Critical & Creative Thinking

About the Journal
Critical & Creative Thinking is an international journal published under the auspices of The Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations (FAPSA). The focus of the journal is philosophical inquiry with school-age students. The journal performs two roles. The first is to publish scholarly research concerning the theory and practice of philosophical inquiry at school level. These articles will appear in the *Research Articles* section. The second is to publish unrefereed reports of practice, comments on resources, suggestions and ideas about philosophising with school students and so forth, with a view to encouraging professional interchange among those interested in philosophical inquiry with school-age students.

Aim and Scope
To provide a vehicle for the communication of ideas and a forum for discussion and debate of issues concerning the practice of philosophical inquiry with school-age students.

To promote better teaching and curricular design for the development of critical and creative thinking amongst school-age students through increased understanding and use of philosophical inquiry in the classroom.

To enrich the understanding of philosophy and philosophical inquiry as well as its role in the development of good thinking and good judgment.

To increase interaction and collaboration between the academic community of scholars in universities and teachers in schools on matters of logic, epistemology, creativity, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, inquiry, philosophy of science, mind, personhood, community, understanding, learning, thinking, dialogue, discussion, and related matters concerning philosophy, inquiry and classroom pedagogy.

To promote discussion of the place of philosophy in the national and school curriculum and its infusion into the present curriculum, as well as the place of philosophy in the intellectual, creative, moral and social development of individuals.

Notes for Contributors

All contributions will be considered for publication. Research articles will be subject to the normal processes of peer-review for scholarly refereed journals, including blind reviewing by at least two referees drawn from the Editorial Committee (or from other international scholars with special expertise as necessary).
Articles should be 1.5 or double spaced in 12 point. Please keep formatting to a minimum. Use footnote citation with a list of references at the end. Tables and text in side-by-side columns should be placed in a table with 1point border.
Contributors should send their articles attached as a *Word* document by email to:
Philip Cam
P.Cam@unsw.edu.au

Letters to the Editor

It may happen that you read an article and would like to respond, but not in the form of a lengthy article. Such responses, which might simply add to a point made by the author either in agreement or disagreement, or offer an alternative view, could appear as a "Letter to the Editor." The idea is to encourage dialogue between readers and authors, in effect using the journal to create a community of inquiry.
Send all contributions to:
P.Cam@unsw.edu.au

ISSN 1325-7730

Welcome to Critical & Creative Thinking

Welcome to Volume 12, No.1 of *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education.* You will notice that the journal has undergone some changes. The new editors Gilbert Burgh, Philip Cam, and Stephan Millet will fill the shoes of previous editor and founder of the journal, Clive Lindop. Clive's place in the history of the journal is not to be underestimated. His commitment and dedication to the creation and maintenance of a journal devoted to philosophy in education has provided an on-going forum for discussion and debate on theoretical and practical aspects of the practice of engaging school age students in activities intended to develop and improve their thinking. We take this opportunity to thank Clive for his contribution and for all the hours spent putting each edition of the journal together – twenty-two to be exact, from Vol.1, No.1 to Vol.11, No.2.

In consultation with Clive and members of FAPSA, we decided that the change in editors required a "new look" *Critical & Creative Thinking.* We hope that you like what you see, but as with previous issues the proof is in the pages. This edition contains an article by founder of Philosophy for Children, Matthew Lipman who tips his hat to John Dewey, and also articles by Ann Margaret

Sharp, Clinton Golding, and Tock Keng Lim. Also included are book reviews of two of Stephen Law's popular books: *The Philosophy Gym* reviewed by Greg Smith and *The Outer Limits* reviewed by Tim Sprod, and a report by Elizabeth Finnegan on the introductory summer seminar on Philosophy for Children, Mendham, NJ, USA, in August 2003.

Notable also is the name change to *Critical & Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education.* This change coincides with and is intended to reflect recent developments in Australasia. What was once called Philosophy for Children has now grown into a sub-discipline of philosophy with its own history, traditions, and pedagogy, and incorporates what could be called philosophical inquiry in the classroom, reflective education and, generally speaking, philosophy in schools as well as related methodologies such as Socratic Dialogue.

One more change needs to be mentioned. *Critical & Creative Thinking* will now be available in May and November. We apologies that this issue is later than usual, but change is not always smooth and we have experienced delays in publication. But happily we report that no such delays will be forthcoming with future issues.

We hope that you will continue your subscription to *Critical & Creative Thinking,* and if you have any suggestions please send them to us.

Gilbert Burgh
Co-editor
University of Queensland, Australia

Subscriptions

To streamline the subscription process, subscription renewals will be due in February and will cover the May and November issues. New subscriptions are welcome anytime of the year. Please note that anyone subscribing to the journal after May will receive the May issue with their subscription, and the next issue posted in November. Renewals will then be due the following February. New subscriptions received after November will cover issues for the following year.

Back issues are available at a cost of AU$5.00 per issue, or if you order ALL of the available back issues the cost is AU$3.00 per issue. To order your back copies fill out the form included in this issue of *Critical & Creative Thinking.*

Subscriptions are now being accepted at the annual rate of AU$25.00 and paid by cheque (fill out form below). Currently there are *no* facilities for Mastercard, Visa or other credit cards. Make cheques out to *Critical & Creative Thinking* and send to:

Gilbert Burgh
Critical & Creative Thinking
Contemporary Studies
University of Queensland
Ipswich Campus
11 Salisbury Road
Ipswich, Q. 4305
AUSTRALIA
Tel: +61 7 3381 1574
Email: g.burgh@uq.edu.au

Critical & Creative Thinking

The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education

Renew your subscription for 2004

Please renew my subscription for 2004 (Please print)

Name……..

Postal address……..

……..

……..Postcode……..

Email…….

Subscription cost AU$25.00

Make cheques out to *Critical & Creative Thinking*.

Send to:

Gilbert Burgh
Critical & Creative Thinking
Contemporary Studies
University of Queensland
Ipswich Campus
11 Salisbury Road
Ipswich, Q. 4305
AUSTRALIA

Critical & Creative Thinking

The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education

BACK ORDERS ARE NOW AVAILABLE

Name…….

Postal address…….

…….

……Postcode……..

Email……

Cost per issue: AU$5.00

Cost of complete catalogue (listed below): AU$40.00

Please send me the issues below (tick box):

- □ **Vol.2 No.1**
- □ **Vol.2 No.2**
- □ **Vol.3 No.2**
- □ **Vol.4 No.2**
- □ **Vol.5 No.1**
- □ **Vol.5 No.2**
- □ **Vol.6 No.1**
- □ **Vol.8 No.2**
- □ **Vol.9 No.2**
- □ **Vol.10 No.2**
- □ **Vol.11 No.2**
- □ **ALL**

I enclose a cheque for the sum of AU$.....

Make cheques out to *Critical & Creative Thinking*

Send to:

Gilbert Burgh
Critical & Creative Thinking
Contemporary Studies
University of Queensland
Ipswich Campus
11 Salisbury Road, Ipswich, Q. 4305
AUSTRALIA

Critical & Creative Thinking

The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education

Vol 12 No.1 May 2004

Research Articles

Reports & Reviews

ISSN 1325-7730

Philosophy for Children's Debt to Dewey

Matthew Lipman, (Montclair State University)

After having been inducted into the Army in 1943, I spent my first year at Stanford University, in California. At the end of the spring semester, in May 1944, I was sent to rejoin the military at its encampment in the mountains of central California. Before leaving Stanford, however, I was invited to share a cup of coffee with my Professor of English, Carl Thomas. He was aware that I knew virtually nothing of philosophy, and so, as a going-away present, he gave me two paper-back books by a philosophy professor named Irwin Edman, of Columbia University. They were largely about a philosopher named John Dewey who had taught at Columbia for many years. I gathered that he'd emphasized practicality or, in any case, the interdependence of theory and practice. This seemed to me from my vantage point as a private in the infantry, a very sensible position to take, so I put away all thought of becoming an engineer, and planned to enroll instead, after the war, at Columbia. I would concentrate upon the study of philosophy. In particular, I would study John Dewey's philosophy. I was dimly conscious of a pressing need to examine this mysterious discipline that had remained hidden from me until I had finished my first year of college.

There I was, then, spending the summer in the very shadow of Mt. Junipero Serra, in the Coast Ranges, but hitch-hiking to Los Angeles, perhaps some 400 miles away, on the weekends. Once in L.A., I would frequent the bookstores in search of works by Mr. Dewey, and was quite frustrated at first not to find any. But then I ran across an anthology of Dewey's writings that had been published just five years previously, and bearing the portentous title, Intelligence in the Modern World.[1] It was said to have been edited by a Joseph Ratner, but I wanted to believe that Dewey himself had had a hand in the choice of the book's components and in their organization. (I've since been told that this was indeed the case.)

It was to be my last weekend pass to Los Angeles, for the entire 71st Infantry Division would be moving to Fort Benning, Ga. that coming Tuesday, in preparation for being sent into combat in Europe. (Earlier we'd been told that we were being prepared for participation in a mountain/jungle invasion of Burma.) No matter: I was extremely eager to start reading the book, so I decided to take the bus back to the encampment instead of hitch-hiking. And indeed, despite some distractions aboard the bus, I did manage to struggle through the book's first chapter and a half.

---

[1]Joseph Ratner, ed., *Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1939).

Dewey's style of writing philosophy, I realized didn't make for easy reading. I wondered if all philosophy were like this. Then I reminded myself that Edman was a philosopher, and he wrote clearly, so maybe the problem lay with Dewey.

Something else troubled me. I'd been on the alert for anything Dewey might say about practicality, and suddenly I thought I'd found what I was looking for. In the very first chapter, "Philosophy and the Education of Man," taken from his book Philosophy and Civilization, he had this to say:

> If we are really, for instance, a materialistic people, we are at least materialistic in a new fashion and on a new scale. I should welcome then a consistent materialistic philosophy, if only it were sufficiently bold, and, in spite of any attendant aesthetic repulsiveness, in the degree in which it marked the coming to consciousness of a group of ideas, it would formulate a coming to self-consciousness of our civilization. Thereby it would furnish ideas, supply an intellectual polity, direct further observations and experiments and organize their results on a grand scale."[2]

This passage is cited from a paragraph in which Dewey is talking about his understanding of the nature of philosophy. I understood it as a plea to interpret philosophy as plain-and-simple practice or, at the very least, as one part of a theory/practice relationship.

But then I read on, finished the first selection in the book and was well into the second, when I ran into this passage:

I stared skeptically at the passage. How could Dewey, the champion of practicality, define philosophy as altogether theoretical? He'd assigned a practical function to education. Why couldn't he have assigned a practical function to philosophy? The book containing that peculiar definition had been published originally in 1916. The anthology I was trying to read had been published in 1939. If the definition was an error, surely he'd had time enough to correct it!

In the years that passed since that bus trip in California, I never encountered a retraction by Dewey of that definition, although several protests have been lodged against it, if I'm not mistaken. Indeed, since Dewey seldom used italics to underscore what he was saying, I figured he must have assigned a very special importance to the definition, one which I was unable to understand. I concluded that the incoherence I thought I saw in Dewey was merely the result of my own ignorance. I couldn't believe that his failure to find a practical role for philosophy was a problem that not even he himself could resolve.

---

ii Op.cit., p. 254. The selection is taken from *John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons). pp. 11-12.

ii

When I returned from Europe, in 1946, I promptly registered in Columbia's "University Undergraduates" program, designed especially for those like myself whose studies had been interrupted by the war. (Its name was subsequently changed to "School of General Studies.") When I'd obtained my bachelor's degree, I simply continued for another two years, so that, by the spring of 1950, I was able to defend my doctoral dissertation, which I'd entitled "Problems of Art Inquiry," and which was, predictably, Deweyan in inspiration and approach. Part philosophy of art and part aesthetics, it attempted to pick up in those places where Dewey had left off, endeavoring always to strengthen the Deweyan approach.[3] The apparent inconsistency between theory and practice was never mentioned because I hadn't a clue as to how to resolve it.

Nevertheless, there were numerous themes which Dewey introduced, particularly in his very late works, that could have used a much more ample treatment then he gave them. Some of these were to appear in the metaphysics of Justus Buchler, whose approach in philosophy I greatly admired. However, Buchler's systematic works didn't begin to come out until 1951,[4] while my doctoral defense had already taken place a year earlier.

When Buchler's work did begin to emerge, my response was to greet it warmly and, rather than combing it for weaknesses, to make common cause with it. Likewise with Dewey: when I discovered aspects of his philosophy that he'd treated too lightly, even superficially, but were important nevertheless, my inclination was to try to develop the arguments in support of them, and thereby strengthen them.

It is common knowledge that throughout his long life, Dewey was aiming at the development of a Theory of Inquiry, of which the treatment in the Logic: The Theory of Inquiry,[5] one of his very late works, was only the beginning. Much of it, naturally, would be based on Peirce, or perhaps it would be better to say that the kernel of it came from Peirce. This was the notion that inquiry began with the failure of one of our key beliefs and ceased when that belief had been repaired or replaced. We were alerted to the realization that one of our beliefs wasn't working by the onset of doubt. It was doubt that caused us to reflect, to inquire. It was doubt that compelled our attitude to switch from an uncritical one to a critical one. It was doubt that forced us to begin thinking imaginatively, creatively, productively, so as to come up with a hypothesis of what could be done to make our doubt subside. Eventually, with the cessation of doubt, we could

[3] What is called "caring thinking" is sometimes of this variety—endeavoring to strengthen the thinking of another person. See *Thinking in Education, 2nd Edition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.) pp.261-270.

[4] Cf. Justus Buchler, *Towards a General Theory of Human Judgment* (New York: Columbia University Press).

[5] John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 1938).

relax, secure in the knowledge that our underlying beliefs were once again working well, and were carrying the weight we'd imposed on them.

As Dewey fleshed out the Peircean paradigm of inquiry, he portrayed us as moving dialectically from a secure pre-reflective situation, thence to an insecure reflective situation, and finally to a new and secure post-reflective situation. One of the most important keys to the Deweyan formulation was therefore the notion of *situation*, a notion that, superficially at least, appeared innocent and harmless. But many of the squabbles that arose between Dewey and his detractors were around this very notion. What, indeed, was a situation? How did it function (if it functioned at all)?

Apparently Dewey thought he could use the notion of *quality*, derived presumably from Peirce's "Firstness", as the glue that would hold all the parts of a situation together. However, he couldn't use the fairly obsolete notions of primary and secondary qualities which he had inherited from the 17th and 18th century philosophical tradition, so he proposed instead the concept of *tertiary* quality, which he ascribed to Bosanquet and possibly also to Santayana. These were qualities that were not localized. Instead, they were to be understood as diffuse and pervasive, so that situations began where their tertiary qualities began and left off where their tertiary qualities left off. They represented the moral or aesthetic character of a situation, often expressible through an adjective or an adverb, such as *dismal* or *friendly* or *sad* or *graceful*. (There was more than an echo of Hegel in these spirited psychological terms.)

As Dewey explained, in the *Logic*, it would be the tertiary quality of a situation that would guide the inquiry satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily. More than that he didn't deem fit to tell us. As a result, the theory of situations was left hanging on the notion of tertiary qualities, much as the theory of inquiry was left hanging on the theory of situations. It was a precarious conceptual architecture, and I thought I would do what I could to stabilize it. I therefore wrote a paper, 'Tertiary Qualities,' which was to serve as the centerpiece of my dissertation. It would press into service conceptions drawn from Gestalt psychology, British philosophical idealism, and French aesthetics, using them to develop a theory of metaphor based on tertiary qualities. It claimed to be able to distinguish four different types of such qualities: *physiognomic*, *transensory*, *dimensional* and *introjectory*.

At the suggestion of Lyle Eddy, another graduate student and one who was already in touch with Dewey, I sent Dewey a copy of the paper. Some weeks later, it was returned with a postcard saying simply, "I like it!" I was exuberant, and so was Lyle. He asked me if I would like to visit Dewey, and of course I accepted the unexpected invitation enthusiastically.

I've elsewhere described that visit and the correspondence with Dewey that followed it. There was little or no further discussion of the dissertation or of Chapter Three, but I felt confident that Dewey

understood what I was trying to say – and do. I went off to Paris on a Fulbright, and Dewey died before I returned. While in Europe I rewrote the dissertation so as to make it more suitable for publication. That didn't occur, however, until 1967,[6] by which time I was a professor of philosophy at Columbia.

Two more years went by, and I'd been thinking more and more about education. Not that I thought explicitly about the apparent inconsistency in Dewey's formulation of the relationship between philosophy and education. On the other hand, it never wholly left my mind. It continued to lurk somewhere in the background. Finding the solution to the problem would be my life's work.

iii

At the beginning of the 1960s, when I'd reflect upon or discuss the educational situation in the United States, I'd think of it as in many ways a troubled one, although I didn't foresee the explosiveness that was building throughout the decade and which came to a head towards the end of that period, as typified by the Columbia riots. Rereading Dewey's writings on education, I found them still illuminating, although he'd begun to put some distance between them and himself when he realized how he had been misunderstood and misinterpreted by the progressive education movement.

He needed to be able to cite a model of inquiry-based education, and the model he chose (predictably, given the wars he had been through in the 19th century between the classicists and the scientists) was the model of science education. Science was the ideal that came to his mind when he thought of inquiry, and it would be science that would "furnish ideas, supply an intellectual polity, direct further observations and experiments and organize their results on a grand scale." Such tasks weren't characteristic of philosophy: they were much more like what scientists did. If the schools taught children to do science-based inquiry, he seemed to be saying, there would be no dichotomy between educational theory and educational practice.

What about philosophy? Could it do this sort of thing? When Dewey tried imagining philosophy in the role of practice he must have had to shake his head decisively. There was no way he could imagine the philosophers of education with whom he was familiar engaging in the

---

[6] Matthew Lipman, *Problems of Art Inquiry*, published as *What Happens in Art* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967). See ch. 3, 'Tertiary Qualities,' pp. 28-44. *Physiognomic* qualities are features of the environment or situation which resemble qualities of human expression. *Transensory* qualities are qualities of space which we experience as qualities of time, and vice versa. *Dimensional* qualities are qualities of sensory modalities (e.g., color, sound, odor, taste, etc.) which we experience as if they were characteristics of other sensory modalities. *Introjectory* qualities are normally features of the environment, but are experienced as if they were features of the human. These four qualities are fundamental exchanges that account for figurative language (e.g. metaphors and similes) appearing to be more appropriate than literal language. They also help account for the fact that, in addition to critical thinking, we engage in creative and caring thinking when we perform appreciative or imaginative judgments. See *Thinking In Education 2nd Edition, op. cit.* pp. 243-260.

experimentation and the organization of nuts and bolts observations that he deemed essential to the future of education. He was thoroughly familiar with the philosophers of education of his day, and he could see that they had relatively little interest in establishing a reciprocal theory/practice relationship with the schools. Their great love was philosophy in the abstract, as it dealt with highly theoretical themes relating to education. Many of the major philosophers had dealt with these themes, and little had changed since then. The eminent philosophers preferred to distance themselves from the classrooms, whose walls were decorated with primitive drawings and whose tiny inhabitants seemed always to have sticky fingers and runny noses. No, the philosophers of education, Dewey must have concluded, neither would nor could involve their beautiful discipline in the noisy turmoil of the schools. The science educators, on the other hand, he must have thought, knew exactly what was needed.

And so, what of philosophy? What could Dewey tell us about how it was to be employed? Dewey minced no words, when he said that philosophy would be "*the general theory of education*." He meant that it was to be the exception to the rule. In every other discipline there had to be an interpenetration of theory and practice, but in the case of philosophy, not so. Philosophy, like Victorian womanhood, was to be put upon a pedestal, where it could receive 360 degrees of respect, but where it would be fully set apart from educational practice. Nowhere in his writings does he refer to the practical use of philosophy in education. It was for him, I believe, unthinkable.

Although when Dewey died, in 1952, he left behind him no samples of philosophical curricula, no specific examples of how philosophy could serve as an essential subject-area in the elementary schools, he did bequeath to us something perhaps just as valuable: a set of *criteria* by means of which we might be able to tell whether our efforts to follow his grand design were on target or misguided. In other words, implicit in his writings are pedagogical guidelines which would be applicable to any curriculum, even to those that had not yet been invented, like educational philosophy (i.e., philosophy functioning educationally, like Philosophy for Children, not to be confused with the philosophy of education.)

It is possible to arrange these criteria in two columns, the first of which lists the *pedagogical* criteria upon which Dewey insists, and the second of which lists the *substantive* criteria upon which Philosophy for Children insists:

Dewey's Pedagogical Criteria	*Philosophy for Children's Substantive Considerations*
1. Logic, philosophy and education are species of inquiry. Logic is the theory of inquiry, *philosophy is the theory of education*.	1. Philosophy has a hand in the construction of all theory, including that of education. But specifically the *practice of philosophy is the methodology of education.*
2 It is imperative that education involve students directly with the problematicity of whatever subject matter they are attempting to study. To deal directly with that problematicity is to think.	2. There is a great deal more to the instigation and fostering of thinking than just having minds encounter problems. There needs to be a teacher, a pedagogy, a community of inquiry and a curriculum. The curriculum, in turn, needs to consist of specially prepared tasks such as stories imbued with philosophical distinctions, reasonings and concepts.
3. One of the most colossal blunders in our culture is the assignment to students of refined, polished secondary texts instead of having students encounter raw, crude subject matter of experience directly so students can think for themselves.	3. Nowhere is this Deweyan point more telling than in the case of doing philosophy. As the discussion proceeds, it moves more and more in the direction of language-based inquiry and deliberative dialogue. Children need to be able to detect the philosophical ideas and reasonings that lie concealed within ordinary discourse.
4. An outline of the generation of thinking by means of the process of inquiry is as follows: (a) Pre-reflective situation (b) Feelings of difficulty or frustration (c) Diffuse problematicity (d) Doubting of what had been previously taken for granted (e) Doubting becomes questioning (f) Formulation of the problem (g) Hypothesis formation (h) Testing of alternative hypotheses (i) Revision of hypotheses (j) Application of revised hypotheses to life situations. (k) Post-reflective situation[7]	4. There is no better illustration of the difference between the Deweyan position, standing alone but including this paradigm as central to the theory of education, in contrast with the Dewey+philosophy position, in which this paradigm is at the heart of the methodology of education. The curriculum utilizes the paradigm of inquiry so that the students are able to absorb it as centrally involved in their education inquiry. They are led to absorb it by having it serve as the infrastructure of the curriculum
5. The Deweyan picture of education shows students pursuing meanings but lacking the	5. It is philosophy that provides us with the skills needed to discuss concepts, inferences,

[7] A less detailed version of the problem-solving paradigm can be found in John Dewey, *How We Think* (New York: D.C. Heath and Co., Revised Edition, 1933).

philosophical tools needed to analyze those meanings.	definitions, arguments, reasons and so on. Philosophy helps children become imaginative, creative and appreciative caring thinkers, not just critical, analytical thinkers.
6. The Deweyan pedagogy is persistently forward-looking in that it insist that positive support be given to the following: (a) *emotions*., since the enlisting of children's emotions expedites their engagement in inquiry; (b) *sociality*, since children are naturally inclined to work together. Their readiness to form a community should be encouraged, not repressed; (c) *habit-formation*, since habits are needed for the development of skills in reasoning, judgment and other aspects of inquiry; (d) *imagination*, since children's reflection and imagination tend to stimulate each other rather than cancel each other out; (e) *interest*, since children's quests for meaning are carried forward on a developing wave of interest.	6. Philosophy for Children is taught with the assistance of children's philosophical novels. These novels make use of stories having an infrastructure which, as the stories unfold, reveal a correspondence to the paradigm of inquiry. The fictional children in the stories can serve as models for the various methods of philosophical inquiry. These emerge in the classroom in the form of thinking styles: empirical, analytic, intuitive, rationalistic, phenomenological, experimental, etc. Contrary to traditional philosophy which always finds it difficult to provide illustrations for philosophical ideas, these stories in their entirety serve as ongoing philosophical examples. The ongoing novel offers a particular dramatization of the life of inquiry.

What I have tried to show is that there is no aspect of Dewey's pedagogy that is explicitly rejected or that is not reflected in the Philosophy for Children approach to elementary school education. Philosophy for Children is built unapologetically on Deweyan foundations. On the other hand, Dewey's approach, through its lack of philosophy in the classroom, experiences much greater difficulty in achieving Deweyan goals. Dewey nowhere discusses the educational use of elementary school philosophy, and while I feel certain that had he been able to examine it in action, he would have been delighted with it, this was not a controversy that could be resolved then and there. He might have mentioned it as a possibility and then rejected it, but he doesn't do even that, which leads me to think that the idea of children doing philosophy never even occurred to him. Too bad: his suggestions as to how it could be used would have been invaluable.

The Other Dimension of Caring Thinking

Ann Margaret Sharp, (Montclair State University)

Introduction

Life comes from physical or biological survival. But the *good* life comes from what we care about, what we value, what we think truly important, as distinguished from what we think merely trivial. What we care about is the source of the criteria we use to evaluate ideas, ideals, persons, events, things, and their importance in our lives. And it is these criteria that determine the judgments we make in our everyday lives.

In the second edition of *Thinking in Education*, Matthew Lipman has indicated the importance of fostering critical, creative and caring thinking in children, if one is to prepare them to make better judgments and live qualitatively better lives. He tells us that caring thinking is appreciative thinking, active thinking, normative thinking, affective thinking and empathetic thinking and then goes on to list a number of mental acts under each of these categories.[8]

Maybe it is because 'caring thinking' is not as common a term as 'critical thinking' and 'creative thinking' in everyday educational language that we stop for pause when we hear it. However when we read what Lipman says about caring thinking, we find ourselves nodding and saying to ourselves, "Yes, that makes sense. To think caringly means to think ethically, affectively, normatively, appreciatively and to actively participate in society with a concern for the common good." In a real sense what we care about is manifest in how we perform, participate, build, contribute and how we relate to others. It is thinking that reveals our ideals as well as what we think is valuable, what we are willing to fight and suffer for.

Nevertheless, one cannot help but think that there is much more to be said about caring thinking and caring practice than what Lipman suggests. Maybe the same can be said with regard to critical and creative thinking – but certainly with caring thinking we seem to be in a realm of metaphysics, as well as descriptive epistemology. Caring thinking suggests a certain view of personhood and a pedagogical process. It also suggests a particular environment for the cultivation of such thinking. I am referring to the process of communal inquiry and the democratic environment of the classroom community of inquiry. It is as if you can't have one without the other, if you are interested in cultivating caring thinking among children on a large scale.

---

[8] Matthew Lipman, *Thinking in Education*, 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 271.

What is a Classroom Community of Inquiry?

A classroom community of inquiry is a group of children who inquire together about common problematic issues in such a way that they build on each other's ideas, offer each other counterexamples, question each other's inferences and encourage each other to come up with alternative views and solutions to the problem at hand and follow the inquiry where it leads. In time they come to identity with the work of the group, as they cooperatively build meaning and commit themselves to an on-going, self-conscious reconstruction of their worldviews as the inquiry proceeds. This constructing and reconstructing of worldviews is something we are all engaged in consciously or unconsciously.

The community of inquiry, at its best, offers an immersion into a democratic and aesthetic experience that can serve as funded experience of the group in envisioning new possibilities and making judgments. The sensitivity, the appreciative discerning of parts and wholes, the imaginative manipulation of elements to construct something of harmony and vision, will be dependent on the consciousness and quality of this immersion. As we become more conscious of the social and aesthetic dimension of the inquiry process, we find that it takes on more and more meaning and we truly care about its process and its outcomes[9]

The Ontic Dimension of Care

Husserl, like Dewey, reminds us that learning is not the accumulation of scraps of knowledge. It is a growth, where every act of knowledge develops the learner, thus making him/her capable of constituting ever more and more complex objectivities – and the objective growth in complexity parallels the subjective growth in capacity.[10] But what kind of capacity is he talking about? I would suggest our capacity to care.

What we care about reveals to others and to ourselves what really matters to us. To care is the opposite of being apathetic, indifferent. Care is the source of friendship, love, interpersonal understanding, commitment, human tenderness and compassion. If the child is not cared for by its mother, it would not live out its first week. If nurturing care does not continue, the child will die. In learning how to love each human being starts from the beginning, says Kierkegaard. This beginning is the relationship between people which we call care. Though it goes beyond feeling, it begins there. It is a feeling denoting a

---

[9] Ann Margaret Sharp, 'The Aesthetic Dimension of Philosophy for Children,' *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines* (Vol. XVII, No 1, l997), pp. 67-75.
[10] See Quentin Lauer, *The Triumph of Subjectivity* (New York: Fordham University Press, l958), p. 29.

relationship of commitment and dedication, taking the ultimate form of being willing to delight in, to suffer with, or even to die for those values and persons we care about.

Such care commits one, ties one to the object. It follows that once this tie has been established some action will take place. Today in modern philosophy there is a growing awareness of the cognitive germ of all emotions and how important the emotions are for the making of good judgments. Some like Solomon and Nussbaum have argued that emotions are judgments, and if they are judgments, we should be able to give reasons to ourselves and others for why we feel the way we do. We are the judgment-making animals, but good judgment-making is as dependent on emotional maturity as it is on rational skilful thinking.

Alfred North Whitehead points out that Descartes was wrong in his thinking, "Cogito, ergo sum," and goes on to say:

It is never bare thought or bare existence that we are aware of. I find myself rather as essentially a unity of emotions, of enjoyment, of hopes, of fears, of regrets, valuations of alternatives, decisions – all of these are my subjective reactions to my environment as I am active in my nature. My unity which is Descartes' "I am" is my process of shaping this welter of material into a consistent pattern of feelings.[11]

For Heidegger, care (Sorge) is the source of all human judgment-making, willing and action. Will is not an independent faculty but a function of the whole person. When we think of the self, we think of the structure of what we care about. If I care about nothing, I lose my sense of self. If I have lost my sense of self, I also lose my sense of relationship to the world and to others. Heidegger thought of care as the basic constitutive phenomenon of human existence. Care is thus, for him, an ontological category, in that it is care that constitutes a human person as a person. Willing and wishing are not the basis for care; it is rather that they are founded on care; they presuppose that we care about something. If we really care about something, we find ourselves wishing and willing to act in certain ways. "Willing is caring made free," says Heidegger.[12] Don't make the mistake of confusing willing with wishing. Willing is the developed mature form of wishing and is rooted with ontological necessity in care. In any individual act, willing and caring go together.[13]

One of the things that make care possible is time, the fact that we are the kind of creatures who exist in time, and are conscious of our own temporality. We are the creatures who know we are going to die. It is because we are finite that we care. For Heidegger, care is also the

[11] Alfred North Whitehead, in *Alfred North Whitehead: His Reflections on Man and Nature*, edited by Ruth Narda Anshen (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 28.
[12] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 371.
[13] Rollo May, *Love and Will* (New York: Norton Company, 1969), pp. 290.

source of conscience. He tells us "conscience is the call of care and manifests itself as care."[14]

To care is always to care about something. We are caught up in our experience of the objective thing or idea or event or person that we care about. When I care, I feel I must do something about the situation. I must make some judgment. I must act. And it is at this point that our care brings our love and our willing into unity. As St. Augustine taught so long ago, "love and do what you will."

Thus, when Paul Tillich, in *The Courage to Be*, described God as one's "Ultimate Concern," he was referring to what the individual really cares about. And when the Buddhist talks of compassion, she is referring to the capacity of the person to care for another. Compassion, a feeling for someone, a capacity to feel what the other is suffering, is rooted in our capacity for care. And when Buber, in *I and Thou*, talked of God, he referred us to the intersubjective and responsive experiencing of the other as a "Thou", rather than as an "It."[15]

Care as Intentionality

Care is important because without it ethical thinking and valuation of all kinds would be impossible. With all our technology and all our wealth, there exists in our society a devastating feeling that in the end perhaps nothing really matters; that no one person can really do anything that will make any real difference in creating a better world. The threat of this kind of feeling is apathy, un-involvement, and the eventual grasping for external stimulants. If I really don't care about anything outside of my own survival, the possibility of a just society is non-existent. If no thing and no person really matters to me, the educational problem then becomes how children are to discover things that really do matter.

Caring is a particular type of intentionality that shows itself especially in our relationship with other persons. By intentionality, I mean the structure which gives meaning to experience. It is not our intentions themselves but it is the dimension which underlies them; it is our capacity to have intentions. It is our imaginative participation in the coming day's possibilities out of which comes the awareness of our capacity to form, to mould, to change ourselves and the day in relation to each other. Intentionality is the bridge between us and the object itself. It is the structure of meaning which makes it possible for us to see and understand the outside world as it is. In intentionality, the dichotomy between subject and object is partially overcome.[16]

---

[14] *Being and Time*, p. 371.
[15] Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 81-82. Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1958).
[16] *Love and Will*, pp. 224-5.

Let me give you an example. If I travel into a rural community to look for a house, the purpose I have in mind for the house will determine to a great extent that which I see. Suppose I want to find a weekend house for a close friend that I plan to visit often. I will be interested to know whether the house is well built, if it gets enough sun and has enough room for their whole family. I'll look at the arrangement of the rooms to see if they are conducive for visitors. I'll want to know if it is near recreational sites for the children and if it has local cultural institutions for the adults. However, suppose I am a person interested in investing in real estate in order to turn a quick profit. Then I might attend to what is needed to fix the place up and put it on the market, whether it is in a good neighborhood, what I will have to pay for it, what I could get for it in the near future. It is the same house. I'm the same person looking for it. But with different intentions, the house and the experience have entirely different meanings.[17]

So to repeat, care is a kind of intentionality. If I care I have the capacity to wish the other well, to take care of, to attend to, to nurture, and to help something or someone grow. If teachers don't care about their students, not much educational growth can take place. Rather, a sense of emptiness and meaninglessness on the part of both children and teachers is almost a certainty. This lack of meaning will not be healed by introducing more thinking skills. It is doubtful whether rationality by itself ever can allay the fear or anxiety and eventual despair that come with the realization that there is little or nothing that I really care about. Something else must happen.

The Community of Inquiry – The Hotbed of Care

It is in this sense that the classroom community of inquiry offers children the opportunity to discover values, things, ideas, ideals and people that they can care about. It also affords them an environment in which they can grow emotionally as well as rationally, socially as well as politically. It is in such a context that they experience authentic dialogue, respect for each other as persons, a growing mutual trust and ability to communicate on a variety of levels. This growing sense of trust in the seriousness of each other is invaluable in the education of the emotions.

With time and practice in communal inquiry they come to realize that their teachers and classmates really do care about them as persons. They believe in their potential ability to make a difference. In turn, this realization makes it possible for children to care about a variety of things and motivates their acting with courage and hope in the world.

[17] Ibid, p. 224.

In *Childhood and Society*, Erik Erickson connected the capacity for trust with the capacity for care.[18] The deeper meaning that accrues in a classroom community of inquiry practice is that the children can come to trust the meaning of their interpersonal, intersubjective universe, and their consciousness can, in principle, be in touch with that meaning. It is in this sense that the very practice of communal inquiry carries intentionality and constitutes care. The practice is the language by which intentionality and care is made communicable to each child.

Conclusion

In conclusion, if we are to foster caring thinking much more is needed than logic and reason. What happens in communal inquiry is that children become aware of a meaningful structure in the relationship of their lives to each other and to the world. They discover many things about themselves and the world but they also create other things as they proceed. As children commit themselves to the process of communal inquiry and all that it involves (including the principle of fallibilism) something much more important than what is said on any particular day is happening. Children are committing themselves to a practice that, although rooted in fallibilism, has intrinsic meaning and calls forth their care: their care for the tools of inquiry, their care for the problems they deem worthy to be inquired into, their care for the form of the dialogue, and their care for each other as they proceed in the inquiry itself. This deeper dimension of meaning is not something of which they are always totally aware. The dimension lies not only in what they say to each other, how many problems they solve, what questions they decide to take on, but in the aesthetic and intersubjective *form* of the dialogue as a whole – as they experience it. They discover themselves as cooperative inquirers, persons who are feeling, intuiting, wondering, speculating, loving and willing, as well as thinking and writing, encountering the whole vast range of human experience with their classmates and teacher.

This is an experience of caring. It is based on a trust that whatever happens in the external world, communication, love, solidarity, creativity, sharing of ideals such as beauty, justice and goodness, suffering and compassion are what really matters.

References

Martin Buber. *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1958).

Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

[18] Erik Erickson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: Norton, 1964).

Quentin Lauer. *The Triumph of Subjectivity* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1958).
Matthew Lipman *Thinking in Education*, 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Rollo May. *Love and Will* (New York: Norton Company, 1969).
Martha Nussbaum. *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature* (Oxford University Press, 1990).
Ann Margaret Sharp. 'The community of Inquiry: Education for Democracy.' *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* (Vol. 9, No. 2), pp. 31-37.
Robert Solomon. *The Passions* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
Paul Tillich. *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952).
Alfred North Whitehead in *Alfred North Whitehead: His Reflections on Man and Nature*, edited by Ruth Narda Anshen (New York: Harper and Row, 1961).

Philosophy for Children and Multiple Intelligences

Clinton Golding, (University of Melbourne)

The later part of the twentieth century has given us many useful educational innovations. Philosophy for Children is one, but there have been many others. For example, recent developments in the diverse fields of brain research, anthropology and the study of learning have led to the theory of Multiple Intelligences (MI). This theory holds that there are many ways of being smart or intelligent, and every person has a different profile of strengths and weaknesses in these ways of being intelligent. (Gardner, 1983)

Drawing on MI theory, many educators have redesigned their classroom programmes to cater for and build on the different intelligences of their students. Despite this current move towards using the theory of MI in educational practice there has been little use made in Philosophy for Children. The content of Philosophy for Children – the philosophical topics, issues and questions – are generally tackled with only three of the intelligences: linguistic for dialogue; interpersonal for working as a community; and logical-mathematical for reasoning and arguing.

Some Philosophy for Children activities draw on the different intelligences of students, but these are seldom used as a chief means of exploring philosophical issues. For example, included in the Philosophy for Children literature are many games and activities using the different intelligences to develop the processes, skills and habits needed for a community of inquiry. These focus on listening, turn-taking or working together as a group, for instance. (DeHaan, McColl and McCutcheon, 1995) There is also some literature which explicitly draws on the different intelligences to create exercises and games for improving the thinking processes involved in a community of inquiry. (Fisher, 1997) Discussion plans and exercises that deliberately require students to use more than their linguistic and logical-mathematical intelligences are another option from the philosophy for children literature – visual organisers of ideas being a popular choice. (Cam, 1995) In the Philosophy for Children classroom there are some teachers who use visual and bodily-kinaesthetic intelligences when they introduce drawing and drama to explore philosophical issues. Some other teachers ask students to present their linguistic answers to philosophical questions in ways which draw on different intelligences – plays, posters or songs for example. Unfortunately, these examples are generally used as isolated fun activities. We rarely see a rigorous attempt to use all the intelligences to tackle and resolve the content of

Philosophy for Children and there is no systematic explanation of how to make best use of MI theory when engaging in philosophical inquiry.

A systematic account of how Philosophy for Children can draw on the theory of MI can be given. The intelligences were identified as the modes or means that people use to make sense of the world and solve problems. (Gardner, 1983) If looked at in this way, it is clear how the different intelligences might be incorporated into Philosophy for Children not just as a games or add-ons, but as a different way for students to make sense of, explore, and resolve the philosophical problems they grapple with.

In this paper I will attempt to give a systematic account of the use of MI in Philosophy for Children. I will briefly look at the theory of multiple intelligences and the different types of intelligence. Then I will examine why it would be a good thing to incorporate this theory into Philosophy for Children. Next I will look at the process of a community of inquiry and where and how in this process using MI would be valuable. Also, as footnotes throughout this article, and as a concluding note, I will examine some of the philosophical issues and concerns that might be raised by the use of MI for philosophical inquiry.

1. The Theory of Multiple Intelligences

The theory of Multiple Intelligences was developed by Harvard psychologist, Howard Gardner. He argues that intelligence is the ability to learn, to solve problems, to make products and to become smarter. (Gardner, 1983) The Theory of Multiple Intelligences says that there are many ways that people can learn, solve problems, make things and be smart. In fact, Gardner says that there are (at least) nine different kinds of human intelligence. In other words, there are nine different ways that people can be smart.

For an ability or talent to be identified as an 'intelligence', it has to meet certain criteria. First, the function of each intelligence is associated with a specific location in the brain. If someone's brain were to be damaged in this location, they would no longer have that type of intelligence. Second, each of the intelligences is used as the foremost means to problem-solve and to fashion products in one or more cultures or groups in the world. Third, there are a set of core operations, procedures and practices for each intelligence and each intelligence has been encoded into a symbol system. Finally, for each intelligence there are examples of people who have excelled in its use. (Gardner, 1999)

The intelligences that have been identified so far are as follows (Gardner, 1999):

Intelligence	Description
Linguistic	The ability to think in words and use language to express ideas. Reading, writing, talking and discussion come easily to people with strengths in this intelligence and they typically do well in school.
Logical-Mathematical	The ability to calculate, measure, use logic and reasoning, and discern logical and numerical patterns. People who are strong here often calculate well and excel in mathematical and scientific activities. They tend to be precise and methodical and think conceptually and abstractly.
Musical-Rhythmic	The ability to hear and use melody, pitch, rhythm, and tone. A person with strong musical intelligence is likely to hum, sing or beat out rhythms. These people easily follow and remember melodies and often have songs running through their heads.
Visual-Spatial	The ability to think in pictures and to see and create images or designs using shape, colour and size. Strength in this area often means that a person does well at visualising or creating representative drawings. These people think in images and pictures.
Bodily-Kinesthetic	The ability to control one's body movements and handle objects skilfully. People with strong bodily-kinesthetic intelligence are highly coordinated, and enjoy moving, holding and touching things.
Interpersonal	The ability to understand and interact with other people in a variety of ways. A person with a strong interpersonal intelligence will work well with a group, detects and responds appropriately to the moods, motivations and desires of others and often winds up playing a leadership role.
Intrapersonal	The ability to understand one's own feelings and who one is in the world. Those with strengths in this area are able to recognise and pursue their own goals. They may keep logs or journals and enjoy solitude and the time to work on their own. Their thinking about their own thinking can be especially refined.
Naturalistic	The ability to comprehend, appreciate and categorise plants, animals and other objects from nature. People with strengths in this area prefer to be in a natural environment, interacting with, exploring and understanding what they find.
Existential	The ability to explore the deep questions about human existence such as the point of life, why we die and how we get here. People with strengths in this area are often described as wise, deep or spiritual.

For education, the important lesson gained from MI theory has been that everyone learns and thinks in unique ways. Although everyone possesses all nine intelligences, we differ in which

intelligences we are strong and in which we are weak. This means that, even though every student can get better at any of the intelligences, lessons can be made more effective for students by tailoring them to their strongest intelligences. If information is presented using a variety of different intelligences and students have a chance to process this information using the intelligences they are strong in, then the students will learn more effectively and deeply.

2. Why Use Multiple Intelligences in Philosophy for Children?

Philosophy for Children is an effective means of deepening understanding for most students. How can MI theory add to this? MI is a well-established pedagogy that educators have been quick to use to enhance the learning of their students. Given that Philosophy for Children traditionally relies on only linguistic, interpersonal and mathematical-logical intelligence, it would be sensible to use multiple intelligences to gain similar benefits in the Philosophy for Children classroom.

First, by using a variety of intelligences in the Philosophy for Children classroom, a teacher can appeal to the different ways of learning and thinking of a wider range of students. This leads to more students being engaged and interested for longer. This also means that students are able to contribute in a wide variety of ways, thus broadening the impact of a community of inquiry. In the same way that the illustrator and graphic designer of a book help us to understand and appreciate what the author writes, the sound sculpture, dance or picture made by students can help us to understand the issues being discussed. By involving a variety of intelligences, students who might not contribute a great deal in a community of inquiry have the motivation and ability to become an integral part.

Secondly, a multiple intelligences approach allows for greater flexibility and creativity of thinking about philosophical issues. Not all thinking is linguistic and some thoughts or ways of thinking may not be expressible in language. So, allowing students to think through problems using different intelligences may allow them to deal with issues and problems they couldn't otherwise deal with.[19] When we allow them to use different intelligences we allow them to think differently. We open up new avenues of creativity and new ideas come to students that would not otherwise have occurred because they are thinking about the issues in different ways.

[19] A question raised by this is: 'How much thinking is not done in language?' Presumably babies think before they have a language, though there is some controversy over whether they have an innate language that they forget as they learn an adult language. Some of our adult thinking is surely visual and some certainly involves emotional content rather than being in words. There are also reports of highly creative or expert people who have insights into a solution to a problem which is not at first expressible in language. They realise the solution using thinking that is not language based and then have to work out how to say it.

The third way that using a MI approach would enhance Philosophy for Children is by building the understanding and personal meaning that students gain. A full understanding cannot be gained solely through the medium of one or two intelligences. A full understanding requires more than just a linguistic and logical understanding. It requires seeing a philosophical issue from many different perspectives. It requires experiencing a philosophical issue in a variety of ways. The more ways you can think about and experience something, the better your understanding. Using a multiple intelligence approach involves thinking about and experiencing philosophical problems in a variety of ways so it leads to a greater understanding for students.

3. How can we use the Theory of Multiple Intelligences in Philosophy for Children?

To find ways of using multiple intelligences while doing Philosophy for Children, it is useful to first analyse the standard process of Philosophy for Children – the community of inquiry. Once we have analysed the process of a community of inquiry we can find where and how using a multiple intelligence approach would be most valuable. The basic process of a community of inquiry is as follows:

Shared experience of a stimulus: A stimulus is something that is used to spark off questions, issues, puzzles and problems for the community to use as the agenda of their inquiry. The students need to have a shared experience of the stimulus so they all have the same starting point for their inquiry. Traditionally the stimulus is a story that students read together.

Create an agenda: questions, issues, problems and puzzles: The students formulate their questions, issues and problems sparked off from the stimulus material.

Seeking understanding and meaning: The central purpose of a community of inquiry is for students to develop understanding and meaning. The aim is to make progress exploring the agenda they set with this purpose in mind. Sometimes students will be attempting to answer specific questions and at other times they will be exploring issues in a more general way. However, at no time are they engaging in mere conversation or just swapping thoughts.

Review and reflection: At the end of a community of inquiry, there needs to be some sense of 'having got somewhere' or 'moving forward'. This could be a reflection on the development of the skills, habits or abilities of students, development of how the community works, or reflection on the students' development in understanding of the content.

I will examine each step in the process to see ways in which a multiple intelligence approach could be valuable.

Shared experience of a stimulus

A stimulus is something that is used to spark off questions, issues, puzzles and problems for the community to use as the agenda for their inquiry. Not everything is an appropriate stimulus however. It must be a stimulus that creates some sort of intellectual discomfort, puzzlement or cognitive dissonance, or the feeling that 'there is something funny going on here'. It has to challenge and stretch student thinking, beliefs and understanding. It has to raise problems, puzzles and concerns of a philosophical nature.

Purpose written stories are perhaps some of the easiest stimuli to use in philosophical inquiry as the philosophical issues and concerns presented are deliberate, obvious and numerous. However, in the same way that we can present different information about a topic using the different intelligences (reading, speaking, pictures, films, pieces of music, dance, tools and equipment . . .), the stimulus for Philosophy for Children can be in the format of any intelligence. With perseverance and training, students can learn to use other types of stimuli as effectively as purpose written philosophy stories. Based on the different intelligences, some possible stimuli that could be used are:

INTELLIGENCE	DESCRIPTION OF STIMULUS
Linguistic	Stories, poems, newspaper and magazine articles, books, talks, lists of questions
Logical-Mathematical	Arguments or positions presented with reasons, brain-storms of ideas or concepts, statistics, facts and figures
Musical-Rhythmic	Music, sound sculptures, concerts, incidental sounds
Visual-Spatial	Pictures, photographs, visual art works, cartoons, videos, television, museums and art galleries
Bodily-Kinesthetic	Drama, dance, objects (museum pieces, sculpture . . .), physical games or sports
Interpersonal	Situations or cases involving interpersonal interaction, television, actual cases students are facing, cooperative games and activities
Intrapersonal	Lists of students' own questions or ideas, exercises for getting students to know more about themselves (multiple intelligence identification, introvert-extrovert scale . . .) self-reflections
Naturalistic	Class trips (nature walk, zoo . . .), 'real' issues they face, facts, classifications, collections
Existential	Things that are deeply important to the students – photo albums, journals, collections . . .

Creating an agenda

At this step in a community of inquiry, the group sets the agenda of the inquiry by identifying what they find interesting and

philosophically problematic. This can be done by identifying one word themes or issues and developing questions from these or by identifying questions and then arranging them into similar issues and themes. Taking statements made in response to the stimulus and turning them into questions is another way to create the agenda.

In this step in the community of inquiry I rely on linguistic intelligence. I have not come across a precise or accurate way of expressing questions about philosophical issues that does not use words.[20] However, it is possible to draw on the different intelligences in the way students come up with the questions and in the way students display or present these questions. Some possible examples of using the different intelligences for creating the agenda follow:

INTELLIGENCE	HOW TO CREATE AN AGENDA
Linguistic	Written or verbal questions
Logical-Mathematical	Arranging the questions according to categories or criteria, analysing the types of questions produced
Musical-Rhythmic	Sound sculptures or music that represents the question, song lyrics that express and expand on the question
Visual-Spatial	Illustrations for the questions
Bodily-Kinesthetic	Having the questions on movable objects like cards and then moving them around as they are categorised and arranged
Interpersonal	Coming up with the questions in groups, combining questions with others
Intrapersonal	Personal lists of questions
Naturalistic	Arranging the questions according to categories or criteria
Existential	Arranging or ranking the questions according to the depth or importance of the question

Seeking understanding and meaning

This step of a community of inquiry is where most of the philosophical work is done. It is here that the students grapple with the philosophical questions, problems and issues from their agenda, seeking

[20] One issue that this raises is whether it is possible to have questions that are not in words. Normally our questions are asked by speaking or writing and it is hard to imagine a question in any other form. You could certainly have inquiries that are made by raising your eyebrows (really?) or by certain noises ('hmmm' meaning 'what do you think'). These are questions that seem as if they are not in words. Even if there are examples of non-linguistic questions, this does not prove that we could ask questions in music or pictures or that the questions we do ask have the sophistication and depth needed for them to be philosophical questions rather than practical inquiries. Because of this difficulty, I always use the linguistic intelligence when creating the agenda of a community of inquiry, but I combine it with other intelligences.

to resolve them and develop understanding and personal meaning for themselves.

It is this step in a community of inquiry where multiple intelligences are least used, but where they would be most useful. The different intelligences are what different people and different cultures use to solve problems, so we can find ways to use the different intelligences to solve *philosophical* problems.

There are two methods for using MI to solve philosophical problems that will work for any intelligence. The first and easiest is to take whatever ideas are produced in a community of inquiry and translate them into the medium of a different intelligence. This simply means change what is said in a community of inquiry into the symbol system of the different intelligences – pictures, music, group activities, etc. While this approach is useful, the drawback is that the actual problem solving only uses linguistic, logical-mathematical and interpersonal intelligences. While this is fine, it is more powerful to have the students solve problems using different intelligences and then, if needed, translate this into linguistic form.

The second method for solving philosophical problems that will work using any intelligence is to use the intelligences to create abstract representations or analogies. Rather than working in language first and then translating into another intelligence, students actually use the different intelligences to think through and explore the question or problem. Rather than relying on linguistic symbols, the students use the symbol systems of different intelligences to make a representation of the concept, process or relationship being investigated. For example, students could use clay to make a representation of the abstract concept 'love,' or of the process used to know you are in love or of the relationship of love or even of how love comes to happen. It is also effective to create comparison representations, for example make a musical representation of love and hate or love and liking. In addition, this method can involve a process of creation or of discovery – students can *make* their own representation or they can *find* a representation. For example, they can make a piece of music to express why people can't stop thinking or find a piece of music that helps answer why people can't stop thinking.

The following is a description of the process I use with students to solve philosophical problems by creating abstract representations. I use the same process regardless of the intelligences being used.

Instructions

Start with some philosophical question or problem and choose an intelligence or two to bring to bear on this.

Tell the students: The object is to use the chosen intelligences to create a representation that helps to explain the idea or answer the

questions posed (for example, draw a picture, make a body sculpture or re-write the words of a well-known song).

Tell the students: What we are trying to do is to create something like a metaphor, analogy or simile. It is often difficult to talk about some of the philosophical problems so we are going to use other methods to think about these problems. We are trying to show what the problem we are investigating is like (a visual picture of what the mind is like, a sound sculpture that shows what destiny is like, a dance that shows what friendship is like).

An example of this is: 'The body is like a machine'. Through this analogy we can explain eating and excreting. Like a machine the body needs fuel and gives off waste products. We can also ask questions that extend the analogy - who is the driver of the machine and where do they sit? How would we explain getting fit using this picture of the body?

Tell the students: Clichés or common representations are forbidden (for example if drawing 'freedom', you cannot draw doves or broken chains.) The aim is to think creatively rather than just use someone else's image.

Tell the students: The ideas you express are more important than artistic skill.

Have the students work individually or in groups creating their representation.

When the students have finished creating their representation, they will need to explain it to the rest of the community. The representations are rarely self-evident. There are several options they can use for explaining what they have produced.

Each person or group could explain the whole of their representation. This is fairly time consuming but is worthwhile if students spent a long time making the representations.

Each person or group explains their favourite aspect of their representation. Make sure everyone gets a chance to explain something about what they have done.

The students move around and engage with the different representations and get them explained as they do this.

Start a discussion. During the discussion, students refer to their representations to explain their answers to the original questions and to give examples to illustrate their answers.

There are also several options for how the rest of the class can be invited to respond to the representations produced:

Get the class to pose questions about the representations. The class could ask any questions about the representation, but the following two types of question are very useful: What is the meaning of those other aspects of the representation you haven't explained? How would you add to your representation so you could explain this other related idea?

Members of the class give their own interpretation of the representations (only interpretations, not value judgements).

Other members of the class add to the representation to extend it (for example, put more people in a body-sculpture or add more detail to a picture to explain more).

Record ideas that the students come up with as they explain their representations. You might want to use a concept-map to do this and ask the students where their ideas could go. Use these ideas as the basis for devising new philosophical questions or problems. You could also categorise or make connections and distinction with the ideas.

As well as the two previous uses of the intelligences, there are many other activities that use different intelligences to solve philosophical problems. The following table records a number of ways for doing this. It is very difficult to design an activity that isolates one and only one intelligence, so many activities I describe draw on several intelligences at once. However each activity is listed beside the intelligence that is dominant in its use.

INTELLIGENCE	ACTIVITY OR EXERCISE
Linguistic	Discussion or writing of ideas and answers; create sayings or quotes that relate to or solve the problem; create a poem about the problem; re-write a story or nursery rhyme so it illustrates some aspect of the problem; hold a written discussion where all ideas are written and responded to on paper.
Logical-Mathematical	Charts and tables of reasons for and against; say your ideas and answers and back them up with reasons, facts and figures (considering the for and against) where appropriate; create a concept-map, Venn diagram or other graphic organiser; compare and contrast; look at cause and effect; hypothesise and test; create an abstract symbol system that helps to answer the question; create unusual connections between ideas; organise and re-organise the information.
Musical-Rhythmic	Focus on the way of saying things to convey different ideas; put sound effects to the verbal ideas to make them more meaningful; create sounds that go with various processes or skills.
Visual-Spatial	Charts and diagrams of ideas; concept maps and other graphic organisers with illustrations of the various ideas or moves in the discussion; draw a picture or create a sculpture about your answers and ideas; picture it in your head; conduct thought-experiments; give a list of related concepts and students must draw the connections between them; pick out colours or patterns to best represent ideas; drawn word association; led imagination exercises where students

	then draw what they see in their mind's eye.
Bodily-Kinesthetic	Act out your ideas and answers or create a drama about them; Create a comparison drama – one that solves the problems and one that does not; make human graphs/values lines; play concept snap (list of related concepts on cards and play snap where the students look for synonyms or antonyms); use body language to convey ideas or to ask for something more; find things or objects that help to clarify the problem; make things to help to resolve the problem.
Interpersonal	Report and argue for a friend's view; report on what others' ideas are and why they hold these and then build on them; use a written dialogue where you write an answer and have someone else build on it or challenge it; write a partial answer and have others add to it; assume the role of another person or character and argue from their point of view; play devil's advocate; small group or paired discussion; role-plays and dramas.
Intrapersonal	Say your personal ideas, thoughts and answers; isolate and examine your personal feeling and values on a certain topic or issue; phenomenological approach (analyse your personal experience and use your personal experience to explore the problem); thinking and writing time on your own; focus on the impact the problem has on a student personally (introspection, feelings, how it affects them, values and beliefs, creative process, image, identity, what can they do?).
Naturalistic	Categorise the different types of answers and ideas; find facts and information to help us solve this problem; naming, classifying, ordering, and ranking of ideas; find something in nature that illustrates an idea; present students with a ranking or classification and they have to guess how it was done.
Existential	Explaining how the question or problem is important for how we live; show the deep lesson we should gain from the topic.

Following are some detailed examples of how you could use the various intelligences to solve philosophical problems:

Imagine that the students have decided to work on the question: Should you keep a friend who is mean to you? As the teacher, you want to help them to use their different intelligences to explore and answer this question. What are some activities you could use?

INTELLIGENCE	ACTIVITY OR EXERCISE
Linguistic	Write a poem that explains what the person should do.
Logical-	Write a list of all the reasons for and against keeping

Mathematical	them as a friend.
Musical-Rhythmic	Create or choose a piece of sound sculpture that best represents having someone who is mean to you as a friend. Compare this with a sound sculpture of a friend who is not mean.
Visual-Spatial	Draw a picture of the abstract concept of friendship (not a concrete representation of an actual friend).
Bodily-Kinesthetic	Choreograph a dance that shows what they should do.
Interpersonal	Devise and act out situations that show all the possible consequences of keeping them as a friend or not keeping them.
Intrapersonal	Create a list of all the features they most value in a friend and then use this to work out whether they should keep the friend who is mean.
Naturalistic	Present some ideas about an animal or plant that acts in an analogous way to a friend who is mean and use this to decide whether you should keep the friend.
Existential	Consider the question why are friends important and come up with some advice for people about what they should do in this situation.

Imagine that the students have decided to work on the question: *What is time?* As the teacher, you want to help them to use their different intelligences to explore and answer this question. What are some activities you could use?

INTELLIGENCE	ACTIVITY OR EXERCISE
Linguistic	Write a story about time disappearing.
Logical-Mathematical	Write a list of all the concepts that are related to 'time' and then create a concept map using all these concepts showing the relationship between them all.
Musical-Rhythmic	Create a sound sculpture that is a musical representation of the abstract concept 'time'.
Visual-Spatial	Draw the abstract concept 'time'.
Bodily-Kinesthetic	Make a body sculpture that shows what 'time' is.
Interpersonal	Collect as many different ideas about what 'time' is from other members of the class and choose the best one to expand on and present using a different intelligence.
Intrapersonal	Examine personal experiences of time and the passage of time.
Naturalistic	Find out about how other animals and plants experience time (or if they experience time).
Existential	Consider the question how does time affect us as human beings and use a different intelligence to represent the answer.

While these MI activities can make a philosophical inquiry deeper and broader, a practical problem to face is that students could treat the activities as merely play with no depth or rigour. Because the activities can be very enjoyable, students sometimes treat them simply as a bit of fun and do not push for the philosophical depth we want from them.

However, I do not think this is a problem solely for a MI approach. It is just as much of a problem for the normal strategy of writing down questions and then discussing them to find answers. Even when using the normal strategy, students can have a superficial discussion. The way to solve the superficiality problem in language-based discussions is the same method to use when employing other intelligences – the teacher or other students ask questions that push the community to think more deeply and broadly.

There are two types of question that students should be asked when they are using different intelligences to explore philosophical questions – content neutral questions and questions with philosophical content. These questions should be asked while students prepare, practise and design. They should also be asked as a review after students have presented their final products.

Content neutral questions are those questions that push the students to think more without leading them in any particular direction about the content they are exploring. Examples of these questions are:

- Why did you do that? (Why did you use clapping in your rhythm?)
- Why do you think that? (Why do you think what you have done is the best answer to the question?)
- How does that help? (How does holding hands help to show your answer to the question?)
- Is that different or the same as what she is doing? (Is your picture different or the same as what Jill has drawn?)
- What do you mean by . . . ? (What does John's movement mean?)
- Are there different ways you could do that? (Is there another way you could show what realty is apart from using words?)
- How did you work that out? (How did you work out that you should arrange the ideas visually in that way?)
- Can you clarify that? (Can you clarify how this is an important issue?)
- What else does that tell us? (What else does your song tell us?)
- What further questions does it raise? (What further questions does your journal idea raise?)
- What have we found out? (What have we found out from your play?)
- What is the most important idea? (What is the most important idea we should take from your sculpture?)

Other useful content-neutral questions are those that ask students to reflect on and build on what others have done:

- Do you agree or disagree with what they have shown?

- How would you answer the question using a different intelligence?
- How would you answer the question using the same intelligence?
- How could you add to what they have done or build on their answer? (How could you add another person into the drama to build on what they have shown about friendship?)
- How would you interpret or explain what they have shown?

The content questions that that should be asked are the philosophical questions that lead students to consider important issues they may have overlooked. These questions do lead the students, but they are important to make sure what they are doing has sufficient depth. These are the same sorts of questions that are in teacher's manuals and discussion plans and are appropriate to use whatever intelligence someone is using. For example, if students are writing the lyrics for a song that explains why friends are important and they include lyrics about family as well, you can also ask them to build into their lyrics answers to the questions – 'Is family as important as friends?' and 'What is the most important difference between family and friends?'[21]

Review and reflection

The final step in a community of inquiry is to review what has happened. This is partly to assess progress with the topics and issues being explored, but it is also to review the processes, skills and habits in the community. For example, if we were looking at reviewing the content of a community of inquiry, we may want to review the major conclusions reached or the most interesting ideas shared. However, if we were reviewing the processes and skills in a community of inquiry we might want to know how well people were listening or what we could do to improve the community in the future. The different intelligences can easily be used for either sort of reflection, even if the community of inquiry primarily used linguistic intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE	REVIEW EXERCISE OR ACTIVITY
Linguistic	Say or write down where progress was made
Logical-Mathematical	Compare and contrast with other people and sessions; rank or rate progress made
Musical-Rhythmic	Create musical-rhythmic representations of improvements, progress or conclusions
Visual-Spatial	Draw pictures illustrating progress or what was

[21] A question raised from this is whether you have to return to linguistic intelligence to consolidate the group's ideas and make final conclusions? Do the students also have to resort to language to deepen what they are doing with other intelligences or to make links between the activities in different intelligences? As a rule of thumb, I say it is not necessary to go back to linguistic intelligence, but it is useful.

	achieved
Bodily-Kinesthetic	Physical rankings where people arrange themselves in a continuum
Interpersonal	Group ratings or reviews
Intrapersonal	Personal ratings or reviews
Naturalistic	Observations and categorization of moves made, or how people interact in the community
Existential	Look at the most important or useful improvements or progress made

I have shown numerous ways in which a multiple intelligence approach can be usefully employed in a philosophical community of inquiry. Different intelligences apart from the standard linguistic and logical-mathematical can be used for the stimulus material, for creating an agenda, for exploring and resolving philosophical issues and even for reviewing progress. Despite this, there are thorny philosophical issues raised by this approach that I need to address further before I claim that as well as being useable doing philosophy, the other intelligences really *enhance* the philosophy. Certainly using the interpersonal intelligence when having student-to-student interaction and discussion enhances philosophy – one of the foundational ideas of philosophy for children is that thinking together makes for better philosophical thinking. But can the other intelligences really help? Some of the questions and problems that need to be addressed here are:

Is philosophy inherently linguistic?

Does everything need to be translated into language for us to be able to really understand it or use it to resolve philosophical issues?

Can fine philosophical distinctions only be made in language?

Is philosophy only really doable using words? Is it best done using words?

As a partial answer to these questions, I concede that philosophy, at least in the Western tradition, is primarily linguistic and logical-mathematical. These types of thinking and the symbol and representation systems associated with them allow us to make a great deal of progress when doing philosophy. Using language and logic is certainly a good way to do philosophy. I might even go as far as saying that much of the time linguistic and logical-mathematical intelligences are essential when doing philosophy. However, I think that even if I concede that the majority of philosophical work needs language and logic, this does not show that a multiple intelligence approach is not also extremely useful for philosophical inquiry.

I think that relying on language and logic alone makes the philosophical inquiry flat. The other intelligences lend a depth to our understanding that we cannot otherwise get. For example, the painting 'Guernica', or a war movie, or war poetry, lends depth to our understanding of war that a logical argument alone cannot do. In addition, even if every community of inquiry needs to end with a

linguistic expression of the answers, the different intelligences are useful to tap into student interests and make them want to pursue the ideas. The intelligences are useful to open up new and creative paths of thinking about the issues and they are useful to consider multiple perspectives on an issue. I think that what is provided for by the other intelligences is equally essential for a deep understanding of philosophical issues. Just because it cannot be crisply packaged into our linguistic system does not mean that it is not essential to a full understanding.

When we approach a philosophical community of inquiry ready to systematically use a multiple intelligence approach, we can engage a wide variety of students and enhance the depth of their philosophical understanding. By using some of the tools and exercises listed here, we can take advantage of developments in educational theory and improve what we are already doing. Get your philosophy students drawing, and writing, and acting and making music.

References

Boggerman, S., Hoerr, T. & Wallach, C. (eds), *Multiple Intelligences: Teaching Through The Personal Intelligences* (Australia: Hawker Brownlow Education, 1998)

Boggerman, S., Hoerr, T. & Wallach, C., *Celebrating Multiple Intelligences: Teaching for Success - A practical Guide* (Australia: Hawker Brownlow Education, 1996)

Cam, P., *Thinking Together: Philosophical Inquiry for the Classroom* (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1995)

Campbell, B., *The Multiple Intelligences Handbook: Lesson Plans and More* (Australia: Hawker Brownlow Education, 1997)

DeHaan, McColl & McCutcheon, *Philosophy with Kids: More Ideas and Activities* (Melbourne: Longman, 1995)

Gardner, H., *Multiple Intelligences Reframed: Multiple Intelligence for the 21st Century* (New York: Basic Books, 1999)

Gardner, H., *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences* (New York: Basic Books, 1983)

Fisher, R, *Games for Thinking* (Oxford: Nash Pollock, 1997)

Piaget-Vygotsky and the Philosophy for Children Program

Tock Keng Lim, (University of Munich)

> *The principal goal of education is to create people who are capable of doing new things, not simply of repeating what other generations have done - people who are creative, inventive, and discoverers. The second goal . . . is to form minds which can be critical, can verify, and not accept everything they are offered.*
>
> Piaget (1972)

> *Every function in the cultural development of the child comes on the stage twice, in two respects: first in relations between people as an interpsychological category, afterwards within the child as intrapsychological category.*
>
> Vygotsky (1978)

Introduction

The critical thinking movement has been gaining momentum at all levels of education in the United States from elementary schools through college (Presseisen, 1986), with several programs available. One thinking program that has spread to about thirty-five countries in Europe, North and South America, Asia and Australia is the Philosophy for Children (P4C) program established by Matthew Lipman and his associates at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State College, New Jersey. Lipman pioneered the development of curriculum materials and teaching methods for the P4C program for primary and secondary level students.

Believing that children can reason deductively and logically using concrete examples, Lipman wrote novels for children (for different grade levels) where he included the ideas of major philosophers in a dialogical mode that students could understand and use for discussion. He also translated abstract formulations used in philosophy to the characters' discussions of reasoning of such formulations in a concrete way. Characters in the novels (i.e., students of roughly the same grade level) model the discovery of both formal and informal rules of thought. Thus the P4C program introduced students to philosophical concepts and issues through discussions of passages in these novels (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyon, 1980).

The P4C program aims to improve students' thinking by introducing them to philosophical concepts and issues embedded in the specially written novels (for Grades K-12). Students discuss philosophical issues through the passages from these novels. The instructional approach utilized in the P4C program is identified as the

community of inquiry (Splitter & Sharp, 1995). In developing the community, dialogue plays a significant role in fostering critical thinking skills in the students. Teachers have to be skilful facilitators and know how to probe with suitable questions. They have to use suitable open-ended questions to spark off discussions in class and to encourage the students to practice good thinking skills.

In a community of inquiry, students speculate and deliberate, using their reason to follow lines of inquiry and to think philosophically in a questioning and reflective manner. They are given opportunities to think in various ways and at different levels in co-operative, self-reflective and self-corrective intellectual inquiry. It is important that the community of inquiry does not get reduced to a set of skills and dispositions; it is a "form of life" in which thinking, speaking and behaving are all interwoven (see Table 1). The uniqueness of the P4C program lies in transforming the group of students into a community of inquiry founded on dialogue, trust and respect (Splitter & Sharp, 1995).

To find the theoretical and empirical basis of P4C from a psychological perspective, this paper focuses on the work of two cognitive developmental theorists, Piaget and Vygotsky, who had a great impact on present thinking on the cognitive development of children and the role played by social interaction in various aspects of cognitive development. There appears to be consensus among the P4C proponents on acknowledging Vygotsky's contributions towards the concept of the instructional approach in P4C and controversy on Piaget's views on reasoning in children.

Table 1: Characteristics of the Community of Inquiry in Philosophy for Children

- a shared sense of puzzlement or intellectual intrigue, which then stimulates further inquiry
- persistence in the search for knowledge and understanding
- giving reasons for opinions, and distinguishing good reasons from bad ones
- students being prepared to "try out" ideas
- fostering mutual co-operation, trust, tolerance, fair mindedness and a heightened degree of sensitivity to fellow participants
- the prominence of conversation and dialogue as key dynamics in the process of inquiry
- an abundance of open-ended questions which serve as "invitations to inquiry"
- self-correcting thinking and thinkers who care for the procedures of inquiry
- a growing awareness on the part of students that they must accept responsibility for their own views and learn to think for themselves.

1. Piaget

Piaget's views on cognitive development developed over a span of a working life of seventy years in a multitude of publications; ideas were developed and revised, with Piaget being his own main revisionist (Meadows, 1993). Owing to the size and scope of the work, Meadows explained that misquotations and misinterpretations of Piaget's work can be found among both his supporters and critics. In addition, across disciplines, what was seen in cognitive systems in Piaget's work by psychologists as insights might be perceived by empirical scientists as not providing enough evidence and by philosophers even as crude.

In working out a biological basis for development, Piaget believed that certain cognitive structures must be in place in order for a child to develop from social interactions. Thus children move through four global developmental stages, sensory motor, pre-operational, concrete operational and formal operational, depending on the acquisition of logical tools. The stress in development, according to Gallagher and Reid (1981), should be on regulatory mechanisms rather than structural stages (which has been much criticized by Piaget's opponents).

Equilibration, a central concept of Piaget's theory, can be seen in the child interacting with the world. In the P4C community of inquiry, a child is given ample opportunities to interact with others. When a child considers alternative viewpoints in a discussion, then he or she can use conflicting information to restructure thought and move to higher stages of cognition, i.e., develop thinking skills. In the process of the community of inquiry (see Table 1), conversation and dialogue predominate as key dynamics; children are prepared to try out ideas, to explore answers to open-ended questions. In time, if they persist in the search for knowledge and understanding, they will be able to distinguish good reasons from bad ones, and to reflect on and self-correct their own views.

There has been much discussion within the P4C program on Piaget's views towards children and philosophy. One of the strongest critics of Piaget being insensitive to philosophy was Gareth Matthews (1980). Matthews pointed out many instances in The Child's Conception of the World (Piaget, 1973), where Piaget missed out on the sense of wonder and puzzlement in the children he interviewed; Matthews insisted that all the concepts that Piaget claimed to have found in children did invite philosophical reflection. Richard Paul, a leading exponent of critical thinking, argued that Piaget had demonstrated that the thinking of young children presupposes philosophical foundations. To Paul (1993), most children have at least the impulse to philosophize and for a time seem driven by a strong desire to know the basic what and why of things. However parents and teachers rarely cultivate this tendency. As children are usually given didactic answers in ways that

discourage rather than stimulate thinking, they lose the impulse to question.

In looking at Piaget's approach from a philosophical viewpoint, Matthews (1994) also questioned Piaget's tendency to emphasize typical child development and ignore the atypical which Gareth found to be more interesting philosophically. Matthews appears to believe strongly in atypical anecdotal evidence, which psychologists may consider as "outliers" and hence may not support the hypothesis. He also criticized Piaget's need for applications. Matthews' criticism must be seen from the philosophical perspective as Matthews is a philosopher. In fact, from the psychological perspective, Piaget has been criticized by some psychologists for not being rigorous enough in his experimentation. It is difficult to reconcile the psychological and philosophical points of view on cognitive development because the techniques of approaching problems in both disciplines are very different. Even the identification of what appears to be the question to study in cognitive development in the two disciplines may differ.

Gazzard (1993) felt that elementary and middle schools opposed the introduction of philosophy in the classroom because Piaget considered that children could not reason until they reach formal operational stage. The schools, according to Gazzard, felt that children did not possess the mental capacity for abstract thinking that philosophy requires. If it is a question of studying the ideas of the philosophers couched in "philosophical" terms and writings, then children would not have the mental capacity until they reached the formal operational stage when they can reason at an abstract level and in terms of possibilities. However if the philosophical ideas and concepts have been translated to a "language" of reason in concrete terms that children can understand, then children can do philosophy. Children, according to Piaget, can reason at a non-abstract level in the pre-operations and concrete operations stages.

The major opposition to Piaget among some P4C critics was that Piaget felt that children cannot reason; however, as discussed above, there has been some misunderstanding, particularly in semantics: How does one define "reasoning"? Piaget, being a scientist, considered reasoning at the formal reasoning level, logical reasoning, so he maintained that children cannot reason logically until they reach the formal operations stage. Piaget proposed that children could reason at a concrete level at an earlier age. The P4C critics, as discussed above, felt that children can reason at a very early level – with which Piaget did not disagree, such reasoning being at a concrete level.

In fact, Barell (1991) pointed out that Piaget's research on object permanence showed that at eighteen months babies began to inquire about the object that, once in front of them, is now placed under a rug. In a review of the literature on analogical reasoning, Reeves and Weisberg (1993) supported the contention that human thinking was

primarily concrete in nature. In line with Sprod (1994), two of Piaget's key ideas have important contributions to our understanding of the cognitive development of children. Children's ability and style of handling ideas develop as they interact with their surroundings; they need to go through these styles in a given order. Consequently children would improve their reasoning and thinking as they interact with each other in the community of inquiry. The other key idea of Piaget, according to Sprod, was that children's development occurs at different rates, partly controlled by physical development and partly due to interaction with the environment.

In working on the materials for the P4C program, Lipman translated formal logic from that has been studied at university level philosophy to stories of children understood by children; the abstract formulations were "converted" to reasoning in a concrete way; children can reason abstractly at the object level. Sharp (1995) pointed out that when Lipman first wrote Harry, he set it at Grades 5 and 6, the beginning of the formal operations stage of a child's development. A child, according to Lipman (1991), could reason deductively and logically using concrete objects. In his specially written stories and novels for children, Lipman translated the abstract formulations to reasoning in a concrete way that children could understand.

2. Vygotsky

The focus of Vygotsky's psychological writing was to explain the nature of the mind by tracing its developments and maturation in the child. One of Vygotsky's (1962, 1978) main assumptions was that cognition originates in social interaction. He proposed that children acquire the necessary cognitive skills to fit into the environment through interaction with their peers and adults. Whereas Piaget described the child as a little scientist, constructing an understanding of the world largely alone, Vygotsky suggested that cognitive development depends much more on the people in the child's world. Children's knowledge of ideas, attitudes, and values develop through interactions with others. Vygotsky also believed that culture and language plays important roles in cognitive development.

In the P4C program, children are given the opportunities to interact both with their peers and their teacher to develop reasoning skills. The P4C critics who, as discussed above, disagreed on the contribution of Piaget to the program, paid tribute to Vygotsky's contribution to the P4C program. In P4C, children carry out a community of inquiry session, facilitated by the teacher, on a passage that they have read. This is well supported by Vygotsky. In Vygotsky's mind, language is critical for cognitive development as language provides a means of expressing ideas and asking questions; it provides the categories and concepts of thinking: something with which all P4C supporters will agree.

An important concept in Vygotsky's (1978) model of social interaction influences was the zone of proximal development, defined as the difference between the level of performance achieved by the child while working independently on a problem and the level of performance achieved by the same child with the help of a more competent peer or adult. The P4C community of inquiry, as pointed out by Sprod (1994) encouraged children to drive the discussion, with the teacher probing to see whether certain reasoning moves have been made; such activities would ensure that the cognitive level of the discussion remains within the zone of proximal development with the teacher playing an important role in keeping the discussion with the zone.

In addition, according to Sprod (1994), Vygotsky has shown us that it is possible for children to work in a social situation beyond their individual competencies; they develop competencies through interacting with their peers and adults in a social situation. The role played by social dialogue and language is significant. This gives support to the community of inquiry approach in developing thinking in children in the P4C program. Generally it would appear that the community of inquiry approach in the P4C program has contributions from both Vygotsky and Piaget, but more from Vygotsky that from Piaget.

References

Barell, J. (1991) *Teaching for Thoughtfulness: Classroom Strategies to Enhance Intellectual Development* (New York: Longman)

Gallagher, J. M., & Reid, D. K. (1981) *The Learning Theory of Piaget and Inhelder* (Austin, Texas: Pro-ed)

Gareth, G. B. (1980) *Philosophy and the Young Child* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press)

Gareth, G. B. (1994) 'Philosophy confronts psychological theories of development,' in Lipman & Sharp (eds.) *Growing up with philosophy* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing House)

Gazzard, A. (1993) 'Philosophy for Children and the Piagetian framework,' in M. Lipman (ed.) *Thinking Children and Education* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing)

Lipman, M. (1991) *Thinking in Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Lipman, M., Sharp, A. M. & Oscanyon, F. S. (1980) *Philosophy in the Classroom* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press)

Meadows, S. (1983) 'Piaget's theory of cognitive development,' in S. Meadows (ed.) *Developing Thinking: Approaches to Children's Cognitive Development* (New York: Methuen & Co.)

Paul, R. W. (1993) *Critical thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World* (Santa Rosa, California: Foundation for Critical Thinking)

Piaget, J. (1973) *The Child's Conception of the World* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul)

Piaget, P. (1972) 'Intellectual evolution from adolescence to adulthood,' *Human Development* (Vol. 15, pp. 1-12)

Presseisen, B. Z. (1986) *Critical Thinking and Thinking Skills: State of the Art Definitions and Practice in Public Schools* (Philadelphia: Research for Better Schools)

Reeves, L. M., & Weisberg, R. W. (1993) 'On the concrete nature of human thinking: Content and context in analogical transfer,' *Educational Psychology* (Vol. 13, Nos. 3 & 4, pp. 245 – 258)

Sharp, A. M. (1995) 'Philosophy for children and the development of ethical values,' *Early Child Development and Care*, (Vol. 107, pp. 45 – 55)

Splitter, L. J. & Sharp, A. M. (1995) *The Classroom as a community of inquiry: Teaching for better thinking*, Melbourne, Australia: Australian Council of Educational Research.

Sprod, T. (1994) *Developing higher order thinking through whole class discussion in a science classroom*, Unpublished MSc dissertation, Oxford University.

Vygotsky, L. G., (1962) *Thought and Language*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vygotsky, L. G., (1978) *Mind in society*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Growth in a Community of Inquiry:

A report on the Introductory Summer Seminar on Philosophy for Children, Mendham, New Jersey, USA., August 2003

Elizabeth Finnegan, (Montclair State University)

During the Mendham summer workshop I learned what it was like to be a member of a 'community of inquiry' by becoming one for ten days. I joined by choice, but could not choose other members of the community, nor could I choose for how long I talked about philosophy with them.

The experience at Mendham was both limited and protected by time. It was limited because just as the community began to grow we had to disband. It was protected because unlike school children we were not forced to tolerate each other for ten months. After ten days we could choose which members we stayed in touch with and whether or not we discussed philosophical issues with them.

At first the members of our 'community of inquiry' became familiar with Lipman's ideas on a method of study that promoted higher order thinking, which combined procedural thinking and thinking about subject matter.[22] We committed ourselves to following the five procedural stages Lipman recognized in such inquiry: the offering of the text, the construction of the agenda, the solidifying of the community, exercises and discussion plans and the encouragement of further responses.[23] At the same time we were invited to experiment with the methods we used within each of these five stages. Over time not only did we change our understanding of what it meant to participate and facilitate in a 'community of inquiry' but the nature of our community also changed. We discovered for ourselves that inquiry "is a self-corrective practice in which a subject matter is investigated with the aim of discovering or inventing ways of dealing with what is problematic".[24]

At first (I suspect like others) I entered into the 'community of inquiry' reticent yet willing to try. "Seeking after affirmation within the gravity of good feelings."[25] Politely we wrote down questions, chose a question and brought forth a few ideas on the question chosen, waiting for the course requirements to be revealed to us. It was a relief when cue cards appeared and directed us. Ask a question. Give an example. Point out an assumption. Think of an alternative point of view. I felt constantly aware of what I was or was not doing. Implicit in our dialogue was a self-imposed order "around whose cues topic initiation and maintenance, turn-taking conventions, speaker-listener interchanges, and conversational repair are practiced and internalised".[26] Within these conventions it became clear that some people had more expertise in philosophical dialogue than others, and some facilitators felt obligated to address this in a way that would meet the approval of others.

---

[22] Matthew Lipman, *Thinking in Education* (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.34.
[23] Tim Sprod, *Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education* (Routledge, 2001), p.153.
[24] *Thinking in Education*, p. 185.
[25] John Cleary, 'Friendship,' *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* (Vol. 16, No. 2), p. 32.
[26] David Kennedy 'Young Children's discourse and the origins if the world: A reading of essences. In *When We Talk. Essays on Classroom Conversation* (Analytic Teaching Press, 1992) p.23

Unskilled as I was, I knew enough to understand that facilitating a dialogue is "more of an art than a technique."[27] It is difficult to define role of a facilitator, and therefore difficult for the facilitator to assess whether he or she has reached any of the criteria for being a facilitator. Unlike an educator, a facilitator does not impart knowledge, and yet at the same time is not ignorant of the subject matter. A good facilitator should exhibit some knowledge of how to guide the 'community of inquiry'. The facilitator is in a paradoxical situation, submitting to and guiding the dialogue. In an adult 'community of inquiry' it is fair to take turns to volunteer the facilitation of a dialogue. In a classroom the teacher is most likely to become the facilitator and may need to impose their authority on the group. Kennedy describes the paradoxical situation of the facilitator: "It is inevitable that the facilitator will apply constraints, insist on sequential movement of argument, attempt to slow things down or speed them up. But his or her control, as Lushyn has argued, is ambiguous."[28] Before I facilitated a session I did not know what the experience would feel like, what the response would be, nor what I would personally learn from it. Facilitating an inquiry is a risk for the first-timer. Risk-taking becomes then an essential part of participation in a community of inquiry.

After taking turns facilitating at Mendham it was ironic to see how quickly members of the community reverted to being educators, by critiquing the facilitators with a list of good points and bad points, without recognizing that criticism itself is a form of dialogue and can be as complex as the philosophical dialogue itself.

"Dialogue", Kennedy notes "is not just a skill, but a set of dispositions."[29] We understand a comment about emotional detachment from a practicing Buddhist differently to a comment about emotional detachment from someone who was neglected as a child. Our internal value system overlaps with our intellectual thoughts. The participants in the community of inquiry are forced to re-examine their assumptions and identify contradictions in their own beliefs. The dialogue, which at one time the participants tried to control by checking off the analytical skills they had used, now had its own life.

How this dialogue functions seems to be the best way to characterize any given 'community of inquiry', at any given point of time. Procedural arrangements regarding the gathering of questions, constructing an agenda, developing discussion plans and evaluation can be reached by democratic vote, silent consensus or vigorous discussion. Each format reveals how power is played out within the community. The issue of power was discussed in our community during a discussion of how communities interact.

For many members of our group power was a sensitive and emotional topic, making it difficult to really discuss certain points at length, e.g. whether holding back information was a power move or whether the community should respect an individual's right to keep personal information private. It certainly revealed a need for the community to engage in a kind of self-awareness and examine how various forms of power are played out within the group, whether it is epistemological knowledge, charisma, political knowledge, verbal domination

---

[27] Matthew Lipman, Ann M. Sharp and F.S. Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom*, 2nd edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), p. 82.
[28] David Kennedy, *The Role of the Facilitator in a Community of Philosophical Inquiry* (Montclair, NJ: Montclair State University, 2003), p. 14.
[29] Ibid., p. 8.

or the power to assign grades. It would take an extremely skilled facilitator to lead such a discussion, and one who understood the emotional tenor of the group and the emotional make-up of the individuals within it. However, even the most skilled facilitator at Mendham would have lacked the time to develop this understanding.

Participating in a 'community of inquiry' and listening to different dialogues illustrated the nature and complexities of the roles that existed within the community: the neutral facilitator, the advocate, the contributor, the guiding educator, the caregiver, the instigator and the observer. Cane also attempts to list the different types of roles in a community of inquiry. It seems impossible to be comprehensive about all the roles that exist within any given community. "Roles emerge, as in a play that is writing itself."[30] A participant in a 'community of inquiry' not only needs to be respectful of the opinions of others but also respectful of the nature of others. A participant in a community of inquiry needs to be ready to change her mind, but also to change her heart. The community of inquiry is not made up of textbooks and lectures, in which our communication is reduced to filling in the correct circles on a Scranton sheet. It is made up of many structural dimensions that Kennedy describes as 'communities' in which participants express and interpret themselves through "gesture, language, mind, love and interest".[31] The complexities of a community of inquiry make it impossible to define, thus we must be careful to describe it by its characteristics. The community of inquiry "is always growing, changing, busy being born or busy dying".[32]

As I monitored my own participation in the community and began to understand the complex structure of a community of inquiry, I saw a number of conflicts. It seemed that conflict was necessary to grow. To survive a 'community of inquiry' must embrace and endure these conflicts. "A person or a community whose habits of mind and action completely facilitated its needs would lack not only the motivation to develop new ideas and habits, but also and more importantly, the insight as to which of them need to be evolved."[33]

Since 'community of inquiry' aims to discuss philosophical questions, by "thinking *for oneself and with other"* the community needs to adapt and reconstruct itself.[34] These adaptations could be simple as raising a yellow card any time a term like 'hermeneutics' is mentioned to express the need for clarification. It could be asking for advice on how to best intervene in a dialogue. Or the adaptations could be complex, such as trying to define what constitutes indoctrination, or outlining how power and powerlessness are played out within the community without hurting anybody's feelings. The communal dialogue allows the 'community of inquiry' to make these adaptations and solidify itself.

All at once the participants seem subject to the dialogue and embedded in the 'community of inquiry'. Even if a participant left in a huff never to be heard of again it would have a profound impact on the way the community viewed itself and continued its discourse. Survival now seems the key

---

[30] David Kennedy, 'Philosophy for Children and the redefinition of philosophy: Total immersion in Mendham,' *Analytic Teaching* (Vol. 10, No. 1), p. 18.
[31] David Kennedy, 'The five communities,' *Analytic Teaching* (Vol. 15, No. 1), pp. 3-16.
[32] Ibid., p. 14.
[33] Maughn Gregory, 'Conflict, inquiry and education for peace.' Presented at the *World Peace Thinkers Meet* conference, held in Calcutta in January, 2001.
[34] David Kennedy, *The Role of the Facilitator in a Community of Philosophical Inquiry*, p. 4.

requirement for the community of inquiry. How do as I a participant develop skills that enable me to survive in this new environment? How does the community develop skills that enable it to survive as a collective of individuals? Participants and the community alike must take responsibility to improve reasoning skills, to discover different methods of inquiry, supply and respond to new readings, respect and consider the feelings and judgements of others. In other words they must exercise co-operative reasoning.

Leaving Mendham, I felt that many of us were willing to venture out of our retreat and into our classrooms with optimism that we could facilitate a 'classroom community of inquiry', and disappointment that as soon as we had seen how much there was to learn about being a participant in a community of inquiry our learning experience came to an abrupt end and we were left wondering how much more do we need to know about how a community of inquiry can improve. Leaving Mendham I understand that the philosophical dialogues we were engaged in were somewhat artificially arranged. Yet within that artificial educational environment the community of inquiry still sought to determine universal truths and revealed truths about itself and its participants. Honesty became inevitable. All the things it means to participate in a community of inquiry – commitment, risk, responsibility, conflict, honesty, and time – are subject to inquiry themselves, the true nature of which touches us like a soothing gust of air across our back on a hot summer day, recognizable in an instant, and at once with us in memory and beyond capture, forever.

References

Cane, Marianne. 'Group roles in community of inquiry.' *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* 16 (3): 12-16.

Cleary, John. 'Friendship.' *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children* 16:2, 32.

Gregory, Maughn. 'Conflict, inquiry and education for peace.' Paper presented at the *World Peace Thinkers Meet* conference, Calcutta, January 2001.

Kennedy, David. 'The five communities.' *Analytic Teaching* (November, 1994) 15 (1): 3-16.

Kennedy, David. 'Philosophy for Children and the redefinition of philosophy: Total immersion at Mendham." *Analytic Teaching* (November, 1989) 10 (1):15-21.

Kennedy, David. *The Role of a Facilitator in a Community of Philosophical Inquiry.* Montclair, NJ: Montclair State University, 2003.

Kennedy, David. 'Young children's discourse and the origins of the world: A reading of essences.' In *When we Talk: Essays on Classroom Conversation*, 19-62. Edited by Ronald F. Reed. Fort Worth, TX: Analytic Teaching Press, 1992.

Lipman, Matthew. *Thinking in Education.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Lipman, Matthew, Sharp, Ann M., and Oscanyan, F.S. *Philosophy in the Classroom.* 2nd ed. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980.

Sprod, Tim. *Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education.* London, UK: Routledge, 2001.

The Outer Limits

By Stephen Law

Reviewed by Tim Sprod, (The Friends' School, Hobart)

So you have been running a community of inquiry in your secondary classroom. The students are all enthused. Where do you send these adolescents when they want to read some more philosophy on their own account? The most common answer to this question used to be: tell them to get a copy of Jostein Gaarder's *Sophie's World*. In this review, I'll suggest that there is another, to my mind better, alternative.

The Outer Limits is a new book from Stephen Law, Lecturer in Philosophy at Heythrop College, University of London. Anybody who has read his 2000 book, *The Philosophy Files*, will know what to expect. If you haven't read that, then this review will give you a good idea of what you are missing.

Law takes quite a different tack from Gaarder, in a number of respects. Firstly, *The Outer Limits* is theme based, rather than taking us on a tour of the history of philosophy and philosophers. The themes Law explores are science and pseudo-science (which is tackled in somewhat different ways in two different chapters), capital punishment, what happens to moral responsibility under determinism, arguments for the existence of God, time travel paradoxes and machine intelligence.

Of course, there are arguments for both approaches: historical and thematic. The familiarity with the tradition, and the big names of philosophy, with which Gaarder's readers are equipped can contribute greatly to their cultural literacy. Furthermore, readers are able to gain an appreciation of how positions have developed over time, and the influences under which certain positions were developed. A theme focus, on the other hand, allows a consideration of the many positions that have been developed with respect to an interesting question, all in one sitting. It can also counteract the impression that philosophy is all about learning what others have said, rather than exploring ideas.

Given that neither approach has a clear inherent superiority, we need to turn to the style of treatment taken in each case. Again, there are distinct differences between Law and Gaarder. A book aimed at younger readers needs to find a way of making the fascination of philosophical thinking apparent, by somehow overcoming the often technical or even turgid prose used by many philosophers. As Matthew Lipman puts it, there is a need to reconstruct the discipline of philosophy in a way that makes it accessible to youngsters.

Gaarder's solution to this problem was to embed his nuggets of philosophy in a novel. Initially, the nuggets were clearly separated from the action in the novel, by placing them in the mouth of the philosophy

teacher Alberto Knox. Often, the book reads like a philosophy primer cut and pasted with a novel. As it develops, however, the philosophy becomes gradually more integrated into the increasingly surreal action, although there is never really a seamless integration. This approach means that the book could be used as a sort of eccentric encyclopedia of philosophers. One could, with a good index, look up potted histories of the major philosophers and their key positions.

Law takes a different tack. Each of his chapters is a more-or-less self contained exploration of a particular philosophical puzzle and the possible answers to it. He makes free use of examples and scenarios, often highly imaginative, not infrequently somewhat bizarre, and usually based on thought experiments from the philosophical literature. The exploration is fictionalized to the extent that most chapters contain a couple of characters who engage in a philosophical argument (more of these later) – but Law never introduces more than the vaguest of stories in which to embed these discussions. Finally, Daniel Postgate supports the text brilliantly with apposite cartoon illustrations on almost every page.

Lipman himself takes neither of these directions, and many of us who work on materials for philosophy in schools follow his example. Of course, like Gaarder he constructs narratives, but he leaves much of the unpacking of the philosophical ideas and arguments to the young readers themselves, in the community of inquiry. His stories raise philosophical puzzles and problems, but they do little more that sketch in a few possible leads for the community to pick up on later. Lipman's stories are set in the everyday world, describing events little different from ones that many youngsters will have experienced. In taking this approach, Lipman makes the written material subservient to the discussion that follows: few youngsters would get much of philosophical value merely from reading the novel. Such an expectation is not available to either of the other authors.

Astute readers may have noted that there is at least one other respect in which Law and Gaarder are alike, and differ from Lipman. They harness the impact of the weird and bizarre, whereas Lipman almost always relies on the commonplace. It is interesting to speculate as to whether the former approach would lead readers to seeing philosophy as disconnected from real life: just an interesting mind game. Lipman certainly thinks so, for this is one of his rationales for using stories about everyday children in everyday situations.

I have already hinted at another way in which Law's book differs from Gaarder's. Although both present much of the philosophy through dialogue, the style of dialogue is markedly different. Indeed, it would be more accurate to call Gaarder's approach monologue, for Alberto expounds at length while Sophie is often reduced to parroting "Yes, Alberto", "No, Alberto" in a way that is strikingly reminiscent of

many of Plato's dialogues – as long as 'Socrates' replaces 'Alberto' in the just cited examples.

Law's dialogues are the real thing. Each of the interlocutors is given real arguments, and each in turn is forced onto the defensive by a powerful presentation of the difficulties of their view. Nor does Law end up handing victory to one of his protagonists, though he is not averse to saying when he thinks an argument works. This is, for me, one of the most attractive features of *The Outer Limits*. It mirrors what is most distinctive and most important in good philosophy.

Indeed, those of us who are engaged in philosophy in schools, particularly under the Lipman model, love to have discussions that reproduce the sorts of discussions Law presents. The interplay of claim and counter claim, reason and objection, example and counter example is the very stuff of the community of inquiry. If our students bring just this feature back into the classroom from their reading of Law, then we would be repaid handsomely.

Of course, not all philosophy in schools is carried out according to the Lipman model. Increasingly, courses in philosophy are being introduced at the Year 11/12 level. For these courses, the Lipman assumption that it is the journey and not the destination that matters does not hold. The syllabus imposes a destination, in terms of such features as philosophical issues that must be grasped and philosophers' positions that must be remembered. This is not to say that the journey is not important: I would maintain that the establishment of a community of inquiry is still of great moment, and that students in such courses still need to learn how to inquire.

Law's books are invaluable for such courses in two ways. First, they provide an excellent model of how to structure philosophical essays. This is not to say that students should write Law-like dialogues in their essays, but rather that they should look at the way in which he considers both sides, and makes the sides engage with each other. Even so, there are syllabuses for which Law's books offer even better models. In the International Baccalaureate's Philosophy course, one of the tasks for assessment is a philosophical dialogue. Here, Law provides an excellent direct model – better, dare I say it, than Plato himself.

Secondly, I could imagine chapters serving as excellent revision material. Law lays out the standard positions, objections and defences so clearly that students would merely need to condense the chapters and they would have excellent summaries. Unfortunately, even taking *The Philosophy Files* into account, there are not Law chapters on all the issues that appear on my syllabus. Let's hope he is writing another sequel.

Lest it be thought that I, as a teacher of philosophy, am making claims about how adolescents would see Law's books without empirical justification, let me say that I have been lending my copies to my students, who have been uniformly positive. Indeed, my most laid back

student – one whom I had struggled to get reading all course – handed *The Outer Limits* back to me with a highly enthusiastic wrap.

In summary, Law has written two introductory philosophy books of great value, in terms of both philosophy and entertainment. Any adolescent – and many a younger child, I would guess – with an ounce of philosophical curiosity will devour *The Outer Limits* and its predecessor *The Philosophy Files* with alacrity. I only wish I had written them myself.

The Outer Limits
By Stephen Law
Orion Group, 2003
ISBN: 1858817900
rrp: $17.95

The Philosophy Gym: 25 Short Adventures in Thinking

By Stephen Law

Reviewed by Greg Smith, (St. Joseph's College, Brisbane)

Perhaps your last purchase in philosophy was Alain de Botton's *The Consolations of Philosophy* (2000), which offered interest and some access to the philosophers over the long weeks of that summer break. Well now you might try Stephen Law's *The Philosophy Gym: 25 short adventures in thinking*. It would be well worth it.

Stephen Law, "once a postman" as the cover blurb notes, now lectures at Heythrop College, University of London. This book seems to be his more-than-introductory course in philosophy with some in-depth coverage of today's controversial issues in 24 chapters. The origins of the universe, time travel, designer babies, brain transplants, machines that think, miracles, and the issues of morality, God and knowledge are attractively laid out in many different styles, as dialogues, as cartoons and as illustrative stories. The attractive layout makes the issues accessible, with broken up text, many headings, suggestions for further reading, and best of all, each chapter is given a Gym category rating: either warm-up, moderate or more challenging.

Luckily Chapter 14 on inductive and deductive thinking was rated as a 'moderate' challenge. But the going gets thick quite quickly and the classic views are quickly brought to bear. For a teacher doing some background reading in the hour before a class, this book may not offer the quick and ready paradigms that she may seek. But it does explore the classic issues in some depth. The standard responses and

theories are explained, and the appropriate and correct terminology is unashamedly used, like Rationalism and Empiricism, and Regress Theory. I recommend the end-of-chapter 'Conclusions' section as the part to read first, to grasp the issue being explored in a nutshell. Chapter 25 on the Seven Paradoxes like 'Achilles and the Tortoise' with Law's hints and comments on each is a neat reference site for us teachers.

Chapter 24 is a useful and quick survey of eight everyday reasoning errors, like *post hoc ergo propter hoc* and *ad hominem* arguments not named in Latin but named with useful tags. The book is distinctively presented in hard cover, with a comprehensive index running to five pages. It is a book "to dip into" as the author says, so it should be an important resource for those advancing in philosophical training beyond FAPSA Level One. It will significantly complement others in a small reference library a teacher practising the community of inquiry will be assembling. I anticipate using my copy regularly.

The Philosophy Gym: 25 Short Adventures in Thinking
By Stephen Law,
Hodder, 2003
ISBN: 0747232717
rrp: $24.95

Journal Contents

Volume 1

Volume 2