous is to travel upward within one's own mind.

The difficulty with the process advocated by Kant is that the only check on the potential bias of one's own thinking is one's own biased self. "I have reasoned it through," so one says, "and I can assure you that I am not the least bit biased." It is a danger similar to the one inherent in postulating the possibility of a private language. As Wittgenstein has pointed out, this is like checking the accuracy of a newspaper by going out and buying another copy of the same edition. It also leads to a travesty of one apparently legitimately universalizing one's own biases, e.g., Hare's fanatic Nazi⁶ who argues that the extermination of the Jews is moral because he can universalize his maxim, i.e., he can will that, even if he were a Jew, he would still wish that all Jews of the world be exterminated.

If we can not go inward to find impartiality, what is the alternative? The goal is to view a given situation, or issue, as objectively as possible, to see it for what it really is rather than as a function of one's preconceived ideas. The

⁶ Richard Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 159-185.

optimum viewpoint, as Kant correctly pointed out, would be a universal, or a God's eye view. However, since striving for a universal view "internally" is problematic, surely the next best option is to go the other way, i.e., try and see the situation from as many actual points of view as possible—with the regulative ideal being an infinite number of viewpoints. Impartiality is not a state of being, nor is it something that is best achieved through the play of one's own imagination or rationality. Impartiality requires that one actually communicate with others and genuinely try to perceive the issue from as many actual perspectives as possible.⁷ One can not claim to be impartial or objective unless there has been a genuine attempt to achieve a "meeting of minds."

In contrast to the "going up" model which suggests that autonomy is achieved through an intra-subjective process, the "going out" model suggests that striving toward impartiality, or objectivity, is an inter-subjective, interactive reasoning process. Neutralizing the determining influence of others merely by travelling upward in one's own mind is inevitably treacherous because often the determining influence of others is most prevalent within one's own mind. By contrast, and paradoxically, the way to neutralize the internal determining influence of others is by forcing oneself to test those perspectives against the viewpoints of actual others. This precludes the possibility of a Pyrrhic victory, or what, in Critical Thinking circles, is referred to as an illegitimate "straw person" manoeuvre, i.e., the underestimation of the strength and wisdom of perspectives that are radically different from one's own. It is only by forcing ourselves to test our judgments against the strongest

⁷ John Stuart Mill lends strong support to this inter-subjective view of impartiality when he argues, in his treatise *On Liberty* that the only way we humans can gain a broad understanding of any issue is by seeing it from as many perspectives as possible.

... the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism and Other Writings* (New York: New American Library, 1962), p. 146 (italics added).

possible actual opposition that, as far as is humanly possible, we can claim to have neutralized our biases.⁸

What is at stake?

We live in a world in which the points of contact between disparate perspectives seem to be dwindling to non-existence. We live in a world in which too many adults role model intolerance of differing viewpoints. We live in a world in which the terror of the fragility of one's own ideology is so profound that scrutiny through a critical eye from an outsider is considered insulting, and from an insider, blasphemy. Yet we live in a world in which the confidence in the infallibility of those same ideologies is so strong that many are willing to die in their names and to take others with them. We live in a world in which the very possibility of striving toward autonomy — that disposition that is uniquely possible for self-conscious entities — seems ever more seriously threatened.

It is no mundane cliché to say that wars are only won by winning the minds of the people. But winning minds does not mean convincing others that we are right and they are wrong. That which divides people can only be transcended by all concerned seriously attempting to tackle the issues that divide them in an impartial way. Peace may very well be the payoff for such interactive thinking. As valuable as peace is, however, it is nonetheless only a potential indirect consequence. The prime value of interactive thinking is that through it, and only through it, is autonomy possible. It is how individuals are, as it were, “reasonably” born.

There is thus no sacrifice in genuinely communicating with your enemy. There is no risk in “articulately listening” to those with whom you radically disagree. In fact quite the opposite is true. There is a huge risk if you do not genuinely communicate, if you do not “articulately listen” to those with opposing viewpoints, and that risk is the loss of yourself.

⁸ In critical thinking terms, this is referred to as being prepared to estimate “global sufficiency”. Establishing global sufficiency requires first that all contenders are scrutinised for weak or fallacious reasoning (the estimation of “local sufficiency”), and thereafter that all the remaining contenders be compared in order to estimate the least worst option, i.e., the one that is the least weakened by a possible counterexample.

The message

There are many possible ways whereby an individual might develop the disposition to continuously test his or her beliefs, attitudes, and judgments against the strongest possible opposition. Engaging reading material that contains a wide range of differing opinions, either by accident or by design (education), might be one way. Actually participating with an open mind in multiple cultures might be another. Alternatively, one might be exposed to the exhilaration of challenging contrasting viewpoints through participating in multiple Communities of Inquiry, which is the central pedagogical tool⁹ at the core of the educational initiative entitled Philosophy for Children.¹⁰

Regardless of the potential paths, however, surely the key ingredient to maintaining one's enthusiasm for engaging in interactive thinking which, importantly, may very well threaten one's own short-term best interests, is to clearly understand what is at stake. The following message, therefore, needs to be heard.

⁹ Mill lends powerful support to this pedagogical tool when he argues that it is critical that exposure to varying perspectives be real rather than imaginary, i.e., that in order to benefit from the multiple viewpoints of others, those viewpoints cannot be artificially contrived by the teacher, or through examining text books. Individuals must have the opportunity to listen to those with whom they disagree, to empathize with their perspectives, and to genuinely see the issue as those others see it. Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of; else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty. Ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this condition; even of those who can argue fluently for their opinions. Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false for anything they know: *they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them, and considered what such persons have to say*; and consequently they do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess. *Ibid*, pp. 163-164 (italics added).

¹⁰ The Philosophy for Children Program was established by Matthew Lipman and his associates at IAPC (The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children), which is associated with Montclair State College in New Jersey. See, for example M. Lipman, A.M. Sharp and F. Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).

You ought to strive toward impartially because your biases may not be your own. If you value autonomy—if you want to be your own person—then you must be not only prepared but, indeed, eager to test your points of view against the strongest possible opposition.

You must remember that, if you wish your judgments to be respected as something more than sheer personal bias, whether in science, in ethics, or in the practical matters of every day life, you must be prepared to follow a process that maximizes the possibility of objectivity. You must remember that, if your claims are not subjected to a process of this sort, you have no grounds whatsoever for asserting that those claims ought to be viewed as the best of all competing positions. You have no grounds whatsoever for making the claim that they are anything more than personal whim, and you have no claim whatsoever to demand respect for those views.

If your beliefs and opinions survive continuing interactive impartial inquiry, they are worthy of being held and espoused, and you, in turn, are worthy of the dignity of being deemed an autonomous being. This is confidence both in yourself as a thinker and in the content of your thoughts that is deserved, not artificially endowed; this is self-respect that has been self-anchored and self-earned, a situation which will ensure its stability and endurance. This is the best that you can do. You ought to be at peace with that.¹¹

Postscript

As it turns out, then, freedom and determinism are not the antagonistic, mutually exclusive positions that they are often portrayed to be. Indeed the possibility of any kind of freedom depends, both literally and conceptually, upon the actuality of many layers of determinism. The fact that physical objects move according to physical chemical laws is the foundational position of determinism, both conceptually and existentially. However, animate beings, precisely because they are also determined by the stimulus environment in which they move, are—to a great or lesser extent—freed from the universal determining power of physical-chemical laws (e.g., they can move up hill). On still another level, symbolically interacting, self-conscious

¹¹ This message forms the foundation of the text *Thinking Your Way to Freedom* (Vancouver, B.C.: Capilano College, 2003) written by Dr. Gardner for the Critical Thinking classes.

entities, precisely because they are also determined by the values that they introject from other symbolically interacting entities, are—to a great or lesser extent—freed from the determining power of behavioural laws. And finally, linguistically interacting self-conscious entities who, through a willingness to strive toward impartiality by genuinely engaging in interactive reasoning, i.e., are prepared to be governed by the rules of reasons, are—to a great or lesser extent—able to free themselves from the determining power of social influence and, in so doing, make autonomy and its existential counterpart, individuality, possible.

Self, Philosophy, and the Community of Inquiry

Pauline Enright (University of Tasmania)

Introduction

As a new subscriber to *Critical & Creative Thinking*, I recently read with interest Clive Lindop's article on 'Self-Identity' (Lindop, 1998) from a previous copy lent to me by a colleague. Lindop effectively discusses self-identity to demonstrate the process of progressive philosophical thinking and reasoning. It struck me that as well as holding perennial philosophical interest, the topic of 'self' is important to educators generally, and to advocates of the classroom Community of Inquiry particularly. When children engage in the classroom Community of Inquiry, they learn to be good inquirers, to become reflective, tolerant, and so on. They learn to listen to others, to become aware of each other's points of view, and consequently to understand each other more. The capacity to relate is improved, and more open-minded, discerning individuals are likely to result. Improved relationships mean improved self-concepts, as noted by Splitter and Sharp:

Given the extent to which each person's own sense of self is dependent on her relations with others—not just human others—it follows that the path towards a truly fulfilling self-concept is one which moves inexorably in the direction of global connectedness and community (Splitter & Sharp 1995), p. 245.

The benefits which can flow from the internalisation of qualities such as respect, care, tolerance, and so on, affect the individual no doubt, but the effects can also be far-reaching and make a difference on a large scale.

The topic of 'self-identity' (or personal identity) holds ongoing interest for educators and philosophers, frequently appearing in Philosophy for Children literature. Given the inherent complexity of the human subject, and the mysteriousness of the human condition, it is likely to be a

topic that is never quite definitively resolved. Educators are aware of the role of education to a child's developing self-concept, and, as pointed out above, the Community of Inquiry is of particular significance. While we find it easy to accept the importance of these influences on a child's development, the question of precisely how these influences work is more complex. Some philosophical approaches to the self are helpful in illuminating this issue.

To my mind there are two key aspects to the attainment of self-concepts: the achievement of 'subjective unity', and the engagement in 'objective relations'. By this I mean: conceiving oneself as a single, more-or-less united, experiencing individual with a first-person perspective, and developing and maintaining the capacity to relate to other similar experiencing individuals. These are the two key aspects to being a 'self'—perceiving oneself as *being* a self, and as being a self among other selves with whom one has relations. And it is here that the Community of Inquiry plays a key role. The kinds of activities which take place in a Community of Inquiry are precisely those which foster the developing self-concept in the ways just described.

Self-concept development begins in infancy and continues in one way or another throughout life. Depending on their positive or negative impact, experiences can either enhance or damage the developing self-concept.¹ The Community of Inquiry can be a positive force in two ways. First, through the practice of reflective thinking and communal discussion, thoughts which may initially be disconnected are expressed, and through discussion become connected and coherent, thereby contributing to a more coordinated and integrated sense of self. Second, networks of meaning are created in community with others, that is, through communicating with and relating to other developing selves, rather than through isolated thinking. Respect for others and for their points of view is increased, and relations with other selves consequently strengthened. Because the processes of self-integration and other-integration occur in tandem, the sense of self and the sense of other are mutually

¹ This is not to suggest that self-concepts are permanently subject to or dependent on 'external' influences, only that such influences are significant, especially early in life when 'inner resources' are still being developed, and therefore, less influential.

intertwined, ultimately resulting in the kind of global connectedness referred to earlier.

By elucidating the concepts of 'internal unity' and 'external unity', the following discussion of philosophical approaches to the self provides a theoretical context for understanding the process of self-formation. Some traditional views of the self are first outlined, and followed by consideration of four approaches which, from different perspectives, address the issues of internal and external unity. These approaches are then considered in light of the Community of Inquiry process.

Contemporary Approaches to the Self

In his article on 'Self-Identity', Lindop refers to Descartes, Locke, Hume and Sartre. Interest in the self goes back further than these thinkers of course, to at least Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, and in more recent times to thinkers such as Maddell, Noonan, Parfit, and Unger,² and many others who have attempted to come to grips with this still contentious issue.

At one end of the spectrum are the neo-Humeans who hold reductionist views of the self, the most radical of which is considered by many to be Derek Parfit.³ For Parfit, selves are no more than sets of causally connected mental states with no causal role outside of and independent of these states. Accordingly, reference to 'subjects of experience' is linguistic only, and does not refer to substantial subjects in their own right. For Parfit, there is no such thing as a 'self' or similar central ground of experience in human individuals. Among its many difficulties, this view has ethical problems,⁴ and also is unable to explain 'self-unity'—that is, the unity and coherence of mental states within a single subjectivity.

At the other end of the spectrum are neo-Cartesians, such as Richard Swinburne, who hold dualist conceptions of the self. On Swinburne's view, persons consist of two distinct

² See, for example: Geoffrey Maddell, *The Identity of the Self* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981); H. Noonan, *Personal Identity* (London: Routledge, 1989); Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and P. Unger, *Identity, Consciousness and Value* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

³ See Parfit (1984).

⁴ Such as the problem that (according to Parfit) without a central self in which to ground identity, I may no longer be responsible for my previous actions—crimes included—as it may not have been 'me' who committed them, but a former person who no longer exists.

and independent parts, body and soul, the soul being the part to which all mental properties belong.⁵ The dualist view is also fraught with problems, such as the impossibility of the solipsistic subject,⁶ to mention one of many.

Personally, I do not find either of the above approaches helpful in elucidating the nature of the self or personal identity. 'Dissecting' persons into bits by means of unlikely thought-experiments (which is where the above types of theory tend to begin) may be a useful starting point for investigation into the self, but is too remote from ordinary life to be useful as an end-point. I believe a more useful approach is to consider human persons as complex units, and to explore what it means to be an experiencing subject. Persons are not simple structures, nor are they an assemblage of theoretically separable parts. Persons are complex structures, composed of parts, each of which is indissolubly linked to other parts. The structure looks 'inward' and 'outward'. It looks 'inward' to its own parts, and to the relations between them. It looks 'outward' as a single structure to its relations with other objects. The process of self-formation is the process by which this structure is achieved. Selves form as thoughts, memories, experiences, and so on, are united into a single subjectivity over time, and experienced from a first-person perspective. Selves relate to other selves by looking outward as more-or-less united units to their relationships with other selves. Understanding the nature of self, then, is not so much a matter of asking about how parts of a person can be separated, but more one of understanding how these parts fit together, and how they achieve 'internal' and 'external' unity.

The Self as Single Subject—Internal Unity

The notion of the 'united subject' began with Immanuel Kant, and has been addressed by other thinkers since. For Kant, subjective unity begins with mental unity, but Jeff Malpas has argued more recently that its source lies in intentional, embodied action.

⁵ See Swinburne (1984).

⁶ That is, the subject who has knowledge about the world in a mind *independent* of the world of which the knowledge is about. The solipsistic subject has developed language and concepts about the world while remaining independent of the world. Because language and concepts are essentially social, this is not possible. (This of course refers to normal human beings, not divine beings such as angels).

In responding to Hume's scepticism about the self, Kant claimed that a united subjectivity was a necessary condition of experience, and thus that selves of some form must exist. The very fact that humans experienced the world was proof enough. But for Kant, the self was essentially cognitive, in that it is the function which unites experiences *semantically*, so that they make sense to the person having them. For experiences to have meaning requires that thoughts and experiences need to be joined up to each other in the right way. A single thought on its own would make no sense, as thoughts gain meaning, not just from their own content, but from their place in a larger network of other thoughts and experiences. Hume's 'bundle of experiences', or more recently Parfit's 'causally connected mental states', are insufficient to achieve cognitive unity, as they have no uniting principle to ensure that thoughts and experiences are joined up *in the right way*. It is not just a matter of having bundles or chains of mental items, but of having principles which ensure they are correctly combined. For Kant, only a self can provide these principles. Two conditions are necessary: the mind's synthesising activity, which ensures that mental states are coherently connected to other mental states, and a single subject, in whose mind the synthesising activities can occur.

'Synthesis' refers to the various operations of the mind, in which thoughts are conceptualised and connected to other thoughts, past and present, to produce the meaning of the particular thought occurring at the time. In Kant's words:

By *synthesis*, in its most general sense, I understand the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge. (Kant, 1929: B 103)

Unlike many of his predecessors, Kant realised that experience of the external world is a joint effort of objects 'out there' and the mind 'in here', rather than the immediate, passive reception of sense impressions. The mind has to do some work so that experience is coherent and intelligible.

Synthesis must occur in the mind of a single, experiencing subject, which has conscious awareness from the first-person perspective. Mental states need to be referred back to a single, unitary consciousness—a single 'I'. Experience thus requires that thoughts be connected up inside a single mind, and make sense to a single subject, from a first-person perspective. As Kant famously put it: "Without

the 'I think' experience would be nothing to me." (Kant, 1929: B 132) And the 'I' that thinks must be a single I, which is aware of itself, and aware of its experience as being a single experience inside a single mind:

In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all *mine*. For other-wise I should have as many coloured and divers a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself. (Kant, 1929: B 134)

I am conscious of the self as identical in respect of the manifold of representations that are given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all *my* representations, and so apprehend them as constituting *one intuition*.⁷ (Kant, 1929: B 135)

So, it is in having experience that we become self-aware, and conversely, it is by being self-aware that we are able to have experience. The very fact that experience occurs entitles the claim that selves exist, as only selves can *have* experience. Without the first-person perspective there would be no experience, as there would be no-one having it. And because the first person perspective is provided only through self-awareness, then having experience means having a self. Kant's claims about the self are formal only, and say little else about what the self might be.

Since Kant, many have thought that cognitive unity has not been fully explained. The question remains as to what *underpins* cognitive unity. Why and how, for example, do the various thoughts and experiences become united in the particular way that they do? In pondering this question, Malpas agrees with Kant that mental unity is linked to self-unity, that is, the making sense of experience by a single consciousness. (Malpas, 1999: p. 89) Unlike Kant, however, Malpas claims that self-unity is not *prior* to mental unity, but that both arise jointly out of experience. Malpas also claims that underpinning mental unity is *intentional, embodied action*.⁸

⁷ An 'intuition' for Kant is a single datum of raw experience; a 'manifold' is a group or multiplicity of sense impressions which have been processed by the mind to produce an experience, such as colour or shape.

⁸Two important points: first, the reverse does not follow. Clearly, a creature can be capable of embodied action while having little or no mental life; second, this claim is not negated by the fact than some persons may be immobile due to injury. Such persons have already engaged in a three-

According to Malpas, subjectivity or self-awareness does not exist prior to experience, because it is experience which provides the possibility of a 'united subject'—that is, a subject that is able to comprehend and process experience. For it is only experience that can furnish the concepts and links required for experience to make sense. It is only in the 'making sense' to a single subjectivity that we get the notion of a self in the first place:

The integration of thoughts, memories and experience, and of mental life in general, is a necessary condition for the possession of such thoughts, memories and experiences. In cases where one cannot attribute to a creature any set of mental states that exhibit even minimal consistency of content and attitude then one cannot attribute any mental states to that creature at all. The appropriate integration of mental states is thus a prerequisite for the identification of a creature as having a mental life of its own. For particular states to be understood as belonging to an individual subject is for those states to exhibit an appropriate unity or integration. It might be tempting to suppose that the integration of states at issue here is something brought about through the operation of the subject upon those states, and this might also be thought to be the basis on which states 'belong' to a particular subject. Such a supposition is quite untenable, however, and the integration of states cannot depend upon or be brought about through those states being operated upon by some previously established and independent 'self'. (Malpas, 1999: p 97)

So while the self is a necessary precondition of experience, it arises only out of experience. The act of uniting experiences—necessary for them to make sense—is the act by which the self is formed.

The unity at issue here is not causal unity (such as neurons firing in the brain), but semantic unity, unity of

dimensional world, and thus their capacity for experience, even when immobile, is tied to their understanding of movement and spatiality. If it were possible—which I doubt—to have a person who had never intentionally moved at all, such a person may gain an understanding of spatiality by watching others. Were it possible to have a person who had neither never intentionally moved, nor interacted with other persons or objects through their senses, I doubt that they would be a person at all. (We are, of course, as above, speaking of ordinary persons and not angels or other divine beings.)

meaning. Coherence of thought is derived from the holistic character of mental states—the fitting of them together in a network of meaning. Unity of thought is unity of content, derived from the realm to which the thoughts belong, not from a solipsistic subject. I could not know the meaning of ‘it’s raining outside’ unless I also know the meaning of rain, and the meaning of ‘outside’, which also requires that I know the meaning of ‘in here’, and that requires knowing where my body is, and indeed that I *have* a body.

Action in the world requires certain abilities, such as the ability to appreciate oneself as an object⁹ among other objects, having the ability to affect those objects, and having an awareness of that ability.¹⁰ This in turn requires a grasp of ‘spatiality’, that is, the awareness of oneself as a three-dimensional object in a world of other three-dimensional objects, located in particular places, and spatially related to each other. Unless we can appreciate ourselves as objects in space, with other objects also existing, we would not understand what experience was about. There is thus an integral connection between the self, spatiality, and agency, or, as Malpas puts it, between the subjective and objective elements of experience:

So in establishing the necessary connection of self and content with spatiality and agency, a connection is also indicated between these concepts and the concept of objective space, and more generally, with the idea of objectivity. What is thus starting to appear is a structure in which subjective and objective elements are interconnected and interdependent. It is on the basis of this structure that thought and experience are possible. (Malpas, 1999: pp. 99-100)

Because self-unity concerns unity between the subjective and objective elements of experience, self-experience is thus more than mental experience, it is also embodied experience, and relational experience. Thus the capacity for cognitive unity is inevitably linked to having a body, living in a three-dimensional world, having the capacity

⁹ ‘Object’ here is used in a general sense, and includes persons and events as well as physical or material objects.

¹⁰ For example, having the ability to act, and having an awareness of that ability is important, as unless I could move my fingers in a certain way, and to know that I could so move them, I would be unable to lift a cup to my lips to take a drink.

to intentionally act, and to relate to other creatures and objects also existing in that world. Correspondingly, selves are not isolated mental entities, but are acting, embodied, relational creatures, living in a three-dimensional world.

Internal Unity and the Community of Inquiry

From the above we understand that an integral link exists between the achievement of semantic unity and the formation of self. The need for semantic unity is also present in the Community of Inquiry. At the heart of the inquiry process is the need for coordinated thinking, the putting together of thoughts and ideas into cohesive sequences within the Community and, correspondingly, within the minds of those taking part. As the group engage in inquiry and discussion, synthesis—the process of concept-formation and meaning-making—takes place within the group between the various members, at the same time that thoughts become coordinated and connected to other thoughts inside individual minds. While the topics addressed may sometimes begin in fantasy, as discussion progresses they become connected to the ordinary three-dimensional world of everyday life, to which children can relate and with which they can identify. Given the relevance of cognitive unity to self-unity described above, it is easy to perceive how the engagement of children in the Community of Inquiry process contributes to more enriched self-concepts.

Indeed, John Dewey saw the need for sequential, coordinated thinking. With coordinated thinking becomes reflective thinking, leading to logical conclusions. Unlike aimless thinking, which is random and unconnected, reflective thinking is systematic and orderly. Reflective thinking makes meaning by connecting and integrating thoughts, aiming them at some desired end:

...Each phase is a step from something to something—technically speaking, it is a *term* of thought. Each term leaves a deposit that is utilized in the next term. The stream or flow becomes a train or chain. There are in reflective thought definite units that are linked together so that there is a sustained movement to a common end.
(Dewey, 1933: pp. 4-5)

While certain signs may indicate a particular state of affairs, only reflective thinking and inquiry can produce the reliable evidence needed to confirm whether or not such a

state actually exists. (Dewey, 1933: pp.11-12) The cultivation of reflective thinking requires, in the first instance, the right attitudes of mind, such as open-mindedness and curiosity. (Dewey, 1933: pp. 31 and 36) Reflective thinking also requires the teaching and (because children are great imitators) the modelling of appropriate skills by a competent teacher. (Dewey, 1933: p. 59) Among other things, these skills include logic, observation, inference, and judgement. (Dewey, 1933: pp. 102-131)

Similarly, Lipman sees the importance of children developing the ability to make their own logical connections, rather than have everything pre-packaged for them, leaving no room for their own endeavours. In understanding how the process of 'synthesis' contributes to self-unity, we can more clearly understand how formulating one's own connections is not just a matter of acquiring cohesive knowledge, but also of contributing to the processes of self-unity and, consequently, to the process of developing richer, more consolidated and integrated self-concepts.

The Self as Social Subject—External Unity

Intimately connected with the internal unity of the subject is the external unity of the subject's relations with others. These forms of unity, as suggested earlier in referring to the work of Malpas, are of course not separate forms of unity, but are related to and contingent on each other. The importance of relationships to self-formation is acknowledged by many philosophers and thinkers. Writing in the late 19th to early 20th century, philosopher and social psychologist George Herbert Mead recognised that relations between human individuals were crucial elements in the processes of self-formation. From a different perspective, Martin Buber drew similar conclusions, in that he saw that the relations between the individual 'I' and the individual 'you' were essential to the formation and experience of self.

Mead's concern was with individuals as social, biological entities, relating to other similar entities. He held that selves are formed *through* this relating—selves are essentially social beings. Mead does not deny the importance of 'thinking', but sees it as conversation with oneself, much as one would have conversations with others. When thinking occurs, we have a kind of interior dialogue with ourselves, in which the self relates to itself as 'an object'. A kind of reasoning occurs between the 'I' and the 'me'. (Pfuetze, 1961: p. 48) This process

begins in infancy as the child responds to and models himself on those around him. Mead notes that this modelling is not imitation, but occurs because the child's own self-awareness is tied to and emerges from his reaction to the way that others respond to him:

The child fashions his own self on the model of other selves. This is not an attitude of imitation, but the self that appears in consciousness must function in conjunction with other selves. The child's consciousness of its own self is quite largely the reflection of the attitudes of others towards him. (Mead, 1982: p.54)

As the child develops, his self-awareness increases both to the degree to which he relates to and recognises other selves and to which constant actions and interactions take place. The developing individual responds in kind to the stimulation which he himself receives. This recognition of and response to the other is intimately tied up with what happens to oneself. It is, in fact, in the very act of responding to the other that one becomes aware of; not only of other selves, but also of one's own self:

The tendency of one to respond to his own stimulation is the material out of which he builds up consciousness of others and of self. When we recognize selves, there is a by-product of direct social responses. The by-product is the tendency to respond to one's self which is transferred and goes to make up other selves, giving them an interior. There is in consciousness the response to a social stimulation, out of which response one builds up other selves. (Mead, 1982: p. 61)

Over time, the consciousness of one's responses to others builds up, forming an interior life. Our subjective life and self is thus imported from our social life. It is not solitary, solipsistic, or isolated. Selves come into being through the social process of one person 'absorbing' the attitudes of another, responding to them, and engaging in the mutual chain of action and reaction which follows. We initially experience ourselves by being reflected through the group of others with whom we interact. Self-awareness is integrally tied to the degree to which others respond to us. Each person reshapes the world in some sense and transmits it to others for their approval or otherwise, and through doing this

experiences his or her own self as essentially a self existing among others. (Mead, 1982: p, 73)

Buber also appreciated the value and role of relationships to self-formation. Writing from a European, Jewish and essentially religious perspective in the early 20th century, Buber's interest lay in working out the meaning of relations between human individuals and between humans and God. Of particular interest to him was the first to second person relation—the me to you, or the 'I' to 'Thou'. This special relation between individuals allows selves to exist—to come into being.

Relationships are fundamental to human life. For Buber, two types of relationships are possible, impersonal and personal. The former is mechanical, functional and objective. The latter is empathetic, respectful and subjective. Neither relation is 'good' or 'bad', but together form the tapestry of human life and relationships, and may change from one to another according to circumstances. (Pfuetze, 1961: pp. 141-142)

Impersonal relationships arise when people or things are treated as objects, or as 'Its'. The realm of 'Its' is a realm of objective relations, of me to things, things with boundaries, things which border on other things. They are in a sense superficial, and I am not changed by them; there is no mystery in 'Its', or participation; there is just 'information' accumulating, piling up, without contemplation, without response. (Buber, 1955: pp. 53-57)

By contrast, personal relationships occur when persons¹¹ are encountered directly, and treated as a 'Thou', that is, as one person to another, as me relating directly to you, 'I' directly to 'Thou'. This is more than 'dealing' with someone; it is the feeling of another through oneself. Selves come into being through this personal form of relating, as it is the direct acknowledgement of the other as a 'Thou' that allows selves to exist (Pfuetze, 1954: pp. 141-143) It is through the personal encounter, through mutual recognition, that this too happens:

When I confront a human being as my You and speak the basic word I-You to him, then he is no thing among things nor does he consist of Things. He is no longer He or She, limited by other Hes and

¹¹ Objects can be treated personally also, such as a tree when it is considered to have a special value, such as being 'sacred'.

Shes, a dot in the world grid of space and time, not a condition that can be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. Neighbourless and seamless, he is You and fills the firmament. (Buber, 1970): p. 59)

In the relationships through which we live, the innate You is realized in the You we encounter: that this, comprehended as a being we confront and accepted as exclusive, can finally be addressed with the basic word, has its ground in the a priori of relation. (Buber, 1970: pp. 78-79)

Treating other persons with respect and mutual recognition, as if they are persons *like us*, with a finite life, and all that that implies, invokes a shared sympathy, a sense of oneself as a self related to another similar self. It is only in the encounter with another that I become a self. Selves are thus *interpersonal*, not isolated. They are literally born from relating to each other and having mutual understandings. Selves face each other, they stir each other, are changed by each other. A kind of mutual empathy between selves says 'I know what it is like for you'.

External Unity and the Community of Inquiry

The key claims of Mead and Buber are that selves do not develop in isolation, but through relations with others, in groups, and between individuals. This fact is appreciated by many child-development theorists and educators. Child psychiatrist Daniel Stern has studied early infancy extensively, claiming that the child's emergent sense of self develops through relationships and interactions with the world around her.¹² Stern presents powerful arguments for the existence of a primitive or emergent sense of self at birth, and possibly even earlier, which develops, becoming 'self-organised' (and only later self aware) in tandem with the infant's experiences and relationships. Because young infants are 'preverbal', behaviour, especially gestures, are studied, producing remarkable conclusions. From a very young age—around nine months—infants are capable of intentional communication:

The most straightforward and common examples of intentional communication are protolinguistic forms of requesting. For example, the mother is

¹² See Stern (1985) for a delightful and informative cover of early infant development.

holding something the infant wants—say, a cookie. The infant reaches out a hand, palm up towards mother, and while making grasping movements and looking back and forth between hand and mother's face intones, "Eh! Eh!" with an imperative prosody (Dore, 1975). These acts, which are directed at a referent person, imply that the infant attributes an internal mental state to that person—namely, comprehension of the infant's intention and the capacity to intend to satisfy that intention. Intentions have become shareable experiences. *Intentionality* becomes a reality. Once again, it need not be self-aware. (Stern, 1985: p. 131)

Communication, then, is not only an important aspect of a child's self-development, but is also a precursor to self-awareness; and through the process of *attunement* (the process of cross-modal mirroring—see Stern, 1985: pp.138-161), is essential to the *possibility* of self-awareness developing at all. It is thus not surprising that relationships are fundamental to of the continuing development of self-awareness and to the development of a healthy self-concept.

Self-concept development continues throughout life, formal education being an important factor in the early years. When children have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the process of their education, self-concepts are exposed to opportunities for enrichment, and, depending on content, to become more morally aware. As Lipman notes, the classroom Community of Inquiry can be a place where traditional social institutions are scrutinised, and where, rather than taking accepted values for granted, their true meaning can be discovered through dialogue. (Lipman, 1988: pp. 119-120) Conversations with others enable the understanding of different viewpoints to one's own—and, where appropriate, their integration—making for more democratic individuals and, correspondingly, a more democratic society. Education for good citizenship will not be achieved by merely transmitting received wisdom from one generation to the next, as this does not allow for the diversity and pluralism which democracy entails:

... in a democratic society, committed to pluralism and diversity, no one set of values can be taught at the expense of other sets of values, without infringement on someone's constitutional rights (Lipman, 1988: p. 48)

Like other skills, the teaching of values requires openness and cooperation, and the opportunity to inquire, reflect, criticise and correct. While the teaching of all subjects benefits from such an approach, the ambiguity of values makes values education especially conducive to the process of inquiry and reflection. In particular, when inquiry reaches the stage of metacognition, children are better able to reflect on the far-reaching consequences of certain actions, and are thus better able to judge the moral status of those acts. (Lipman, 1988: pp. 81-82) The communal nature of the classroom Community of Inquiry provides the ideal setting for such inquiry and judgement to take place. Through engaging with and relating to others, a diversity of views can be considered, thus leading to a more reasonable and cooperative sense of oneself as a self among similar others.

The value of communal inquiry to the formation of 'the democratic character' has been noted in more recent times by Gilbert Burgh. In his article (Burgh, 2003), Burgh explores the various benefits of 'education for democracy', through training such as participation in a Community of Inquiry, and 'democratic education', in which students participate in varying degrees in the decision-making of their own school. While citing the respective merits (or otherwise) of each approach, Burgh notes that true democracy requires more than the conveying of the dominant culture to students as if it is beyond question. It rather requires "a certain process in decision-making" and a "theory of education that is not at odds with its own democratic theory". (Burgh, 2003: p. 19) The teaching of philosophy in schools provides the ideal format in which critical inquiry and reflective thinking can take place, especially in relation to areas which might be considered contestable or controversial:

The potential of reflective inquiry in the classroom to tap into students' ability to deal with difference and diversity cannot be overstated. Philosophical inquiry encourages such a process. (Burgh, 2003: p. 21)

While Burgh concludes that a developmental approach, encompassing elements of both theory and practice, is best, he places the emphasis for producing democratic citizens on correct training, agreeing with Lipman that the "fostering of democratic dispositions is necessary to democratic life, more so than the preparation of so-called good decision-makers." (Burgh, 2003: p. 27)

It is precisely in the engagement with other selves like one's own, such as occurs in the Community of Inquiry (and hence, in the 'community of equals'), that the fostering of good, critical judgement, alongside tolerance and acceptance of difference, can take place, and the development of more open-minded individuals can be promoted.

Observation of Community of Inquiry sessions often bear out the above claims. A report of a recently observed session by teacher Sue Stack demonstrates the process of mutual inquiry and resultant improved understanding. In her report (Stack, 2003: p. 2), Stack notes that when asked about the rules, the children offered (among others) the following:

- No put downs
- Give your opinions—all opinions are valued
- Agree/disagree with idea not person
- Listen and take turns

These rules appeared to prevail throughout the session. Stack noticed that as the discussion progressed, children who were uncertain were helped to express themselves by others and by facilitator Jenny Morgan. Children clearly articulated both their agreements and disagreements with each other, giving their reasons for doing so. While the discussion (about perception) initially appeared uncoordinated and meandering, as it progressed the students began to link the various contributions, integrating them into a new and lively understanding of the topic:

All the meandering earlier—the different threads, the longwinded examples—now reappeared in the debate as students began to integrate and refer to earlier conversation, continually building. I began to notice some students taking the role of pulling things together, others giving concrete examples, others asking questions with angst, while others imagining new possibilities. Together they were creating a very rich discussion that spiraled into increasing understanding as they really tried the different ideas on. Each student played a valuable role and pushed the conversation to places where it couldn't have gone if they were alone. It was like a dynamic system creating new emergent properties—in this case it was emergent understanding. So this was what a community of inquiry was all about, I thought. (Stack, 2003: pp. 6-7)

This example of children reaching new understanding through their own efforts exemplifies the value of learning in community with others. Through the flow of offerings and interactions, an enhanced appreciation of the topic was reached, one which was beyond any likely individual achievement. Students themselves appreciated the value of mutual interaction, as evidenced by their comments when interviewed by Stack:

What I like about Philosophy is that we get to share our opinions and use our brains—something we don't do in other classes. (Grade 5 boy)

I talk over the ideas in philosophy with my Mum. She likes it—she says it is the only time she gets to think. (Grade 5 girl)

When I asked whether they found themselves using these skills, like when they were looking at things on the street, they told me how it was better if someone else was there—“you really need others to discuss it”.

They all said how they have come to appreciate each other more “you know what they are thinking.” Even when they are drawing you know they are listening and thinking. You get a better sense of them. You get to talk about it afterwards.

They were very considerate of each other and their opinions as I debriefed them. The language they used to describe what they liked was about ‘sharing my opinions’ not ‘telling my opinions’—again and again they reinforced that it was important to have other people involved. The Philosophy for Children program is called P4C—the 4C's of philosophy—caring, critical, creative and collaborative. It was evident that all of these were happening and that the children valued them. (Stack, 2003: pp. 3, 4, 10, 11-12)

The above first-hand reports support the view that learning with, relating to, and interacting with others, contributes to an appreciation of a ‘communal’ sense of oneself, especially in the early years of life when self-concepts are still in their infancy. In the above example, it is in particular the interpersonal interaction of the Community of Inquiry which has allowed this awareness to develop.

As well as increased sympathy towards others, Stack's interviews also showed that the children appreciated how their philosophy sessions helped them individually, especially

when it came to developing areas in which they had previously felt inadequate:

One of the very articulate girls explained how she has learnt to think aloud. How she started off not being confident at all but now she is using her brain all the time and the thoughts come a lot easier. Another said how determined she is to solve the topic, just using your mind to work it out. All of them agreed that they had thinking skills now that they didn't have before. (Stack, 2003: pp. 9-10)

Comments such as these demonstrate how the Community of Inquiry contributes to producing more competent individuals, and consequently healthier, enriched self-concepts. When engaged in classroom Community of Inquiry sessions myself, I found similar comments being made, such as:

I now know how to think better, how to put different ideas together. (Grade 3 girl)

I like listening to others' ideas because it helps me to think of some. (Grade 3 boy)

I understand more what the consequences of decisions means, and why we have to think about them first. (Grade 6 girl)

In encountering each other, both as individuals and as members of the group, participants develop not only a better understanding of others, but also of themselves. As their improved self-understanding feeds back into the discussion, appreciation and understanding of others correspondingly increases, as selves are reflected through other selves and the world is 'reshaped' and re-transmitted, enhancing the experience of oneself as a self among others. (Mead, above) And in treating other persons with mutual recognition and respect—as persons *like* us, we experience a mutual sympathy, an understanding of each other, only realisable through facing and encountering each other as equal and similar individuals, who have concerns like us, and which therefore matter *to* us. (Buber, above)

Conclusion

As a topic of perennial interest, self-identity has intrigued philosophers, educators, and others alike. The importance of education, and experience generally, to the development of healthy self-concepts and the spirit of 'global connectedness' is recognised by adherents to the Community

of Inquiry. Bringing philosophical considerations to bear on the issues involved in self-formation and experience helps unpack and illuminate how the Community of Inquiry is of influence. Engagement in dialogue, together with critical and reflective thinking facilitates the achievement of internal self-unity, pointed to by Kant and Malpas as necessary to self-awareness and self-experience—indeed to the capacity for any experience at all. Through the sharing of ideas, thoughts initially disconnected and meandering become coordinated and semantically linked, providing a sense of consolidation and integration—a healthy backdrop for continuing inquiry into unresolved issues.

At the same time, the sympathetic and social nature of the Community provides an ideal environment for the flowering of communal and interpersonal relations with others, noted by Mead and Buber to be an essential aspect of self-concept formation. The interchange of ideas in the spirit of cooperation and mutuality promotes shared understanding, tolerance and empathy, while the inquiring and reflective processes allow prevailing norms and values to be brought under rational scrutiny. In taking into account attitudes other than one's own, more democratic and open-minded individuals are likely to result. While not all Community of Inquiry sessions, especially in the initial stages, produce the same positive outcomes referred to above, knowing the value of what is possible, and usually achievable with persistence, facilitators (thankfully) are willing to persevere, as they realise that the aim of improved individual self-worth, and the achievement of the spirit of 'global connectedness', are worthwhile goals, and importantly ones which are inevitably intertwined.

Bibliography

- Buber, Martin (1970). *I and Thou*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Burgh, Gilbert (2003). 'Philosophy in Schools: Education for democracy or democratic education.' *Critical & Creative Thinking*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 18-30.
- Dewey, John (1933). *How We Think*. Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company.
- Friedman, Maurice S (1955). *Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue*. New York: Harper & Row.

- Kant, Immanuel (1929). *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Lindop, Clive (1998). 'Self-Identity—explorations in philosophic method.' *Critical & Creative Thinking*, Vol.11, No. 2, pp. 1-8.
- Lipman, Matthew (1988). *Philosophy Goes to School*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Malpas, Jeff (1999). *Place and Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mead, George Herbert (1982). *The Individual and the Social Self*, ed. D. L. Miller. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Parfit, Derek (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Pfuetze, Paul (1954). *Self, Society, Existence*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Splitter, Laurence and Sharp, Ann (1995). *Teaching for Better Thinking*. Melbourne: ACER Press.
- Stack, Sue (2003). *Philosophy for Children—learning how to think together—a classroom experience*. Tasmania: Holistic Education Network, HENT@bigpond.com
- Stern, Daniel N. (1985). *The Interpersonal World of the Infant*. United States: Basic Books.
- Swinburne, Richard (1984). 'The Dualist Theory.' In Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, *Personal Identity*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Practicality in Philosophy for Children¹

Jennifer Bleazby (University of New South Wales)

Philosophy for Children (hereafter P4C) doesn't facilitate practicality and this is a serious problem for any pedagogy, especially one that claims to facilitate critical thinking, thoughtful action and democratic citizenship. By practical, I mean the testing out of ideas, knowledge and methods and their subsequent application to actual situations. I agree with John Dewey's claim that this notion of practicality is an essential attribute of the inquiry process itself. In theory Matthew Lipman agrees with Dewey. However the pedagogy of P4C contradicts his theoretical position. P4C requires the practising of inquiry skills in the classroom Community of Inquiry, but it doesn't require their application to concrete situations and nor does it require the testing and application of knowledge. As such, P4C implies that the development of thinking skills and the construction of ideas, theories and meaning in the COI is purely cognitive and theoretical and doesn't include practicality.

In this paper, I will explore the educational consequences of this problematic position. In particular, I believe P4C's exclusion of practicality means that it can't properly facilitate the development of good thinking, democratic citizenship, thoughtful action and meaningful learning. I will also offer an explanation of P4C's problematic position, which I believe results from the notion of Philosophy it assumes. By exploring the nature and source of this problem I hope to provide a framework for the future construction of a solution.

¹ I would like to thank Philip Cam for reading and making invaluable comments on this paper.

Practicality and the Development of Critical Thinking and Meaningful Learning

According to Dewey, inquiry is the weighing up and evaluating of alternative ideas (solutions) so as to find out which ones can be applied to problematic situations in order to render them meaningful. The evaluation of ideas requires that they be tested under controlled conditions, so that their consequences can be experienced, as opposed to just imagined or discussed. This is because Dewey accepts the pragmatic principle, which states that it's the practical consequences to which an idea or concept leads that establishes its meaning. Thus, for Dewey, experimentation is an essential aspect of the inquiry process itself, as we must critically reflect on our actions so as to make connections between them and their consequences, and evaluate whether they bring about desired consequences. The process of making connections is what Dewey calls reasoning (Dewey, 1916: p. 145). However Dewey maintains that it's only when ideas are applied to problematic situations that the situations are transformed into meaningful experiences, and the ideas made successful and meaningful. Thus, for Dewey, no judgment can be made about the meaning of an idea until it has been tested, and final judgment must be withheld until the idea has been purposefully applied to the concrete situation for which it was intended (Dewey, 1938: p. 114).

Lipman also accepts the pragmatic principal, stating that "to stop the idea from becoming a meaningless abstraction, [we must] consider how to demonstrate its practical bearings" (Lipman, 2003: p. 208). Consequently, Lipman must also accept Dewey's claim that inquiry involves practice. Lipman suggests this view by claiming that "the dialogue in a community of inquiry is aimed at practical results, such as settlements, determinations, decisions or conclusions. All of these are *judgments*." (Lipman, 2003: p. 111) He implies that judgments should be applied and that they are the products of "skilfully performed acts" (Lipman, 2003: p. 211). Since Lipman believes that application provides meaning and purpose and thus is the basis of judgment, he must also agree that application itself involves critically reflecting on one's actions and making connections between them and their consequences. As Lipman states:

When, however, practice comes to be permeated with critical thinking, so that we reflect critically on what we do before, while, and after we do it,

mere practice becomes self-correcting practice and self-correcting practice is inquiry (Lipman, 2003: p.49).

Thus, like Dewey, Lipman agrees that all inquiry involves practice and that informed practice is itself inquiry. As such, he explicitly rejects a dualism of theory and practice (Lipman, 2003: p. 201).

However the pedagogy of P4C contradicts this theoretical position. While the COI requires the weighing up of alternative solutions and ideas through communal dialogue, there is no emphasis on the practical testing of these ideas as part of the inquiry process itself. Furthermore, while Lipman stresses the importance of making judgments in the COI, he makes no recommendations for the application of judgments to the real world as a part of the COI. P4C's pedagogy implies that inquiry is a cognitive process that ends with judgments and that while thoughtful actions will automatically follow, they are not part of the inquiry itself. This is problematic because, as Lipman and Dewey argue, thoughtful action and informed practice are inquiry. Furthermore, if practicality is an essential aspect of all thinking, then it's not possible to fully facilitate the cognitive, rational aspect of thinking independently of practicality. This is why Dewey compared classrooms to laboratories and insisted that students test and apply their thoughts and ideas to actual situations as a part of the learning process (Dewey, 1916: 162).

As the meaning and value of ideas are determined by their testing and application, students need to test and apply them in order to construct meaning and gain understanding. P4C implies that mere discussion and consideration of the practical application and use of ideas, concepts and thinking methods is sufficient to render them meaningful for students. However this repeats the mistake of traditional schooling, which is often accused of transmitting abstract, irrelevant and meaningless facts, which students do not know how to use and thus don't understand. Lipman recognizes and criticizes this traditional practice, but in practice he repeats it through excluding experimentation and application in the COI.

Furthermore, if students have no understanding of the practical consequences of ideas and methods, those methods and ideas will have no value to them. If methods and ideas have no value to students, then they will not care about them

and feel motivated to improve and develop them. This includes the COI procedures, as well as the ideas, concepts and methods that are the objects of inquiry. Thus, practicality is important for motivating students to improve and develop their thinking and to co-operate in the construction of knowledge. As Lipman himself states, “students would think better if they could be provided with conditions that would encourage the application of their thinking to the world in which they lived” (Lipman, 2003: p. 208).

Practicality and the Development of Democratic Citizenship

One of P4C’s strengths is its ability to facilitate the development of democratic citizenship, without resorting to the indoctrination that frequently characterizes traditional civics education. P4C facilitates the development of the types of attitudes as well as the social, affective and thinking skills necessary for good citizenship because participation in the COI necessitates the practising and development of them. The COI embraces Dewey’s flexible ideals of democracy by promoting a free and equal exchange of diverse perspectives, open-mindedness, and dialogue guided by reason, as well as care for others and the procedures of inquiry (Dewey, 1916: pp. 83-85). However, in order to fully value and develop such skills students must be able to apply them in real situations. This reflects the current trend in civics and citizenship education towards education for *active* citizenship, which claims that students must practice their citizenship in the community in order to learn it. (Saha, 2002: p. 2)

Practising citizenship is important because the classroom COI is a very controlled and, in a sense, artificial community, not necessarily reflective of real communities, but rather an ideal of what we desire them to be. Thus, any ideas and methods constructed in the COI will need to be altered to accommodate other members of society and the actual contexts in which they will be applied. As Dewey explains, it’s our social nature which gives rise to inquiry, because when we interact with others in different contexts we are exposed to different viewpoints, experiences and methods, which force us to critically reflect on our own beliefs and thinking (Dewey, 1938: p. 46). This is why Lipman’s pedagogy necessitates social interaction. However, even if the COI is ideally diverse, if students aren’t exposed to the

diversity and contingencies of reality, they may develop an uncritical, unreflective acceptance of certain modes of thinking and beliefs. These ideals may be so ingrained by the time students leave school that they will lack the attitude and ability to reconstruct them. This is the very type of citizen P4C rightfully aims to overcome. Thus, if our aim is to educate for social reconstruction, as it should be, and clearly as both Dewey's and Lipman's aim is, then students must constantly be exposed to the diverse community outside the classroom.

Furthermore, by not allowing students to go out into the greater community and make actual changes, P4C makes the mistake of traditional civics education, which seemingly values students "for what they will become". (White and Wyn, 2004: p.1) According to this view, students must acquire certain skills and knowledge because one day they will be able to apply them in real situations. However they are not currently mature enough to apply them and thus are of no current value to society. Such pedagogies devalue young people and contribute to their common tendency to feel useless, powerless, and dependent on others for guidance and information. (Pearl, 1978: pp. 18-20)

Owen argues that this problem derives from traditional education's acceptance of the narrow, legal definition of citizenship, as someone who can vote, sit on a jury, run for parliament, etc. (Owen, 1996: p. 21) However, I contend that it is the result of an ideal of autonomy as independence and self sufficiency, which is opposed to dependency and community. Autonomy is then taken as the criterion for full citizenship. Thus, as Iris Marion Young argues, even people who have legal citizenship often don't have full citizenship and opportunity for social participation, such as the unemployed and full-time mothers, who are seen as dependents. (Young, 1995: p. 549) However, Owen is right to claim that any notion of citizenship which excludes young people

pushes us toward redundant pedagogies that focus on training people for future roles, rather than equipping them with skills and understandings that can and must be given expression immediately (1996:21).

My contention is that P4C rejects the notion of autonomy and citizenship as requiring self-sufficiency because it supports the view that independent thinking is

developed through communal thinking and thus our development of autonomy is dependent on our interaction with others. To quote Lipman:

Unfortunately, autonomy has often been associated with a kind of rugged individualism: the independent critical thinker as a self-sufficient, cognitive macho type, protected by an umbrella of invincibly powerful arguments. In reality the reflective model is thoroughly social and communal (2003: p. 25).

As such, P4C's conception of autonomy isn't opposed to dependency. Consequently, those who are considered particularly dependent, such as young people and children, aren't denied autonomy and citizenship. However, by excluding student participation in the decision making processes of their community, P4C also implies the contradictory viewpoint that students are merely apprentice citizens with nothing currently useful to contribute to society. Thus, if P4C's aim is to educate for active, autonomous citizenship, students must be viewed as valuable, active citizens. As Roger Holdsworth argues, this requires giving them roles of value that have a real affect on the decision-making processes of the society in which they live (Holdsworth, 2000).

The exclusion of young people and children from participating in the decision-making processes of their society also violates Dewey's criterion for democracy, which promotes a free and equal exchange of all perspectives. Children and youth make up a large, diverse group, whose democratic exclusion is illegitimate. As Roger Holdsworth states, in a democratic society "[s]tudents have the *right* to participate in decisions that affect their lives." (Holdsworth, 1996: p. 27, my italics) The most immediate decisions affecting young people are those concerning school governance and curriculum, from which they are generally excluded. Holdsworth points out that this is the reason why traditional civics education seemed contradictory, as students were told the value of democracy, equality and inclusiveness, yet "the school organization marginalized the exercise of student roles in the 'democracy of the school.'" (Holdsworth, 2000: p. 351) According to Gilbert Burgh, Dewey also seemed to overlook this contradiction because his student-centred Laboratory School didn't necessitate student participation in the organization of the school, nor within the

greater community. (Burgh, 2003: p.113) Burgh also criticizes P4C for “educating for democracy” while not promoting “democratic education”, which would involve student involvement in school governance and encourage student participation in real issues which affect them. (Burgh, 2003: pp. 111-113)

White and Wyn argue that since young people are excluded from participating in the development of youth policies, such policies often fail to represent and incorporate the values of the very people they are about (White and Wyn, 2004: p.2). Rather, they are constructed solely by adults from a very different generation. Unlike previous generations young people today live in an increasingly technological, multicultural society, where the nuclear family is far less predominant, and they are more likely to have both parents working. Adults can't speak on behalf of youth and children based on their own experiences as youth, as their experiences are outdated. Besides the fact that young people and children have a democratic right to participate in the construction of policies and systems which affect them, their participation is necessary in order that such policies and systems be relevant and affective. Otherwise young people will have policies, laws, and systems imposed on them, supposedly for their own good, which they may or may not understand, agree with or value. This could explain the very poor political literacy and lack of interest in their communities exhibited by many young Australians, as reported by the Civics Expert Group in 1994. One would expect students to disvalue and rebel against ideals and values which are authoritatively imposed on them, especially if they are imposed on them by another generation. This is hardly conducive of active citizenship.

The Source of the Problem

So far I have argued that practicality is essential for facilitating autonomous, active, democratic, citizenship; for meaningful learning and understanding; and for the development of reflective thinking and thoughtful action. As already mentioned, Dewey argues that practicality is an essential element of all inquiry—a claim with which Lipman agrees. It seems strange then that he would exclude it from the classroom, especially since Dewey embraced it. However, this difference between Dewey and Lipman could result from Dewey's emphasis on experimental, scientific inquiry as an ideal model of thinking and Lipman's emphasis on the

theoretically orientated methods of philosophical inquiry. Lipman connects reflective thinking to the discipline of philosophy, as philosophy has a well established discourse and tools (e.g. logic) for critically discussing and thinking about thinking itself. Thus, he questions Dewey's aligning of scientific inquiry with thinking.

The problem is that thinking may be no more a natural ally of science than democracy is. The difference is papered over in *How We Think*, but the fact is that for many students of the matter, reaching all the way back to Plato, excellent thinking is conceived of as philosophical thinking (Lipman, 2003: p. 36).

While Dewey's ideal of scientific inquiry is particularly practical, traditionally philosophy is stringently theoretical. As Lipman himself explains, there is reluctance from those in "... pure philosophy to cross over in support of a branch of philosophy prepared to get its hands dirty dealing with the practical issues of life." (Lipman, 2003: p. 43) Although this attitude has gradually changed, there is still an underlying assumption that philosophy is theoretical, and like pure maths, its abstractness is considered to render it superior to other disciplines. Even though Lipman is critical of "pure philosophy" (after all P4C is applied philosophy), the pedagogy of P4C partially accepts this ideal of philosophical inquiry through its exclusion of practicality.

I agree with Lipman's claim that the highly reflective and metacognitive nature of philosophical inquiry makes it the ideal model for an education centred on thinking. However, I also agree with Dewey's claim that philosophy should be reconstructed so as to incorporate practicality. (Dewey, 1916: p.328) Arguably, philosophers rarely, if ever, actually test and apply their theories, some of which might be considered to be impossible or highly problematic if ever actually applied. Lipman and Dewey agree that philosophy, like all inquiry, derives from uncertain or problematic experiences which require practical solutions so as to render them meaningful. The uncertainties of philosophy are found in "widespread social conditions and aims". (Dewey, 1916: p. 331) Hence, philosophy must construct actual solutions to real problems, which means they must be tested and applied. We can, therefore, concur with Dewey that philosophical solutions involve changing people's "emotional and intellectual dispositions", particularly of young people whose

dispositions are not yet determined (Dewey, 1916: pp. 331-332). It makes sense that Dewey describes philosophy as a “general theory of education”, because it is in schools that such changes are made, and thus that philosophical solutions can be tested and applied (Dewey, 1916: pp. 323-332).

Conclusion

The facilitation of meaningful learning, good thinking, thoughtful action, active, democratic citizenship and intelligent experience, all of which are interconnected, is only possible if students are able to practice their ideas, knowledge and methods through experimentation and thoughtful participation in their schools and communities. A reconstructed P4C program could facilitate such learning experiences. However, this requires that P4C adopt the type of reconstructed notion of philosophy Dewey prescribes; one which involves connecting philosophy to actual social problems and constructing solutions that could be tested or applied. Otherwise P4C will repeat the mistakes of traditional education which dichotomises thought/action and theory/practice. The detrimental consequences of such dualistic thinking are summarized by Dewey.

Thinking which is not connected with an increase of efficiency in action, and with learning more about ourselves, and with learning more about the world in which we live, has something the matter with it just as thought. And skill obtained apart from thinking is not with any sense of the purpose for which it is used... And the information severed from thoughtful action is dead, a mind-crushing load... We speak, legitimately enough, about the method of thinking, but the important thing to bear in mind about method is that thinking is method, the method of intelligent experience in the course in which it takes. (Dewey, 1916: 152-153.)

Bibliography

- Burgh, Gilbert (2003). ‘Democratic Education: Aligning Curriculum, Pedagogy, Assessment and School Governance.’ In Cam, Philip (ed.) *Philosophy, Democracy and Education*. APPEND/UNESCO, pp. 101-120.
- Civics Expert Group (1994). *Whereas the People: Civics and Citizenship Education*. Canberra: AGPS.

- Dewey, John (1916). *Democracy and Education*. New York: The Free Press.
- Dewey, John (1938). *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. New York: Henry Holt & Company.
- Holdsworth, Roger (2000). 'Schools that create real roles of value for young people'. *Prospects*, Vol. XXX, No 3, pp. 349-362.
- Holdsworth, Roger (1996). 'What do we mean by student participation?' *Youth Studies Australia*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 26-28.
- Lipman, Matthew (2003). *Thinking in Education* (Second edition). Cambridge University Press.
- Owen, David (1996). 'Dilemmas and opportunities for the young active citizen.' *Youth Studies Australia*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 20-23.
- Pearl, Arthur (1978). 'Toward a general theory of valuing youth.' In Arthur Pearl, Douglas Grant and Ernst Wenk (eds.), *The Value of Youth*. Davis: International Dialogue Press, pp. 17-30.
- White, R. and Wyn, J. (forthcoming 2004). *Youth and Society*. Oxford University Press.
- Young, Iris Marion (1995). 'Mothers, citizenship, and independence: A critique of pure family values.' *Ethics*, Vol. 105, No. 3, pp. 535-556.
- Saha, Laurence J. (2002). 'Education for active citizenship.' In Joseph Zajda (ed.), *Society and the Environment: Teaching SOSE*. Melbourne: James Nicholas Publishers, pp. 1-13.

Not in my classroom: a Response to the *Values Education Study*

Leif Larsen (University of South Australia)

Introduction

In July 2002 the Commonwealth Minister for Education, Science and Training, the Hon Brendan Nelson MP, commissioned a values education study with the unanimous support of all Australian state and territory ministers. The study was undertaken by the Curriculum Corporation and was designed to:

- Enable schools to develop and demonstrate current practice in values education;
- Provide an informed basis for promoting improved values education in Australian schools; and
- Make recommendations on a set of Principles and a Framework for improved values education in Australian schools (*Values Education Study*, p.1).

A little over twelve months later a report was produced detailing the investigation undertaken, including research in almost seventy schools nationwide and what the report describes as “a comprehensive literature search” (p.1) (more on the alleged comprehensiveness of this literature search later). From the report a *Draft National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* was developed which, it is assumed, will form the basis of a nationwide approach to values education in our schools in the not too distant future.

As a primary school teacher, philosophy graduate and enthusiast of Philosophy for Children this greatly disturbs me. In this paper I will outline why I am concerned about the state of values education in schools, how the *Values Education Study* both highlights and contributes to this problem, and what I think ought to be done about it.

“Not in my Classroom”: The Problem of Moral Relativism

I first became uneasy about values education in schools while teaching fourth year education students about to embark on teaching careers. Their degree included a compulsory subject in their final year incorporating, amongst other things, some focus on values education and, in particular, whether a relativist view of morality is defensible or feasible.

More often than not students came to this course purporting to be constructivists, consistent with the South Australian curriculum and the dominant pedagogy in education today. What has become apparent to me and many of my colleagues is that the so-called constructivist approach to values espoused by many students is little more than a kind of relativism which conveniently absolves students from making moral judgments of any kind. At university and perhaps in society generally, students have been taught that it is wrong to make judgments. This is an assertion I hear with disturbing regularity in my tutorials. It leads to an almost pathological reluctance to judge a belief or action as wrong, particularly if it is a belief or action that might be deemed as culturally derived. Despite this apparent relativism, students nonetheless continued to make moral judgments on a regular basis when it suited them. How can this be, I wondered? How can a class full of willing moral ‘judgers’ purport to be moral relativists?

This leads to what I have called the “not in my classroom” problem. When confronted with attitudes or behaviours they found objectionable, these pre-service teachers denounced them by claiming that they are inappropriate or have no place in their classroom, rather than making any explicit moral judgment. This enables them to maintain their veneer of moral relativism while avoiding difficult or objectionable issues. When challenged as to why this is the case, these pre-service teachers could provide no coherent or consistent belief system to justify their position, instead appealing to authority or consensus by falling back on what is legal or “acceptable” in this country or what is promoted or discouraged in the state curriculum. At best, they argued that some views or actions are too controversial and might cause “offence” and are thus inappropriate in the classroom. In other words, students have the right to say and do as they please at home or in their own communities, but “not in my classroom”.

I therefore set out, as an introduction to the part of the course that dealt with values, to try to determine where my students really stood in relation to moral relativism. I began by giving the class a short quiz in which they were asked to say whether they thought the following actions were morally permissible *in the countries in which they were practised*:

1. Japanese whaling practices
2. Hindus not eating meat
3. Milk-fed veal raised for slaughter in the USA
4. Muslim dress codes for women
5. Arranged marriages for Indian women
6. Cutting off the hands of thieves
7. Female circumcision
8. Honour killings

Students were then asked to say whether or not the same actions would be morally permissible *if they were practised in Australia*. While there were a few dissenters, the views of the students were startlingly similar: the first five actions on the list were generally considered morally permissible in the countries in which they are currently practised but they were not considered to be morally permissible in Australia. Students were quite upfront in justifying their views on the grounds of cultural relativism. When it came to the last three actions, however, the students were almost unanimous in rejecting them as morally impermissible irrespective of where they were practised. When challenged, students tended to rely on some sort of limited harm principle to condemn these actions, overriding any concerns they may have had for cultural sensitivity or self-determination in the process.

How can this be, I asked them? Is right and wrong culturally relative, or are there such things as moral absolutes? The more we delved into this question the more the students struggled to try to maintain some consistency in their justifications. For example, many sought to downplay the harmful effects of arranged marriages and compulsory dress codes (especially for women) so they could cling to cultural relativism as their overriding justification. Where things became really interesting was when students were asked why arranged marriages were not morally permissible amongst Indian communities in Australia, or why

compulsory dress codes were not morally permissible amongst Muslims in Australia. If such issues are culturally relative, then surely this is the case independent of where they live. While there was less consensus (and more confusion) on this issue, many students turned instead to what is “acceptable” or legal in Australia: cultural relativism was replaced with an appeal to authority or consensus (national or legal relativism?) as a moral justification.

What was clear from these discussions, and during the remainder of the course, was that students generally had no coherent belief system that enabled them to make consistent moral judgments. This may not surprise many readers as the same could be said about society generally. What did emerge as a surprise was that, despite the critical battering that it took during the course, students continued blithely to mouth allegiance to relativism to enable them to avoid making moral judgments while continuing to do precisely that when it suited them.

Why has relativism taken such a hold in our classrooms despite its inherent inconsistencies? Part of the problem lies with the understanding of constructivism amongst education students. Part of the problem seems to me to be that the constructivist underpinning of the South Australian curriculum is taken as gospel in education circles and is rarely, if ever, the subject of challenge or rigorous debate. Too often constructivism is poorly understood by pre-service teachers who, in turn, reduce it to nothing more than uncritical moral relativism whereby any knowledge or viewpoint “constructed” by a student, or a particular national / ethnic / cultural group, is automatically considered to be as valid as any other and thus unchallengeable, therefore avoiding responsibility for difficult moral judgments.

What's Wrong With the Values Education Study?

Is this approach to ethics exhibited by my teaching students really a problem in our classrooms? The *Values Education Study* illustrates not only that it is, but that it will probably get worse. Written within the constructivist framework, the *Study* seems to share the same confusion about values education as many pre-service teachers. To fully appreciate this confusion it is worth looking first at the literature review included in the *Study* as this reveals (or ought to reveal) the theoretical underpinning of what is happening in schools and what the Curriculum Corporation

proposes for schools in the *Draft Framework*. According to the *Study*, “while some attention has been given to teaching methods, much of the literature on values has tended to focus on issues of definition and classification, and the extent to which anyone can, or ought impose their own moral precepts on others” (p.34). It is this debate that characterises the *Study’s* review of the literature. It distinguishes between two broad approaches to values education favoured in the literature: The “character education/prescriptive approach” (p.176) and the “cognitive-developmental/descriptive approaches” (p.178). It is the old moral education debate between teaching students *how* to think as opposed to teaching them *what* to think, a debate that received some attention in the pages of this journal some years ago¹ and which the authors of the *Study* might have benefited from reading. The “character education” approach favours the instilling of a certain set of core values in students and is “based on the presumption that it is possible to identify a set of universal values, and that adults have a duty to teach these to children” (p.176), an approach associated in education circles primarily with the work of Lickona. This approach attracts the standard (and substantial) constructivist criticism that it neglects “an active student role in constructing meaning, making decisions and reflecting on their own lives, as opposed to accepting ready-made truths” (p.36).

For supporters of Philosophy for Children the so-called “cognitive-developmental/descriptive approaches” are more interesting. A range of different approaches are mentioned but most attention is paid to two: Kohlberg’s moral reasoning, and “values clarification” which, according to the *Study*, is heavily influenced by the work of Dewey (p.178). Both are given short shrift. The *Study* also refers fleetingly to “another less popular approach” to values education: “rational thinking and reasoning” whereby “students are encouraged to use logical thinking and the procedures of scientific investigation when dealing with values issues. This approach”, says the *Study*, “is based on the assumption that valuing is a cognitive process of determining and justifying facts, and the beliefs derived from those facts” (pp.178-9). Of all the approaches discussed this is presumably the one

¹ See the debate between Cam, Cresswell & Hobson and Davson-Galle in Vol 2, No 2 (October 1994) and Vol 3, No 1 (March 1995).

where Philosophy for Children fits most snugly, yet it is considered unimportant and warrants no further mention. Not only that, but no work on Philosophy for Children or community of inquiry features at all in the literature review as far as I can see. This glaring omission may contribute in some way to the confusion demonstrated by the *Study* when it comes to summarising this debate in its Key Findings from the Literature Review, by which time all cognitive-developmental approaches have been lumped together with 'values clarification' as believing that "the valuing process is internal and relative" (p.35) which clearly is not the case with many such approaches and certainly not with Philosophy for Children.

What is most interesting about this literature review (apart from neglecting a significant body of work that could and should inform this debate) is its relationship to what is actually happening in schools, as identified in the case studies within the *Values Education Study*, and the manner in which it informs the position taken by the *Study* itself in relation to values education. As stated above, the principal debate in the literature review is played out between character education and cognitive development – in other words, prescriptive versus descriptive moral education. According to the *Study*

whilst it may not have been overt in the reports they prepared, many of the schools and clusters involved in the study have effectively been playing out this debate as they search for the best way to address values education; often seeking some sort of synthesis of the two contrasting views. Such synthesis is arguably supported by the strong empirical indications that the adoption of different teaching and learning approaches is much more effective than the adoption of a single approach in isolation (p.35).

Unfortunately, this assertion is not borne out by the case studies. On the evidence presented, there is little real debate about whether schools ought to prescribe values. Rather, the debate shifts subtly to whether these values ought to be instilled in students explicitly or implicitly. This is despite most schools claiming not to be prescriptive about values. Why this apparent contradiction? The problem lies, I believe, in what schools mean when they talk and think about values education. Those of us who are advocates of

Philosophy for Children tend to believe that values education ought to be largely about providing children with the skills to make consistent and responsible moral decisions (what the literature review represents as a cognitive-developmental approach) but there is relatively little evidence of this approach in schools. On the contrary, there was an overwhelming tendency amongst the schools involved in the *Study* to see values education as a sort of school-wide social contract (similar to the sort of process of negotiation and agreement of class rules that many teachers undertake with their classes at the beginning of each year). For example, one school saw values education as being about reviewing its “current school values to ensure that they continued to be reflective of its school community and understood by students, staff and the wider community” (p.4) while another focused on “developing values as a community in order to reculture the school in line with agreed values and work towards building congruence between our values, policies and practices” (p.5).

This was a common approach. In fact, the whole purpose of the *Study* could be seen as an attempt to prescribe a set of values that are acceptable to all, to be promoted in schools and adhered to by students and school communities generally. Hence, the *Draft National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools* lists ten “shared values” that schools that took part in the *Study* generally felt ought to be promoted as appropriate. The list includes such general “values” as tolerance and understanding, respect, responsibility, honesty, freedom and social justice (p.7). The major difference in approach seems to be that the private, Christian schools are more upfront about the specific set of values they wish to instill in their students. The public schools, on the other hand, manage to maintain their apparent neutrality by prescribing a set of moral values that are so general as to be rendered almost meaningless. As one critic says, “it may be possible to achieve an appearance of consensus by sticking with an abstract list of traditional values [but] such consensus is superficial at best” (p.172). The fact that this list of shared values is being promoted by public schools and, at the same time, trumpeted as a return to traditional values by a federal Government that has been so openly critical of them in the past for being allegedly “values-neutral”, demonstrates just how meaningless it really is.

Nothing illustrates this point better than the debate about whether values ought to be taught explicitly or implicitly. On the face of it, this debate is entirely reasonable: is it more effective to teach skills explicitly, through direct teaching and practice, or to teach them implicitly through modeling and the hidden curriculum? The problem with this debate is that we are not just talking about skills. While some schools certainly reported that imparting skills is a part of their approach to values education (particularly in relation to student resilience) the major focus of the *Study* is values education as a social contract and a contract is, by its very nature, about adherence to rules. Anyone who doubts this assessment need look no further than the *Draft Framework* that defines being ethical as nothing more than “acting in accordance with generally agreed rules and/or standards for right [moral] conduct or practice” (p.7). The debate about whether values ought to be taught explicitly or implicitly reveals itself arguably as a debate about how forthright we ought to be about indoctrination of students to follow rules and/or commit to a certain set of values.

The Answer: Philosophy in the Classroom

The social contract approach may be an important part of values education for many schools but it is hardly the whole picture. What is clearly missing from the *Values Education Study* is any real understanding of, or commitment to the sort of pedagogical approach to teaching values that can be found in a program such as Philosophy for Children. If our schools are really such havens of moral relativism, where behaving ethically is seen as no more than following agreed rules or standards, how can we expect students to develop the skills required to be rational, independent, ethical thinkers and decision-makers? As Matthew Lipman has demonstrated, the ability to make consistent ethical decisions is very much dependent upon being able to reason logically, and this is a skill that needs to be explicitly taught at the primary school level.²

Again, this latter point was illustrated to me in no uncertain terms when teaching pre-service teachers. Not only did many of my students lack the ability to reason

² See Lipman's New Jersey Test of Reasoning Skills in his 1980 book *Philosophy in the Classroom*.

logically, but they often did not see the importance of reasoning, or assessing these reasons against objective criteria, when it came to making ethical judgments or decisions, hence the tendency to fall easy prey to the responsibility-free charms of moral relativism. So, if values education in schools is to play a genuine role in producing students who are better equipped as moral thinkers then the revolution needs to begin in universities. This point was acknowledged in the literature review of the *Study* which suggested that “many prospective teachers are not necessarily ready to teach values” and that “there is an increased need for an understanding of values development and the methods of values education to be included in the pre-service and in-service education of teachers” (p.174). Unfortunately, this view was not considered important enough to make it into the list of recommendations. But it is clearly an area that needs urgent attention. As educators we need to examine the way in which we teach constructivism and to think about how best to incorporate core courses on reasoning and values education into pre-service teaching curricula. Until this occurs our schools will continue to be mired in moral relativism and the “not in my classroom” problem will continue to flourish.

Bibliography

- Cam, P (1994). ‘A Philosophical approach to moral education.’ In *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol 2, No 2.
- Cam, P (1995). ‘Against indoctrination: Response to Davson-Galle.’ In *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol 3, No 1.
- Creswell, R & Hobson, P (1994). ‘Contested values and Philosophy for Children in a pluralist, democratic state.’ In *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol 2, No 2.
- Creswell, R & Hobson, P (1994). ‘The moral dimension: A response to Davson-Galle.’ In *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol 3, No 1.

- Curriculum Corporation (2003). *Values Education Study: Final Report*. Canberra: Department of Education, Science and Training.
- Curriculum Corporation (2003). *A Draft National Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools*. Canberra: Department of Education, Science and Training.
- Davson-Galle, P. (1995). 'Advocatus Diabli or Advocatus Dei? A reply to Cam, Cresswell & Hobson, and dePuig.' In *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol 3, No 1.
- Davson-Galle, P. (1995). 'Rejoinders to Cam, Creswell & Hobson.' In *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children*, Vol. 3, No. 1.
- Lipman, M., Sharp, A.M. & Oscanyan, F.S. (1980). *Philosophy in the Classroom*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Letter

Comment on Clinton Golding: 'Philosophy for Children and Multiple Intelligences'

Dear Editors,

I would like to make a comment on the article 'Philosophy for Children and Multiple Intelligences' by Clinton Golding (Vol.12, No.1). Clinton fails to recognise in his text that Gardner's so-called theory of Multiple Intelligences can not by any means be regarded as some sort of renaissance in our understanding of the learning process. Rather, Gardner's work represented a repackaging in populist form of a long-standing field of research more correctly understood as being concerned with the nature of cognition. The key to the take-up of Gardner's model was its appearance in the literature of educationalists at a time in the early eighties when progressives were in the grip of a reaction against peer-to-peer assessment and anxious to uncover a theory that advanced the notion of a universal intellectual capacity. Largely as a consequence of this ideological slant the theory of Multiple Intelligences has remained on the periphery of pedagogical theory and practice and in the majority of important texts appears only as a footnote or afterthought. This is to be regretted, as the recognition that cognition is a complex and diverse function is crucial in all areas of the curriculum. It remains to be seen whether or not Gardner's work has obscured or advanced this understanding. Nevertheless, I would have thought that proponents of Philosophy for Children would be well versed in the need for classroom programs to be innovative and inclusive of all children.

Sincerely,

Patrick Hockey
17 Morse Street
Warrnambool 3280

Bytes of wisdom for postmodern kids

Greg Smith (St. Joseph's College, Brisbane)

Exploring proverbs in the Year 9 philosophy class

Communication in our teenagers' postmodern world is characterised by the ten-second news grab, the enigmatic email, the cryptic answer phone message and the right to-the-point chat room remark. Consequently, we teachers of philosophy can find ourselves constantly inviting our students to explain, elaborate, or rephrase in other words the rather too short comments they make in philosophy sessions. Within this world of stenographics, it occurred to me that an exploration of the traditional wisdom contained in idioms and proverbs would provide grist for discussion to suit their communication style.

The following is an account and initial evaluation of a staged lesson, repeated with different groups of Year 9 mixed boys and girls from suburban Brisbane independent schools in October 2004. I have entitled it 'Bytes of Wisdom' since much of the point of the sessions from my planning point of view was to open up the treasury of common proverbs as riches of our language in stand-alone sessions. As parents of a living heritage, as sources for insight into the experience of living the examined life, and as memorable byte-sized packages, proverbs do require some unpacking. My hunch proved quite successful; the discussion was rich and informative and their learning was obvious.

For resources, I drew from a very helpful article, Marjorie H. Holden and Mimi Warshaw, 'A bird in the hand and a bird in the bush: using proverbs to teach skills and comprehension' (Holden and Warshaw, 1985) and some handout teaching materials by Janet Aaker Smith (1987). Holden and Warshaw offer observations for the English teacher on literary forms such as personification, the genre of aphorism, rhetorical devices, grammatical turns, the history and origins of proverbs, poetic language, levels of abstraction and poetic imagery in proverbs. My concern however was not to explicate the indirect statements of truth they contain, but

to plot the interpretive steps we took to reach our satisfactory meanings. I was keen to explore the polyvalence that proverbs offer in deeper meanings and symbolic references. The study of language is indeed interesting but I facilitated a search for these more philosophical skills and dimensions.

Context

To open discussion, I invited the students to consider why we might be exploring proverbs printed on the first handout sheet within the context of a philosophy lesson. The Book of Proverbs is in the bible. Surely philosophy was to be found in books, in logic, in the insights of the great philosophers? Philosophy was taught and learned, not discovered; bought in courses and belonged to the learned, wasn't it? They agreed that wisdom was not necessarily found in commercial courses, or in just getting older. Whatever wisdom counted for happiness was active reflection upon experience; that seeking wisdom was a desire to make good decisions based on reasonable responses to the options available. Socrates was right to say that the unexamined life was not worth living. The happier person was one who had gained the habit of critically and actively reflecting on experience, both his or her own experience and that of others too. I suggested that the inherited proverbs were just such bytes of wisdom, whose validity stands or falls on their relevance to particular circumstances.

Progress of session

On that basis, we proceeded to unpack some very common proverbs, seeking interim meanings in their rhetorical, semantic and immediate applications, and then to reformulate them in some more generalised statements of advice.

Along with adults listening, I was surprised with these young people's unfamiliarity with the proverbs. Some had heard some few but even fewer could not go that next step to elaborate what they might mean. Discussion round the group centred for a time on clarification and articulation, veering between particular and general, between guesses and satisfactory explanations. I was satisfied to invite, expect and affirm fragmentary and notional suggestions until the discussing community felt a firmer ground had been reached. In this process of exploring the semantics, the unusual grammatical forms and the agricultural references, they

began to break the ice in broaching this topic. It was satisfying to watch the faces light up in agreement and recognition.

My next stage was to move to work in pairs to sort through some more selections, finding matched and opposite meanings in pairs of proverbs. Matching pairs of proverbs found include: Birds of a feather flock together/A man is known by the company he keeps; People in glass houses shouldn't throw stones/The pot calls the kettle black; and Deeds not words/The proof of the pudding is in the eating. This step practised some associative thinking, some insightful comprehension and some valuable discussion in pairs. As teacher my role was merely to affirm recorded responses and discuss variations.

The next (postmodern) step was to find cracks in the wisdom. We found proverbs that contradicted one another and we questioned how this could be so. No grand narrative or continuum of revelations here! This took some effort to read, discuss and think about meanings they could glean so as to find examples of proverbs that gave opposite advice and proverbs that offered similar advice. Examples of oppositions included: Fine feathers make fine birds/You can't judge a book by its cover; Too many cooks spoil the broth/Many hands make light work; and look before you leap/He who hesitates is lost.

By virtue of associative thinking, others came to mind: 'Fortune favours the bold' echoes 'nothing ventured, nothing gained' and 'a dog in the manger' is similar to the bird who 'feathers his own nest.' Admittedly as indicated already, some teacher input quickened the rate of recall and association, but as one student remarked, after getting over the initially difficult encounter with the genre of aphorism and this poetic language, an abundance of associations then followed with greater ease. Here I also noted the non-inclusive language unselfconsciously used in this traditional and more historical material.

A more interesting and creative step was to consider proverbs across cultures. Holden and Warshaw (1985) supply some Japanese, Chinese, Hausa and German proverbs (in translation) to consider pairing with traditional English speaking ones. If more time was available and I had a more cultural orientation, we might have ventured into their social and historical contexts as a way to interpret them. As it was, we had to be content to accept surface readings. We found

that the Hebrew proverb 'When the kettle boils over, it overflows its own sides' could be echoed in the English language, 'Don't cut off your nose to spite your face' and that the German proverb, 'One ass nicknames another "Longears"' is like 'the pot calls the kettle black' in our language. This process of cross-cultural transaction, if indeed it was rather simplistic and surface rendering, did offer windows of insight for variant readings, assessing matches/mismatches and eliciting wonder and curiosity about the sources and expressions of traditional embedded wisdom.

Our fifth stage was to turn common proverbs round for surprising or comic effect. I supplied some examples found on the internet such as: 'When the blind leadeth the blind get out of the way' and 'Where there's smoke, there's pollution.' The students caught on readily enough with light humour in contributions like: 'Don't bite the hand that looks dirty' and 'Strike while the bug is close.' In the short time available and within the constraints of the day, this more creative step was not so thoroughly pursued as I hope to at another time.

Our sixth step was to read some disguised proverbs so as to recognise the common ones they contained. I am grateful to Janet Smith's materials for this step. Readers of this journal will no doubt find the so-called hidden proverbs in such as: 'Pulchritude doesn't extend below the surface of the dermis,' 'Compute not your immature gallinaceans prior to their being produced' and 'Precipitancy creates prodigality.' The scribe is pleased to make more of these available upon request. More able students, perhaps the more literary-canny ones, really enjoyed this bit of deconstructive fun, stripping away the pompous words. I was pleased that the activity led to some ready talk, some excited findings and some sense of achievement on a hot Brisbane afternoon.

Review

Proverbs are rather short enigmatic sayings containing familiar truths or wise advice. They offer a sometime fragmentary folk wisdom for living, demonstrating that our cultural inheritance can offer some richer insights about life than the media does. They can be read at literal, emotional or abstract levels. I found these byte-sized chunks of reflected-upon experience have become a neglected resource

in our schools, for most of these Year 9 students did not know many of the common ones or much about them. Perhaps the horse has bolted and it is too late to teach old fashioned axioms. I am now glad I took the bull by the horns, risking my belief that fortune favours the bold for I could never do things by halves—enough is as good as a feast.

As a facilitator of community of inquiry, I practised patience as a virtue and prevented fear giving itself wings when I trialled a pretty kettle of fish in these discussions; I believe I did not cook my own goose. I now trust that reading here about my experience others too may find that virtue is found in the middle. It may be teasing to find that birds of a feather flock together, but actually philosophers will always find the proof in the pudding of action. I invite you too to let the cat out of the bag, to share the riches of the living inheritance that we have in conventional proverbs. Sometimes the first step is the hardest and we need to cut our cloth to suit our audience. But I disproved the dictum that speech is silver, silence is golden. QED.

Exploring proverbs: A discussion plan

1. Read some common proverbs for meaning.
2. Match proverbs that have similar meanings.
3. Pair proverbs that have opposite meanings.
4. Compare proverbs that come from different cultures.
5. Change common proverbs for comic or surprising effect.
6. Remove disguised language round common proverbs.
7. Evaluation.

Philosophical Skills Practised

1. Assessing matches and mismatches
2. Realising interpretative methods
3. Including contextual cues
4. Re-rendering, rephrasing and elaborating the obvious
5. Dealing with paradoxes and contradictions
6. Seeking deeper levels of meaning
7. Normal community of inquiry skills: deeper listening, echoing others, advancing the inquiry, posing questions, appraising progress, self-correction, etc.

References

- Hawkes, Nigel (n.d.). 'Misleading messages from the horse's mouth.' *The Times*.
- Holden, M.H. and Warshaw, M. (1985). 'A bird in the hand and a bird in the bush: using proverbs to teach skills and comprehension.' *English Journal*, Vol. 3, pp. 63-67.
- Smith, Janet Aaker (1987). *Proverb Puzzle and 16 Puzzling proverbs*. Private circulation.

Connecting Concepts: Thinking Activities for Students

By Clinton Golding

Reviewed by Sarah Davey (University of Queensland)

Clinton Golding's *Connecting Concepts* is an important addition to any philosophical practitioner's toolkit. As teachers and philosophers look for new approaches to incorporate philosophy into the curriculum this is yet another useful resource to add to the collection.

Although Golding recognises that conceptual analysis is certainly not the only aspect to philosophical inquiry, he argues that this is a good starting point for both students and teachers. While grappling with concepts and their meanings, students begin to learn the skills that form the basis of inquiry. He also notes that this is a fun and engaging activity for students which can form the stepping stone of interest for further philosophical exploration.

Connecting Concepts has an easy-to-follow format with an explanatory introduction preceding the activities. In the introduction Golding maps how certain concepts included in the book could be incorporated into the curriculum, e.g., the concept of justice may be introduced into a Social Studies, Economics or Health session. The book is divided into four parts: 'How to Use a Concept Game,' 'Concept Games,' 'Extending the Use of Concept Games' and the final section which provides blackline master copies of two of the concept games for photocopying.

In 'How to Use a Concept Game,' Golding gives a clear explanation of how the concept game works. This acts as a lesson plan and details step by step how to physically set up the game and how to implement it. This section outlines both the expectations of the teacher and the student. Golding then shows how the concept game relates to a Community of Inquiry. By explaining how a Community of Inquiry should operate, Golding is outlining how discussion should be facilitated in the concept game. While a concept game could

be a stand-alone activity or incorporated into a Community of Inquiry, the same type of dialogue and thinking is required in both formats.

In the section 'Concept Games' Golding provides materials for a number of concepts to get teachers started. They include racism, justice, intelligence, mind, responsibility, rules, science, culture, art, violence, reality and knowledge. For each of the concepts Golding has included a list of cases for discussion, and a range of extension questions and activities.

The third section of the book looks at variations on the concept game. These include different formats and ways of incorporating concept games into class activities where a concept game may not have been pre-planned. There are also extension activities using the same preparation for the standard concept game, e.g., introducing necessary and sufficient conditions.

Included in the book are two concept games prepared for photocopying. While there is a small amount of preparation for each concept game by way of concept cards and a list of cases, these may be re-used in extension activities and are well worth the cutting and pasting.

Equipped with a pair of scissors, a reliable photocopier and Golding's *Connecting Concepts* educators may enter any classroom with students of any age and through the steps outlined in the book engage students in an inquiry. For those educators with a desire to incorporate philosophy into the classroom, Golding's book provides a platform for launching into further philosophical dialogue with students. These activities give both students and teachers practice in engaging with concepts, engaging with each other and engaging with philosophical ideas.

Connecting Concepts: Thinking Activities for Students

By Clinton Golding

Australian Council for Educational Research, 2003

ISBN: 0864316089

rrp: \$39.96

F A P S A

Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations

Conference 2005

Monday - Wednesday 26-28 September
St Cuthbert's College, Epsom, Auckland, NZ

PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN STRAND

Sharing Classroom Strategies and Best Practice

Keynote speakers: Philip Cam and Lynne Hinton

PHILOSOPHY IN SENIOR SCHOOL STRAND

in association with the
Philosophy Department
University of Auckland

Developing Philosophy as a Secondary School Subject

An exploration of the possibilities for this in NZ, drawing on the experience of Australians and New Zealanders who are innovators in this area.

Registration \$180, or \$100 for student/unwaged

CALL FOR PAPERS

Offers of papers and workshops to
v.kovach@auckland.ac.nz

Critical & Creative Thinking is planning a special conference issue for Vol.13, No.2 (Nov 2005). Conference papers submitted for publication will be peer-reviewed. For details on manuscript preparation see "Notes for Contributors". Please send an electronic copy by 31 July 2005 to p.cam@unsw.edu.au.

Registration enquiries to michele@lifequest.co.nz
Accommodation available at the venue at reasonable cost

ABN 74 471 866 705

NEW COURSE IN 2005

School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics
University of Queensland

PHIL7700 Philosophy and Classroom Inquiry

Specifically designed for those interested in integrating philosophy into their classroom practice, it is intended that this course be presented for the first time in June/July of 2005.

PHIL7700 is a professional development course in philosophical inquiry in the classroom that is suitable for teachers and education professionals. Though presently a stand-alone course, it will form the core of a more extensive postgraduate program leading to a Graduate Certificate and on to a Graduate Diploma in Philosophy.

COURSE DESCRIPTION

Philosophical inquiry provides a framework for integrating curriculum, teaching and learning. This course is suitable for education professionals looking to initiate and develop philosophical inquiry into their classroom practice to improve students' literacy, numeracy and higher-order thinking skills. It also offers suitably qualified teachers the opportunity to advance their professional practice and practical knowledge of philosophy.

Module 1: (a) collaborative inquiry and questioning, (b) connecting to the purpose of education, (c) connecting to curriculum and pedagogy, (d) improving student outcomes (Coordinator Dr. G Burgh, Contemporary Studies)

Module 2: topics in philosophy (Coordinator Dr D. Hyde, Philosophy)

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION PLEASE CONTACT
Dr Dominic Hyde, Room E315 Forgan Smith Building
University of Queensland (St. Lucia campus)
Phone: (07) 3365 2578
Email: d.hyde@uq.edu.au**

Buranda State School
Philosophy in the Classroom
AN ONLINE COURSE ...

Enrolments now open for Semester 1, 2005
through Education Queensland - The Learning Place

In this comprehensive, fully facilitated course, 'Learning to Think: Philosophy in the Classroom', participants will explore the development of Philosophy in Schools and learn how to teach philosophy through a community of inquiry process, in their own classrooms. The development of conceptual understandings and reasoning skills is also covered, as well as how to plan for and integrate philosophy education into the classroom.

Staff at Buranda State School, with input and advice from Dr Phil Cam, developed the course. It was funded through the Quality Teacher Program, and is facilitated by Buranda teachers.

The course is suitable for both beginners and those who wish to build on their current practice and extend their knowledge. It is a practical course with assessment being based on classroom experiences. Participants must have regular access to a class of students, preferably primary or lower secondary.

There are five modules over fifteen weeks. Each module requires approximately three hours online and three hours offline. No prior study in the field of Philosophy is needed.

Maximum number per course is 15 participants. Based on a cost-recovery model, in line with QTP's copyright guidelines, the cost per participant is \$540 (includes GST). A one hour CD of Buranda students doing philosophy is included (unavailable elsewhere).

This course is approved by the Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA).

TO REGISTER

Go to The Learning Place (<http://education.qld.gov.au/learningplace>)

OTHER TRAINING

Buranda State School offers several levels of training for individuals or schools. For more information please email the school with your details and we will contact you ktay17@eq.edu.au or phone the school (3391 5896).

Children enjoy learning at Buranda State School, 24 Cowley Street, Buranda
Q. 4102, Australia

Critical & Creative Thinking

*The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in
Education*

Renew your subscription for 2005

TAX INVOICE. NO GST APPLIES

Please renew my subscription for 2005 (Please print)

Name.....
.....

Postal address.....
.....
.....

.....Postcode.....

Email.....

Subscription cost AU\$25.00

Make cheques out to *Critical & Creative Thinking*.

Send to:
Gilbert Burgh
Critical & Creative Thinking
Contemporary Studies
University of Queensland
11 Salisbury Road, Ipswich, Q. 4305
AUSTRALIA

Critical & Creative Thinking

The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education

BACK ISSUES ARE NOW AVAILABLE TAX INVOICE. NO GST APPLIES

Name.....

Postal address.....

.....

.....**Postcode**.....

Email.....

Cost per issue: AU\$5.00

Cost of back catalogue (listed below): **AU\$40.00**

Please send me the issues below (tick box):

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.2 No.1 | <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.6 No.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.2 No.2 | <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.8 No.2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.3 No.2 | <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.9 No.2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.4 No.2 | <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.10 No.2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.5 No.1 | <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.11 No.2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Vol.5 No.2 | <input type="checkbox"/> ALL |

I enclose a cheque for the sum of AU\$.....

Make cheques out to *Critical & Creative Thinking*

Send to:

Gilbert Burgh
Critical & Creative Thinking
 Contemporary Studies
 University of Queensland
 11 Salisbury Road, Ipswich, Q. 4305
 AUSTRALIA

Journal Contents

Volume 1

Number 1 March 1993

Matthew Lipman The Educational Value of Philosophy for Children

Ann M. Sharp The Ethics of Translation

Ron Reed Reconstructing Linguistic Experience

Felicity Haynes Teaching Children to Think for Themselves

Christina Slade Pixie's Anti-realistic view of Analogy

Robert Laird Philosophy for Children in Aboriginal Classrooms

Tim Sprod Philosophy for children and Literacy

Anthony Imbrosciano Logic in Schools

Laurance Splitter *Simon* Chapter 1 a story about being the same and being different

Number 2 October 1993

Phil Guin Reflections on Karl Popper & Philosophy for Children

Matthew Lipman Unreasonable People and Inappropriate Judgments

Ron Reed Critical Theory, Post-modernism & Communicative Rationality

Helmut Schreier The Role of Stories in Philosophising with Children

Klaus Doderer Children as Little Philosophers in Children's Books

Jen Glaser Is Pixie Reasonable? Social and Ethical Themes in 'Pixie'

Martyn Maher Reflections on Philosophic Practice in the Classroom

Lyn English Using Philosophical Inquiry to enhance Mathematical Communication

David Inverarity Paint Me some Thinking

Laurance Splitter *Simon* Chapter 1 Classroom Discussion Plans and Exercises

Volume 2

Number 1 March 1994

Ann M. Sharp The religious dimension of Philosophy

for Children I

Ross Phillips A sincere word for the Devil's Advocate

Sandy Yule Philosopher culture and teacher culture

Anthony Brooker Punishment

Lawrence Parker Strategies for infusing critical thinking into a culture

Carmel Cairns & Sue Wilks A PMI on philosophy

Anthony Imbrosciano Teaching logic well

Malcolm Miller Philosophy in New Brunswick schools

Tim Sprod An attempt at evaluating Philosophy for Children

Number 2 October 1994

Ann M. Sharp The religious dimension of Philosophy for Children II

Philip Cam A philosophical approach to moral education

Roger Cresswell & Peter Hobson Contested values and Philosophy for Children in a pluralistic, democratic state

Irene de Puig Beyond knowledge moral and political education

Sue Wilks Encouraging pupil participation practical ways of establishing a community of inquiry

Christine Durham A philosophical fortune hunt

Greg Smith An experience of introducing Lisa to secondary schoolteachers

Tock Keng Lim Evaluation of the Philosophy for Children project in Singapore

Volume 3

Number 1 March 1995

Chris de Haan Deweyan aesthetics in the philosophy classroom

Terri Field Philosophy for Children and the feminist critique of reason

Nina Iulina Philosophy abroad - a Russian perspective

Sandy Yule On trusting teachers with philosophy

Peter Davson-Galle Advocatus Diabli or Advocatus Dei? a reply to Cam

Cresswell & Hobson

Philip Cam Against indoctrination - response to Davson-Galle

Roger Cresswell & Peter Hobson The moral dimension
– response to Davson-Galle
Peter Davson-Galle Rejoiners to Cam, Resselwell &
Hobson
Ann Sharp Habit in the thought of CS Peirce
Yim Pyoungkap A graceful error corrects the cave
Manuel Meglas Rosa Is Philosophy for Children useful
for the ESL teacher?
Clive Lindop Philosophy for Children and ESL
**Clive Lindop with Liz Delany, Jenny Gee, Wendy
Nestor, Ann MacNamara, Mary O'Keefe** Philosophy
comes to School
Ann M. Sharp Who owns the flowers?
Peter Davson-Galle More doggerel verse

Number 2 October 1995 ICPIC Conference Issue 1

Peter Singer Coping with global change
Ann M. Sharp Educating for global ethical
consciousness
Susan Gardner Inquiry is no mere conversation
Christina Slade Reflective reasoning and the self
Mike Pritchard On becoming reasonable
Richard Morehouse Research in Philosophy for
Children
Vicki Mackrill Philosophy for Children in Kinder and
Prep
Kathleen Davson-Galle Bare Brains
James Battye A puzzle for Jessica
Laurance Splitter Philosophy for Children Strategic
Plan

Volume 4

Number 1 March 1996 ICPIC Conference Issue 2

Robert Fisher Socratic education: a new paradigm for
philosophical inquiry
Gilbert Burgh Translating democracy into practice a
case for demarchy
Shari Popen Rethinking teaching and teachers within
communities of inquiry
Phil Guin Education for global citizenship
Mike Ross A child's belief system and security
Greg Smith Fostering community in the community of
inquiry

Lim Tock Keng & Kuna Kaliannan Reflections of teachers on the community of inquiry in their classroom

Margarete Wenzel Storytelling as embodied philosophy

Jin Whan Park Democratic citizenship education in a global community the case of Korea

Fr Stan Anih Schooling without thinking the educational curricular crisis in our time

Tim Sprod Bouncing Balls

Roger Cresswell Book Review: *Thinking Stories I & II* by Philip Cam (ed)

Number 2 Oct 1996

Carol Steiner Learning opportunities, communication and mass education

Christina Slade Conversing across communities

David Kennedy Young children's moves

Ross Phillips Self esteem and ownership of ideas

Dina Mendoca The religious dimension of Philosophy for Children

Steve Williams Learning sequences and inquiry in small groups

Roger Cresswell Demons, devils, dragons and flames harnessing sporting interests in the philosophy classroom

Peter Davson-Galle Matters of degree and kind

Volume 5

Number 1 March 1997

Matthew Lipman Philosophical discussion plans and exercises

Winifred W.H. Lamb 'A good dinner and a game of backgammon'

Clive Lindop Truth, hunches and our form of life

Dina Mendoca Reading Vygotsky

Anthony Imbrosciano Philosophy and student academic performance

Tim Sprod An historical community of inquiry

Kathleen & Peter Davson-Galle Eyes lie

Number 2 Oct 1997

Freddy Mortier Competence in children psychological,

legal, moral

Christine Gehrett The power of narrative in a philosophical community of inquiry

Marie-France Daniel An interactionist-constructivist mode for the practical education of preservice teachers in physical education

Tim Sprod Book review: *Reasonable Children* by Michael Pritchard

Clive Lindop Book review: *Thinking Stories III* by Philip Cam

Volume 6

Number 1 March 1998

Susan Gardner Philosophy for Children really works! A report on a two year study

Richard Morehouse The use of student argument skill a report on a two year study

Tock Keng Lim How to evaluate Philosophy for children

Terry Allen Being an individual in the community of inquiry

Mary Barrett Humour

Peter Davson-Galle Schools and Fools

Winifred W.H. Lamb Book review: *The philosophy of Childhood*

Lilly Hawkins Book review: *Thinking and Talking Through Literature* Colleen Abbott & Susan Wilks

Number 2 Oct 1998

Clive Lindop Self-identity explorations in philosophic method

Wendy Turgeon Reluctant philosophers: causes and cures

Tim Sprod Thinking for oneself

Leanne Parfitt Education and Thinking

John Colbeck Courage to think, to be, and to become different

FAPCA Report

Volume 7

Number 1 March 1999

Jim Burdett The community of inquiry as a means of

reducing youth suicide

Peter Davson-Galle Democracy, philosophy and schools

David Kennedy The politics of objectivity, the philosophy of childhood and dialogical education

Lola Hill Pre-service teachers' experience of the community of inquiry

Leanne Parfitt Dynamics of a classroom dialogue

Michel Sasseville ICPIC Report to UNESCO
International cooperation in Philosophy for Children

Number 2 Oct 1999

Gareth Matthews Philosophy as child's play

Tim Sprod Philosophy and Childhood

Stephan Millett The Wesley experience

Winifred W.H. Lamb TOK at Narrabundah

Greg Smith Using non-Lipman materials with Yr 9

Ross Phillips Book review: *Places for Thinking* by
Francesca Partridge & Franck Dubuc, Laurance
Splitter & Tim Sprod

Volume 8

Number 1 March 2000

Winifred W.H. Lamb Philosophy for Children and the
'Whole child'

Sue Knight & Carol Collins The curriculum
transformed philosophy embedded in the curriculum
areas

Felicity Haynes & Bruce Haynes The development of a
conceptual framework for critical thinking and
problem solving K-12

Joanna Haynes & Karin Murriss Listening, juggling
and travelling in philosophical space

Mary Barrett American philosophical naturalism in
Lisa

Laurance Splitter Teacher perspectives on Philosophy
for Children - Part I

Number 2 Oct 2000

Marie-France Daniel From talking to dialogue Greg
Smith Growing into community

Mia O'Brien Developing thinking and knowing

Brenda Cherednichenko Teaching thinking reform for

educational equity

Jin-Whan Park Teaching moral wisdom

Laurance Splitter Teacher perspectives on Philosophy for Children - Part II

Volume 9

Number 1 March 2001

Tim Sprod Aristotle, children and morality I

Matthew Lipman with Salvatore Pizzurro The Vygotsky touch

Matthew Del Nevo Philosophy is not a technology

Maureen McDermott & Christine Fox The encouragement of "reasonableness" through the practice of philosophy with children at risk.

Kevin Barry, Leonard King, Carmel Maloney & Maureen Burke Philosophy for Children and the promotion of high level cognitive talk

Clinton Golding Concept games a method of philosophical exploration

Clive Lindop Book Review: *Engaging with Ethics* by Mark Freakley & Gilbert Burgh

Number 2 Oct 2001

Tim Sprod Aristotle, children and morality II

Matthew Lipman Dramatising philosophy Jim Burdett Education and aesthetics

Sandra Lynch Encouraging students voices in school welfare policy

Seon-hee Jo & Jin-whan Park Applying P4C in Korean preschool

Chris Falzon Philosophy goes to the movies

Crystal Baulch The Seven Dwarfs and the Game of Knowledge and Belief

Clive Lindop Book Review: *Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education* by Tim Sprod

Volume 10

Number 1 March 2002

Hannu Juuso Hegel on teaching philosophy

Philip Cam Fact, value and philosophy education

Megan Laverty-Smith Teaching and pedagogy in Australian schools

Gilbert Burgh & Mia O'Brien Philosophy and education: integrating curriculum, teaching and learning

Number 2 Oct 2002

Marie-France Daniel Pupil thinking: relativistic or inter-subjective?

Hannu Juuso Hegel's influence on P4C

Clive Lindop Plato's legacy: how to do philosophy

GrupIREF Interview with Mat Lipman

Clive Lindop Book review: *Philosophy goes to the movies* by Chris Falzon

Volume 11

Number 1 March 2003

Val Catchpoole Neither doctrinaire nor relativistic: constructing a base for ethical inquiry

David Ward Making the implicit explicit: exploring philosophic method in P4C

Juliana Mercon School and philosophy: the expected and the unexpected

Lynne Hinton Productive pedagogies: the link between New Basics and P4C

Greg Smith Recognising and valuing progress in learning

Stephan Millett Thinking tools for teaching ethics across the curriculum

Cathy Douglas Including the disadvantaged: literacy through philosophy

Number 2 Oct 2003

George Vassilacopoulos & Toula Nicolacopoulos
Inquiry into hope – keynote address to VAPS, April 2003

Felicity Haynes Thoughts on hope – a response

George Vassilacopoulos & Toula Nicolacopoulos
Thoughts on Hope – a reply

Gilbert Burgh Philosophy in schools: education for democracy or democratic education

Laurance Splitter Transforming how teachers teach and students learn

Lynne Hinton Reinventing a school

Philip Cam The Question Quadrant

Grup IREF Ecodialogo: Environmental education

Volume 12

Number 1 May 2004

Matthew Lipman Philosophy for children's debt to Dewey

Ann M. Sharp The other dimension of caring thinking

Clinton Golding Philosophy for children and multiple intelligences

Tock Keng Lim Piaget-Vygotsky and the philosophy for children program

Elizabeth Finnegan What does it mean to participate in a community of inquiry and for the community of inquiry to grow

Tim Sprod Book review: *Outer Limits* by Stephen Law

Greg Smith Book review: *Philosophy Gym* by Stephen Law